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1. Background 
The  actors  participating  in  the  production  process  are 
roughly three: employers, workers and the State. 
A brief outline of their respective legal position and their 
role is set out below. 
The first point to make is that these actors perform not only 
singly, as individuals, but also as part of a group. Another 
is that there have been changes in the course of time, both in 
tenm; of  their legal position and in terms of their function in 
the labour process. 
With regard to the group aspect, we need to study the rules 
which govern their actions as such and identify their global 
role. 
We shall look in tum at: 
•  union freedom; 
•  workers' organisations; 
•  employers' organisations; 
•  the public authorities. 
CHAPTER 1:  UNION FREEDOM 
SECTION 1: FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE 
AND UNION FREEDOM 
2. Legislation 
Freedom to associate is enshrined in the Belgian Constitu-
tion. Union freedom is regarded as an aspect of this right, 
although it is not actually spelt out as such. The basic legal 
text is the Ad of  24 May 1921. In addition to this text, there 
is the collective labour agreement No 5  (CNT of 24 May 
1971, MB,  1 July 1971). 
Other key texts in this area include: 
•  the  Act of 19 August  1948 on  benefits  of general 
interest in peacetime (MB, 21 August 1948); 
•  the Act of  19 December 1974 on relations between the 
public authorities  and civil  service  unions  (MB,  24 
December 1974). 
Belgium has also ratified the following documents pertaining 
to international law: 
•  n.n Convention No 87 of  1948 on freedom to associate; 
•  ILO Convention No 98 on the right to organise collec-
tive bargaining; 
•  the European Declaration on Human Rights; 
•  the United Nations Pact on Social Rights (1966). 
Belgium has not yet ratified the European Social Charter. 
3. The principle 
Article 20 of the Constitution stipulates that Belgians have 
the right to congregate.  They may not be prevented from 
doing so through any means. 
This article has been interpreted in such a way as to guaran-
tee  the  freedom  to  associate at all  aspects of social  life, 
including labour relations
1
• 
Article 1 of the 24 May 1921 Act specifies that no-one may 
1.  MAST A., and  DUJARDIN, J., Grondwettelijk recht, Ghent,  Story-
Scientia, 1985, p. 583. 
7 
be  forced  to join or not to join an  association.  In other 
words,  both  negative  and  positive  union  freedom  are 
guaranteed by law. 
Although the principle of union freedom is formulated in 
absolute terms, without a single restriction, such restrictions 
obviously exist. 
4. Definition 
There is no definition of the concept "union  organisation~ 
"occupational union • or "union • in Belgian law. In general, 
these terms are used to designate workers' organisations, but 
the word union refers likewise to organisations representing 
the employers, the professional classes and farmers. 
Workers' organisations currently play an extremely broad-
ranging  role  in  Belgian  social  affairs.  They  defend  the 
interests of their members at corporate level  and  in  the 
higher echelons of society. 
They fulfil a similar function vis-a-vis the political authori-
ties. 
Hence the  need  to  adopt  a  broad  definition of the  term 
'~nion organisation n in Belgium, along the lines proposed 
by J.M.  Verdier.  ~professional organisation is a group 
made up of  natural and legal persons with a professional 
activity which,  with  a  view to defending  their interests, 
improving their existence and representing their profession 
through  collective  action,  question  or participate in  the 
organisation of  their profession, and participate in framing 
and developing  economic  and social policy at national 
level 
4
• 
5. Contract of association 
Anyone joining a union concludes an agreement, a contract 
of association. Usually, provision would be made for such 
a contract in the Civil Code. This is not the case in Belgium. 
The only form of association covered by the Belgian Civil 
Code concerns companies,  in other words, profit-making 
associations. Non-profit-making associations are not referred 
to. They are covered by special regulations. 
In legal terms, the easiest way of analysing the contract of 
association concluded by a union member is by a contrario 
deduction, taking the corporate model as a guide
3
•  Associa-
tion,  then,  as  a  specific  contract,  features  the  following 
elements
4
: 
1.  the will of two or more individuals to unite in order to 
achieve a stated object; 
2.  the pooling of goods or services; 
3.  the intention  to  achieve  the object  described  in  the 
contract on a non-profit-making basis; 
4.  allowing  all  members  to  participate  in  the  results 
obtained without implying their participation in profits 
or losses. 
2.  VERDIER, J.M.,  Traite de droit du travail, Syndicats, Ed. Dalloz, 
1966, p. 209. 
3.  Article 1832 cc. 
4.  HORJON, P., Nouveau precis de droit social beige, Liege, Faculte de 
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SECTION 2: THE INGREDIENTS OF UNION FREEDOM 
6. Foreword 
Three key aspects of  union freedom need to be highlighted: 
the relationship between unions and the individual worker; 
the relationship between organisations and the relationship 
between organisations and the State
5
• 
7. Positive and negative union freedom 
No-one may be forced to join or not to join an organisation 
(1921 Act, Article 2). 
Union freedom is non-compulsory and pluralist. One may 
join the organisation of one's.  choice. 
This  principle  is  confirmed  by  ILO  Convention  No  87, 
Article 2 and by ILO Convention No 98, Articles 1 and 2. 
All  that is  needed  is  that  members  should abide by the 
statutes of the association (1921  Act, Article 2). They may 
not be refused on grounds of ~ex, colour, race, religion or 
nationality .,  . 
Can people be rejected on account of their political creed? 
The answer is yes, if that creed clashes with the union's 
views  on  policy.  May  the  organisation  bring  up  other 
reasons for refusing membership? May they reject a person 
manifestly intending to obey the statutes but who refuses to 
cooperate? Apparently, they may. Concluding a contract of 
association  assumes  that  there  is  ua  will  to  cooperate " 
(affectio societatis). 
Article 2 of the 1921 Act provides extra protection for the 
individual  vis-a-vis  third  parties  seeking  to  debar  that 
individual from joining their organisation  7• 
Nevertheless,  the  protection  of the  individual  vis-a-vis 
organisations (for example,  the right not to be excluded) 
remains a difficult problem, particularly now that workers 
are  increasingly  represented  by  a  dwindling  number  of 
organisations,  i.e.  the  most  representative  among  them. 
Belgian legislation is not watertight in this respect. 
Last but not least, there is Collective Agreement No 5 of 24 
May 1971 on union delegation. The multi-industry employ-
ers' organisations which are party to the agreement explicitly 
undertake to advise their members not to put pressure on 
their staff to prevent them from joining a union and not to 
hold  out  any  inducements  to  non-union  workers  which 
would put them at an advantage over their union colleagues. 
They  also  undertake  not  to  interfere,  either  directly  or 
indirectly, with the freedom of association
8
• 
8. The nationality requirement 
Do only Belgians enjoy union freedom or is  this a  right 
accruing to anyone resident in Belgium? 
a)  Article 20 of the Constitution explicitly recognises this 
right for Belgians. On the other hand, the 24 May 1921 
5.  BI.ANPAIN,  R., De syndicale vrijheid, in: Ameidsrecht, CAD,  111,  p. 
19 et seq. 
6.  VALTICOS, N.,  Traite  du droit du travail, Droit international du 
Travail,  Dalloz, Paris, updated 1973, p. 24. 
7.  BLANPAIN,  R.,  De  syndicale  vrijheid in  Belgie,  De Standaard, 
Antwerp, p. 93. 
8.  Article 3, CCT no 5. 
Act on the right to associate does not mention national-
ity at all. Comparing the two texts, the Belgian legisla-
tor certainly appears to have intended to guarantee free-
dom to associate to Belgians only
9
• 
International  social  law  has  overturned  this  trend. 
Belgium  has  ratified  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights and ILO Conventions No 87 and 98 on 
union freedom as well as ILO CQnvention  No  111  on 
non-discrimination. Our country has likewise ratified 
the  UN  Pacts  on political rights  and on social and 
economic rights. 
b)  Article 14 of the European Human Rights Convention 
stipulates that the rights and freedoms spelt out in the 
Convention must be extended to all without distinction, 
particularly on the basis of  nationality. Yet the principle 
of non-discrimination  does  not stop  the State  from 
imposing  restrictions  on  the  political  activities  of 
foreigners 
10
• 
c)  Article  2  of ILO  Convention  No  87 stipulates  that 
workers and employers may, without any discrimina-
tion whatsoever, join the organisation of their choice. 
Any discrimination on the grounds of nationality, sex, 
political creed or profession is excluded
11
•  Restrictions 
may be imposed in the armed forces,  the police and 
suchlike
12
•  Non-discrimination applies equally to the 
public and private service sectors
13
• 
The question whether the principle of  non-discrimina-
tion also applies to activities in the social field needs to 
be studied on a case by case basis,  taking the local 
situation into account. 
d)  Finally, EEC Directive No  15 of  1961  stipulates non-
discrimination with regard to trade union membership 
of  EEC nationals
14
• 
9. The repercussions of membership 
Each individual who joins an association thereby agrees to 
obey the rules and decisions taken in accordance with the 
regulations (1921  Act, Article 2;  ILO  Treaty  No  87, Arti-
cle 2). 
This clause raises the problem of the union's powers vis-a-
vis its members. The problem is twofold: 
•  to what extent can a union take decisions binding on its 
members: i.e. the question of statutory power; 
•  to what extent can a union force its members to adopt, 
as members of  a group, a particular line of  conduct: i.e. 
the question of disciplinary power. 
9.  MAsT, A., and DUJARDIN, J., Overzicht van het Belgisch grondwette-
lijk recht, Ghent, Story-Scientia, 1985, p. 583. 
10.  CEDH,  Article 11.  MAST, A.  and DUJARDIN, J., Overzicht van het 
Belgisch grondwettelijk recht, op. cit., p. 584. 
11.  VALTICOS,  N.,  Traite du droit du  travail.  Droit international du 
travail, Dalloz, Paris, updated 1973, p. 24. 
12.  lLo Convention No. 87, Article 9. 
13.  La Uberte syndicale, in: Round-up of  the decisions and principles 
of the  Committee on  union freedom of  the International Labour 
Office in Geneva, BIT, 1985, No 210. 
14.  PB, 26 August 1961. BELGWM 
10. Statutory powers: internal and external competence 
Article  2  of the  1921  Act  confers  statutory  powers  on 
occupational organisations within the framework of their 
social objective: as members of the organisation, workers or 
employers are bound by the decisions taken in compliance 
with the statutes.  What is the meaning and scope of this 
clause? 
Action undertaken by a union cannot be effective unless 
group solidarity is given free rein. The organisation needs to 
speak for all its members. It must be sure that its decisions 
will be respected. The union can only accept those who will 
not imperil the bond of solidarity. 
At this point we must differentiate between the organisa-
tion's  internal  conduct  (vis-a-vis  its  members)  and  its 
external conduct (vis-a-vis the outside world). 
Clearly, in matters internal, the organisation must be the sole 
arbiter of the conduct it adopts. 
The situation becomes less clear-cut when the organisation's 
decisions also affect the individual's life outside the group, 
particularly his non-occupational life. After all, the occupa-
tional organisation is not the only body which defends the 
interests of its members. First of all, the individual himself 
will want to defend his occupational and personal interests 
regardless of any group affiliation, as part of his individual 
labour relations. Then there is the possibility of non-organ-
ised collective activity outside the unions, indeed sometimes 
against the unions. So is it permissible to prevent a worker 
from defending his interests outside the union framework by 
reason of his membership of that union, if the latter fails to 
fulfil its obligations? 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the 1921 Act, the principle of legal 
compulsion should be applied to the decisions of occupa-
tional organisations. Since anyone who joins a union is in 
fact concluding a contract, the same legal consequences as 
those applicable to contracts under the Civil Code should be 
made to apply. 
For decisions to be binding, they must fulfil the following 
conditions
15
: 
1.  steps taken by the organisations may  not breach the 
peace (Articles  6 and 1133 of the Civil Code)  or in-
fringe binding legal regulations; 
2.  clauses must square with the social objective; 
3.  they  must  comply  with  statutory  provisions,  with 
special emphasis on respect for the individual rights of 
members as enshrined in binding law and the statutes; 
4.  decisions  are binding  not only  on  those  who  were 
members at the time when they were taken, but also on 
those who joined afterwards; 
5.  if  the organisation is not a corporate body, the question 
whether rules decided in due form are binding needs to 
be resolved by applying specific legal interpretations or 
by  law.  The legal  interpretations of the Civil  Code 
(business management: Article 1372 cc, provision for 
third parties:  Article 1121  cc,  "nameless  contract~ 
mandate: Article 1984 CC) fall short of what is needed. 
15.  BLANPAIN, R., Handboek, Story-Scientia, Ghent, 1968, p. 127. 
9 
11. Disciplinary powers
16 
Disciplinary sanctions are not the same as legal penalties
17
• 
A disciplinary offence is a violation of  professional rules or 
a  transgression  against  professional  propriety  and  fair 
dealing if these rules have not been codified. 
The principle of the non-retroactiveness of penal law does 
not apply
18
• 
The organisation may take disciplinary action against its 
members provided it tallies with the statutes. 
What kind of infringements exist and what are the penalties 
attached to them? In principle, any act detrimental to the 
social  objective  of the  association  may  carry  sanctions, 
unless the parties involved have clearly voiced their inten-
tions to the contrary. 
The  organisation  can  take  action  against  the  offending 
member only in ways with a material or moral bearing on his 
membership. The union has no power to act beyond this 
sphere.  Possible penalties  include reprimands,  warnings, 
fines, financial forfeit, forfeit of voting rights, suspension
19
• 
It would be logical to assume, given the contractual nature 
of the association agreement,  that both infringement and 
penalty would be established on a statutory basis. Law and 
order and morality still mitigate penalties. All the same the 
union is an institution and it is generally accepted that both 
statutory and non-statutory measures may be taken3». 
Although  legally sound,  this point of view hardly seems 
justifiable on social grounds. 
The two parties may start legal proceedings for failure to 
meet contractual obligations,  always bearing in mind the 
problems that can arise from the lack of  corporate identity on 
the part of the unions. 
SECTION 3: PROTECTION OF UNION FREEDOM 
12. Protection 
Both the 1921 Act and ILO  Treaty No 98 afford such protec-
tion. Each individual is protected against acts of violence, 
threats and particularly against interference with his right to 
employment  resulting  from  the  exercise  of his  right  to 
associate. The relevant penalties derive from the 1921 Act. 
The right to associate may also be interfered with in ways 
other than those spelt out in the 1921  Act.  In such cases, 
civil rather than legal sanctions will ensue. The inclusion in 
a collective agreement of a clause giving substantial, exclu-
sive financial benefits to members of a trade union consti-
tutes an unlawful means of pressure and runs counter to law 
and order principles. It is therefore considered null and void. 
An employer who applies it is in breach of the law and will 
have to compensate for damages. Compensation will equal 
16.  Ibid., p. 131. 
17.  VANHOUDT,  C.J.,  and  CALEWAERT,  W.,  Belgisch  strafrecht,  3 
volumes, Story-Scientia, Ghent, 1968, p. 912. 
18.  MAsT, A., Overzicht van het Belgisch Administratief  Recht, Story-
Sci entia, Ghent, 1971, p. 135. 
19.  BLANPAIN,  R.,  Handboek,  Story-Scientia,  Ghent,  1968,  p.  129. 
PIRON, J., and DENIS, P., Le droit des relations collectives du travail 
en Belgique, Larcier, Brussels, 1970, p. 15. 
20.  BLANPAIN, R., De syndiwle vrijheid, De Standaard, Antwerp, 1968, 
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the amount of the bonus paid out to  the privileged union 
members21• In other words, both common law and penal law 
have a hand in protecting union freedom. 
SECTION 4: THE LIMITS ON  UNION FREEDOM 
13. Preface 
. Neither the Constitution nor the 1921 Act restrict union free-
dom or impose conditions on the way it is applied. All the 
same, there are restrictions deriving either from common law 
or from specific or international sources. 
We need to differentiate between direct and indirect restric-
tions. 
Direct restrictions prevent people from joining or not joining 
a union; indirect restrictions circumscribe the organisation's 
means of action or its rights. 
14. Indirect restrictions 
Some provisions contain indirect restrictions of the freedom 
to associate, yet do not infringe the actual principle of the 
freedom  to  associate:  the  union's  means  of action  are 
restricted or the exercise of certain rights denied. 
Strike action and back-up measures are a union's chief means 
of  action. The maintenance of law and order necessarily re-
stricts these activities, a restriction comparable to the 19th 
century's Article 310 of the Penal Code. 
Particular cases in point include: 
•  legislation on mining, open-cast mining and quarrying; 
•  civil and military requisitioning; 
•  penal rules and regulations
22
; 
•  preventive action in  respect of the safety of strategic 
and  vital  areas  and  strengthening  of law  and  order 
enforcement; 
•  public sector strike regulations. 
A union may be denied the exercise of certain rights,  for 
example: 
•  the problem of corporate personality; 
•  the concept of "most representative organisation ~ 
•  the procedure  rendering  binding  a  collective  labour 
agreement; 
•  the settlement of social disputes; 
•  Indirect restrictions, vital needs. 
15. Indirect restriction - vital needs 
The Act of  19 August 1948 establishes, with regard to  the 
private sector, an obligation on joint committees or the King 
to take whatever steps are necessary to supply certain vital 
needs or to have certain tasks carried out
23
• 
Members of staff designated for this purpose must accom-
plish these tasks, which are defined beforehand. Failure to 
do so carries penalties provided for by law.  The workers 
thus singled out are on regular duty during this period. 
21.  Labour Court, Brussels, 19 February 1973, RW 1972-73, p. 1633 
v. Labour Court, Antwerp, 24 June 1971, RW,  1972-73, p. 1499. 
22.  The Penal Code lists sanctions for the following offences, among 
others:  State security,  infringement of rights guaranteed by  the 
Constitution, law and order, public safety, persons, property. 
23.  MAGREZ,  M., Regime des prestations d'interet public en temps de 
paix, rr, 1963, p. 685 et seq. 
Article 6 of  the Ad of  19 December 1948 stipulates that they 
are entitled to all  social  laws during this period.  The Act 
further lays down the procedures which must be applied. 
16. Direct restrictions-general legal principles 
The  contract  of association  is  subject  to  general  legal 
principles. For example, the principle of contractual auton-
omy applies. This implies that every individual has the right 
to negotiate membership of  an association freely and without 
constraint.  Similarly, Article 6 of the Civil Code must be 
upheld.  This  Article bans  the  conclusion  of any  special 
agreement which departs from law and order regulations and 
morality laws. 
17. Direct restrictions - clauses 
on union security - the concept 
The clauses  on  union  security  are either  spelt  out in  a 
collective labour agreement or are part of legislation. They 
confer certain benefits on union organisations or on their 
individual  members by virtue of their union membership 
( "Zekerheidsclausules ~  "Organisation-Klausul ~  "Union 
Securityj. 
Such  clauses  are  included  in  order  to  put  pressure  on 
workers to join the trade union. In principle, therefore, they 
run counter to  "negative" union freedom.  Indeed, the legal 
argument rages unchecked, even in terms of statute law24. 
18. Union security clauses-conditional legality 
The 1921 Act does not explicitly address the question of 
legality of the security clauses.  The problem needs to be 
placed in  the current social and economic context.  It cer-
tainly never surfaced in 1921
25
• Union security clauses are an 
inducement to workers to join a union. 
To  what  extent  does  this  clash  with  union  freedom  as 
protected by Belgian law? 
The 1921 Ad is clear on this point. For there to be infringe-
ment  carrying  legal  penalties,  the  act  (in  this  case  the 
security clause) must be perpetrated  'With deliberate intent 
to violate the freedom to associate" (Article 4). The clause as 
such is not prohibited. 
Some authors argue that its lawfulness depends on certain 
conditions being met
26
• 
In order for the clause to be acceptable, they say any extra 
benefits to union members can only pass muster if: 
1)  the organisations are all  treated alike.  Statute law is 
actually changing in this respect. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal ruled in 1981
27 that union bonuses might be paid 
out only to workers affiliated to a given organisation. 
In our view, the Court's interpretation runs counter to 
our union legislation. This does in fact accept discrimi-
nation between representative unions on the one hand 
and non-representative unions on the other, and allows 
certain  special  advantages  to  accrue  to  the  former. 
24.  LENAERTS,  H.,  lnleiding  lot  het  sociaal  recht,  Story-Scientia, 
Ghent, 1973, p. 320. 
25.  PAPIER-JAMOULLE,  M., and DAVID, A.f'., Conventions collectives et 
avantages reserves aux syndiques, ITT, 1972, p. 113 et seq. 
26.  BLANPAIN,  R., Handboek, Story-Scientia, Ghent, 1968, p. 173. 
27.  Supreme Court, 27 April 1981, RW,  1981, 1982 et seq. BELGIUM 
However, the law does not in general accept (or if so, 
only in very exceptional cases)  that there should be 
discrimination between the most representative unions 
as such; 
2)  they  have  actually  contributed  to  social  peace  and 
economic growth
28
; 
3)  the  pressure  on  non-union  members  is  such  as  to 
reassure them they can resist it. Concretely, this means 
that the benefits may not be much more substantial than 
the amount of the union contributions
29
; 
4)  entrenched rights are respected. Any advantages previ-
ously granted to all workers may not suddenly apply to 
union members only
30
• 
The Conseil d'Etat has ruled  likewise
31
,  adding  that  the 
advantages granted to union members do not run counter to 
the principle of equality spell out in Article 6 of the Consti-
tution  because unionised workers are part of a  category 
which can be objectively determined. All individuals in the 
same circumstances enjoy these advantages. 
19. Restrictions deriving from external law 
Restrictions can also follow from international acts ratified 
by Belgium. These basically imply that national legislation 
can decide for itself to what extent and on which terms union 
freedom shall be recognised. The United Nations Treaty of 
16 December J96d
2 stipulates (Article 8) that laws may be 
brought in to impose such restrictions as are needed to main-
tain a democratic society, national security, law and order 
and the rights and freedoms of other citizens. ILO  Conven-
tion No  87 stipulates (Article  9)  that it is up to national 
legislation to decide the union freedom of the police and 
armed forces. 
20. Conclusion 
Belgian  legislation effectively  guarantees union  freedom. 
Such restrictions as apply are limited in scope. They apply 
to tasks of  common interest which must be performed. 
CHAPTER II: THE LEGAL POSITION 
OF TRADE UNIONS 
21. Preface 
The problem of determining the legal position of occupa-
tional organisations has always proved tricky in the case of 
workers' organisations. The problem of employers' organi-
sations has not been nearly as intractable. 
In respect of  workers' organisations, the question has arisen 
as to how their integration into the existing legal structure 
would affect their raison d 'etre.  At the same time,  these 
organisations have had to deal with the problem of legal 
incapacity. As organisations, they were unable to perform 
the legal acts needed for their survival. 
28.  Conseil d'Etat, 8 February 1967, no 12206, Dec. R. v. S., 1967, p. 
167. 
29.  Labour  Court,  Brussels,  19.2.1973,  RW,  1972-73,  p.  1633. 
Industrial Tribunal, Ghent, 25.6.1965, TSR,  1966, p. 359. 
30.  Industrial Tribunal, Antwerp,  17.5.1960, TSR,  1962, p.  83  with 
notes by BLANPAIN,  R. 
31.  Conseil d'Etat, 3.2.1967, Les patrons teinturiers-degraisseurs de 
Belgique, 12.205, RDS,  1967, p. 252. 
32.  Belgium ratified this Convention by an Act dated 15 May 1981  (MB, 
22 May 1981). 
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The Belgians have solved this problem in the shape of a 
compromise which seeks to  strike a  fair balance between 
legality and de facto reality. 
22. Partially regulated organisations 
Workers' organisations are regarded as de facto organisa-
tions.  This is  not the correct way of looking at things. 
Indeed, occupational organisations are mentioned in so many 
legal texts,  decrees,  collective labour agreements that we 
should accept the principle that they are partially regulated. 
It is true that Belgian trade unions are not corporate bodies 
and that they are under no obligation to obtain such legal 
status. 
The fact of their legal incapacity and that they cannot act as 
legal entities means that they cannot have rights and duties 
as  such.  They cannot acquire assets of their own.  They 
cannot bring a  legal action.  They cannot conclude agree-
ments. 
But the law does offer the opportunity for them to acquire 
legal identity
33
• 
Two measures have been taken to solve the problem: 
•  we  have  introduced  the  concept of functional  legal 
entity; 
•  we use the notion of "representative organisation ~ 
23. Functional legal entity 
Special laws have been drafted with specific scope to give 
trade unions limited legal identity
34 
In  modem  legal  thinking  this  is  taken  to  mean  that  the 
legislator grants limited legal identity only for the purpose 
of carrying out a  well-defined task.  Hence the notion of 
functional legal entity. It gives the trade unions leave to take 
legal action. 
Not everyone agrees with this interpretation, however. There 
is considerable support for the idea that unions should be 
given global legal identity. 
Another point is that the law tends to recognise this func-
tional legal identity only in the case of the most representa-
tive organisations. 
In  this  sense,  unions can only take legal  action  in cases 
restrictively prescribed by la~
5 • 
A key issue recently surfaced in the debate on whether the 
legislator had  made any  provision  for  the possibility of 
taking trade unions to court in the case of a strike. Some take 
a negative stance on this question, arguing the legal incapac-
ity of  unions. Others opt for the reality theory, arguing that 
the  very  fact  of their  existence  gives  the  unions  legal 
33.  Act of 31  March 1899 on professional  associations,  MB,  8 April 
1899. Act of27 June 1921  on non-profitmaking associations, MB, 
1 July 1921. 
34.  LENAERTS,  M.,  lnleiding  tot  het  sociaal  recht,  Story-Scientia, 
Ghent, 1973, p. 335. 
35.  For example, the union might go to law in respect of: 
•  the operation of  works councils (Act of  20 September 1948 on 
the organisation of  economic life, Art 24, MB, 27/28 Septem-
ber 1948); 
•  compulsory implementation of  collective labour agreements 
(Act of  5 December 1968 on collective labour agreements and 
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identity. A third trend applies the theory of implicit attribu-
tion  of competence.  Their  argument  is  that  whoever  is 
regarded by the law as empowered to conclude collective 
agreements  is  implicitly  entitled  to  take  legal  action  to 
guarantee that these agreements are kepf6. 
For the time being, a majority still tend to support the first 
argument (legal incapacity). 
24. Representative organisations 
a) The concept 
A range of  criteria needs to be taken into account in deciding 
how representative a  trade union is.  As far as the law is 
concerned,  the prime concern is to  identify those criteria 
which  best  reflect  the  unions'  ability  to  mobilise  the 
workforce. There are quantitative and qualitative criteria. 
For example: 
•  the number of affiliated members (quantitative); 
•  the kind of  organisation (qualitative). 
Legislation in Belgium will generally tend to heed political 
considerations in judging the degree of representativeness of 
a  trade union (participation in managing the country:  for 
example, whether it is a  member of the National Labour 
Council or not). The drafting stages of the Act of  5 Decem-
ber  1968  on  collective  labour  agreements  (CLA)  were 
eloquent in this respect. The Senate committee stated that a 
trade union could not be recognised as a valid partner unless 
it supplied proof of its stability,  authority and ability  to 
command respect. 
Otherwise,  it could not guarantee that it could  fulfil  the 
obligations contracted in the collective labour agreements 
and hence could be regarded as capable of living up to its 
responsibilities.  The CLA  Act also  expects  representative 
organisations to play a  stabilising role and that they will 
keep wildcat social action in check. The draft bill on social 
solidarity37  states  that  the  only  employers'  and  workers' 
organisations recognised as being representative are those 
which meet the following requirements: 
•  their  actions  must  extend  to  the  whole  of Belgian 
territory; 
•  the members of the employers' organisations must be-
tween  them employ  an  average of at  least  200,000 
workers;  the  workers'  organisations  must  total  an 
average membership of at least 200,000; 
•  the members in question must pay their dues; 
•  the organisations must prove that their leaders were 
elected by free ballot of all members. 
The concept of 'tepresentative organisation "turns up again 
in an Order-in-Council dated 9 June 1945 on the status of 
the joint committees. 
Belgian social law does not give a uniform definition of the 
concept of "most representative occupational organisations  '~ 
The fact that Belgian trade unions are not legal entities and 
that their legal position is only partially regulated means that 
the State has had to find other solutions. The authorities have 
36.  STROOBANT,  M.,  Stakingsvrijheid  en  Stakingsverbod:  naar  een 
nieuwejurisprudentie, rrr, 1987, p. 435. DEMANET, Reflexions sur 
le droit de greve dans le secteur prive, TIT, 1988, p. 400. 
37.  This was drafted during World War II following clandestine talks 
between workers and employers. 
had to  find ways to enable the unions to work within the 
legal system, at least to some extent. They have also had to 
think up ways of forcing the unions to stick to the rules of 
society. 
On the latter point, the selection between different organisa-
tions would appear to be working well as far as achieving the 
desired objectives is concerned. The public authorities only 
talk to and negotiate with organisations which are able to 
guarantee that the obligations contracted will be respected, 
not only vis-a-vis members but also vis-a-vis non-members. 
This has fostered the idea that it is better for the State to talk 
only to representative organisations. 
This is certainly the approach taken by the Council of  State 
when it calls those organisations representative which ')nay 
be considered as wielding sufficient authority to represent 
the people concerned 
8
• 
Apparently then, it is possible for several organisations to be 
representative at once. 
Although legislation, legal doctrine and case law alike often 
use the concept of "most  representative organisation •,  it 
would be a mistake to conclude that the Belgian legislator 
actually accepts the idea that one organisation may be more 
representative than another. There is no room for monopoly 
positions in Belgium legislation. 
This is all the more true as the legislator does not define the 
concept of "representative  organisation~ We must tum to 
doctrine and statute law for guidance in this matter. 
b) The legal criteria 
There are a number of legal provisions which mention some 
of  the conditions that trade unions must meet in order to be 
regarded as representative, but these are in no way exhaus-
tive. Some laws use the following criteria for occupational 
organisations
39
: 
a)  they must be situated throughout the country; 
b)  they  must  be  represented  on the  Central  Economic 
Council (CEC) and the National Labour Council (NLc); 
c)  workers'  organisations  must  have  at  least  50,000 
members. 
There are no legal conditions attached to membership of the 
CEC. In order to be represented on the NLC, the organisation 
need only show it ''has nation-wide links •. 
As  for occupational federations,  the only criteria for their 
representativeness is that they should be "affiliated to or be 
part of  an multi-industry organisation ••. 
The issue of representativeness again comes up in the World 
War II draft bill on social solidarity which lays down the 
following criteria: 
a)  the  organisations  must  be nation-wide  and  address 
themselves to all companies or salaried trades; 
38.  LENAERTS,  H., Inleiding tot het sociaal recht,  op.  cit., 1973, p. 
325. 
39.  Article 31 ofthe Collective Agreements Act; par 4b) of the Workers 
Safety Act; Article 188 of the Royal  Decree of 18 February 1971 
on works councils. 
40.  Article2(2) of the Act of29 May 1952 instituting the NLC (MB, 31 
May 1952). 
41.  Article 3(2) of the Collective Agreements Act. BELGIUM 
b)  they must prove that they have at least 200,000 paid-up 
members; 
c)  occupational federations must represent at least 20% of 
all workers in the companies or trades concerned; 
d)  the statutes must mention that the organisation seeks to 
develop the principle of  joint consultation between the 
social partners and the State; 
e)  the leaders must be freely elected by all members; 
f)  the leaders must report to members on a regular basis. 
25. Union Freedom and the Public Utility Services 
Trade unionism in the public sector is largely governed by 
its own rules. There are very few provisions common to the 
private and public sector. 
Among these shared provisions, however, are those which 
describe the freedom to associate as a fundamental social and 
economic right (e.g. Article 20 of the Constitution and the 
Act of24 May 1921). Similarly, Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights applies equally to the public 
and to the private sector. Still, the said Article immediately 
goes on to open the door to specific arrangements42. 
The State was openly hostile to trade unionism in the public 
sector  throughout  the  19th  Century,  Article  20 of the 
Constitution notwithstanding. It was not until the Act of  24 
May 1921  was brought in  that things began to  change43. 
Civil Setvants gradually won the right to associate, but their 
right to strike is curtailed
44 to this day. 
The Royal Decrees of  14 December 1937 (MB, 15.12.1937), 
11  July  1949  (MB  27. 7.1949)  and  20 June  1955  (MB, 
22.6.1955) instituted rules to govern the trade union links of 
civil setvants. One feature of the system in force is that no 
prior authorisation is needed to set up a trade union.  The 
State must recognise the union if the latter is to exercise its 
powers. The authorities may withhold or withdraw recogni-
tion. The union basically has advisory powers. 
This regulation was not valid for all public services. In fact 
it only applied to the Kingdom.  The provinces, the com-
munes and  semi-public  services  did not come within  its 
scope, unless the authority involved decided otherwise. 
Trade  unionism  in  the  public  utility  services  is  today 
governed by the law. The Act of  19 December 1974 regulat-
ing relations between the State and the civil service unions
45 
applies to the public sector as a whole instead of  just to the 
Kingdom. The law is carried out progressively
46
• 
The central feature of the new regulations is that the advi-
sory powers have given way to the right to consult and the 
42.  Article  11/ECHR  says  that  'this article does  not preclude  legal 
restrictions on the exercise of  this right by members of  the armed 
forces, the police force or the civil service~ 
43.  MAST, A. and DUJARDIN, J., op. cit., p. 588. 
44.  Ibid., p. 148-150. HUBERLANT, c., Apercu des etapes de /'obtention 
de Ia liberte syndicate pour les agents des services publics, RDJA, 
1968, p. 58. 
45.  MB,  24.12.1974  amended  by  the  Act  of 20 June  1975  (MB, 
16.9.1975), 1 September 1980 (MB  10.9.1980) and  19 July 1983 
(MB 4.8.1983). 
46.  Royal Decree of28 September 1984 (MB 20.10.1984), implement-
ing the Act of 19 December 1974 on relations between the State and 
the trade unions of its staff, amended by Royal  Decree of 17 July 
1985 (MB 24.7 .1985). 
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right to negotiate. These rights are exercised by the commit-
tees that have been set up at various levels. 
The right to negotiate within the meaning of the Act of  19 
December 1974 is a procedure whereby the representative 
organisations obtain the right to  vet any major measures 
which  the  State  intends  to  promulgate  with  a  view  to 
regulating the working conditions of its staff. The negotiat-
ing procedure is a substantial requirement which the authori-
ties  must respect.  It must feature an  in-depth discussion 
between the parties. The results are put down in a  ']Jroto-
col ".  The State only has a political commitment to honour 
the agreement47. 
Consultation is  a  procedure applicable to  less  important 
measures concerning the regulation of working conditions 
for State civil servants.  Again,  it is a substantial require-
ment. The results are set down in a reasoned opinion
48
• 
The negotiating committees are the following: 
•  the general  committee common  to  all  public utility 
services; 
•  the  committee  for  the  national,  "Community"  and 
regional services; 
•  the committee for each provincial and local setvice; 
•  the sectoral committees; 
•  the special committees. 
The consultation committees are the following: 
•  high-level consultation committees; 
•  intermediate consultation committees; 
•  basic consultation committees; 
•  the special committees. 
A Law of  11 July 1978 regulates relations between the State 
and unions of military personnel in the land, sea and naval 
air forces and medical services and of gendarmerie person-
nel49.  There is also the Law of  14 January 1975 setting out 
the first disciplinary regulations governing the armed for-
ces50. 
CHAPTER Ill: THE TRADE UNION 
MOVEMENT IN BELGIUM 
26. Introduction 
A number of factors have played a part in the development 
and growth of union structures in Belgium.  Belgian trade 
unionism as it exists today dates back to the first half of the 
19th century. Its history has been a chequered one. 
27. Features 
a)  The origins and growth of the trade union movement 
are closely linked to those of the political movement. 
Socialist trade unionism saw the light of day as a sub-
section of the Belgian Workers' Paro/
1
• This highlights 
a first important feature of Belgian trade unionism, i.e. 
its links with political structures. These links are of a 
47.  Het nieuw syndicaal statuut van het personeel in de Overheidssec-
tor, Ghent, Story-Scientia, 1985, p. 178. 
48.  Ibid., p.  178. 
49.  MB,  18 August 1978. 
50.  MB,  1 February 1975. 
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structural as well as an ideological nature. While it is 
true that  the unions  possess  independent structures, 
there are institutional
52 or informal
53  links. 
b)  A second feature is pluralism. This pluralism has been 
shaped by two  factors,  i.e.  the  ideological  division 
mentioned above and philosophical factors. The ideo-
logical division led to the growth of a socialist and a 
liberal trade union movement. This mirrors a vision of 
society. It also led to the establishment of a Christian 
movement. The latter is obviously also an ideological 
choice. 
c)  A third feature is that Belgian trade unionism is struc-
tured by industrial sectors, with weaker multi-trade or 
multi-industry structures. An organisation covering an 
industrial sector is known as a confederation.  These 
confederations are headed by a national multi-industry 
organisation. Belgium has three national multi-industry 
organisations, the rom (Belgian General Federation of 
Labour),  the  CGSLB  (Federation  of Liberal  Trade 
Unions  of Belgium)  and  the esc (Confederation  of 
Christian Trade Unions). 
d)  Belgium has no industrial  unions.  Manual  workers, 
white-collar workers and professional and managerial 
staff are affiliated  to  different  trade  confederations. 
Professional and managerial staff may belong to a spe-
cific  section  within  each  union.  At  the  same  time, 
however, there is a separate union organisation for pro-
fessional  and  managerial  staff,  the  CNC  (National 
Confederation of  Professional and Managerial Staff). 
e)  Alongside  the  national  multi-industry  organisations 
there are smaller category  organisations.  These are 
small unions to which only certain categories of em-
ployee belong. The employee's occupation is often the 
criterion for admission. 
f)  The sixth feature is the high degree of unionisation. 
Approximately 70% of employees belong to a union
54
• 
It is not, however, compulsory in Belgium to belong to 
a trade union
55
• 
g)  The three organisations recognised as the most repre-
sentative play a central role in Belgian industrial rela-
tions. The others play a smaller role. 
52.  The socialist union, the FGTB,  acts in common with the socialist 
parties. 
53.  The liberal unions,  COSLB  and  SLEP,  have informal  links.  The 
Christian movement  has  more formal  links  with  the  Christian 
parties although it does not act jointly with them in any real sense. 
54.  BLANPAJN, R., Syndicate vrijheid in Belgie, op. cit., p. 93. 
55.  The number of members in Belgium is:  (1985)  esc  1,367,589 
members (1985);  FOTB  1,097,594 members {1980);  COSLB 200,000 
members; see: ARCQ,  E.  and BLAISE, P., Les organisations syndica-
les en Belgique, supplements I et II;  SLOMP,  H.  and VAN MIERLO, T., 
Arbeidsverhoudingen in Belgie, Utrecht/Antwerp, Tome 1,  p. 219 
and Tome II, p. 264 (Aula-boeken). 
28. Internal structures: FGTB, CSC,  revie~ 
The FGTB and the esc are national multi-industry organisa-
tions. They take precedence over the trade confederations 
which are national organisations based on industrial sectors 
or occupations.  The FGTB  and the esc, like the national 
trade confederations,  are geographically structured at the 
following levels: 
•  local or by regional enterprise 
•  provincial 
•  national 
•  international (at European and worldwide level). 
The multi-industry structure includes all occupations and all 
industrial sectors in both the private and the public sectors. 
Multi-industry structures are very disparate and not very 
logical. There is a historical explanation for this. 
The development of the Belgian trade union movement has 
been  uneven and  has  been shaped by various needs and 
possibilities. As little power as possible has been conceded. 
Any change to what might be termed trade union boundaries 
has led to difficult negotiations between the various national 
bodies. Relations between the multi-industry organisations 
and confederations are determined very simply. The trade 
confederations set great store by their autonomy and try to 
give up the smallest possible amount of this autonomy to the 
multi-industry organisation. 
In the multi-industry structure, with the exception of the 
public sector,  a  distinction  is  made between  manual  and 
white-collar workers.  There is  a  horizontal structure for 
white-collar workers covering all  occupational sectors.  A 
vertical structure has been established for manual workers. 
SETCA (a national white-collar union affiliated to the FGTB), 
the LBC  and  the CNE  (respectively Flemish-speaking and 
French-speaking white-collar sections within the Confedera-
tion of Christian  Trade  Unions)  are occupational unions 
covering all sectors of  activity. The various industrial sectors 
have a specialist internal structure. 
Manual workers are grouped by industrial sector or by a 
number of industrial sectors, for instance the Confederation 
of Belgian Metalworkers,  the General Confederation,  the 
Confederation of Textile and Clothing Workers,  etc. This 
applies both to the FGTB and to the esc. 
All  public  service  employees  belong  to  their own  trade 
confederation: the General Confederation of  Public Service 
Employees (  CGSP-FGTB) and the Christian Confederation of 
Public Service Employees (CCSP-csc). 
Reforms of the  State have also had an impact on union 
structures. For understandable reasons union restructuring 
has not taken place at the same speed as the restructuring of 
political  structures.  Socio-economic issues are felt  to  be 
more  important than  cultural  issues within  the workers' 
movement. Moreover, there is now an awareness in union 
circles that the social struggle would be better served by 
solidarity between Flemish and Walloon workers. Reforms 
of the State also seem unlikely to make industrial relations 
56.  Eoc, De Belgische vakbeweging, EEC,  Europese documentalie, aerie 
d'information syndicale,  Brussels,  1968, p.  1.  SPJTAELS, o., Le 
mouvement  syndical  en  Belgique,  Institut  de  Sociologie,  ULB, 
Brussels, 1967, p. 29.  ARCQ,  E.  and BLAISE, P., Les organisations 
syndicales en Belgique, op. cit., p. 10. BELGIUM 
more democratic. ·The  social  struggle would  remain  the 
same. 
The  restructuring  which  has  finally  been  set  in  motion 
started from the idea that the existing structures should be 
kept. These structures would have a coordinating function. 
At the same time new regional structures would be set up 
within the organisation in order to  meet the requirements 
imposed by reforms of the State. The multi-industry organi-
sation, with the exception of  the LBC/CNE, was the first to be 
restructured. This bas been followed by the trade confedera-
tions. This restructuring has not yet been completed. 
The main  change has been  the creation of inter-regional 
structures for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. 
A general overview shows that the FGTB places less emphasis 
than  the esc on an occupational  category  structure.  The 
administrative organisation of enterprise is more important 
for the FGTB. The esc places more emphasis on the domicile 
of the member. 
29. The internal structure of the CGSLB 
In contrast to the FGTB and the esc, the CGSLB is divided 
into sections containing a mixture of occupational and multi-
industry aspects. 
The  division  in  this  case  is  geographical  rather  than  a 
division  by  branches  of industry,  with  the  exception, 
however,  of public  service  employees.  The  latter  were 
grouped in an independent confederation: the Liberal Union 
of  Public Service Employees (SLASP)
57
• Following the 1971 
Law on union status in the public services
58  these two unions 
decided to merge
59
• This agreement led to the creation of the 
Free Public Service  Union  (SLFP),  the only occupational 
union within the CGSLB. 
30. Regionalisation 
The progressive division of Belgium into communities has 
entailed a progressive adaptation of union  structures.  As 
political structures have been modified, unions have had to 
follow suit. The transfer of powers in social and economic 
matters from national level to the community executives has 
also  changed  the  level  at  which  negotiations  take  place 
between the public authorities and the social partners. 
A feature of the trade union movement is that adaptation to 
the establishment of  communities has taken place through an 
internal division of national structures. The latter retain a 
coordinating  function.  New  independent  regional  bodies 
have not been established. 
31. Union personnel 
Union officials may be divided into two groups: on the one 
hand activists at enterprise level and on the other hand union 
staff members. 
Activists, who are union members at enterprise level, form 
a  union  delegation.  In  larger  enterprises  this  delegation 
operates as  an association with a general assembly  and a 
57.  The SLSP existed together with it and was part of the CGSLB. 
58.  Draft law of 18 February 1971, Chamber 1970-71, Parliamentary 
Document, p. 889. 
59.  This took place on 10 June 1972. 
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management committee.  Some members of the delegation 
may be exempted from all or part of  their work duties so that 
they may perform their union functions.  Each union has a 
union delegation in each enterprise. These delegations may 
act separately or jointly. The person acting as the spokesper-
son  in  dealings  wi~ the employer is known as  the chief 
delegate. 
Union staff members may be divided into two groups. These 
include executive personnel who are employed under a con-
tract of employment. Union staff members may also come 
from the ranks of  activists. They too are bound by a contract 
of  employment and are paid by the union, but in contrast to 
the executive personnel, determine the organisation's policy. 
32. International and European links
60 
The representative Belgian organisations (FGTB, esc, CGSLB) 
are affiliated to their respective international organisations. 
The FGTB belongs to ICFfU, the CSC to WCL and the CGSLB 
to WFTU (World Federation of  Trade Unions).  At European 
level, the FGTB and the esc are both members of ETUC. 
33. Legal structure of the unions 
The legal status of Belgian unions is partly regulated. They 
do not possess legal personality and as such do not therefore 
possess  legal  capacity.  In  practice,  they  possess a partial 
functional legal personality
61
• 
The main  management  has  been  set  up with a  specialist 
division for each level at which the industry wishes to exert 
influence. The administration is designed flexibly so that it 
has considerable capacity for adaptation and so that it can 
follow rapid changes in economic and social life. 
Working parties have been established. 
There  are  very  close  links  with  organisations  in  other 
countries.  The  FEB  (Federation  of Belgian  Enterprises) 
represents only  industry  and  commerce.  Agriculture and 
small businesses are affiliated to other organisations. The 
FEB has reached an  agreement with these organisations in 
order to achieve a distribution of functions for the purposes 
of national  and  multi-industry  negotiations.  The  FEB  is, 
however, the most influential organisation. 
Only industry-level federations may be affiliated to the FEB, 
not individual employers. There are some 40 federations re-
presenting approximately 35,000 enterprises. 
The FEB also has active and non-active members. The latter 
take part only in the work of certain research committees. 
34. Regionalisation 
Reforms of the State have had the same impact on employ-
ers' organisations as on employees' organisations. In con-
trast to employees' organisations, employers' organisations 
have independent and specific organs acting as spokesper-
sons.  The  FEB  has  not  as  yet  implemented  an  internal 
div~sion. 
In Flanders the Vlaams Ekonomisch Verbond (VEV) and in 
60.  BLAISE,  P.,  Les  structures  du  syndicalisme  international,  in: 
Courrier hebdomadaire, Brussels, CRISP,  1986. 
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Wallonia the Union Wallonne des Entreprises (UWE) act as 
spokespersons. 
CHAPTER IV: THE STRUCTURE 
OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
35. Introduction 
The role of  the State in establishing industrial relations is of 
primordial importance. The nature of this role has changed 
over the years. 
In the context of  a free economy, most emphasis is placed on 
the idea that the public authorities have a supplementary, or 
possibly, where necessary, a policing role. Stress is placed 
on the function of  the State as a policing body. There is now 
a movement away from this perception of a supplementary 
and coordinating role towards the idea of independent action. 
The State takes the place of individuals. 
Nowadays State tasks include all these functions, i.e. coor-
dinating, supplementing, regulating and maintaining order. 
This complex task has had an impact on the structures set up 
to enable the public authorities to fulfil their obligations. 
These structures include: 
•  structures needed to carry out the regulatory function, 
i.e. the Ministry of  Employment and Labour; 
•  the structures needed for the supervisory and policing 
function:  the inspection services; 
•  the  structures  required  to  encourage  negotiations 
between workers and employers: bargaining structures; 
•  the structures needed to provide the parties with logisti-
cal support: the Ministry of  Employment and Labour; 
•  the structures enabling the State to settle disputes, i.e. 
conciliation boards and labour courts. 
36. Legal nature of structures 
The above-mentioned structures may be public services pure 
and simple62• 
Some have a certain autonomy. They carry out their duties 
under  State  control  but  themselves  retain  the  essential 
features of  a public service
63
•  In Belgium these are known as 
semi-public institutions. They are covered by public law. 
A  third group of institutions  is  covered  by  private law. 
These institutions are instructed by the State to carry out 
tasks of general interest, under State control
64
• 
37. The Ministry of  Labour and Employment -
the regulatory function
65 
This Ministry prepares the regulatory work of the Executive 
authorities. It provides at the same time support for citizens 
within the limits of its competence. For this purpose it has 
specialist services.  It also supervises a  number of public 
utility institutions answerable to it. 
62.  For instance the Ministry of  Employment and lAbour. 
63.  For instance the National lAbour Council,  the National Employ-
ment and Placement Service. 
64.  For instance the union organisations, which pay out unemployment 
benefit. 
65.  For the historical context, see:  DELVAUX, 0., et al, Honderdjaar 
sociaal recht in Belgie, Bruylant, Brussels, 1987, p. 155. 
Following  the  State  reforms,  regional  and  community 
structures have been established. 
38. Supervisory and policing duties of the 
authorities - the settlement of disputes 
These functions are entrusted to a number of inspectorates 
which are answerable to various departments and semi-public 
bodies. They work in close cooperation with the judiciary, 
although  they  have an  administrative  character and  also 
possess special status
66
• The courts are also competent to deal 
with industrial relations. Civil aspects are dealt with by the 
labour courts and tribunals. Criminal aspects come under the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
67
• 
39. Encouragement of collective bargaining 
The State offers its services in order to make social con-
certation possible.  Public institutions  through which the 
social partners can organise social concertation have been set 
up. These structures may be of a joint
68 or tripartite
69 nature. 
Social concertation often takes place in a non-institutional-
ised way, although the public authorities may play a support-
ing role in these cases as well. 
40. The settlement of disputes 
This is the task of  the judiciary. The courts are competent to 
deal with individual disputes. 
Collective disputes  are dealt with by  conciliation boards 
answerable to the public authorities or established independ-
ently10. 
CHAPTER V: LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
SECTION  1: REVIEW OF THE SOURCES OF LAW 
41. List 
Legal theory includes the following sources of law
71
: 
•  law in the broad sense; 
•  international treaties and regulations; 
•  collective agreements; 
•  the individual contract; 
•  custom; 
•  case law; 
•  legal opinion; 
•  natural justice. 
French doctrine supplements these with a further three sour-
ces: 
•  the unilateral decision-making powers of employers; 
66.  These inspection services - of which there are many - are not 
coordinated. Andre Nayer has examined the operation of some 24 
different labour inspectorate&:  NAYER, A., Les inspections sociales 
en Belgique, Brussels, Vie Ouvriere, 1980, p. 14. 
67.  PETIT, J., ArlJeidsgerechten en  sociaal procesrecht, APR,  Ghent, 
Story-Scientia, 1980. 
68.  For instance  the Joint  Committees:  institutions  in which  social 
dialogue is institutionalised. 
69.  For instance the National Committee for Economic Expansion. 
70.  For instance the conciliation boards of the Joint Committees and the 
Office of  Collective lAbour Relations of the Ministry of  Employ-
ment. 
71.  BLANPAJN,  R.,  Handboek  van  het  Belgische  ArlJeidsrecht,  in: 
Collectief  arbeidsrecht, Story-Scientia, Ghent, 1968, p. 21. BELGIUM 
•  the general principles of employment and social secu-
rity; 
•  the overall legal system within which employment and 
social security has its place. 
42. Legislation 
In contrast to other branches of law where Parliament has 
power over legislation, employment and social security is 
often  established  after  wide-ranging  and  in  some  cases 
compulsory  consultation between  the social  partners,  for 
instance within the National Labour Council or the Central 
Economic Council. 
Most legislative provisions are of  a mandatory and protective 
nature. Collective labour agreements are taking over from 
the  law  in  the  broad  sense.  These  agreements  make  it 
possible for the bargaining parties to adapt regulations so 
that they  are  more in keeping  with  the  actual  needs  of 
industrial life, industrial sectors and enterprises. 
43. International agreements 
International regulations are an  important source of law. 
Obvisiously,  in  accordance with  the principles of sover-
eignty, every international regulation must be ratified by a 
national decision. 
In accordance with Article 68 of the Constitution, treaties are 
concluded by Royal Decree. If  these treaties are likely to 
"bind  the State or to  bind Belgians individually they are 
effective only after they have received the approval of  the 
legislative chambers~ 
When there is a conflict between a national regulation and an 
international regulation which has direct effect in  national 
law, the regulation set out in the treaty takes priority
72
• 
Conventions  concluded  within  the  International  Labour 
Organisation have no effect as such. Pursuant to Article 68 
of the  Constitution  they  must  first  be  ratified  by  Royal 
Decree and by Parliament.  In principle these conventions 
make it necessary for the State to adapt its national legisla-
tion. Ratification does not automatically entail the repeal of 
a contradictory national law.  The ratified convention may 
repeal  the effects of existing  legislation  only  within  the 
limits of its own scope of application
73
• 
This does not apply to EEC Regulations. The Treaty estab-
lishing the  EEC  provides  independent powers  for  certain 
bodies. National parliaments cannot then intervene
74
• 
44. Custom 
Custom covers a rule of life, accepted by a certain group, 
which has not acquired the characteristics of a rule of law. 
In this latter case we speak of custom. 
72.  Supreme Court, 27 May 1971, rr, 3 July 1971, p. 471. 
73.  DEPREZ,  u.,  De  bronnen  van  het  arbeidsrecht  in  Belgie,  EC 
Commission, Brussels, 1973, p. 20. Supreme Court, 21  September 
1959, Pas. I, 1960, p. 98. Supreme Court, 27 May 1971, Pas. I, 
1971, p. 886 with the conclusions ofthe director of public prosecu-
tions  Ganshof van der  Meersch.  MAST,  A.  and  DUJARDIN,  P., 
Overzicht  van  het Belgisch grondwettelijk recht,  Story-Scientia, 
Ghent, 1985, p. 346. 
74.  DEPREZ,  U.,  De bronnen van het ameidsrecht in  Belgie,  Story-
Scientia, Ghent, 1973, p. 22. 
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It has certain characteristics 
75
: 
•  it is not written; 
•  it is used repeatedly; 
•  it is accepted by the majority of the social group; 
•  it needs a certain period to be prescribed. 
These characteristics are indispensable for a rule to acquire 
the general nature needed for legal stability. 
The notion of established practice which the law uses is 
equivocal, although it is also used in the Civil Code (Ar-
ticle 1135). 
Established practice cannot be a source of obligation when 
an agreement excludes custom, even implicitly
76
• 
45. Natural justice 
According to Article 1135 of the Civil Code, natural justice 
is also accepted as a source oflaw in civil law. It is perfectly 
possible to defend this opinion in civil issues. The parties 
can define their cooperation almost completely through the 
contractual relationship over which they have full control. It 
is  therefore  understandable  that  contracts  are  not  only 
binding as  regards  their express stipulations,  but also as 
regards all the consequences which law, custom or natural 
justice attach thereto. 
The employment law relationship is determined only to a 
certain extent by the contractual relationship of the parties. 
A number of basic factors are not covered by the agreement. 
Judging the consequences of an agreement on the basis of 
natural justice in the contractual sphere could lead to flagrant 
injustices in the general context of the employment relation-
ship. There is  in effect a fundamental  socio-economic in-
equality in this case. 
Natural justice  can  be  considered  - with  the  necessary 
reservations- as a source oflaw, but solely in relation to the 
individual employment relationship. 
SECTION 2: CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
SOURCES OF LAW 
46. Hierarchy of sources of law 
Article 51  of the Law of  5 December 1968n ended discus-
sions on the hierarchy of sources of law which had come 
about as a result of  the shortcomings of the Laws of  4 March 
1954  and  11  March  1954  on  collective  agreements  for 
manual and white-collar workers
78
• 
47. Current legislation 
The Law of 5  December 1968 introduced  the  following 
hierarchy: 
1.  The mandatory provisions of law; 
2.  Collective agreements which have been decreed gener-
ally applicable, in the following order: 
75.  GJLJSSEN,  J.,  Historische  inleiding tot  het recht,  VUB,  Brussels, 
1972, Tome II, p. 155. 
76.  Supreme Court, 3 April 1978, JTT,  173; Walloon Region, 1977-78, 
2441 with MP ruling. 
77.  Collective Agreements and Joint Committees Act of  5 December 
1968, MB,  15 January 1968. 
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agreements concluded within the CNT  (National 
Labour Council); 
agreements concluded within a Joint Committee; 
agreements concluded within a Joint Subcommit-
tee. 
3.  Collective agreements which have not been decreed 
generally applicable, where the employer is a signatory 
to the agreement or is a member of an organisation that 
is a signatory to the agreement, in the following order: 
agreements concluded within the CNT; 
agreements concluded within a Joint Committee; 
agreements concluded within a Joint Subcommit-
tee; 
agreements concluded outside any joint body. 
4.  Individual  written  agreements,  where the  employer, 
although not a signatory to the agreement nor a member 
of a  signatory organisation,  operates in  an  industry 
covered by the joint body within which the agreement 
has been concluded. 
5.  Works rules. 
6.  Supplementary provisions of the law. 
7.  Individual oral agreements. 
8.  Established practice. 
48.  Hierarchical order 
The  following  comments  may  be  made  as  regards  this 
hierarchy: 
1.  A detailed description of the position occupied by the 
various collective agreements is given. 
2.  Collective agreements which  have  not been  decreed 
generally applicable but which employers have stated 
that they will respect by their direct or indirect (through 
their membership of  a signatory organisation) signature 
are ranked above individual written agreements. 
3.  A distinction is made between written and non-written 
individual contracts.  The latter rank lower than non-
generally applicable collective agreements concluded 
within a joint body and works rules. 
4.  ''Established practice"  ranks lowest. 
5.  Collective agreements concluded outside any joint body 
rank above non-generally applicable agreements con-
cluded within  a joint body  covering  an  industry  in 
which an employer operates who approves the collec-
tive  agreement  either  directly  via  his  signature  or 
indirectly by belonging to a signatory organisation. 
6.  Neither custom nor natural justice, nor the general prin-
ciples of law are mentioned. 
7.  International rules of law are not dealt with separately. 
49. The mandatory provisions of law 
The notion of '1aw "must be understood in its formal sense. 
The provisions of a collective agreement which are contrary 
to the mandatory provisions of the law, decrees and interna-
tional treaties and regulations which are binding on Belgium 
are null and void
79
• 
Decrees enacted by the community and  regional  councils 
should also be added here
80
• 
79.  79.LENAERTS,  H.,  lnleiding tot het sociaal recht,  Ghent,  Story-
Scientia, 1985, p. 145. 
80.  LENAERTS,  H.,  lnleiding  tot  het  sociaal  recht,  Ghent,  Story-
Scientia, 1985, p.  145. 
In order to determine the hierarchy of legal instruments, the 
general rules of public law and human rights are applied. 
This also applies when determining the relationship between 
international and national instruments. 
50. Collective agreements 
Collective agreements which have been decreed generally 
applicable are ranked second. Collective agreements which 
have not been decreed generally applicable are ranked third. 
Collective  agreements  which  have  been  made  generally 
applicable have  the same  legal  force  as  a  Royal Decree 
enacting the law, bearing in mind that the official procedure 
is carried out by Royal Decree
81
• 
They carry penal sanctions
82
•  Article 10 of the Collective 
Agreements Law lays down a hierarchy of  collective agree-
ments depending on the level at which they are concluded: 
the CNT, a Joint Subcommittee or outside any joint body. 
A  lower-level  collective  agreement  cannot  be  decreed 
generally applicable if it conflicts with an existing agreement 
which has been decreed generally applicable. If  a lower-level 
collective  agreement  which  has  already  been  declared 
generally applicable conflicts with a subsequent collective 
agreement which is decreed generally applicable, the general 
applicability of the lower-level collective agreement may be 
repealed  by  Royal  Decree
83
•  Its  conflicting  provisions 
become null and void, but the agreement as such continues 
to exist. The courts refuse to apply the conflicting provisions 
of  a lower-level collective agreement
84
• 
51. Collective agreements (continuation) 
Agreements which have not been decreed generally applica-
ble take precedence over individual agreements and works 
rules, provided that the employer has signed the collective 
agreement or is a member of a signatory organisation. 
If  these conditions are not satisfied, the collective agreement 
has subsidiary applicability and ranks below the individual 
written agreement but above works rules. 
The Laws of  4 March and 11  March 1954 have therefore 
been  amended.  They  stipulated  that  all  collective labour 
agreements which had not been decreed generally applicable 
had subsidiary applicability. 
52. Works rules 
The provisions of  works rules may not be contrary to current 
collective agreements. This applies to both generally applica-
ble and non-generally applicable collective agreements. 
Article 4(2) of the Works Rules La~
5 states that employers 
and their employees are bound by the provisions of works 
81.  LENAERTS, H., /nleiding tot het sociaal recht, op. cit., p. 146. 
82.  Collective Agreements Act, Article 56. 
83.  Collective Agreements Act, Article 34;  al. LENAERTS, H., lnleiding 
tot  het sociaal recht,  op.  cit., p.  146.  The author  defends  the 
opinion that the King is obliged to repeal the royal decree making 
the collective agreement generally applicable. 
84.  Constitution, Article 107. 
85.  Works Rules Law of  8 Apri/1964, MB, 5 May 1965. BELGIUM 
rules.  This  implies  that  works  rules  take  priority  over 
individual contracts of employment'6. 
On the other hand, clause 3 of the same Article sets out the 
possibility of  departing from works rules in individual cases, 
provided that regulatory and legal provisions are observed. 
Moreover, Article 51  of the Collective Agreements Law 
states that individual contracts of employment take prece-
dence over works rules
87
• 
53. Employer's unilateral decision-making powers 
The Collective Agreements Law gives employers authority 
over employees. This authority means that employers may in 
numerous  matters  unilaterally  decide  how  and  in  what 
conditions the work should be provided. There is no trace 
here of contractual agreements. 
Only in a limited number of cases are employers required to 
take  account  of the  wishes of the other party,  i.e.  the 
employee. 
Otherwise, employers alone decide on the production process 
as  a  whole,  including  human  work,  although  with  the 
exception of the mandatory rules imposed upon them by 
regulations and collective agreements. 
54. General principles of law 
Case law has developed a series of general rules in order to 
fill the gaps in the legislation. These rules are considered to 
be general principles of  law. They provide a legal foundation 
allowing the courts to pronounce the law even when there 
are shortcomings in the written statute law. 
This source, likewise, is not mentioned by Article 51 of the 
Collective Agreements Law but is generally accepted
88
• 
55. Binding force of the hierarchy 
During preparatory parliamentary work the question  has 
often arisen as to whether the hierarchy set out in Article 51 
of the Collective Agreements Law can be  waived
89
•  The 
original  draft  law  provided  for  this  possibility.  Lower-
ranking sources of law could derogate from higher-ranking 
sources even in the case of mandatory provisions. This was 
possible only for provisions which were more advantageous 
for employees. 
The Council of  State rejected this possibility, arguing that it 
would not always be clear whether a provision was actually 
more advantageous or not for employees  and  whether a 
provision advantageous for employees would be detrimental 
to the community at large. 
The Council of  State opinion appears to be accepted in case 
law
90
• It should be borne in mind that the mandatory provi-
sions are often minimum standards and that other regulations 
86.  LENAERTS, H., Jnleiding tot het sociaal recht, op. cit., p. 148. 
87.  Supreme Courl,  18 December 1974, JJT,  1975, p. 53, with com-
ments by LENAERTS, H. Supreme Court, 20 Apri/1977, JIT, 1977, 
p. 184, with comments by LENAERTS, H. 
88.  LENAERTS,  H., Jnleiding  tot het sociaal recht,  op.  cit..  LAMER-
LYNCK, G.H., LYON<:AEN, G. and PELISSIER, J., Droit du travail, op. 
cit., p. 43. 
89.  LENAERTS, H., lnleiding tot het sociaal recht, op. cit., p. 148. 
90.  Ibid., p. 152.  . 
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may be provided. This cannot be considered as a departure 
from the hierarchical rules
91
• 
56. Sources of law not mentioned in Art. 51 
The list in Article 51  is  relatively complete but does not 
contain  all  the sources of law.  It does  not  for  instance 
mention decisions of  Joint Committees, irregular collective 
agreements, collective agreements which do not qualify for 
fonnal status as collective agreements, individual agreements 
which are not an employment contract, unilateral obligations 
and natural justice. 
Legal opinion and case law give a place to each of these 
sources92• 
The decisions of Joint Committees have the value that the 
law attributes to them in each specific case
93
• 
Irregular collective labour agreements have the value of a 
written individual agreement or of established practice
94
• 
Collective  agreements  which  cannot  be  considered  as 
formally  recognised  collective  agreements  may  not  take 
priority over individual written agr~ments
95 • 
57. Fundamental socio-economic rights 
Title IV of the Belgian Constitution deals with Belgians and 
their rights. This title does not set out fundamental socio-
economic rights. It lists the fundamental political rights of a 
democratic political system.  Certain of these fundamental 
rights may also apply to industrial relations. These include: 
•  the principle of  equality set out in Article 6 of the Con-
stitution; 
•  the principle of non-discrimination set out in Article 
6(a); 
•  the right to assemble in a peaceful and unarmed manner 
set out in Article 19; 
•  the freedom of association set out in Article 20. 
Since the Second World War some ten or so measures have 
been taken to introduce a  coherent set of socio-economic 
rights into the Constitution.  These have remained without 
effect
96
•  This does not mean that the Belgian legal system 
does not contain any  fundamental  socio-economic rights. 
General principles may be deduced from the legislation and 
in some cases from ratified international regulations. This 
would  be  the  case  for  instance  after  ratification  of the 
European Social Charter which has yet to take place. 
CHAPTER VI: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
58. Introduction 
The history of industrial relations in Belgium has been very 
eventful
97
•  Both  occupation of the workplace and  strike 
91.  VAN  EECKHOUTTE,  w.,  De  hierarchie  van  de  arbeidsrechtelijlce 
normen in:  RIGAUX,  M.  Actuele problemen van het arbeidsrecht, 
(ed.), Antwerp, Kluwer, 1987, p.219. 
92.  VAN EECKHOUTTE, W., loc. cit., p. 240. 
93.  LENAERTS, H., lnleiding tot het sociaal recht, op. cit., p. 148. 
94.  VAN EECKHOUTTE, W., loc. cit., p. 241. 
95.  Ibid., p. 242. 
96.  MAsT, A., Overzicht van het Belgische grondwettelijk recht, Story-
Scientia, Ghent, 1985, p. 508. 
97.  CHLEPNER, S.B., Cent ans d 'histoire sociale en Belgique, Brussels, 
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action have been used in industrial conflicts. Over the last 
ten years their numbers and extent have decreased substan-
tially. There have been few national multi-industry strikes. 
Despite this historical social movement, it can be seen that 
situations of industrial conflict are covered by few regula-
tions. If a  regulation  does  exist,  it  is  to  a  large extent 
collectively  agreed and optional.  It should be noted  that 
since  the  beginning of the  social  crisis,  the  situation  is 
tending to change. Employers are more likely than in the 
past to take their case before the judicial authorities in the 
event of  a dispute. 
59. Procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
Belgium has a network of  procedures intended to prevent and 
resolve industrial disputes. 
a)  Informal procedures entail the appointment of a person 
who may, with authority, negotiate with the parties in 
question. This person may be an ordinary citizen or a 
political personality. No regulations exist on the matter. 
b)  The question of whether collective disputes  may  be 
resolved by the courts also needs to be examined. The 
answer is no. The situation is particularly clear when 
collective disputes of interest are involved. The courts 
are not competent. Opinions are divided in the case of 
disputes of rights
98
• 
c)  Some public servants may, because of their function, 
undertake conciliatory  action,  either individually  or 
acting as a board. There is, for instance, a conciliation 
board within the Joint Committees and the CNT.  Labour 
inspectors and employment inspectors have conciliation 
tasks alongside their supervisory tasks. 
There is also a specific department within the Ministry 
of  Employment and Labour which has to take action in 
the case of  collective labour disputes
99
• 
d)  In Belgium three procedures may be used: arbitration, 
conciliation and reconciliation. The difference between 
these three methods is the increasingly important role of 
the third party in the settlement of the dispute. Concili-
ation and reconciliation are used in particular in Bel-
gium. These may be made compulsory by law or under 
collective agreements. Arbitration is used very rarely. 
Compulsory arbitration does not exist. 
60. Dispute situations: strikes, factory 
occupations and lock-outs 
Industrial disputes are only partly regulated: 
a)  Many laws refer to strikes, but legislators have avoided 
overall regulations.  Moreover, strikes are often dealt 
with by the terms of agreements. The Belgian Supreme 
Court of  Justice has ruled that strikes are not governed 
by law, but that they are covered by the Belgian legal 
system
100
• This applies in particular to the private sector 
but is not fully  extended  to  the public sector.  It  is 
generally accepted that public servants in principle have 
98.  RIGAUX, M., Collectieve arbeidscon.flicten, in: Reeks arbeidsrecht, 
Brussels, CAD, 111-15-15. 
99.  RIGAUX, M., Collectieve arbeidsgeschillen, op. cit., 111-15-28. 
100.  Supreme Court, 21  December  1981,  Bulletin 3, Brussels,  VUB, 
Centrum Arbeidsrecht, 1982, et seq. 
the right to strike. There is no prohibition on strikes. 
Exception  is  made for certain security services
101
•  It 
should be borne in  mind that Belgian courts are not 
competent to deal with collective disputes. 
b)  Occupation of the workplace is  not dealt with  as a 
special form of collective dispute. It is considered as a 
form of strike. There are no special regulations. The 
courts are not normally competent. In practice, employ-
ers often make use of possession injunctions based on 
the violation of their rights of ownership in order to 
obtain eviction of the employees. 
c)  There is no legal regulation of the lock-out. There are, 
however, some collective agreements which deal with 
this problem. 
d)  The consequences of collective disputes on individual 
employees from  the point of view of labour law and 
social security law are generally governed by legislation 
or by case law. 
61. Limitations of the right to strike 
The exercise of the right to strike is subject to a variety of 
different limitations. 
These include prior notice of strike, the cooling-off period, 
compulsory conciliation,  the peace obligation inherent in 
collective agreements, the compulsory performance of tasks 
of vital importance, military and civilian requisitions
102
• 
CHAPTER VII: THE PROSPECTS 
UNDER COMMUNITY LAW 
62. Introduction 
This general outline of Belgian labour law provides for a 
comparison with EC law as it stands at present and even to 
some extent with its probable development from the point of 
view of the completion of the Single European Market in 
1992. As regards the current situation, it should be noted 
that the legal framework established by the EC is relatively 
limited as regards industrial relations.  Attention has been 
paid  in particular to  the free  movement of workers,  the 
repeal  of binding  measures,  equality  between  men  and 
women and the problem of safety at work. Attention has also 
been drawn to other aspects of social relations. Legislative 
activity in this area is largely centred on the encouragement 
and coordination of national legislative work. Because of its 
expansion and greater cross-border integration, the Europe 
of 1992 will have new consequences. It is difficult to predict 
what the main ideas of European bodies will be in future 
years. It is, however, possible to indicate the convergences 
and divergences between  Belgian national  legislation and 
possible developments of EC law. 
63. From the point of view of the actors 
It seems that there will be no divergence from the principle 
of trade union  freedom.  Problems will probably arise as 
regards clauses relating to union security, given that Belgium 
pays considerable attention to  ')regative" trade union free-
dom. Another point of friction could be the notion of the 
101.  MAsT, A. and DUJARDIN, J., Grondwettelijk Recht, op. cit., p. 334. 
102.  RIOAUX, M., Staking en bedriifsbezetting, op. cit., p. 165. BELGIUM 
~st  representative organisation ~ Belgian opinion tends to 
restrict the number of  social partners. The stress is placed on 
their  multi-industry  nature.  A  point of major discussion 
could be  the problem of the  legal  personality of unions. 
Unions are strongly opposed to any obligation to take on 
legal personality. 
64. From the point of view of legal instruments 
Serious disagreement should not be expected as regards the 
hierarchy of sources of law. The same does not apply when 
looking in greater depth at the legal structure of collective 
agreements. There could be differences in two areas.  The 
first is the mandatory force of collective agreements which 
have  been  decreed  generally  applicable,  along  with  the 
possibility of obtaining their enforcement before the courts. 
The second issue relates to the legal force and significance of 
the peace obligation clauses contained in collective agree-
21 
ments.  Attention  should also  be  paid to  the fact  that the 
provisions of collective agreements are not integrated into 
individual  contracts  of employment,  but  form  a  higher-
ranking legal source according to Belgian law. 
65. From the point of view of collective disputes 
A  problem  might  arise  here  because  of the  fact  that  in 
Belgium the settlement of disputes is mainly covered by the 
terms of  agreements and is regulated by law only to a lesser 
extent. 
It is of  crucial importance for Belgian trade unionism that the 
unions cannot be  declared liable in the case of collective 
disputes. A serious problem could arise as regards the lack 
of jurisdiction  of the  Belgian  judiciary  over  collective 
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CHAPTER 1:  ACTORS 
1. General characteristics 
Danish  labour  law  is  traditionally  subdivided  into  three 
parts: 
•  collective labour law 
•  individual employment law 
•  public labour law 
The different parts of labour law have different main  ac-
tors:  the  parties  to  collective  agreements  in  collective 
labour law,  the parties to  individual contracts of employ-
ment in individual employment law and  the state and  the 
municipalities as  administrative bodies  in  public employ-
ment law. 
The collective actors play a more important role in Danish 
labour  law  than  the  individual  actors,  and  at  collective 
level, the enterprise level is of secondary importance com-
pared to the level of the organizations. 
Collective  labour  law  deals  with  the  rights  and  duties 
further  to  collective agreements,  which under Danish  law 
are legally binding both for the parties (organizations) who 
have concluded them and members of the parties, e.g. the 
individual workers and the individual employers. 
Individual employment law deals with the rights and duties 
of the parties to individual employment contracts. 
Public labour law is  the law on the working environment 
and  those  parts  of social  security  law  which  are  closely 
related to  the labour market,  e.g.  the rules on unemploy-
ment  and  sick  benefit.  Major parts of the  Danish  social 
security and social welfare system are tax  financed and not 
closely linked to paid employment. 
2. Trade unions and employers' associations 
The  two  main  organizations  in  the  private  sector  - the 
Confederation of Trade  Unions  (LO) and  the Danish Em-
ployers' Confederation  (DA)  - were,  as  mentioned  in  the 
introduction, both founded  in the late  19th century.  They 
are umbrella organizations. 
The  employers  are  in  the  main  organized  by  branch  of 
industry but some employers are individual members of the 
Danish Employers' Confederation (DA). 
The  structure  of the  trade  unions  has  been  a  matter  of 
debate for about a century. There are about 30 trade unions 
that  are members of the  Confederation of Trade  Unions. 
The  criteria for  drawing  borderlines  between  them  vary. 
Some trade unions are for  skilled workers in  a particular 
craft.  Others  are  for  both  unskilled  workers  and  skilled 
workers  in  an  industry.  Unskilled  workers  who  do  not 
belong to  one of these unions are organized according to 
sex,  in  that  Denmark  still  has  a  women-only  union  for 
unskilled  female  workers.  Men  doing  the  same  work  or 
other unskilled work are organized in another union. 
In  Denmark,  both  the  employers'  and  the  employees' 
organizations  are  preparing  to  make  radical  structural 
changes during the nineties.  The Confederation of  Danish 
Trade  Unions  (LO)  is  planning  to  divide  its  30  member 
unions  into  five  cartels  covering  the  industrial  sector 
(400 000 workers), the trade/service sector (350 000), the 
23 
construction  sector  (200  000),  the  municipal  sector 
(300 000) and the governmental sector (100 000). 
The purpose is to abolish the existing structure where each 
trade union in principle stands alone when bargaining with 
the employer.  Thus the  steady disintegration of demarca-
tions  has  resulted in  increasing competition between trade 
unions  with  contiguous  areas.  Furthermore  it should  be 
seen  as  a  countermeasure  to  the  amalgamation  as  of 
1.1.1990  of  the  two  large(st)  employers'  associations 
within  the  industrial  sector (Jernets  Arbejdsgiveiforening 
and lndustrifagenes Arbejdsgivere). 
Traditionally general  issues are negotiated at  central/nati-
onal  level  and  more  specific  demands  are  negotiated  at 
workplace level. 
Apart  from  the  two  abovementioned  main  organizations 
there  are  other  main  organizations  for  employees  with 
higher qualifications.  Vocational training is the main crite-
rion for membership in the trade unions in these organiza-
tions. 
The Danish  Constitution  protects  freedom  of association. 
However, it outlaws only intervention that freedom by the 
legislator.  There is  a statute law prohibiting dismissal  on 
grounds of membership  or non-membership  of trade un-
ions but as regards aspects of the employment relationship 
other than  dismissal  an  employer in  the  private sector is 
probably  free  to  discriminate against workers  because of 
their trade union  membership unless this  is  prohibited by 
collective agreement. Closed shop agreements are lawful in 
Denmark. 
Since  most  private  employers  are  covered  by  collective 
agreements  and  all  collective agreements are construed as 
containing  an  implied  term  prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds  of trade  union  membership,  the  main  practical 
rule is that it is unlawful for a private employer to interfere 
with the freedom of association. 
A  public  sector  employer  is  required  to  make  objective 
decisions  on  all  matters  including  employment  matters. 
Discrimination on  grounds of trade union  membership  is 
therefore prohibited in the public sector
1
• 
3. Employers - individual workers - enterprise level 
The freedom to  recruit and dismiss is usually described in 
Denmark  as  part  of  the  employer's  prerogatives.  The 
concept  of managerial  prerogatives  is  used  in  a  broader 
way in Danish labour law than  in  some of the continental 
European countrie where it refers only to an aspect of the 
individual employment relationship. 
The managerial prerogatives of the employer are recogni-
zed  in  collective agreements  and  case  law.  They  are not 
laid down by statutory provisions. The scope for manage-
rial freedom in the employment relationship is therefore of 
varying extent according to which collective agreement the 
individual employer is bound by. 
The borderline between contractual matters that are settled 
by  collective agreement (or individual contract) and  man-
agement  issues  in  the  employment  field  that  are  decided 
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unilaterally by the employer is blurred.  The employer or 
the  employer's  organization  may  "sell»  the  managerial 
prerogatives  by  collective  agreement.  The  freedom  to 
dismiss without  fair  reasons  is,  for example,  limited  by 
collective agreements protecting against unfair dismissals. 
The existing case law on  the employer's managerial  pre-
rogatives deals with the following themes: 
•  freedom  to  select workers  and  employees  for  recruit-
ment and promotion 
•  freedom to dismiss workers and employees 
•  power to issue works rules 
•  power to direct and allocate work 
•  power to monitor the performance of work 
•  power to determine working hours subject to collective 
agreement restrictions 
•  the employer's right to interpret collective agreements 
In  1960,  provisions  against  unfair  dismissal  were  intro-
duced into the Basic Agreement. 
It follows from case law that the employer has authority to 
lay down works rules, for example concerning safety at the 
work-place  or the  conduct  of the  worker  in  matters  of 
smoking, drinking and the like. Works rules are only law-
ful  managerial instructions if there are reasonable grounds 
to issue them. 
The employer has wide authority to give instructions as to 
how the work is to be done.  He can decide what technical 
equipment is to  be used,  distribute the work  between the 
workers and give the individual worker directives regard-
ing his work. 
The employer may also introduce measures of supervision, 
e.g. time and motion studies, checks working time, etc. 
The arrangement of working hours within the limits set by 
the collective agreement is also a managerial prerogative. 
Finally,  Danish  employers  have  a  right  of interpreting 
collective agreements.  Conflicts concerning the interpreta-
tion of collective agreements are in  the last resort settled 
by  arbitration.  In  the  period  until  the  arbitral  award  is 
made,  the workers are under an obligation to abide by the 
employer's interpretation of the collective agreement (even 
in cases where it is wrong and  the workers' union subse-
quently win at the arbitration board). 
4. Workers' participation-Enterprise-level 
Denmark has  no general  legislation  on  co-determination. 
Workers'  participation  is  primarily  channelled  through: 
working environment legislation, collective agreements on 
shop stewards,  collective agreements on co-operation and 
works councils, and company legislation. 
The Working Environment Act provides for an institutional 
set up,  which comprises both a public monitoring system 
and a safety organization at enterprise level
2
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In enterprises with ten staff or more, safety representatives 
must be elected among the workers. When there are more 
than  20  staff,  a  safety  committee  must  be  formed.  The 
safety  committee  is  to  plan,  direct,  advise,  disseminate 
2.  See for details NIELSEN, RUTH, Arbejdsmi/jBret, Copenhagen 1993. 
information  about,  and  monitor  the  work  carried  out at 
enterprise level relating to safety and health. 
Safety  representatives are entitled to  training paid by the 
employer,  time off to  fulfil  their functions,  and  are pro-
tected against dismissal in the same way as shop stewards, 
i.e. they cannot be dismissed unless there is a 
11Compelling" 
reason for so doing. 
Rules about shop stewards are found  in  collective agree-
ments3.  A shop steward is elected by his fellow-workers. 
Only unionised workers are eligible as shop stewards.  All 
workers  (whether  union-members  or not)  are  entitled  to 
vote. The election must be approved by the union which is 
a party to the collective agreement in question. An elected 
shop steward is regarded as the local representative of the 
trade  union  and  may  for  example  conclude  collective 
agreements with the employer. 
The shop steward's main task is to further the interests of 
his colleagues, but he also has a duty to work with the em-
ployer. He must work within the confines of the collective 
agreements, which in Denmark entail a wideranging peace 
obligation. A shop steward can therefore not call for indus-
trial action in support of the claims made by the workers. 
A shop steward (who keeps the rules) has stronger protec-
tion against dismissal than ordinary workers. A shop stew-
ard cannot only be dismissed unless there is a compelling 
reason  for  the  dismissal.  Redundancy  is  not  sufficient 
cause to  dismiss a shop steward if ordinary workers could 
have been dismissed instead of him. In the event of unlaw-
ful  dismissal, the shop steward is entitled to re-instatement 
or damages. 
In  194  7,  the Confederation of  Trade  Unions (LO) and  the 
employers'  organization  concluded  a central  level  collec-
tive agreement on  co-operation and  works councils.  This 
agreement was later developed further.  The present agree-
ment is from 1987. Similar agreements exist in other areas 
of the labour market, e.g. the public sector
4
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According  to  the  co-operation  agreement  enterprises 
should  be  run  in  a  way  that  encourages  cooperation  in 
order to ensure the competitiveness of the undertaking and 
the job satisfaction of the workers. 
The agreement  provides  for  works  councils  in  industrial 
and craft enterprises employing 35 workers or more when 
recommended by either the employers or a majority of the 
workers. 
The works council is a joint body consisting of a manage-
ment group and an employee group. Shop stewards are ex 
officio  members  of the  employee group.  The size of the 
committee  is  determined  by  the number of employees  in 
the enterprise concerned. 
The  task  of the  works  council  is  to  preserve  good  and 
stable working and employment conditions, to improve the 
employees'  welfare and  security and  their interest in  im-
proving  the  efficiency  and  competitiveness  of the  enter-
3.  See  for  details  HASSELBALCH,  OLE,  Tillidsmandsrel,  Copenhagen 
1987. 
4.  See for details NIELSEN, RUTH, Larebog i Arbejdsret, Copenhagen 
1994. DENMARK 
prises.  The works council  is entitled  to  co-determination 
on principles governing the enterprise's personnel policy. 
In  this  lies  an  obligation  on the  employer  to  strive  for 
agreement on  such  questions,  i.e.  a  duty  to  negotiate  in 
good faith.  Furthermore the works council has,  in accord-
ance with the agreement, a right to exercise co-influence, 
that  is  a  right  to  exchange  viewpoints  and  proposals  in 
respect of policies of day-to-day  organization of produc-
tion and work and as regards implementation of any major 
change in the enterprise. 
Finally, if it is agreed, discussions may be held about the 
principal structure, mode of operation and applicability of 
wage  systems  designed  to  improve  production  and  the 
possibility of establishing funds  for educational and social 
purposes. 
The council receives information from management on the 
enterprise's financial  position  and  future  prospects.  This 
information must be presented in such a form as to enable 
the council to understand the situation. 
In  1974,  provisions which  ensured  employee  representa-
tion  on  company  boards  were  introduced  into  company 
legislation. This right was extended in 1980 and 19875• 
In  companies  with  35  or more  staff the  employees  are 
entitled to elect one third of the members of the supervis-
ory  board.  The  elected  members  are  protected  against 
dismissal in the same way as shop stewards. 
Danish joint stock companies are structured in accordance 
with the two-tier system, i.e. the company has a supervi-
sory board of directors and a board of management.  The 
board of directors must consist of at least three members 
elected  by the  general  meeting.  It is  responsible  for  the 
general  policy  and  proper  management  of the  company. 
Decisions  of significant  importance  cannot  generally  be 
taken by the management without the special authorization 
of the supervisory board of directors. 
There  are  no  statutory  provisions  on  consultation  and 
information of the social  partners.  The above  mentioned 
rules on consultation and information operate at enterprise 
level. 
As  creditors employees are entitled  to  the same informa-
tion, etc as other creditors. 
The main provisions on the legal position of creditors in 
the  case of bankruptcy  are  found  in  the Bankruptcy Act. 
Irrespective  of their  role  as  creditors,  employees  have 
under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act a limited right of 
participation  in  decisions  in  cases  where a  firm  has  sus-
pended  its  payments.  The Bankruptcy Act does  not gen-
erally provide for workers' participation in decisions con-
cerning  the bankrupt estate beyond  the rights that follow 
from the employees' role as creditors. 
S. The state 
5.1 The state as legislator 
The legislator has not interfered much in  the labour mar-
ket. There is almost no legislation on collective labour law 
5.  See  for  details  e.g.  GOMARD,  BERNHARD,  Aklie-og  anpartssel-
skabsret, Copenhagen 1987. 
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issues,  and  no  general  employment  legislation  covering 
individual  contracts  of employment  for  all  categories  of 
workers. There is, however, legislation for specific groups 
of employees,  notably  the  Salaried  Employee's  Act  (in 
Danish  Funktioruerloven).  There  are  also  statutory  acts 
covering  specific  issues,  such  as  the  Work  Environment 
Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Equal Treatment Act,  the Act 
on the Retention of  Workers' Rights in the event of  Trans-
fer of Undertakings  and  other  examples  could  be  men-
tioned. (See below in chapter II). 
It is a general feature of Nordic labour law that statutory 
provisions are usually enacted at the request of- or at least 
with the consent of- the major labour market organiza-
tions.  The  single  most  outstanding  exception  from  this 
general  pattern is the equality legislation which has been 
adopted  during  the  last  15-20  years  by  the  politicians 
against the opposition of the labour market organizations. 
In  this  area the politicians have thus deviated  from  their 
normal  behaviour  in  labour  market  matters  and  chosen 
legislation  without  support  from  the  labour  market 
organizations, which would have preferred self-regulation 
by collective agreements. 
The Danish laws were adopted in order to fulfil Denmark's 
obligations under the EC Treaty.  It was the general opinion 
that Denmark had no choice. Danish collective agreements 
have limited coverage in that only employees or employers 
who either individually or through  their organization are 
parties to the agreement are protected by them. This leaves 
a number of employees without collective agreement pro-
tection  and  Denmark  would  have  violated  the  EC  provi-
sions had the Equal Pay Act and the Equal Treatment Act 
not been enacted.  So the Danish politicians complied with 
the EC  provisions - some reluctantly, while others saw an 
opportunity to use the EC as a lever for reform. 
5.2 The State as employer 
The public  sector employs  around  one third of the total 
Danish labour force, and about half the female work-force. 
Employment  in  the  public  sector  is  governed  both  by 
principles of public administrative law and by labour law. 
Different categories of employment relationships  exist in 
the public sector. 
A  minority are  "civil  servants" (in  Danish tjenestemamd). 
Their terms of employment are partly fixed by legislation, 
partly  be  agreements  which,  however,  are  not  ordinary 
contracts. If  no agreement is reached the employer decides 
what terms shall  apply.  Civil  servants are not entitled to 
strike or use other forms of industrial action to obtain an 
acceptable agreement. 
The  majority  of public  sector  employees  are  employed 
under ordinary collective agreements. If  the employer is a 
public authority, however, it must observe general princi-
ples of public administrative law,  e.g. the duty to be im-
partial and objective, including when making employment 
decisions. The managerial prerogatives of the public sector 
employer are  therefore  more  restricted  than  those of the 
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6. Legal actors and gender 
In  the  Nordic  countries,  equality  between  the  sexes  has 
progressed to a certain extent, but not fully. 
In the Scandinavian countries, in the development towards 
equality between men and women, some types of openings 
are more accessible to women than others. There is a com-
paratively  high  proportion  of women  in  parliamentary 
bodies  in  the  Nordic  countries  - between  114  and  113, 
whereas  women's precense  in  decision-making  bodies  in 
the labour market organizations is below  10%
6
•  This may 
account for some of the differences in the views on equal-
ity legislation between politicians, of whom about  113  are 
women, and representatives of the labour market organiza-
tions are predominantly male. 
Women also gain influence in legal studies and the judici-
ary (especially in the first instance courts) before they gain 
an  equal  share  of the  decision-making  positions  in  the 
labour  market  organizations.  In  most  EU  countries,  na-
tional  labour  law  is  probably  less  favourable  to  women 
than international law and EU law, a fact which is motivat-
ing some judges to push for the integration of Community 
law into national law by putting questions to the European 
Court of  Justice under Article  177(2)  of the  EC  Treaty
7
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The  European  Court  of Justice  has  shown  considerable 
willingness to deliver audacious judgments
8  in the field of 
labour  law,  not  least  in  matters  concerning  women  and 
equality. 
The Danish  trade  unions  were  reluctant  to  invoke  Com-
munity  law  until  the  mid  1980s.  But  then  a  trade  union 
with  more  than  80%  women  members  (but  very  few 
women in decision-making positions) broke the consensus 
and  asked  the  Danish  judicial  bodies  to  refer  questions 
concerning equal  pay
9  and  equal  treatment'
0  to  the  Euro-
pean Court of  Justice for preliminary rulings. 
CHAPTER II: INSTRUMENTS - SOURCES OF LAW 
1. Outline 
It is characteristic of Danish labour law that the Constitu-
tion and international law have been of very little import-
ance  and that  there are very  few  statute laws.  Collective 
agreements,  case  law  and  unwritten  principles  of  law 
constitute  the  main  sources of law.  There is,  however,  a 
trend  towards increased statutory regulation of the mana-
gerial relation between the employer and the staff partly as 
a result of Denmark's membership of the EU, see below. 
Denmark's entry  into  the  Community  has  led  to  a  shift 
6.  See  on  the  difference  between  women's  representation  in  the 
parliamentary  and  the corporate channel:  Det  uferdige demokrati. 
Kvinner i nordisk politikk, Oslo 1983. 
7.  Cf SIBYLLE RAAscH, Der Einfluss des Rechtes der europiiischen Ge-
meinschaften auf  die Perspektiven der Richter im Arbeitsrecht zum 
Bereich  Frauen  und  Arbeit  in  der  Bundesrepuhlik  Deutschland, 
1988 {unpublished research paper). 
8.  Cf  RASMUSSEN, HJAL  TE, On lAw and Policy in the European Court 
of  Justice, Dordrecht 1986. 
9.  Case  c-1 09/88  Handels-og-Kontorfunktioruerernes  Forbund i  Dan-
mark v  Dansk  Arbejdsgiverforening (acting for  Danfoss)  [1989] 
ECR 3199. 
10.  179/88, Handels-og Kontorfunktioruerernes Forbund i Danmark 
on behalf of Birte  Vibeke  Hertz versus  Dansk  Arbejdsgiver-
forening on behalf of Aldi Marked[1990] ECR I-3979. 
away from collective agreements towards legislation and it 
has confronted Denmark with the developments in employ-
ment  protection  that  occurred  in  a  number of other  EO-
countries during the 1970s as well as with the fundamental 
rights  protected  by  international  conventions which  Den-
mark has ratified but traditionally not taken very seriously. 
The concept of collective redundancies was introduced into 
Danish law in order to implement the collective redundan-
cies directive. The legal significance of the enterprise was 
increased by the Directive on the safeguarding of  acquired 
rights in the event of  the transfer of  undertakings. (See on 
the impact of  Community law below in chapter IV). 
2. Constitutional law and social rights 
The Danish  Constitution  contains only few  provisions of 
relevance  to  the  labour market.  There is  e.g.  no  ban on 
discrimination on grounds of sex,  race,  ethnic origin and 
the like in  the Constitution and  there is no constitutional 
protection  of the  right  to  strike.  There  is,  however,  as 
mentioned  in  chapter I,  some  protection  for  freedom  of 
association. 
Cases have  been  brought  before  the  Courts
11  where em-
ployees have claimed that a public employer has violated 
the  Constitution  e.g.  by  dismissing  an  employee  on 
grounds  of membership  or  non-membership  of a  trade 
union. So  far,  no such claims have been successful. It is a 
matter of discussion whether this is because the Constitu-
tion cannot be invoked in  the employment relationship or 
because the particular cause of action by the employer was 
not in contravention of the Constitution. 
It is,  however,  clear that  from  a practical  point of view 
that the Constitution plays a very limited role as a source 
of Danish labour law. 
3. Statutory regulation 
Traditionally  statutory  regulation  has  played  a secondary 
role compared to collective agreements. 
There  is  almost  no  legislation  on  collective  labour  law 
issues,  and  no  general  employment  legislation  covering 
individual  contracts  of employment  for  all  categories  of 
workers.  There  is  e.g.  no  general  statutory  prohibition 
against unfair dismissal. 
There  is,  however,  legislation  for  specific  groups  of 
employees, notably the Salaried Employees Act (in Danish 
Funktiona?rloven).  There  are  also  statute  laws  covering 
specific  issues,  such  as  the  Work  Environment  Act,  the 
Equal Pay Act,  the  Equal  Treatment Act,  the Act on  the 
Safeguarding of  Workers ' Rights in the event of  the Trans-
fer  of  Undertakings  and  the  provisions  on  collective 
redundancies in  the Act on Unemployment Benefit.  An Act 
prohibiting  discrimination  on  grounds  of race,  colour, 
religion,  political  opinion,  national  extraction  or  social 
origin is  expected  to  be proposed by  the Minister of La-
bour in autumn 1995. 
Issues  closely  related  to  social  security,  e.g.  unemploy-
ment  benefit  and  sickness  benefit,  are  also  governed  by 
statute laws. 
11.  in particular tJ 1986,898. DENMARK 
Apart from  the work environment legislation most of the 
labour legislation of the last 15  years has been adopted to 
implement  EC  directives.  Danish  collective  agreements 
cannot be used as the only means to implement EC direc-
tives, see below. The development at EC level is therefore 
resulting in a shift in the traditional pattern of sources of 
labour law in Denmark away  from  collective agreements 
towards legislation. 
4. Govenunent regulatory power 
In  matters  of work  environment
12  statutory  instruments 
play an important part. The same is true as regards unem-
ployment benefit.  In other labour law areas  statutory  in-
struments are of minor importance. 
5. Collective agreements and 
individual employment contracts 
A  collective  agreement  in  Denmark  is  an  agreement  (a 
contract)  between  on  the  workers'  side  a  collectivity, 
typically a trade union, and on the employer side either a 
collectivity or an individual employer concerning working 
conditions, e.g. wages, and/or the relationship between the 
parties. 
There is no statutory definition of a collective agreement in 
Danish law. The above definition is in accordance with the 
general view in the literature on labour law
13
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It is  not  a  requirement  in  Danish  law  that  a  collective 
agreement must be in writing. Oral agreements are as bin-
ding  as  collective  agreements.  The  borderline  between 
collective agreements and custom is therefore blurred. 
Collective agreements are legally binding and  make  up  a 
considerable - maybe the most important - part of Danish 
labour law. 
It is  usual  to  say  that a  Danish collective agreement  has 
both a contractual content and a normative content. 
The contractual content is its binding effect on the parties 
to the agreement. One of the most important aspects of the 
contractual content is the peace obligation, see below. 
The normative content is  its binding effect on individual 
contracts  of employment  entered  into  by  an  employer 
covered by the collective agreement. 
The Danish employer must comply with the agreement on 
the terms and conditions he offers all  workers and  empl-
oyees  doing  work  under  the . agreement,  regardless  of 
whether the individual worker is a union member or not. 
If,  for example,  the employer underpays a non-unionized 
worker, he has committed a breach of the collective agre-
ement towards the trade union which is a party to it and is 
likely to be brought before the Labour Court and sentenced 
to pay a fine  (bod)  to  the trade union which is a party to 
the agreement. 
12.  See  for  details  NIELSEN,  RUTH,  Arbejdsmiljeret,  Copenhagen 
1993. 
13.  See for  example JACOBSEN,  PER,  Kollektiv arbejdsret,  Copen-
hagen  1994;  OLE  KRARUP,  Arbejdsretten,  Copenhagen  1980; 
HASSELBALCH, OLE,  Kollektivarbejdsretten,  Copenhagen 1987; 
and  ALLAN  RISE  &  JENS  DEGERBfifL,  Grundreg/er  i  dansk 
arbejdsret, Copenhagen 1983. 
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Around 2/3 of all workplaces in Denmark are estimated to 
be covered  by  collective agreements.  A  collective agree-
ment  is  binding  as  a contract.  On the employer side the 
party may  be  either an organization or an  individual em-
ployer. 
On the workers' side a Danish collective agreement must 
be concluded by a collectivity, typically a trade union. In 
principle any  collectivity  of workers  may  be party  to  a 
collective  agreement.  This  includes  workers'  represen-
tatives but it is in  practice unusual  for them to  conclude 
collective agreements on behalf of their colleagues. 
The general rule is that it is a question of power not of law 
whether a  trade  union  can  make  an  employer  negotiate 
with it. There are almost no statutory provisions in Danish 
labour  law  requiring  the  employer  to  recognize  a  trade 
union or to negotiate with it. 
In  a  conflict of interest a  trade union can  take industrial 
action (strikes, etc.) in order to force an employer to nego-
tiate a collective agreement with it. If the  trade union is 
strong enough it will succeed, if not it will fail.  It is per-
fectly  lawful  for  the  employer  to  refuse  to  discuss  the 
matter with the trade union. Because of the high degree of 
unionization  most  employers  cannot  afford  to  refuse  to 
negotiate.  It is  therefore  from  a  practical  point  of view 
unusual for an employer to be unwilling to negotiate with a · 
trade union. 
As mentioned earlier, even in conflicts of interests strikes, 
etc.  are only lawful if they have a reasonable purpose and 
if there is a reasonable degree of proportionality between 
the means used and the ends to be obtained. 
If an  employer is  already  covered  by  a  collective agree-
ment with one trade union and another trade union wishes 
to enter a collective agreement with him covering the same 
work, the second trade union will not be free to take indus-
trial  action  to  obtain  a  collective  agreement  if the  two 
competing trade unions are members of the same umbrella 
organization,  typically  the Confederation of Trade  unions 
(LO).  In  this situation one could say  that the trade union 
which got a collective agreement first has obtained a sort 
of recognition  and  right  of negotiation  which  excludes 
other trade unions from the same confederation. 
It is also possible for an employer to  give special  recog-
nition to one particular trade union by collective agreement 
in that he promises this trade union not to negotiate with 
others. 
In special circumstance, e.g. collective redundancies, there 
are statutory provisions concerning negotiation. 
Collective agreements  exist  at different  levels.  The basic 
principles of collective labour law are laid down in collec-
tive  agreements  between  the  main  organizations,  e.g.  in 
the basic agreement concluded between the two main orga-
nizations:  the Confederation of  Trade  Unions  (LO) and the 
Danish  Employers'  Confederation  (DA).  These collective 
agreements  are  framework  agreements  which  cover  the 
whole country and different sectors of the economy. 
Another example of framework agreements is the co-opera-
tion  agreement.  The agreement provides for works coun-
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ers or more when recommended by either the employers or 
a majority of the workers. 
Terms and conditions of work, e.g. relating to wages, are 
laid down in collective agreements concluded between the 
trade unions  and  the  corresponding employers'  organiza-
tion.  These  agreements  usually  do  not  cover  the  whole 
country but only a specific sector or branch. 
Different wage  systems  are used  in  Denmark.  The  most 
important ones  are  the  'normal  wage system " where  the 
collective agreement lays down the pay rate that is actually 
paid for the kind of work covered by the agreement. In the 
so-called  U,inimal  wage system " the collective agreement 
lays down a wage rate in addition to which most employ-
ees receive extra payment based on a very wide variety of 
criteria.  During the  1990s a  U,inimum  wage system" has 
developed where the collective agreement does not require 
the employer to pay any specific wage rate but guarantees 
that the  end  result  for  the  individual  worker cannot  fall 
below  a  level  fixed  in  the  collective  agreement.  In  the 
latter two systems, the individual wages are fixed at enter-
prise level in principle as a result of individual negotiation 
but in practice the negotiation is very often carried out by 
the shop steward. 
There is  no  regional  bargaining  in  Denmark  and  bargai-
ning at enterprise level usually occurs only when the enter-
prise is not a member of the relevant employer's associa-
tion.  Questions on the timing of the daily working hours 
are  often  negotiated  on  a  local  basis  between  the  shop 
steward  and  the  management  if the  collective  agreement 
leaves room for manoeuvre. 
A collective agreement is  binding upon an employer who 
either individually or because he is  a  member of an  em-
ployers' organization which has concluded it,  is a party to 
the agreement. The employer must comply with the agree-
ment on the terms and conditions he offers all workers and 
employees  doing  work  under  the  agreement  whether  the 
individual worker is a union member or not. 
Extension of agreements is not possible under Danish law. 
A  Danish  collective  agreement  is  only  binding  upon  an 
employer who, either individually or because he is a mem-
ber of an employers' organization which has concluded it, 
is a party to  the agreement.  It is  not binding upon others 
and cannot be extended to cover outsiders. 
Danish collective agreements are therefore never sufficient 
as the sole instrument to  implement EEC-directives  which 
guarantee minimum rights for all workers. Denmark there-
fore  has  to  introduce  legislation  in  traditional  collective 
agreement areas when  the  EC  adopts directives  providing 
for minimum rights in these areas. 
Equal pay has for example for many years been a traditio-
nal collective labour law issue in Denmark that was settled 
by the organizations by collective agreement without statu-
tory intervention. 
The problem whether or not to adopt legislation on equal 
pay was raised in Denmark before entry into the Commu-
nity  (as  of 1.1.1973).  A  vast  majority  in  Parliament  re-
jected proposals for equal pay legislation in the late 1960s 
and early  1970s
14
•  The main argument was that the collec-
tive autonomy of the  labour market parties should be re-
spected and the issue left to regulation by collective agree-
ment.  Denmark's  membership  of the  EU  changed  this 
view. 
There is  no  statutory defmition of a contract of employ-
ment in Danish law. In the literature it is usual to regard a 
contract as  a contract of employment when a person (the 
worker or the employee) who is subject to the instructions 
of another (the employer)  undertakes to  do work against 
some kind of remuneration. 
The employment contract is becoming differentiated: in the 
1990s, there is not one, but several employment contracts. 
The concept  uemployment contract" is no longer as clear as 
it  used  to  be,  because  the development of new  forms  of 
work  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of several  kinds  of 
employment  contracts.  One  finds  the  part-time  contract, 
the fixed-term contract,  the temporary work contract,  the 
job-sharing or job-splitting contract,  and others could be 
mentioned. 
In  connection  with  the  development  of new  forms  of 
employment  contracts,  the  employment  contract,  in  par-
ticular non-standard types of it, is becoming surrounded by 
formal  requirements in a number of EEC  Member States
1s. 
In many countries, the contract must have a written form 
and must contain some compulsory stipulations. 
Danish law requires agreement between the offeror and the 
offeree as  to  the terms of the contract, but there are very 
few requirements of form. 
According  to  "Christian  den  Femtes  Danske  Lov" from 
1683  '[  ...  ]everybody is bound by his promise, be it made 
by word of  mouth, by hand or by seal [  ...  ] ~ According to 
this provision informal contracts are binding and promises 
oblige the promisor even if they are not supported by any 
cause  or consideration.  The Council Directive on  an  em-
ployer's obligation to inform employees of  the conditions 
applicable to  the  contract of employment or employment 
relationship
16  was  implemented  in  Denmark  in  1993 
through the adoption of an  Act requiring the employer to 
provide information on 
a)  the identities of the parties; 
b)  the place of  work; where there is no fixed or main place 
of work, the principle that the employee is employed at 
various places and  the registered place of business or, 
where appropriate, the domicile of the employer; 
c)  i)  the title, grade,  nature or category of the work for 
which the employee is employed; or 
ii)  a brief specification or description of the work; 
d)  the date of commencement of the contract or employ-
ment relationship; 
e)  in  the case of a temporary contract or employment rela-
tionship, the expected duration thereof; 
f)  the  amount  of paid  leave  to  which  the  employee  is 
entitled  or,  where  this  cannot  be  indicated  when  the 
14.  See for  more details RUTH NIELSEN:  Kvindearbejdsret, Copen-
hagen 1979. 
15.  See for details NIELSEN, RUTH, Form and Proofofthe Contract 
of  Employment, report for the EEC-Commission,  1989. 
16.  91/533/EEC. DENMARK 
information is given, the procedures for allocating and 
determining such leave; 
g)  the length of the periods of notice to be observed by the 
employer  and  the  employee  should  their  contract  or 
employment relationship  be terminated or,  where this 
cannot be indicated when the information is given, the 
method for determining such periods of  notice; 
h)  the initial basic amount, the other component elements 
and  the frequency  of payment of the  remuneration  to 
which the employee is entitled, 
i)  the  length of the employee's normal  working  day  or 
week; 
j)  where appropriate: 
i)  the collective agreements governing the employee's 
conditions of work; 
or 
ii)  in the case of collective agreements concluded out-
side the business by  special joint bodies or institu-
tions, the name of the competent body or joint insti-
tution within which the agreements were concluded. 
As far as  the requirements of cause and consideration are 
concerned the difference between Danish law and  French 
and Anglo-American law is conceptual rather than practi-
cal.  Anyway it is of no practical importance in relation to 
employment contracts that Danish law in principle accepts 
contracts  without  cause  or consideration.  A  contract  of 
employment  is  as  mentioned  a  contract  where  work  is 
exchanged for remuneration in a way that subordinates the 
worker to the employer. 
If the  employer  is  bound  by  a  collective  agreement 
covering the work in question he is  under an  obligation 
towards the union which is a party to the collective agree-
ment to observe all its terms and conditions when entering 
into individual employment contracts regardless of whether 
the individual party to this contract is a union member or 
not.  There is  therefore a presumption that the  individual 
contract contains the terms and conditions of the collective 
agreement even when there is no explicit reference to it. 
6. Case law 
The case law in labour matters stems from different courts 
and  tribunals.  Conflicts  about  collective  agreements  are 
settled  in a  special  part of the  procedural  system,  which 
has nothing to do with individual employment conflicts or 
public labour law conflicts.  Individual  employment cases 
are  usually  heard  by  the  ordinary  civil  courts,  whereas 
public  labour law conflicts are usually  dealt with  by  the 
criminal branch of the (ordinary) courts. 
Danish  collective  labour  law  is  - apart  from  collective 
agreements- mainly based upon case law developed within 
the framework of the special  procedural system set up  to 
solve collective labour conflicts (see below in chapter 111), 
i.e. industrial arbitration and the Labour Court. 
The material from the Labour Court is publicly available, 
but arbitral awards belong in principle to  the parties,  i.e. 
the labour market organizations. 
29 
A number of labour law writers in Denmark are employed 
with or otherwise connected with the organizations.  Other 
writers  hold  research  positions  in  the  universities  and 
similar institutions. It is in practice sometimes difficult for 
academic  researchers  to  gain  access  to  source  material 
which is the property of the organizations. This is, in my 
view,  a considerable impediment to independent research. 
There is a need for public access to the sources of law17• 
The ordinary court judges who have ruled  in labour law 
cases in Denmark seem to view the cases from the points 
of view of the law of contract, the law of civil procedure 
and  public  administrative  law.  Judges  are  mainly  con-
cerned with the law as a means of protecting individuals. 
Case law from the European Court of  Justice plays a grow-
ing  role in  Danish  labour law.  This applies both  to  case 
law stemming  from  other  EU  countries and  to  European 
case law developing from Danish cases. 
The European  Commission took infringement proceedings 
against Denmark in 1983 over the then Equal Pay Act
18
• 
7. Custom and practice 
Custom and practice is an  important source of law in the 
collective  labour  law  part  of the  procedural  system  but 
seems to  play only a  minor role in the other parts of the 
system. 
8. International Law 
In respect of international  law Denmark has  traditionally 
adhered  to  the  so-called  dualistic  theory.  International 
conventions ratified by Denmark are not regarded as part 
of Danish law unless  they  are in  some way  incorporated 
into Danish  law.  In  labour law  matters,  especially as  re-
gards  fundamental  human  rights,  there  are  discrepancies 
between  Danish  law  and  the  international  minimum stan-
dards. 
Denmark  has  for  example  ratified  a  number  of interna-
tional  conventions on human rights but they are only re-
garded as  binding upon  the state as  "state~ They are not 
(yet) transformed into national labour law and are usually 
not considered binding upon  public employers or private 
employers. It has for example until very recently been the 
general  view  that  a  private  Danish  employer  is  free  to 
make  racist  recruitment  decisions.  An  Act  prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religion, politi-
cal  opinion,  national  extraction  or social  origin  is,  how-
ever, expected to be proposed by the Minister of Labour in 
autumn 1995. 
As  another example  the  following  conclusion concerning 
the Danish implementation of the European Social Charter 
may  be mentioned:  "it  is evident that the Danish govern-
ments have at no time had any intention of  adhering strict-
ly  to  those principles,  if this would mean a  necessity to 
abolish traditional principles of  the Danish labour market. 
. . .  This means that the Charter cannot get a strong profile 
in the national state of law,  and it must also necessarily 
17.  Cf KRARUP,  OLE  &  MATIHIASEN,  JeROEN,  Ajskedigelseret, 
1984. 
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mean that the national state of  law on certain points may 
be in violation of  the principles of  the Charter.  '~ 
9
• 
The dualistic theory has,  however,  been contested during 
recent years
20
• 
9. Conflict of rules - hierarchy of sources 
There is a strong tradition of "realistic legal theory " in the 
Nordic  countries
21
•  This  results  in  academic  researchers 
trying to give an account and analysis of all the sources of 
laws  in  legal  practice.  This view leads  to  a  focus  on  the 
traditional sources of law: collective agreements, case law, 
unwritten principles of law etc. 
In  labour law  matters,  especially as  regards  fundamental 
human rights, there are discrepancies between Danish law 
and the international minimum standards. 
In respect of international law, Denmark has as mentioned 
traditionally followed  the dualistic theory so  that interna-
tional conventions ratified by Denmark are not regarded as 
part of Danish law unless they are incorporated into Dan-
ish law. The dualistic theory has, however, been contested 
during  recent  years  and  it  has  been  argued  that  interna-
tional conventions ought to be considered law at a higher 
level than domestic law. 
The problem of possible discrepancies between the Consti-
tution and  Danish  law has not arisen  in  Denmark due  to 
the  marginal  role  played  by  the  Constitution  in  Danish 
labour law.  The implementation of EEC directives is lead-
ing to a change in the traditional pattern of sources of law 
away  from  collective agreements  towards  legislation,  see 
below in chapter w. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
AND DEALING WITH DISPUTES 
Danish labour law is  as  mentioned  often  subdivided  into 
three parts: 
•  collective labour law 
•  individual employment law 
•  public labour law 
The procedural system in Danish labour law is subdivided 
along the same lines.  Disputes about collective agreements 
are settled in a special part of the procedural system, which 
has nothing to do with individual employment conflicts or 
public labour law disputes.  Individual  employment  cases 
are  usually  heard  by  the  ordinary  civil  courts,  whereas 
public  labour law  disputes  are usually  dealt with  by  the 
criminal branch of the (ordinary) courts. 
What  sanctions  are  available  depends  on  where  in  the 
procedural system a case is heard. 
1. Collective labour law 
In  1908-1910,  the  basic  principles  for  the  settlement  of 
disputes of conflicts relating to collective agreements were 
19.  JACOBSEN, PER,  in: JASPERS  and BETTEN (eds), 25 years Euro-
pean Social Charter, Kluwer 1986, p. 81  pp. 
20.  Cf EsPERSEN, OLE, lndgaelse og opfyldelse aftrakJater, Copen-
hagen 1970, p. 163. 
21.  See on this theory: ALF Ross, Ret og Retfardighed, Copenha-
gen 1953. 
laid down as mentioned in the inttpduction. A fundamental 
distinction  was  drawn  between  ¢onflicts  of interest  and 
conflicts of right. 
1 
A  conflict of interest arises  in  arteas  where no  valid col-
lective agreement applies.  This ~y  be because the matter 
in  dispute has  never been  coveretl  by  a  collective agree-
ment,  e.g. due to the employer  ~ing non-affiliated to an 
employers' organization; or it rna~ be because a previously 
existing  collective  agreement  has  been  terminated.  In 
conflicts of interest the parties are free  to  take  industrial 
action: strike, lock-out, blacking and boycott. 
A  conflict of right arises  where the matter in  dispute is 
already covered by a collective agreement. 
A Danish collective agreement entails a peace obligation, 
i.e.  a duty on the parties to the collective agreement and 
their members not to  take industrial  action over a matter 
covered  by  the  agreement.  In  th~ event of a  conflict of 
right,  there is  only in very few  cases a right to  resort to 
industrial action (strikes, etc.). 
The exceptions from the peace obligation are: 
•  cases where the employer does mot pay the wages 
•  cases where it is necessary to stop working in order to 
protect the health and welfare of the worker 
•  cases  where  the  employer requires the workers  to  do 
work that is not covered by  th~ collective agreement in 
force 
•  cases  of lawful  sympathetic  strike  or other  industrial 
action. 
In Denmark there is legal parity between the workers and 
the employers in the sense that the employer has the same 
right to lock-out as the workers have to strike. 
In the event of a conflict of right, there is virtually never a 
right to resort to industrial action, e.g. to lock-out. 
The only exception  from  the peace obligation that is  rel-
evant for employers is  cases of lawful sympathetic indus-
trial action, i.e. lock-out. 
In  conflict of interest  situations  there  is  freedom  to  take 
industrial  action  rovided  there  is  a  reasonable  degree of 
proportionality between  the  goal  to  be obtained  and  the 
means used to obtain it. 
The  freedom  applies  both  to  the  workers  and  to  the 
employers. 
A lawful lock-out does not suspend the individual contract 
of employment under Danish  law.  It terminates it.  After 
the  lock-out  the  collective parties usually  agree upon  re-
instatement. If they  do  not and  if 
1 the employer does not 
enter into a new individual contract!with a particular work-
er, this worker is no longer employ~  with the employer. 
An  unlawful  lock-out  is  a  breach \of the collective agre-
ement.  It  will  usually  result  in  th~ employer being  sen-
tenced  to  pay  a  "bod".  It neither  s~pends nor terminates 
the individual contract of employment. 
As an  alternative to industrial action, a procedural system 
has  been  set  up  to  enable  aggrie~ed parties  to  obtain  a 
judicial settlement of the dispute. DENMARK 
This procedural system has been subdivided into two bran-
ches: industrial arbitration and the Labour Court. 
In broad terms, conflicts over the interpretation of collec-
tive agreements are settled by arbitration, whereas conflicts 
over an  alleged  breach  of the  collective  agreement,  e.g. 
strikes in violation of the peace obligation, are dealt with 
by  the  Labour  Court,  which  can  impose  a  fine  ("bod j 
upon the workers or others who have violated the agree-
ment. 
A  standard grievance procedure for  the handling of con-
flicts by industrial arbitration was laid down by collective 
agreement in 1908 (Normenfor behandling affaglig strid). 
The first Act on the Labour Court was passed in 1910. The 
Act presently in force dates back to 1973. 
In collective labour law there is a special sanction, the so-
called  'fJod" which  is  an  amount  of money  the  Labour 
Court  can  sentence a  party  to  a collective agreement  (or 
members  of that  party)  to  pay  to  the  other party  in  the 
event of breach of the collective agreement. 
When workers strike in violation of the  peace obligation 
entailed in any  collective agreement each of them is  sen-
tenced to pay a  "bod" which  is  calculated on  the basis of 
the number of working  hours  they  have  been  on  strike. 
The normal 'fJod"is 27 DKK per strike hour (approximately 
3,5 ECU}  for unskilled workers and 32 DKK (approximately 
4  ECU}  per strike hour for skilled workers. If  the organi-
zation  has  made itself responsible for  the strike it will  in 
addition be sentenced to pay a  'fJod"which can be a consi-
derable amount of money.  The organization is regarded as 
responsible both if it has taken an  active part in the strike 
and if it has not done enough to prevent the workers from 
striking. 
When workers strike, a meeting between the organizations 
must be held at the request of the employer or the employ-
ers' organization, usually within 24 hours. If  the workers 
go back to work before this meeting or follow a suggestion 
from  this  meeting  to  resume work they  are as  a rule not 
liable to pay a 'fJod ~ 
Cases  are brought before the Labour Court  by  the  most 
comprehensive organization, typically the two main organ-
izations on the Danish labour market:  the Confederation of 
Trade  Unions  (LO}  and  the Danish Employers' Confeder-
ation (DA} and never by the individuals whose rights might 
have been violated. 
If  for example an employer violates his duty under a col-
lective agreement  to  pay  a  woman  equal  pay,  the  trade 
union - provided it is not a member of a more comprehen-
sive  organization  - which  is  a  party  to  that  collective 
agreement can bring the case before the Labour Court. The 
individual woman who is being discriminated against can 
do nothing. If  the trade union is a member of a more com-
prehensive organization,  e.g.  the  Confederation of Trade 
Unions (in Danish W}, it is up to the more comprehensive 
organization to decide whether or not to bring an action. 
Industrial arbitration cases are usually dealt with by  arbi-
tration  tribunals  set up  ad hoc for  each  individual  case. 
The tribunal consists of a chairman and usually two repre-
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sentatives of each  party  to  the  collective agreement22•  In 
dismissal  cases  there  is,  however,  a  permanent  unfair 
dismissal arbitration board. 
In  1960,  provisions  against  unfair  dismissal  were  intro-
duced  into  the  Basic  Agreement  (which  is  a  collective 
agreement, see above) between the Confederation of  Trade 
Unions  (in  Danish  W}  and  the  employers'  organization. 
Following this, similar provisions were introduced into the 
Salaried Employees  Act (in  Danish  Funktiont2rloven)  in 
1964.  The  basic  principle of the  unfair dismissal  provi-
sions  is  that  termination  of employment  shall  not  take 
place unless  there  is  a valid  reason  for  termination con-
nected  with  the  capacity  or  conduct  of  the  wor-
ker/employee or based on the operational requirements of 
the enterprise. 
Section 4.3  of the above basic agreement  prohibits arbi-
trariness in the dismissal  of a worker or an  employee.  A 
dismissed worker or employee with at least 9 months of 
continuous  employment  with  the  employer  is  entitled  to 
request a statement of the reasons for dismissal. 
If  the employee/worker asserts that the dismissal is unreas-
onable and not founded  in  the conduct of the worker/em-
ployee or the circumstances of the undertaking, local nego-
tiations  between  representatives of management and  staff 
may  be  demanded.  If no  agreement  is  reached  by  local 
level negotiation, the interested union may demand negoti-
ations between the organizations. If  this does not result in 
agreement,  the trade union  may  bring the case before an 
unfair dismissal arbitration board set up by the main orga-
nizations (i.e. the Confederation of  Trade Unions (LO) and 
the employers' organization) 
Redundancy is always sufficient cause for dismissal. In the 
event  of redundancy,  the  employer  may  choose  at  will 
which workers/employees to dismiss. This discretion is not 
subject to arbitration or judicial control. Danish employers 
are not under an obligation to follow objective rules for the 
selection  of workers  to  be  dismissed  where  economic 
necessity requires a reduction in the labour force. 
A  wide  range  of causes  related  to  the  worker/employee 
rna y  render a dismissal  fair,  for  example  refusal  to  obey 
orders, sickness (in certain cases) and lack of capability or 
qualifications. 
The  basic  agreement  between  the  main  labour  market 
organizations provides for two types of remedies for unfair 
dismissal: 
•  re-instatement, and 
•  monetary compensation 
It is a precondition of re-instatement under the basic agree-
ment that the interested trade union chooses to invoke this 
remedy  and  that  the  relations  between  the  worker/em-
ployee and the employer have not been damaged in a way 
that renders continuance of the employment inexpedient. 
The amount of money  that may  be awarded as compensa-
tion cannot exceed 52 weeks pay. 
22.  A  Danish  industrial  arbitration Tribunal  has  asked  the Euro-
pean Court of Justice questions under art 177 of the EEC-Treaty 
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Unfair dismissal provisions in other sources of law usually 
only  provide  for  monetary  compensation,  but  not  re-
instatement. 
An example of this is the Salaried Employees Act sec.  2b. 
The concept of  unfair dismissal in this Act is understood as 
in the above basic agreement. 
Most workers/employees are covered either by collective 
agreement provisions against unfair dismissals or the Sala-
ried Employees Act sec.  2b. 
There is legislation against dismissals of workers in special 
circumstances, for example safety representatives. 
There is  no  general  statutory minimum period of notice 
under Danish law. For certain groups, notably salaried em-
ployees covered by the Salaried Employees Act, the length 
of notice,  is,  however,  laid  down  by statute.  For other 
groups, the length of notice depends upon collective agree-
ment.  It  is  very  common  for  collective  agr~ments to 
contain provisions on this matter. In the absence hereof the 
length of notice may be determined by custom or by indi-
vidual contract. If  the length of notice cannot be fixed by 
any of these sources of law, a reasonable period of notice 
is  required.  What  length  this  is  depends  on  the circum-
stances of the individual employment relationship. 
In the case of gross misconduct on the part of the work-
er/employee the contract of employment may be terminated 
by  the employer without notice.  Such  dismissals  are al-
ways  regarded  as  fair  and  reasonable  under  the  above 
provisions concerning unfair dismissal.  In other cases,  the 
employer must both observe the applicable period of notice 
and have a  fair reason  for dismissing the person in ques-
tion. 
There are no formal rules on the necessity to give a warn-
ing  before  resorting  to  dismissal.  In  the  case  of minor 
offences, warnings are required in order for the dismissal 
to be considered fair. 
2. Individual employment law 
There is no system of conciliation, mediation and arbitra-
tion concerning conflicts relating to individual employment 
contracts in Denmark. 
Conflicts arising out of individual employment contracts or 
concerning the interpretation of legislation governing such 
contracts are dealt with by the ordinary civil courts.  The 
Labour Court does not hear individual employment cases. 
Denmark has, in contrast to most other Western countries, 
no  special  labour or employment  courts  or tribunals  to 
handle cases concerning individual employment conflicts. 
In employment cases the complainant may  invoke all  the 
remedies usually available in  the law of contract, e.g. the 
court  may  declare  the  rights  of the  parties,  the  injured 
party may rescind the contract in the event of a fundamen-
tal  breach of the contract, and the court may award dam-
ages  for economic loss and,  where there is special  provi-
sion for this remedy, also compensation for non-economic 
loss, e.g. injured feelings. 
As regards employees in the public sector the law of em-
ployment contracts applies along with public administra-
tive law. A public authority has. duty to be impartial and 
objective  - including  when  funqtioning  as  an  employer. 
Decisions made by public  bodi~ which violate this prin-
ciple are- under administrative Ulw- invalid. As a conse-
quence  an  unfair  dismissal  in  the  public  sector  may  be 
invalid (because of administrativcr law), whereas a similar 
dismissal  in the private sector only entails a  duty on the 
employer  to  pay  damages.  If the  unfair  dismissal  is 
covered by collective agreement 'the case is different,  see 
above. 
3. Public labour law 
Public labour law disputes are -usually  dealt with by the 
criminal branch of the (ordinary) courts. Cases are brought 
by the public prosecutor. The typical sanction is a (small) 
fine for violation for example of the Working Environment 
Act. 
The Labour Inspectorate has nothing to do with individual 
employment contracts  in  Denmark  except as  regards  the 
Holidays Act. 
CHAPTER IV: NATIONAL LAW IN 
AN INTERNATIONAL CONTE)(T 
1. Danish labour law compared to the labour 
law systems of other EU countrie$ 
There are major variations
23  between the Member States as 
regards the legal regulation of collective agreements in res-
pect of negotiating  rights and duties,  levels of collective 
bargaining, binding effect of the ¢ollective agreement, the 
right of the workers to strike when a collective agreement 
is in force, extension of the no~tive  effect of the agree-
ment and its duration and coverage. 
The 15 EU countries can be
24 divided into three groups: 
•  10 countries (Austria,  Germani)',  France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  Portugal,  Italy  and 
Greece) belong to the Roman-Germanic system 
•  2 countries (the United Kingdom and Ireland) belong to 
the Anglo-Saxon system, 
•  3  countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) belong to 
the Nordic system of labour regulation. 
Denmark was until  1. 1.1995 unique in an  EU  context by 
being  the  only  representative  of, the  Nordic  labour  law 
tradition
25
•  In  broad terms this tradition places a  stronger 
emphasis on collective labour law than is the case in other 
EU-countries. The Nordic workfo~e  has the highest degree 
of unionization  (around  80-90%)1 in  the  EU.  The strong 
position of the trade unions  may be due to  the  fact  that 
they  like,  their Scandinavian  coupterparts,  tend  to  work 
very closely with the employer. 
As mentioned in  the introduction, the two main organiza-
tions on the Danish labour market,  the Confederation of 
23.  Cf  EEC-COMMISSION,  Summary  Report  on  the  Comparative 
Study on  Rules Governing Workiflg  Conditions in the Member 
States, SEC(89) 926, Bruxelles 1989, no 45-52. 
24.  Cf EEC-COMMISSION,  Comparative  Study  on  Rules  Governing 
Working  Conditions  in  the  Member  States,  Part  1,  General 
Aspects, Bruxelles 1989. 
25.  BRUUN,  N.,  Fl.oOOREN,  B., HYDtN, H., HALVORSEN,  M.  and 
NIELSEN, R.,  The  Nordic Labour ;Relations Model,  Aldershot, 
Dartmouth, 1992. DENMARK 
Trade  Unions  (LO)  and  the Danish Employers' Confeder-
ation  (DA)  concluded  a  basic  agreement,  the  so-called 
September Agreement (Septemberforlig),  in 1899 where the 
employers recognized the right of the workers to unionize 
and LO  in return recognized the managerial prerogatives of 
the employer.  Similar agreements were concluded  in the 
other Nordic countries at the beginning of the 20th century 
but do not exist in the other EU countries where the trade 
unions  have  traditionally  have  contested  the  managerial 
power of the employers
26
• 
Denmark has, in contrast to most other Western countries, 
no  special  labour or employment  courts  or tribunals  to 
handle cases concerning individual employment conflicts. 
In addition, Danish labour law is rather old-fashioned due 
to the fact that Denmark has not (yet) adopted comprehen-
sive employment protection legislation comparable to that 
enacted in a number of other countries during the last 20 
years or so. 
2. Private international law and 
detennination of law applicable 
2.1 Rules on conflict of labour laws in general 
In 1968, the Convention of  the Member States of  the EEC 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of  Judgments in  Civil 
and Commercial  Matters  was  signed
27
•  Denmark became 
signatory to the convention in 1978 and has transposed the 
Convention into Danish law by section 247 of the Act on 
Court Procedure and by a  special Act
28  incorporating the 
Convention into Danish law as of 1.11.1986. 
In the case of a legal dispute, venues can be established in 
several Member States, both under national law and under 
the  EC  Judgment  Convention.  It  was  therefore,  in  the 
opinion of the  Commission,  necessary  to  harmonize  the 
conflict of labour law rules of the Member States. 
In 1972, the European Commission proposed a Regulation 
on conflicts of  laws in employment relationships within the 
Community
29
•  To reflect the opinions of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the European Parliament, an amend-
ed proposal was presented in 1976
30
• 
In  1972,  the  Commission  also  submitted  a  Preliminary 
Draft Convention  on  the Law Applicable to  Contractual 
and  Non-Contractual  Obligations  which  among  other 
matters contained provisions on the choice of law in em-
ployment relations. 
The above draft Regulation on the choice of law in  em-
ployment  relations  has  never  been  adopted,  whereas  the 
draft Convention in an amended  form  (omitting the non-
26.  Compare SUMMERS,  CLYDE,  Comparisons in Labor lAw: Swe-
den and the United States, in: Svensk Juristtidning,  1983 p. 589 
ff. 
27.  See for a commentary O.J.  1979 c 59. 
28.  Act no 325 of 4.6.1986. 
29.  J  .o.  1972 No c 49/26. The text of the  d~aft Regulation is  also 
published  in:  Rabels  Zeitschrift jar ausliindisches  und  inter-
nationales Privatrecht,  1973, p. 585. 
30.  COM(75) 653. This text is reprinted in: Bulletin of  Comparative 
Labour Relations, Deventer 1976, p. 288. 
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contractual obligations) was signed in  1980 as the Euro-
pean Communities' Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligationr
1
• 
The main  difference between the draft Regulation on the 
choice of law in employment relations and the Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations relates
32 
to the degree to which party autonomy is permitted. 
In the explanatory memorandum to the amended proposal 
for a Regulation the Commission points to the fact that the 
conflict of law rules of the Member States of the EU vary 
greatly. In broad terms there are two opposing systems. 
Under one system the binding provisions of national  la-
bour law are considered to be 'lois de police et de sdrete', 
so that precedence is given to national labour law in intra-
Community employment relationships. 
Under the other system, precedence is given to the ability 
of the parties to choose the applicable law. 
The proposed Regulation  stipulated the place of work as 
the binding criterion in most cases. It allows a free choice 
of law by the contracting parties only within certain limits 
bound to objective criteria.  In addition the minimum pro-
tective legislation at the place of work should always be 
valid.  The draft Regulation thus outlawed party autonomy 
in most cases in employment matters. 
The Rome Convention allows party autonomy as the main 
rule in all contractual matters including employment rela-
tions. If the parties to a multinational collective agreement 
want to create legal uniformity within the firm by means of 
the collective agreement, they may rely on the party auton-
omy of private international law and achieve their goal by 
means of a choice of law clause or a forum clause. 
Denmark put the Convention  into  force  on  1 July  1984. 
The Convention has been incorporated into Danish law as 
it stands as an appendix to the Danish Ace
3 which introdu-
ces it. 
It follows from Article 9 of the Rome Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations that a contract, 
e.g. a contract of employment, is valid as regards form if 
it fulfils either the law of the lex loci contractus or of the 
lex causa. 
If,  for example, an employer whose place of business is in 
France recruits a Danish engineer who lives in Denmark at 
the time of contracting to do work at a plant in Italy and 
the contract of employment includes a choice of law clause 
in favour of Italian law, the contract of employment will, 
31.  See on the convention:  LANDO,  OLE,  The  EEC Convention  on 
the  lAw Applicable  to  Contractual  Obligations,  in:  Common 
Market Law Review, 1987, p. 159. 
32.  See for commentaries and comparisons of the two instruments: 
HEPPLE,  B.A., Conflict of  lAws on  Employment Relationships 
within the EEC,  in:  LIPSTEIN, K. (ed),  Harmonization of  Private 
lntenttJtional  lAw by  the  EEC,  London  1978;  Philip,  Allan, 
Contracts of  Employment in the lAw of  Conflict of  Laws in the 
EEC,  in  lntenttJtionales  Recht  und  Wirtscha.ftsordnung,  Fest-
schrift  jar  F  A  Mann,  Miinchen  1977;  and  GAMIU.SCHEO, 
FRANZ,  lntereuropdisches  Arbeitsrecht.  Zu  zwei  Vorschldgen 
der  EWG  zum  intenttJtionalen  Arbeitsrecht,  in:  Rabels  Zeit-
schri.ft fur ausliindisches und intenttJtionales Privatrecht,  1973, 
p. 284. 
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according to Article 9 of the Rome Convention, be valid as 
regards form if it fulfils either the requirements of French 
law, or of  Danish law or of  Italian law. 
It will  therefore  often  be  somewhat  difficult  to  assess 
whether an employment contract with connections to dif-
ferent  EEC countries does or does not fulfil  the requisite 
formal  requirements.  Harmonization  of formal  require-
ments  will  consequently  add  to  the  legal  certainty  sur-
rounding employment contracts. 
2.2 Choice by the parties - limitations 
on freedom of choice: imperative law 
Article 3 of the Convention  provides that a contract shall 
be governed by the law chosen by the parties. However, in 
individual employment contracts the employee is protected 
by the mandatory rules of the law which would govern the 
individual employment contract in the absence of a choice 
of law by the parties, see Article 6 of  the Convention. 
According to Article 6(2),  this is the law of the country in 
which the employee habitually carries out his work or, if 
the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any 
one particular country, the law of the country in which the 
place of business through which he was engaged is  situ-
ated. If  it appears from the circumstances of the case that 
the  contract  is  more  closely  connected  with  the  law  of 
another country, the contract shall be governed by the law 
of that country. 
2.3 The law applicable in the event of failure to choose 
Article 4 of the Convention  contains the general  rule that 
contracts shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which they are most closely connected. 
Individual  employment  contracts  are,  according  to  Arti-
cle 6{2), prima facie governed by the law of the country in 
which the employee habitually carries out his work or, if 
the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any 
one particular country, the law of the country in which the 
place of business through which he was engaged  is  situ-
ated. 
The prima facie rule in Article 6 is a presumption of some 
strength.  It applies  unless  it  appears  from  the  circum-
stances of the  case  that  the contract is  more closely  con-
nected with  the  law of another country.  In  that case  the 
contract shall be governed by the law of that country. 
3. Movtment within the Community of workers within 
the same enterprise or group of enterprises 
3.1 Definition of a multinational enterprise 
The  ICFfU
34  Charter  of Trade  Union  Demands for  the 
Legislative  Control  of Multinational  Companies
35
,  says 
that for trade union purposes
36 a multinational enterprise is 
34.  I.e. the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
35.  ICFTU,  Charter of Trade  Union  Demands for the  Legislative 
Control of  Multinational  Companies,  in:  Bulletin of Compara-
tive lAbour Relations, Deventer 1976, p. 405. 
36.  See on the trade unions and multinationals: RIDDLE, JOHN,  The 
rcrro  and  the  Multinationals,  in:  Bulletin  of Comparative 
lAbour Relations, Deventer 1976, p. 327. 
one  which  carries  on activities  other than  marketing  its 
own products in more than one ctntry. 
The o  ECD  Guidelines for Multi  ational Enterprises  pro-
vides  in paragraph 8  of the lnt oduction  that  ~  precise 
legal definition of  multinational ~terprises is not required 
for the purposes of  the  Guideline~. These usually comprise 
companies  or other entities  who$e  ownership  is  private, 
state or mixed,  established  in  iljferent countries  and so 
linked that one or more of  them Jr,ay be able to exercise a 
significant influence over the activities of others and,  in 
particular,  to  share  knowledge  and  resources  with  the 
others." 
The  lME-Committeel
1  clarified  the  definition of a  multi-
national  enterprise  in  the  c&A easel'  dating  from  1984 
where the Comminee concluded:  While it is not the inten-
tion of  the Committee to change its position, as reflected in 
the  text  of the  Guidelines,  that, for the purpose of the 
Guidelines, no precise definition of  a multinational enter-
prise is required, the Committee considers that the sharing 
of knowledge  and  resources  among  companies  or other 
entities would not be in itself, i.e.  in the absence of  other 
relevant  circumstances,  a  sufficient  indication  that  such 
companies  or entities  constitute  4  multinational enterpri-
se." 
For labour law purposes there is no need for a more pre-
cise definition of a multinational enterprise than that con-
tained  in  the OECD Guidelines.  With respect to collective 
labour law, the decisive difference between a multinational 
enterprise and  a one-country  co~pany is  that  in multina-
tional  enterprises  there is  some degree of central  control 
over  major  managerial  decisions,  especially  concerning 
investment and plant location. 
This gives the multinational employer the power to transfer 
activities  and  money  from  one  country  to  another.  The 
result sometimes is that  the workers are faced  with a na-
tional subsidiary as employer whidh is closing down due to 
a decision by central management! on which they have had 
no real influence, and which does not have sufficient finan-
cial  means  to  meet  the  obligations  under  national  law 
towards the workers being made redundane
9
• 
3.2 International and Community provisions 
Many  provisions  in  international  labour  law  and  EEC-
labour law deal  with individual employment law but only 
few  with collective agreements
40
•  This is probably due to 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
I.e.  the  Committee on  International  Investment  and  Multina-
tional Enterprises set up by the OECD on 21  January 1975. The 
IME-Committee  is  competent  to  clarify  the  Guidelines.  The 
clarifications have  the  same status as  the Guidelines:  they  are 
voluntary and not legally enforceable. 
Reprinted as case no  10 in the OOCD  chapter of: BLANPAIN, R. 
(ed), International  Encyclopediaf~r  lAbour Law and Industrial 
Relations.  Case Law, Deventer 19$5. 
See  the  case  law  reproduced  in:  BLANPAIN,  R.  (ed),  Interna-
tional Encyclopedia for lAbour Law and Industrial  Relations. 
Case Law, Deventer 1985. 
See e.g. ILO-convention no 87 andl98, which, however, are not 
relevant to the problem discussed 4ere. DENMARK 
the  fact  that it is easier to  harmonize individual employ-
ment law than collective labour law
41
• 
The  recommendations
42  contained  in  the  ILO-tripartite 
declaration on multinationals and the OECD  Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises
43  are not binding. They contrib-
ute to the development of  a code of good practice requiring 
multinationals to respect national practices, to abstain from 
misuse  of their  power to  transfer jobs and  money  from 
country to country and to provide workers with informa-
tion  and  give  them  access  to  consultations  with  real 
decision-makers.  Non-binding  clarifications  of the  OECD 
Guidelines can, as mentioned earlier, be given by the IME 
Committee. 
The one collective  labour law  issue  that  has  been  most 
intensely dealt with at international  level  is  information, 
consultation and worker participation. 
The question of whether or not - and if so how - to estab-
lish cross-frontier rights of information and consultation in 
relation to multinational employers has, during the last 20 
years or so,  been the subject of discussion and proposals 
both at Nordic
44 and EU level
45
• 
At EU level two different models of increasing workers' in-
volvement in the life of the undertaking have been attempt-
ed. 
One model  is worker participation in management bodies 
of the undertaking. This model underlies the draft Regula-
tion for a European  Company Statute
46  and  the draft 5th 
Directive on Company Law
41
• 
There are no Danish provisions in statute laws or collective 
agreements  providing  for  workers'  rights  to  information 
from  or consultation with non-Danish parts of their em-
ployer. Workers'  participation  in  Denmark operates only 
within Denmark. 
How to establish cross-frontier rights to  information and 
consultation in relation to Nordic multinational employers 
was the subject of a report published in 1988
48
• 
The  employers'  organizations  were  strongly  opposed  to 
cross-frontier  rights  to  information  and  consultation  and 
took the view that information and consultation should be 
channelled  through  the  local  (national)  e.g.  Danish 
employer. Danish workers should therefore not be entitled 
to 
11go  over the head" of their Danish employer and seek 
41.  cf:  KAHN-FREUND,  0TIO: On  Uses  and Misuses of Compara-
tive Law, Selected Writings,  London 1978 p. 294. 
42.  See annex 1 and 2. 
43.  cf: BLANPAIN, R., Guidelines for multinational Entetprises and 
Labour Relations,  in:  BLANPAIN,  R  (ed),  Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations, Deventer 1987 p. 133. 
44.  cf: Koncemfackligt Samarbete i Norden, Nordisk Rild 1988. 
45.  cf:  DocKSEY,  CHRISTOPHER,  Employee  information  and 
consultation rights in the Member States of  the European Com-
munities, Comparative Labor Law,  1985, p. 32 ff and:  DocK-
SHY,  CHRISTOPHER,  Information  and Consultation  of Employ-
ees:  The  United  Kingdom  and  the  Vredeling  Directive,  in: 
Modem Law Review, 1986, p. 281. 
46.  EC Bulletin, Supplement 4/75, COM(88) 320. 
47.  Amended Porposal for  a  Fifth Directive concerning the struc-
ture of public limited companies and the powers and obligations 
of their organs, O.J.  1983 c 240, EC Bulletin Supplement 6/83. 
48.  Koncemfagligt Samarbejde i Norden, Nordisk Rild 1988. 
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information and consultation with e.g. the Swedish part of 
the employer. 
The  trade  unions  took  the  opposite  view  and  called  for 
collective agreements providing for cross-frontier rights to 
information and consultation. Due to the lack of  agreement 
nothing has  come out of it so far.  It is consequently not 
likely that the Danish leading organizations, the Confeder-
ation of Trade  Unions  (LO)  and  the Danish  Employers' 
Confederation (DA),  will in the near future be able to agree 
upon  a  collective  agreement  solution  to  the  problem  of 
securing  rights  to  consultation  and  information  within 
multinational groups. 
As  mentioned,  in  1974,  provisions  which  ensured 
employee  representation  on  company  boards  were  intro-
duced into company legislation. This right was extended in 
1980  and  1987
49
•  One  possibility  would  be  to  develop 
these rules so as to cover multinational groups. 
3.3 Cross-national collective agreements 
Foreign elements can  affect collective agreements in two 
different ways. 
On the one hand,  there is the question of the applicability 
of national collective agreements to situations with foreign 
elements,  e.g.  the  applicability  of a  Danish  collective 
agreement  to  foreign  workers  doing  work  in  Denmark. 
This question is not dealt with in this paper. 
On  the  other hand,  there  is  the question  of international 
(here  European)  collective  agreements,  i.e.  agreements 
concluded between parties from different countries. 
Collective bargaining at European  level  could be of two 
major types: 
•  Europe-wide framework agreements laying down basic 
principles which  are then  to  be incorporated  into  na-
tional  collective agreements.  For practical purposes no 
such collective agreements exist
50
•  This is probably due 
to  the low degree of internationalization of the labour 
market organizations. This type of European collective 
agreements is not discussed further here; 
•  enterprise  level  cross-border  collective  agreements  in 
multinational  firms.  A  few  such  agreements  exist.  In 
this  paper the  term  multinational  agreement  refers  to 
this type of European collective agreements. 
Consideration is given below to whether similar effects in 
different countries can be obtained by relying on similariti-
es of national  legal  systems, by means of private interna-
tional  law,  or  by  means  of supranational  (international 
labour law or EEC labour law) provisions. 
Since collective labour law is fundamentally different from 
country  to  country  within  the  EEC,  multinational  enter-
prises  which  choose  to  operate  by  way  of multinational 
collective agreements will  be faced  with the problems of 
private international law, i.e. the question of which law is 
applicable, in what countries can venue be established and 
49.  See for details e.g.: GOMARD,  BERNHARD, Aktie-og anpartssel-
skabsrel, Copenhagen 1987. 
50.  cf:  RoGER  BLANPAIN,  Report on collective agreements,  p.  12 
for the EEC-Commission's project on Rules Governing Working 
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is  a  judgment  delivered  in  one  country  enforceable  in 
another'. 
3.3.1 Law applicable 
As  mentioned an individual employment contract is  gov-
erned by the law chosen by the parties. 
However,  in  individual  employment  contracts  the 
employee is protected by the mandatory rules of the law 
which would govern the individual employment contract in 
the absence of a choice of law by the parties, see Article 6 
of the Convention. 
According to Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention on the 
Law applicable to Contractual Obligations, which as men-
tioned is incorporated into Danish law,  this is the law of 
the country in which the employee habitually carries out 
his work or, if the employee does not habitually carry out 
his work  in  any  one particular country,  the  law  of the 
country in which the place of business through which he 
was engaged is situated. If  it appears from the circumstan-
ces of the case that the contract is more closely connected 
with the law of another country, the contract will be gov-
erned by the law of that country. 
If  the Danish part of a multinational enterprise is party to a 
Danish collective agreement, this agreement must be com-
plied  with  by  the  employers  as  regards  the  wages  and 
terms of employment offered to all employees in Denmark, 
including  employees  coming  from  other  EEC-countries. 
Danish collective  agreements  are to  be observed  by  the 
employers bound by them, in respect of both members and 
non-members of the union which is a  party thereto,  pro-
vided they do work covered by the agreement. 
3.3.2 Which law is applicable as the proper law 
of a multinational collective agreement in the 
absence of a choice of law by the parties? 
Collective  agreements  at  enterprise  level  are  not  very 
common in Denmark but it is possible for the Danish part 
of a multinational firm to conclude a collective agreement 
containing  provisions  on  the  cross-frontier  movement  of 
workers within  the  firm  including  provisions on  the law 
applicable. 
51.  The literature on collective labour law aspects of private inter-
national  law is much more limited than  the literature on the 
individual employment contract. See on collective labour law in 
particular:  WAI:Z,  STEFAN,  Multinationale  Untemehmen  und 
internationaler  Tarifvertrag.  Eine  arbeitskollisionsrechtliche 
Untersuchung,  Baden-Baden  1981,  GAMILLSCHEG,  fRANZ, 
lnternationales  Arbeitsrecht,  Tilbingen  1959,  p.  355  and: 
MORGENSTERN,  FEucE, International Conflicts of  Labour Law, 
Geneve 1984, p. 95.  See also: BIRK, ROLF,  DAS INTERNATIONA-
LE  ARBEITSRECHT  DER  BUNDESREPUBUK  DEUTSCHLAND,  in: 
Rabels Zeitschri.ft jar ausliindisches und internationales Privat-
recht,  1982,  p.  384;  BIRK,  ROLF,  Mitbestimmung  und 
Kollisionsrecht,  Recht  der  lntemationalen  Wirtscha.ft,  1915, 
p.  589;  BOGDAN,  MICHAEL,  Den  svenska  internationella 
arbetsriittens grunder,  Svensk Juristtidning  1979, p. 81;  LAN-
DO,  OLE, Arbejdsforhold og international privatret,  TFR  1979, 
p.  1;  LYON-CAEN,  GERARD,  LYON-CAEN,  ANTOINE,  Droit 
social  international  et  europeen,  Paris  1980;  GAMILLSCHEG, 
FRANZ,  Conflict of  Laws in Employment  Contracts and Indus-
trial  Relations,  in:  BLANPAIN,  R.,  Comparative  Labour  Law 
and Industrial Relations, Deventer 1987, p. 95. 
Article 4 of the European Communities' Convention on the 
Law Applicable to  Contractual  Obligations of 1980 pro-
vides that contracts  shall  be governed by the law of the 
country with which they are most closely connected. The 
article contains the general presumption that in transactions 
that are not business transactions,  the law of the habitual 
residence  of the  party  who  performs  the  characteristic 
obligation applies prima facie.  In business transactions, the 
law of the principal  place of business of the  party who 
performs the characteristic obligation is prima facie appli-
cable. If  the characteristic obligation is to be performed by 
a  subsidiary,  the  law of the  place of that  establishment 
applies prima facie. 
According  to  Article  6  of the  Convention,  employment 
contracts are prima facie governed by the law of the coun-
try in  which the employee habitually carries on his work 
or, if he does not do that in any one country, by the law of 
the country in which the place of business through which 
he was engaged is situated. 
The question arises whether multinational collective agree-
ments are governed by Article 4 or Article 6 or perhaps fall 
outside the scope of the Convention.  Since Article 6 ex-
pressly  limits  its  scope  to  (individual)  employment  con-
tracts the relevant provision, if any, will be Article 4. 
Under  Nordic  and  Continental  European  law,  collective 
agreements are binding contracts,  whereas this  is  not the 
case under English law. 
In  Article  2  of the  abovementioned  draft  Regulation  on 
choice  of  law,  collective  agreements  were  explicitly 
included  in  the  term  'law'  if they  were binding  on the 
parties. This means that continental and Danish collective 
agreements  but  as  a  general  rule  not  British  collective 
agreements were included. 
Since the prevailing rule in the EEC area is to treat collec-
tive agreements as contracts,  it seems most reasonable to 
regard them as covered by the choice of law Convention 
without distinction as to the nature of their legal effects. 
In support of this interpretation, the judgment of the EEC 
Court  in  the  infringement  proceeding  against  the  UK
52 
about the violation of the Equal Treatment Directive by the 
UK Sex Discrimination Act may be referred to. In this case 
the  Court  ruled:  "Jhe  directive  thus  covers  all collective 
agreements without distinction as to the nature of  the legal 
effects which  they do  or do  not produce.  The  reason for 
that generality  lies  in  the fact that,  even if  they are not 
legally binding as  between the parties who sign them  or 
with  regard  to  the  employment  relationships  which  they 
govern,  collective agreements nevertheless have important 
de facto consequences for the employment relationships to 
which they refer,  particularly in so far as they determine 
the rights of  the workers and, in the interests of  industrial 
harmony, give undertakings some indication of  the condi-
tions which employment relationships must satisfy or need 
not satisfy": 
The criterion stipulated in the presumption in Article 4 (the 
place of business of the party performing the characteristic 
52.  Case  165/82,  HOC-Commission  v  United  Kingdom  of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, Reports 1983 p. 3431. DENMARK 
obligation) will  in the case of a  multinational  agreement 
most often not point to any country at all. 
The  party  performing  the  characteristic  obligation  of a 
multinational collective agreement is the trade union(s) and 
the  workers.  In  a  multinational  collective agreement  the 
party on the workers'  side that  signs  the agreement will 
normally  be  some  kind  of joint committee  representing 
trade unions  from  the different countries covered by  the 
agreement. 
If  the agreement covers, for example Denmark, the UK and 
France the party to the agreement (which is composed of 
the  trade  unions  involved)  very  often  has  no  principal 
place  of business  anywhere.  The  trade  unions  of each 
country have a principal place of business, but if there is 
only one agreement,  the party to that agreement typically 
has no principal place of business. 
The general  rule in Article 4 (that the agreement shall  be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is  most 
closely connected) points to the country where the multi-
national  agreement  has  its  centre of gravity  socially  and 
economically. This may be any of the countries covered by 
it.  The court will have to take all  connecting factors  into 
consideration and in some cases it will be difficult to pre-
dict  which  country  a  court  will  regard  a  multinational 
agreement as most closely connected with. 
The centre of gravity  method  provided  for  in  Article 4 
does - as a starting point- result in a multinational agree-
ment being subject to one and only one legal system, but 
according  to Article  7(2)  nothing  in  the  Convention  may 
restrict the application of the mandatory rules of the law of 
the forum  in  a  situation where they  are  mandatory  irre-
spective  of the  law  otherwise applicable  to  the  contract. 
Under Article 16 of the Rome Convention  the application 
of a rule of the law of any country specified by the Con-
vention  may  be  refused  if such  application  is  manifestly 
incompatible with  the public policy  (ordre public) of the 
forum. 
3.3.3 Party autonomy 
Article 3 of the Rome Convention provides that a contract 
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. 
Under Article 17 of the Judgment Convention the parties to 
a contract may choose the forum.  The EEC Court ruled in 
the Sanicentral cas~
3 that this provision applies to individ-
ual employment contracts. The Court has never been asked 
whether it applies  to  collective agreements,  but it  seems 
fairly obvious that the answer would be in the affirmative. 
The problem dealt with here is whether the above provi-
sions enable the parties to a multinational collective agree-
ment to create uniform legal effects in different EEC coun-
tries by making a party reference or putting a forum clause 
into the agreement. 
The answers  to  questions  concerning  party  autonomy  as 
regards  the  choice of the  proper law  of a  multinational 
collective agreement and the relevant forum are somewhat 
53.  Case 25179,  Sanicentral GmbH v Rene Collin, Reports 1979 p. 
3423. 
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uncertain. There is no case law and only few authors have 
expressed an opinion. 
Stefan Walt" is  of the  view  that  West  German  law  on 
conflict  of rules  before  the  incorporation  of the  Rome 
Convention did not allow the parties to choose the proper 
law  because  German  collective  labour  law  would  be 
regarded as mandatory on its territory. A forum agreement 
on the other hand would be lawful. 
There is nothing in the Rome Convention that prevents the 
parties from choosing the applicable law.  The problem is 
(as with Article 4)  that if the chosen law is incompatible 
with  basic  collective  labour law  principles of the  forum 
country those principles will be applied under Article 7(2) 
(or in rare cases under Article 16) of the Convention. If  a 
choice of law clause is to  produce legal  uniformity in all 
countries covered by a multinational collective agreement 
it  is  therefore necessary  to  choose  the law of a  country 
whose law  is  not too  unacceptable in  the other countries 
covered by the agreement. 
If, for example, a multinational agreement of an enterprise 
operating in Denmark and the UK  contains a choice of law 
clause in favour of English law and the employer under-
pays Danish workers working in Denmark, will the Danish 
trade unions then, notwithstanding the choice of law clause 
in favour of English law according to which the agreement 
has no binding effect, be able to claim wages in accordance 
with the agreement and  'bod• under Danish law under a 
litigation before the Danish Labour Court? 
If, however, the Danish trade unions in this example prefer 
English law and arrange a strike under such circumstances 
that would be lawful under English law (but not under Da-
nish  law)  can  the  employer  then,  notwithstanding  the 
choice of law clause,  go to the Danish Labour Court and 
invoke  the  Danish  peace  obligation,  i.e.  the  prohibition 
against strikes when a collective agreement is in force? 
If one looks at the binding versus non-binding effect of a 
collective agreement, it is possible in the UK to conclude a 
binding  agreement.  The  choice  of a  legal  system  under 
which the agreement is binding would therefore (probably) 
be acceptable in the UK,  whereas the Danish Labour Court 
for  example  would  presumably  not  accept  a  collective 
agreement as non-binding. 
4. Danish labour law and Community law 
Provisions on the free movement of workers are primarily 
found  in  Denmark  in  the  legislation  on  aliens,  whereas 
provisions on social policy form part of the labour legisla-
tion.  Most of Danish case  law is  about equal  pay,  equal 
treatment and transfer of undertakings
55
• 
54. 
55. 
WALZ,  STEFAN,  Multinationale Vnlernehmen und inlernationa-
ler Tarifvertrag.  Eine arbeitskollisionsrechtliche Vnlersuchung, 
Baden-Baden 1981. 
See  on this  subject:  NIELSEN,  RUTH:  The  effect of community 
law on the labour law of  the Member States, Danish report for 
the 1988 FIDE  congress,  printed in the congress report, Vol 2, 
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4.1 Free movement of workers and employment 
Directives 221 /64/EEC and 360/68/EEC are implemented in 
Denmark mainly by the Aliens Act and the statutory instru-
ments issued in pursuance of it. 
The Aliens Act section  2. 2  provides  that  restrictions  on 
aliens following from chapters 3-5 of the Aliens Act only 
apply to aliens covered by the EEC  rules in so far as they 
are compatible with these rules.  The Danish Aliens Act is 
intended to be in accordance with the EEC  provisions, but 
should it tum out, e.g.  through an  interpretation by the 
European Court of  Justice, that the EEC provisions contain 
requirements that are not fulfilled by the text of the Danish 
Aliens Act, the Act gives priority to the EEC provisions. 
Even though regulations are directly applicable in Member 
States, some of the provisions of Regulation 1612168 and 
Regulation 1251170 on the free movement of workers and 
the right to remain in a  Member State after having been 
employed there are - in order to clarify the legal situation 
in Denmark - repeated in the statutory instruments issued 
in pursuance of the Danish Aliens Act. 
The Danish Constitution section 2 7 provides that Danish 
civil  servants  (tjenestemamd)  are  required  to  be  Danish 
citizens. Civil servant status is used in jobs falling outside 
the exception in Article 48(4) of the EC  Treaty. 
In practice it is not always clear why a  position is  filled 
either by an employee covered by a collective agreement or 
by a civil servant.  Apart from the nationality requirement 
for  civil  servants  the  main  difference  between  the  two 
forms of employment is that civil servants are not allowed 
to strike whereas there is some freedom of industrial action 
for employees under collective agreements. If  it is consid-
ered desirable that a group of workers should have a very 
low strike frequency this is often the reason why the public 
employer prefers civil servants (tjenesterrurnd).  As a side-
effect the jobs can then only be filled by Danes because of 
the nationality requirement in the Constitution.  This may 
lead to violations of Article 48(4) of the EC-Treaty which 
according to the European Court of  Justice should be inter-
preted narrowly
56
•  To avoid  this  problem it has been ar-
gued that EU  citizens are entitled to employment under the 
relevant  collective agreement instead of employment as a 
civil  servant (tjenesterrurnd)  in  cases where it is unlawful 
under EEC law to exclude non-Danes
57
• There is no Danish 
case law on this issue. 
56. 
57. 
Case  152173,  Giovanni  Maria  Sotgiu  v Deutsche  Bundespost, 
case  149179,  Commission  v Belgium,  Case  307/84,  Commis-
sion v France,  case 225/85,  Commission v Italy,  case  147/86, 
Commission v Greece. 
cf:  HAGEL-S0RENSEN,  KARSTEN  and  GULMANN,  CLAUS,  EF-ret, 
Copenhagen 1993. 
4.2 Equal pay 
A statute Law on equal pay was adopted in 1976
58  to im-
plement the Equal Pay Directivt?J.  Originally the wording 
of the Act did not mention work of equal value. The Euro-
pean Commission  brought an action against Denmark on 
this  ground claiming that Denmark had failed  to comply 
with the Equal Pay Directive. Denmark lost
60
• The Act was 
then  amended  in  1986.  A  new amendment of the Equal 
Pay Act was  made  in  1989.  It  enables  the Equal Status 
Council  to  demand  disclosure  of  information  from 
employers in equal pay cases.  In 1992 the Equal Pay Act 
was again amended, adapting the text of the Act to devel-
opments which had taken place in case law
61
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Danish case  law on equal pay has developed thorugh the 
1990s.  There are some 20 arbitral  awards and two judg-
ments from the ordinary courts.  In the Danfoss Case qu-
estions were put to the European Court of  Justice concern-
ing problems relating to the burden of proofS
2
• In the Royal 
Copenhagen Case a preliminary ruling was requested from 
the  EC  on  the  application  of the equal  pay  principle in 
relation to piece work
63
• 
All  Danish  collective  agreements  on  wages  provide  for 
equal pay rates for men and women unless the opposite is 
expressly stated.  Compliance with the equal pay principle 
is regarded as an implied term, but it does not mean that 
all equal pay problems in collective agreements have been 
solved. Broadly speaking there remain two types of prob-
lems: 
•  problems  related  to  different  collective  agreements 
laying down different pay conditions; 
•  problems  related  to  the  minimal  or  minimum  wage 
systems and other individual wage agreements. 
Different collective agreements 
Unskilled workers 
Denmark has a women-only trade union (Kvindeligt Arbej-
derforbund)  for  various  categories  of unskilled  women 
workers. Unskilled male workers doing the same work (or 
work of equal value) will be members of a different male-
dominated union (SiD).  In some cases the two unions have 
concluded joint collective agreements,  in other cases they 
are parties to separate collective agreements. These parallel 
agreements  covering  the  same  work  (or work  of equal 
value) do not always provide for the same pay; sometimes 
the  male  agreement  provides  for  extra pay  in  situations 
where the women's agreement does not. In these situations 
women and men doing the same work (or work of equal 
58.  Act  no 32 of 4.2.1976  as amended by Act no  65 of 19.2.1986. 
The amendment  in  1986 was  adopted  to  fulfil  the judgment of 
the  EC-Court  of 30.1.1985  in  case  143/83  where  the  EC-court 
ruled  that  Denmark  had  failed  to  comply  with  the  equal  pay 
directive by not mentioning work of equal value in the original 
wording of the equal pay Act. 
59.  75/117/EEC. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
Case 143/83. 
Consolidation Act no. 639 of 1992 on Equal Pay. 
Case  C-1 09/88  Handels-og-Kontorfunktioruerernes  Forbund  i 
Danmark  v  Dansk  Arbejdsgiverforening  (acting  for  Danfoss) 
[1989)  ECR 3199 . 
Case  C-400/93  Specialarbejderforbundet  i Danmark  v Dansk 
lndustri for Royal  Copenhagen A/S, Judgment of31  May  1995, 
nyr. DENMARK 
value) will receive different payment. This is a violation of 
the  equal  pay  principle both  under  EEC  law  and  under 
Danish law as it is interpreted in judicial practice. 
It also happens  that the women's agreement allows  part-
time work while the men's agreement prohibits it,  resul-
ting in men being barred from part-time work in situations 
where it is open for women (see below under equal treat-
ment). 
There are two arbitral awards - one from  1977
64  and an-
other from  19876S - ruling that unskilled male and female 
workers doing the same work or work of equal value must 
receive equal pay.  The fact  that they are covered by two 
different collective agreements cannot be used as an excuse 
for different payment of women and men where the work-
ers are unskilled. 
Skilled workers 
According  to  Danish  practice  the  situation  is  different 
where skilled workers are concerned. 
In a case concerning  Vejle Amts Folkeblad (a local  news-
paper) the problem was whether male skilled typographers 
and  female  skilled clerical workers doing  the same work 
(typing advertisements) who were covered by two different 
collective agreements (one for graphic workers and another 
for clerical workers) should receive equal pay. The graphic 
workers agreement provided for better pay (irrespective of 
the sex  of the graphic worker)  than  the  clerical  workers 
agreement did (likewise irrespective of the sex of the cleri-
cal  worker).  In Denmark  most graphic workers are  men 
and most clerical workers are women. 
The arbitral award
66 from February 1985 (two weeks after 
the EEC-judgment against Denmark in case 143/83) was in 
favour  of  the  employer.  It  stated  that  where  skilled 
workers are concerned each collective agreement should be 
looked at separately and that no comparison can be made 
across collective agreements. 
After the European Court's judgment in the Danfoss-ll-ca-
se67,  it is likely that any new case similar to the Vejle Amts 
Folkeblad  case  would  reach  the  opposite  result.  In  the 
European  Court's  judgement  it  is  explicitly  stated  that 
differences in vocational  training must be of relevance to 
the work actually performed in order to justify differences 
in pay between men and women. The onus of proving this 
is on the employer. 
Better payment  to  members  of a  male  dominated  group 
doing  the same work as  members of a predominantly  fe-
male group due to their being covered by different collec-
tive agreements constitutes  indirect discrimination  and  is 
incompatible with the EEC Directive on Equal Pay and the 
practice of the European Court of  JusticetM. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
Arbitral award of8.12.1977 in the FOB case. 
Arbitral award of29.4.1987 in the Premier Is-case. 
Arbitral  award of 11.2.1985, published in Arbejdsretligt Tids-
skrift 1985, p. 185. 
Case 109/88. 
See in particular the Bilka-case, case 170/84. See for a critical 
assessment of the Danish practice on equal pay: NIELSEN,  RUTH 
and  KIRSTEN  PRECHT,  EF-regler  om  ligeltm- perspekliver for 
Dansk ret, u 1988, B, p. 169. 
39 
Minimwn wage system 
The  general  pattern  is  that  male  dominated  groups  get 
more extra payment than predominantly female groups - a 
fact that makes it likely that this wage system serves as a 
cover for indirect discrimination. 
This is,  however,  difficult to prove.  In Denmark the full 
burden of proof, until the Danfoss-11 Case, was on the em-
ployee side.  In an arbitral award from  April  1985 in the 
Danfoss-1-caseffJ,  it was stated that the employees had not 
proved that the wage difference could not be due to rea-
sons other than sex.  Consequently the arbitrator found in 
favour of the employer. The burden of proof placed upon 
the  employees  in  this  case  is  in  practice  impossible  to 
discharge. The result in this case is incompatible with the 
Equal Pay Directive and with the policy statements on the 
burden of proof contained in the EEC action programme on 
equality
10
• 
If  the EEC draft proposaJ1
1 for a directive on the burden of 
proof in equality cases is adopted, Danish law on this point 
will need to be changed. 
The Danfoss-1 arbitral award was the reason why the trade 
union brought a new case on the same issue and asked the 
chairman of the arbitration board  to  put questions  to the 
European  Court  of Justice
72  concerning  the  burden  of 
proof under the EEC  rules.  The European Court answered 
that the burden of proof is on the employer in cases where 
the wage system is not transparent and the employee shows 
that men and women doing work of equal value on average 
receive different payment. 
Similar problems arise where the wage is fixed by individ-
ual contract in jobs where no collective agreement applies. 
One such case has been brought before the courts in Den-
mark73. 
4.3 Equal treatment 
The Danish Equal Treatment Act74  was enacted in 1978 in 
order to  implement the Equal  Treatment Directive75. The 
Act was amended in  1984 in order to make the EC  Com-
mission withdraw its infringement procedure against Den-
mark in case 149/83. New amendments were made in 1989 
mainly to  strengthen the role of the Equal Status Council 
and to bring together the Equal Treatment Act and the Act 
on Parental Leave. The Act was further amended in  1994 
to  implement  the  Pregnancy  Directive  (92/45/EEC).  The 
Equal Treatment Act contains a ban on direct and indirect 
sex discrimination. 
Equal treatment is practically never dealt with by collective 
agreement.  Accordingly  the  Danish  case  law  on  equal 
treatment  stems  from  the  ordinary  courts.  Most  of the 
cases are about dismissal of pregnant women 
76
• 
69.  Arbitral award of  16.4.1985 in the Danfos-1-case, published in: 
Arbejdsretligt Tidsskrift 1985, p. 197. 
70.  COM(85) 801  p. 6. 
71.  V/1611/87. 
72.  Case 109/88. 
73.  u 1990, 871. 
74.  Consolidation Act no. 875 of 17.10.1994 on equal treatment. 
75.  76/206/EEC. 
76.  See for details: ANDERSEN,  AONETE and NIELSEN, RUTH,  lige-
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As is the case in equal pay matters, there are problems in 
Denmark concerning indirect sex discrimination under the 
Equal Treatment Act. 
The judgment of the Danish Supreme Court in the Danpo-
case11  illustrates this.  The case is about a  factory  where 
unskilled men and women workers did the same work (or 
work of equal value). They were covered by a joint collec-
tive agreement between on the one side the employer and 
on the other side the two above mentioned sex  -segregated 
unions for unskilled workers (Kvindeligt Arbejdeiforbund 
and SiD).  Until 1976 they had been covered by two separ-
ate collective agreements. The joint agreement contained a 
provision  enabling  the  employer  to  send  workers  home 
without pay in certain situations if they were doing work 
that before 1976 was covered by the collective agreement 
with  the  female  workers  union.  In  the  same  situations 
workers who did work which before 1976 was covered by 
the  collective  agreement  with  the  male-dominated  union 
could not be sent home without pay. It was beyond dispute 
that in practice nearly everyone working under the unfa-
vourable provision in the agreement was female and near  I  y 
everyone covered  by the  more favourable  provision  was 
male. 
The women  workers  union  (Kvindeligt  Arbejdeiforbund) 
claimed  that  the  collective  agreement  was  incompatible 
with the Equal Treatment Act and consequently was partly 
invalid. 
The majority in the Supreme Court found that there was no 
discrimination in the wording of the collective agreement 
and  therefore no violation of the Equal Treatment Act. In 
principle men could do work which before 1976 was cov-
ered by the agreement with the women workers' union and 
women could do work which before 1976 was covered by 
the agreement with the male dominated union.  In practice 
they did not. 
The minority in the Supreme Court found  that the Equal 
Treatment Act had been violated. 
In  my  view,  the  majority  finding  in  the  Danpo-case  is 
incompatible with the  EEC  Equal Treatment Directive,  in 
particular the prohibition of indirect discrimination. 
In another case
78  a male student who (for a period) wanted 
to work part-time as an unskilled worker brought an action 
against his union (SiD)  and his employer because the col-
lective  agreement  did  not allow  part-time work.  Had he 
been a  woman he would  have  "belonged 
11  to  the Women 
Workers Union (Kvindeligt Arbejderforbund) whose collec-
tive agreement covering the same work allowed part-time. 
The Court found that the collective agreement arrangement 
as a whole was incompatible with the Equal Treatment Act 
but the Court did not find that the  "male 
11 collective agree-
ment seen in isolation was in contravention of the Act and 
therefore (partly)  invalid.  The plaintiff consequently  lost 
his  case.  In  Denmark  there  are different  opinions  as  to 
whether it is  favourable or unfavourable for  the workers 
that  the  collective agreement  empowers  the  employer to 
choose part-time employment. In the above case the "male" 
union  claimed  that  their  collective  agreement  was  better 
77.  UfR  1983, 379. 
78.  u 1982, 484. 
than the female collective agreement. If  any of the collec-
tive agreements were invalid it was the women's. 
4.4 Collective redundancies 
The Collective Redundancies Directive
19 was originally im-
plemented in Denmark by chapter 5A of the Act on Unem-
ployment Benefit. In 1994, a new Act on Collective Redun-
dancies  was  adopted  to  implement  the  Directive from 
1992
80 amending the Collective Redundancy Directive. The 
Act  applies  only  when  the  redundancies  are substantial. 
Within a period of 30 days they must amount to: 
•  at least 10 in a firm which normally employs above 20 
and less than 100 employees. 
•  at  least  10%  of the  number  of employees  in  firms 
which normally employ 100 and under 300 employees. 
•  at least 30 in firms which normally employ at least 300 
employees. 
If  an employer intends to make redundancies on this scale, 
he  must  begin  negotiating  as  soon  as  possible  with  the 
employees of the firm or their representatives if  any. 
The purpose of the negotiation is to reach an agreement on 
either how to avoid the redundancies or how to limit their 
number and also on how to alleviate their effects. 
The employer has an  obligation to give the employees or 
their representatives all the information necessary. He must 
give  written  information  at  least  of the  reason  for  the 
redundancies, of the number of employees who are to be 
made redundant,  the number of employees who are nor-
mally employed in  the firm and also in which period the 
redundancies  are  to  be effected.  A  copy of this  written 
information must be sent to the labour market board. 
If the employer still  wants  to carry out the redundancies 
after  the  negotiations  he  must  send  written  information 
about this to the labour market board. As soon as possible 
and at the latest 10 days after the above mentioned infor-
mation has been sent to the labour market board, the em-
ployer  must  give  information  about  who  is  to  he  made 
redundant.  These persons must get the information at the 
same time. 
As mentioned above, the redundancies are effected 30 days 
after the  information has  been  sent to  the labour market 
board.  Violations of negotiations and warning obligations 
are punishable by payment of a  fme.  In addition an em-
ployer who does  not send  the  information  to  the labour 
market board must pay compensation to the employees in 
question equivalent to 30 day wages. 
One Danish court has asked a question under Article 177 
of the  EC  Treaty  concerning the  Collective Redundancies 
Directive,  namely  whether it covers  situations where an 
employer does not actually make collective dismissals but 
continues until  he is  unable to pay the wages,  which  in 
Denmark  results  in  the  workers  stopping  work  collec-
tively. The answer by the European Court of  Justice was 
in the negative
81
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79.  75/129/EEC. 
80.  Directive 92/56/EEC,  Danish Act no 414 of 1.6.1994. 
81.  Case 284/83,  Dansk  Metalarbejderforbund og Specialarbejder-
forbundet i Danmark v H.  Nielsen og Sen, Maskinfabrik Als. DENMARK 
4.5 Transfers of undertakings 
The  Directive  on  the  Retention  of Acquired  Rights  on 
Transfers of  Undertakings
82  is implemented in De~mark  by 
the Act on Transfers of  Undertakingj3. 
Under the Danish Act contracts of employment and collec-
tive agreements are not terminated by the transfer of the 
undertaking.  All the transferor's rights, duties,  powers or 
liabilities under individual employment contracts or collec-
tive agreements are automatically transferred to the trans-
feree. 
The provisions on information and consultation are sanc-
tionable by a fine. 
The transfer of a firm to a bankrupt estate is not covered 
by the Act on transfers of  undertakings, whereas sale and 
other transfer of the firm from a bankrupt estate is covered 
by the Act. 
Before the implementation of the EC Directive on Transfers 
of Undertakings the solution in Danish law was the oppo-
site.  Individual  contracts  of employment  and  collective 
agreements were terminated by the transfer of the under-
taking unless the parties agreed to enter into new contracts 
and agreements. 
The general aim of the EC Directive is to improve employ-
ment protection.  The Danish way of implementing  it is, 
however, not solely to the benefit of the workers. Danish 
collective  agreements  impose  a  peace  obligation  on  the 
parties, i.e. a duty not to take industrial action. 
Before the implementation of the directive, Danish collec-
tive agreements were terminated by the transfer. There was 
therefore no  peace obligation.  Workers  who  did  not  ap-
prove of the transfer were entitled to take industrial action, 
e.g. to strike, in order to influence the decision of manage-
ment on whether or not to transfer the undertaking. Under 
current Danish law workers have to accept the decision of 
management without being able to  influence it by indus-
trial  action.  This  is  not a  necessary  consequence of the 
directive,  which  only  requires  Member  States  to  ensure 
that the duties
84  of the employers to observe the terms of 
collective agreements are transferred. There is no need to 
transfer  the  rights  of employers  under  collective  agree-
ments  (in  Denmark the most important employer right is 
the  peace  obligation  on  workers)  but  the  Danish  Act 
implementing the Directive does that. 
The Directive gives Member States the option  to  choose 
whether  there  shall  be joint and  several  liability  of the 
transferor  employer  and  the  transferee  employer  or 
whether all liabilities shall be transferred to the transferee 
employer.  The Danish Act has chosen the latter solution. 
The transferor can thus discharge himself of all obligations 
towards  his  employees  by  transferring  the  undertaking. 
The possibility  that  this  may  give rise  to  abuse,  e.g.  in 
bankruptcy cases, has been discussed in the literature
85
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82.  77/187/EEC. 
83.  Act no.  111  of 1979. 
84.  See art. 3.2 of the directive. 
85.  See e.g.: SVENNINO ANDERSEN,  LARS,  Lenmodtagemes retsstil-
ling  ved  virksomhedsoverdragelse,  Copenhagen  1990,  with 
further references. 
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Danish courts have asked questions under Article 177 of 
the EC Treaty concerning the content and interpretation of 
Directive 771187/EEC in a number of cases
86
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4.6 Insolvency of the employer 
The Directive on Protection of  the Employees against the 
Insolvency of the  Employe~' is not implemented in Den-
mark  by  special  legislation.  Denmark has  an Act on  the 
Employees Guarantee Fund which dates back to 1978 and 
which is usually regarded as sufficient to fulfil  the requi-
rements of the Directive. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
Denmark's entry into the Community has generally led to a 
shift away from collective agreements towards legislation 
and it has confronted Denmark with the developments in 
employment protection that occurred in a number of other 
EU countries during the 1970s as well as with the funda-
mental  rights protected by international conventions Den-
mark has ratified but traditionally not taken very seriously. 
The concept of collective redundancies was introduced in 
Danish  law  in  order  to  implement  the  Collective 
Redundancies  Directive.  The  legal  significance  of  the 
enterprise was increased by the Directive on the Retention 
of  Acquired Rights by the Transfer of  Undertakings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  structures as  sketched  in  the  previous  edition  have 
remained relatively stable in Germany. The impact of the 
structural  change  on  the  system  of labour  relations  in 
Germany was less dramatic than in  most other countries. 
This system has even survived the reunification. However, 
the task of reconstructing the economy in Eastern Germany 
has increased the challenge for the actors and institutions. 
This accelerates adaptation processes that otherwise might 
have started much later. 
The trade unions of  the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) were dissolved. Employers' associations any way had 
not existed in the former  GDR.  The West German trade 
unions and employers' associations, therefore, have extended 
their scope of activity to the territory of the former GDR. 
Disregarding few exceptions and transitional rules of minor 
importance for a  limited period the system of the West-
German labour law and all its institutions as a whole was 
transferred to the new East German states. Thereby also the 
system of institutionalised workers' participation, a charac-
teristic feature of  the German labour law, was established in 
these new states as well as the system of labour courts. All 
this meant a substantial change for the East German popula-
tion and consequently could not take place without difficul-
ties. 
Still productivity differs in both parts of Germany, being 
distinctly  lower  in  the  East.  This  causes  difficulties  in 
adapting the working conditions to an equal level in the two 
parts of the country. 
CHAPTER 1:  THE MAIN ACTORS 
In addition to the individual workers and individual employ-
ers there are mainly four actors to be taken into account if 
sketching the basic structure of  the German system: the trade 
unions, the works councils and the workers representatives 
in supervisory boards of big companies on the one hand and 
the employers associations on the other hand.  Among the 
tripartite  bodies  the  Federal  Labour Office  is  playing  a 
dominant role. As far as State authorities and Government 
institutions are concerned the Federal Ministry of  Labour 
and Social Affairs is the decisive organ. 
1. Trade Unions 
At least as a general pattern there is no political or ideo-
logical  fragmentation  between different unions.  Different 
political and ideological wings are amalgamated in one and 
the same association. This principle of  amalgamated unions, 
established after the second World War is still strong and 
powerful even if meanwhile specific Christian unions are 
existing. They play a very marginal role so far. 
The second important characteristic of unions in the Federal 
Republic is the fact that they are organised on an industry 
basis. This means that the union is open to all employees in 
the industry concerned no matter which trade or occupation 
they are engaged in. This again implies that there is only one 
union for all of the industry. Industry in this context should 
be understood in a very broad sense. Thus, for example the 
metal union covers the automobile industry as well as for 
example the electrical industry, the shipbuilding industry, 
the machine building industry and the computer industry, to 
mention just a few.  Again there are unions which do not fit 
in this industry-based pattern. The most important example 
in this context is the white-collar employees' union (DAG}. 
This union is not confined to any one industry, it is open to 
white-collar workers of all industries. This leads to the fact 
that as  far  as  white-collar employees  are concerned  the 
white-collar employees' union competed with the industry-
based unions. Another important exception is the union of 
education  and  science  (GEW}  which  is  not  open  to  all 
employees of an establishment but only to those who have 
specific  professions  and  occupations  in  the  system  of 
education and science. 
The most important associations of employees in the Federal 
Republic of  Germany are the individual unions organised in 
the Gennan Federation of  Trade Unions (DGB).  Members of 
this Federation are not individual employees but unions. 
According to the standing rules of the DGB,  member unions 
must co-ordinate their fields of organisation. These can be 
altered only in agreement with the union or unions con-
cerned and with the DGB  itself. To quote an example: when 
in 1978 the police union (GdP) became member of the DGB, 
the union of  public services, transport and traffic (OTV) was 
asked to recommend  to its members,  working for police 
departments, to transfer to the GdP.  At the same time, the 
police union recommended to its members, not in the police 
service, to transfer to the OTV. 
Thus overlapping and  competition is eliminated between 
unions organised in the DGB.  There is one exception to this 
principle. As already mentioned the union of education and 
science (  GEW)  is open to employees employed in establish-
ments covered by the union of public services, transport and 
traffic, thus a certain amount of competition is inevitable. 
In  the  future  the  number  of DGB  member  unions  will 
continue to drop.  The current policy tries to equalize the 
power of the various individual unions by way of merger. 
Further reorganizations will follow and lead to a significant 
change of the ·balance of power within the DGB. 
Due to the already implemented privatization of the railway 
system the  railworkers union is no longer related  to  the 
public but to the private sector. The same will apply to the 
union of  employees of the German mail when the privatiza-
tion of  the postal services will be completed. This shift from 
the public to the private sector, however, does not have a 
significant impact on the structure of those unions. 
According to their standing rules and programmes, the DGB 
and its member unions are politically neutral, that is they are 
not organised along party lines and do not adhere to any 
ideology. But it should be mentioned that in reality the DGB 
unions are politically closer to the Social Democratic Party 
than to any other party. 
The DGB,  financed by dues paid by the individual unions, 
has a mainly policy-making function, although the member 
unions are not bound by its policies.  The DGB  does not 
conclude collective agreements,  these are handled by the 
member unions individually. It can mediate in inter-union 
disputes if asked to do so. Its main function should be seen 
as a spokesman for the labour movement on the one hand GERMANY 
and as a coordinator of the policies of the member unions on 
the other. 
The organisational  structure of the  DGB  and  its  member 
unions is uniform on all  important aspects.  The member 
unions are national associations and are divided into federal, 
district and local levels. Some unions also have a state level 
organisation sandwiched between  the district and  federal 
levels. Others also have local plant branches. 
Governing bodies of the individual unions, at every level, 
are the assemblies of delegates or members, the executive 
board  and,  at  federal  level,  the  executive  council.  The 
highest governing  body  of each  individual  union  is  the 
federal convention, which meets every three or four years. 
Ideally, this should reflect the membership structure of the 
individual unions. But in practice, this is often not the case. 
Women, for example are under-represented at the convention 
in proportion to their numbers on the membership rolls. It is 
the function of  the convention to elect the Federal Executive 
Board,  to  vote on changes  in  the  standing  rules  and  to 
formulate the basic principles of union policy.  It is very 
doubtful to what degree the convention actually performs 
this last function. The assumption that union policy is more 
likely to be determined by the executive board than by the 
delegates is not entirely without foundation, the board has a 
multitude of opportunities  to  influence  the  formation  of 
opinion within the convention. 
Between convention sessions the Federal Executive Board is 
the ultimate authority.  It consists in almost all  unions of 
delegates elected at district conferences and members of the 
federal executive board. The administration is carried out at 
federal  level  by the executive board,  on lower levels by 
subordinate state or district boards and local administrative 
boards. 
The OOB consists of  a federal association, state associations, 
district associations and numerous local branches. According 
to its guidelines, local branches are to be organised in all 
places with more than 200 union members. 
At every organisational level of the OOB there is an executive 
board and an assembly of delegates (at local level an assem-
bly of members). The assembly of delegates is made up of 
members from the individual unions. 
The  federal  convention  of the  DGB  is,  like  that  of the 
individual  unions,  the  highest  governing  body.  It  is  an 
assembly of  delegates elected by members of all the unions, 
meeting every three years. Individual unions are represented 
according to  their membership strength.  This means  that 
large unions, such as the metal union and the union of public 
services, transport and traffic, have the strongest positions. 
Between the federal conventions the executive council is the 
highest decision-making body of the DGB.  It consists of 100 
members nominated by the individual unions, the Federal 
Executive board and the district chairman of the DGB.  The 
authority of the executive council is so far-reaching that it 
may be regarded, more or less, as the main decision-making 
body of the DGB. 
As in the individual unions the daily business of the DGB  is 
carried out by the executive board.  The federal  executive 
board of  the OOB comprises the managing board (eight mem-
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hers and a chairman) and the chairman of each of the DGB 
member unions. 
In 1993 about 10.8 million out of the employed work-force 
of about 25.5 million and about 4.0 million unemployed 
persons were organised in DGB member unions. The figures 
for  the  white-collar  workers'  union  (DAG)  (about  0.6 
million) and the Christian unions (about 0.3 million) are 
comparatively  small.  The same  is  true  for  the  different 
unions of leading personnel whose umbrella organisation is 
theAssodation ofLeading Personnel (ULA) (about 20,000). 
The rate of unionisation remained relatively stable, some-
where between 30 to 40%. In 1970 on the average 30.5% of 
the workforce were organized in the DGB, in 1990 these were 
31 % in 1990 (the several per cent organized in unions not 
belonging to the DGB not included). After reunification the 
rate climbed up to 38% due to a bigger amount of unioniza-
tion in the former territory of East Germany. In the mean-
time there is a significant loss of membership throughout the 
union movement. 
The role of  unions as organisations representing the workers' 
interests is generally accepted and uncontested in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The trade unions are not only factu-
ally integrated in society but they have quite a few institu-
tionalised rights of participation. These rights are not only 
limited to matters of the labour market but go far beyond 
this. The unions to a more or less limited extent are inte-
grated  on  boards  dealing  with  educational  and  cultural 
matters,  on boards of mass  media,  in institutions dealing 
with economic and social security matters, in the system of 
labour courts and social security courts, to give some idea of 
the multitude of their activities. 
Among the many challenges the trade unions presently are 
facing  the  following  may  be  the  most  important  one. 
Traditionally German trade unions not merely understood 
their role as being a spokesman of the members but of the 
workers as a whole. In times of full employment during the 
booming periods from the mid-fifties to the mid-seventies it 
was no problem to keep up this image:  frictions between 
members'  interests  and  non-members'  interests  did  not 
become evident. This has changed. Nowadays the promotion 
of members'  interests may  increase the barriers for those 
belonging to peripheral groups and especially for those who 
are unemployed. Due to their traditional self-understanding 
trade  unions  have  no  choice  but  to  integrate  members' 
interests and non-members' interests, including the interests 
of those who are unemployed. The tensions created by this 
difficult attempt of  harmonisation of heterogeneous interests 
has become most evident in the controversy on the question 
whether reduction of working time should be reached with 
or without full compensation of wage: should members give 
up part of their income in order to reduce labour costs and 
thereby give the enterprises a chance to  hire unemployed 
persons or should unions simply focus on maintaining or 
improving the income situation of their members? Recently 
in East Germany as well as in West Germany the problem 
arose that more companies had difficulties to cope with the 
minimum conditions as laid down in the collective agree-
ments.  This  led  to  the  need  to  flexibilize  the  collective 
agreements and to empower the actors on plant and enter-
prise  level  to  deviate  within  certain  limits  from  these 
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bargaining power and bargaining activities,  at least  to  a 
certain  extent.  The works  councils  as  bodies  of institu-
tionalized workers' participation thereby are integrated in the 
structure of  collective bargaining. These examples show the 
dilemma the unions are put in. It is important to stress that 
the awareness of this dilemma among the population as a 
whole has grown and has led to a very intensive discussion 
on the trade unions' role. In short: it has become one of the 
political key issues in the FRG. 
While it was rather easy for trade unions to respond to the 
homogeneous interests of  the traditional core membership of 
full timers being employed for an indefmite time, this has 
changed in view of the increasing variety of heterogeneous 
interests among the membership. Since German unions are 
big  organisations,  centralised  on  a  national  level,  it  is 
extremely difficult for them to maintain solidarity through-
out the membership and at the same time respond to  the 
specific interests of specific groups within the membership. 
So far German unions are meeting this need only to a very 
marginal extent. This explains why those who belong to the 
peripheral groups of the labour market are still much more 
reluctant to join the unions than the traditional core groups 
and why the membership has dropped after having risen at 
first so drastically in the former GDR after the reunification. 
Unions not only have difficulties in integrating the periphe-
rical groups of  workers and meeting the specific interests of 
the employees in the former GDR, they in addition still have 
problems  to  become  attractive  for  white-collar workers. 
While the overall rate of unionisation amounts to almost 
40%, the rate of white-collar unionisation not even reaches 
20%. This shows clearly that the unions at least up to now 
could not overcome the image to be an organisation mainly 
for blue-collar workers. While unions until recently simply 
ignored  the  specific  interests of peripherical  groups  and 
white-collars, this has changed. Now they make all kind of 
efforts to become attractive also for those groups. It however 
turns out that this policy of  adaptation only can be performed 
very  slowly  in  view of the  fact  that  the  traditional  core 
groups still are very strong and are determined to defend 
their position within the unions. 
2. Works Councils 
Workers' participation by works councils is somehow the 
backbone  of the  German  system  of industrial  relations. 
Originally in 1920 the system of institutionalised workers' 
participation in  the  private and  in  the  public  sector was 
governed by the same law. This is no longer the case today. 
The relevant law for the private sector is the Works Constitu-
tion Act of  1972. The Federal Staff Representation Act of 
1974 covers the public sector. It should be stressed that for 
the personnel of the different states the Federal Staff Re-
presentation Act is specified by  the respective State Staff 
Representation Acts. These State Acts,  however,  may  not 
exceed the frame provided by the Federal Act. However the 
difference between the regulation in the private and in the 
public sector may be neglected in the context of this report. 
In order to illustrate the basic structure it may be sufficient 
to sketch the model for the private sector. 
Contrary to  many  other countries,  works councils in  the 
Federal Republic of Germany are exclusively made up of 
workers' representatives. Works councils act as counterparts 
of the management on the side of the workers. 
Works council members are elected by secret ballot by all 
workers of the plant over 18 years of age. Workers over 18 
years of age and who have been employed for at least six 
months,  may  be  elected.  The  term  of office  for  works 
council members is four years.  Re-election is possible and 
not limited in any way. 
Every plant with more than five employees over 18 years of 
age,  three of them having been employed for at last six 
months,  is required by law to establish a works council. 
Nevertheless, many small and medium-sized plants do not 
have a works council. Only larger enterprises fully comply 
with the law. According to estimates, only around 20% of 
all plants required to establish a works council have in actual 
practice  followed  the  legal  requirement.  It is  up  to the 
workers of  the plant whether they want to establish a works 
council or not. There is no sanction, if they fail to do so. But 
obviously employees who do not establish a works council 
voluntarily abandon all the rights given to the works council 
by law. 
In principle and according to the law works councils are still 
separate institutions from trade unions.  They represent all 
workers of a plant whether they are union members or not. 
But in  spite of the institutional separation between unions 
and  works councils there are close links.  Meanwhile the 
unions have succeeded  in  influencing the composition of 
works councils, the large majority of  works council members 
are union members. 
The size of the works council depends on the number of 
workers in the plant. In plants with up to 20 employees it is 
only one member, in plants with between 21  and 50 employ-
ees it should be three members and finally in plants with 
between 7,001 and 9,000 employees it reaches 31  employ-
ees. Above this level two more members must be added for 
each additional part of 3,000 employees. 
Blue-collar workers and white-collar workers are treated as 
separate groups. The proportion of representatives of each 
group in the works council depends on the proportion of 
each group of the total work-force of the plant. 
If works councils are established in different plants of a 
multiplant  enterprise,  they  must  form  a  general  works 
council. Each individual works council appoints two of its 
members  (a  blue-collar  representative and  a  white-collar 
representative)  to  the  general  works council.  The works 
councils of the individual plants are not subordinated to the 
general works council. The general works council is only 
authorised to deal with matters which cannot be regulated at 
plant level  or which are delegated  to  it by  an  individual 
works council. 
It  is  up  to  the general  works councils of enterprises be-
longing to a group to establish a group works council at the 
level of the parent company.  Each general works council 
would have to appoint two of its members (one blue-collar 
representative and one white-collar representative). But even 
if the Works Constitution Act of  1972 opens this channel to 
estab~ish a group works council, it only plays a marginal role 
in actual practice. GERMANY 
Specific rights are ascribed to the works councils by  law, 
ranging from the mere right to information or the right to be 
consulted through the right of control and veto, to the most 
important right of all: the right of co-determination. 
Co-determination in  this context means that management 
cannot take any decisions without the consent of the works 
council. In the absence of a consensus, any move by man-
agement would be judged to be illegal. But co-determination 
goes even further. It gives both sides an equal voice in the 
decision-making process. Therefore either side- at least in 
principle - can take the initiative and call for a new settle-
ment. 
3. Representative Body for Executive Staff 
According to the Works Constitution Act executive staff is 
not covered by works council's representation. Members of 
this group are neither permitted to participate in the election 
of  works council members nor can they be elected. In many 
enterprises  the  group  of executive  staff,  excluded  from 
works  council's  representation,  had  established  its  own 
representative body on basis on an agreement between the 
group and the employer. There was no homogeneous pattern 
of the  organizational  structure  and  the  rights  of these 
representative bodies.  These bodies existed  in  about 330 
enterprises. In all cases they only dealt with matters concern-
ing the group of executive staff. 
In 1989 an Act on Representative Body for Executive Staff 
was passed. Thereby a legal basis for executive staff's repre-
sentation now is provided. According to this Act a represen-
tative body for the executive staff may be elected in estab-
lishments regularly employing at least  10 executive staff 
members. It is up to the executive staff whether such a body 
is  to  be  formed.  If an  establishment has  fewer  than  10 
employees  classed  as  executive  staff,  they  are  counted 
towards the number employed in the geographically nearest 
establishment of the same company in which the quorum is 
met. A general representative body for executive staff must 
be formed if there are several such bodies at the individual 
establishment  level.  A  group  representative  body  for 
executive staff can  be formed  with the agreement of the 
general executive bodies of the group member companies 
together  employing  at  least  75%  of the  executive  staff 
employed by the group of companies as a whole. 
Representive  bodies  of executive  staff  are  confined  to 
infonnation and consultation rights. They neither dispose on 
rights of veto nor on co-determination rights. Whether the 
fonnally weak position, however, corresponds with a weak 
position in actual reality is an open question. So far empiri-
cal evidence is lacking. 
4. Workers Representatives in the Supervisory Board 
Workers' participation in the supervisory board was built 
into the traditional corporate framework and simply altered 
the previous position of the corporate governing bodies. The 
two-board system, with both a supervisory and a manage-
ment board,  existed  before  the  introduction  of workers' 
participation. Both boards retain their traditional functions 
under the new system but, since workers have the right tore-
presentation on the supervisory board, these boards are no 
longer composed solely of persons guided by the interests of 
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the owners. Workers are represented only on the supervisory 
board, which has purely control functions. The supervisory 
board elects the management board and monitors its activi-
ties, but does not perform management functions itself. 
The law distinguishes three different forms of participation. 
The first applies only to particular sectors: the coal mining, 
iron and steel industries. This law was introduced in 1951. 
The 1951  statute adopted a participatory model  based on 
equal  representation  of shareholders  and  workers on the 
supervisory board, the chairmanship being reserved for a 
"neutral"person, elected by a majority vote of both workers' 
and  shareholders'  representatives.  The 1951  statute goes 
slightly beyond the level of the supervisory board. It allows 
some sort of  worker representation on the management board 
for the first, and so far the only, time.  One member of the 
management board must be a Work director~ in charge of 
all social and personnel affairs. This means that he cannot be 
elected against the votes of the  majority of the workers' 
representatives on the supervisory board but, once elected, 
the work director has the same legal status as all the other 
members of the management board. 
The second model of  workers' representation, introduced by 
the Worlcr Constitution Act in 1952, does not relate to a spe-
cific sector, but applies only to enterprises having a mini-
mum number of employees. Any company employing more 
than 500 people must admit workers' representatives to the 
supervisory  board,  but  only  one-third  of  that  board's 
members must be employees' representatives. 
The third and last model, the 1976 Co-determination Act, re-
presents an attempt to close the gap between the two previ-
ous models  and  to  ensure  increased  participation  for  all 
workers.  Companies with at least 2,000 employees must 
allow equal representation on the supervisory board. Unlike 
the steel and coal  model,  this law does not provide for a 
"neutral" chairman, but leaves his election to the majority of 
the board: in  case of a deadlock,  the law leaves it to  the 
shareholders'  representatives  to  elect  the  chairman.  The 
chairman  must  therefore  be  acceptable  to  the  owners' 
representatives. Since in cases of deadlock the chairman has 
the deciding vote, the final word is always with the share-
holders' representatives. 
The three models differ very much  in their answer to  the 
question  of who  should  represent  the  employees  on  the 
supervisory board.  None of the  models  requires  that  all 
representatives  have  to  be  employees  of the  particular 
enterprise (so called internal delegates).  According to the 
law of 1952 a certain proportion of external delegates is 
allowed, but the appointments are the sole responsibility of 
the employees of the enterprise. The unions have no formal 
influence whatsoever. The two other models give the union 
a right to nominate the external delegates. But there is a very 
important difference between the two: contrary to the steel 
and coal model, the Act of 1976 provides that the workers of 
the enterprise are entitled to reject any candidate proposed by 
the unions. 
5. Relationship between those Actors on the workers' side 
While the formal structure gives the impression that there is 
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the workers' representation in the supervisory board, this is 
significantly different in practice. In most cases the majority 
of  the workers' representatives in the supervisory board that 
are recruited among the employees are at the same time are 
works council members. It has become the normal pattern 
that at least the chairman and the vice-chairman of the works 
council (or of the central works council  in a  multi-plant 
enterprise)  also represent the workers in  the  supervisory 
board. 
This interconnection obviously leads to a strengthening of 
both systems of  institutional workers' participation. In quite 
a few companies this interrelationship has led to the estab-
lishment of informal  channels.  And  in  many  companies 
management tends to discuss critical questions with at least 
the internal workers' representatives in informal meetings 
before information is given to the supervisory board. The 
intensity of  these informal communications appears to be the 
strongest in  the case of the coal  mining,  iron  and  steel 
industries,  where  the  Work  director"  functions  as  an 
important link. Since however these industries are becoming 
less and less important, this very model is playing less and 
less a role. Only due to legislative activities to be described 
below it could be kept alive to a relevant extent. 
Due to the fact that decentralisation has become a necessity 
(see below) works councils are becoming more and more 
powerful.  In  spite  of the  fact  that  most  works  council 
members  at  the  same  time  are  union  members,  works 
councils very often tend to act very autonomously.  Their 
micro-perspective is not necessarily identical with the trade 
union's macro-perspective.  Especially in the former GDR 
works councils quite often are not satisfied by the way the 
specific  needs  of the  East  German  economy  and  labour 
market are dealt with by the trade unions.  Consequently 
tensions between trade unions and works councils no longer 
can be ignored.  Whether cooperation or rivalry  between 
these two actors will be the pattern of the future, is still an 
open question. 
6. Employers' Associations 
Private employers are united in trade associations as well as 
in inter-industrial organisations. The trade and inter-indus-
trial  associations exist independent of one another,  most 
employers are members of both. 
Like the employees' trade unions, the employers' trade asso-
ciations are also, as a rule, organised on three levels: local 
or district, state and federal. Just as on the employees' side 
these associations are organised on an industry basis. Thus 
the employers in the same industry (e.g. metal industries) 
form associations on a local or district level. These local or 
district associations are united on a state level and the state 
associations are united on a federal level in a central organi-
sation.  The  inter-industrial  employers'  associations  are 
divided into local or district associations and, as a rule, on 
state level organisations. 
The majority of  the central trades associations and the inter-
industrial state organisations of the employers belong to the 
German Confederation of  Employers' Associations (BOA). 
Although it is difficult to obtain exact figures on the organ-
isation rate of  employers, there is no doubt that this exceeds 
by far the employees' rate of unionisation. In the manufac-
turing industry,  in  banking and in  insurance the average 
organisation rate is estimated to be between 80% and 90%. 
This average figure comprises industries with a much higher 
rate. Thus the rate in the chemical industry is estimated at 
100%.  Lower rates  are  to  be  found  in  the  engineering 
industry with about 70%. 
The BOA covers the employers' associations of practically all 
economic sectors. In addition to manufacturing industries it 
includes  mining,  crafts,  agriculture,  commerce,  private 
banking,  private insurance,  private transport and various 
other trades. 
According to its standing rules the function of the Confed-
eration is to represent the socio-political interests of employ-
ers beyond the scope of one state or economic sector. The 
members are not bound by its policies. Neither the BDA nor 
the  inter-industrial  associations,  participate  in  collective 
bargaining.  This  is  exclusively  the  responsibility  of the 
individual employers' trade organisations. The Confedera-
tion  does  make  recommendations  as  to  strategy  when 
bargaining with the unions. 
There are two associations in the public sector, one for the 
states,  the associations of German States, and one for the 
municipalities,  the union of municipal employers' associ-
ations. The latter is a confederation of ten member associ-
ations mainly organised within the region of  a state. 
Employers' associations in the private sector traditionally 
have tried to be an organisation of all enterprises, irrespec-
tive of their size. Small and medium sized enterprises were 
supposed to have the same influence and to get the same 
rewards as big business.  Due to the crisis and to the in-
creased international competition labour costs have become 
a decisive factor influencing competivity. It has turned out 
that - at least in general - increases of labour costs easier can 
be absorbed by big enterprises than by small and medium 
sized  companies.  Therefore  employers'  associations  are 
attacked by their small and medium sized members as well 
as by many members from the former GOR as to be much too 
generous and to merely represent the interests of big busi-
ness.  Groups of small and medium sized enterprises even 
discuss  whether  they  should  step  out of the  traditional 
employers' associations and found new organisations. It can 
be predicted that this will not happen. However the tensions 
within  the  employers'  associations  have  become  strong 
enough to make a redefinition of the relationship between 
smaller and bigger enterprises within the employers' associa-
tions inevitable. May be that employers' associations will 
have  to  give  up  the  policy  of unified  standards  for  all 
members, replacing this policy by specific standards for big 
enterprises on the one hand and small and medium-sized 
enterprises on the other hand. 
The employers associations' self-understanding of their role 
also has been significantly affected by the structural change. 
On the one hand  employers'  associations are inclined  to 
promote the companies' flexibility and autonomy in order to 
increase their adaptability to  market needs.  On  the other 
hand employers' associations cannot follow this trend too far 
without loosing the basic justification of their very existence. 
In  other words:  in  order to  legitimise  their  function  as 
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emphasize at last a minimum of centralised collective regu-
lations. For this very reason employers associations' always 
have opposed proposals to make it possible to hire unionised 
workers under conditions  below  the  level  guaranteed  in 
collective agreements. In short: employers' associations as 
well as trade unions are interested very much in maintaining 
the  traditional  system  of region-wide  or  industry-wide 
collective bargaining. 
7. Federal Labour Office 
The Federal Labour Office is organised as a tripartite body. 
It has subsidiaries on regional and local levels. It is by far 
the most important agency in the field of labour administra-
tion. The Labour Office not only administers the system of 
unemployment insurance,  but has quite a task  to actively 
intervene on the labour market. It had until July 1994 the 
monopoly of placement service, it organises and finances 
training and retraining programmes, it can provide tempo-
rary employment for unemployed persons, it can stimulate 
employment by providing subsidies to enterprises etc. The 
functioning of  the Labour Office is regulated in detail by the 
law. 
8. Private placement service agencies 
In August 1994 the monopoly of the Federal Labour Office 
was revoked. Thus private placement service agencies for the 
first time have appeared on the German labour market. Due 
to the short period of time having elapsed since, it is not yet 
possible to predict what impact these agencies will have in 
future. 
9. Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs 
The Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs is not 
only drafting the Acts in the area of labour law and social 
security law but it also has a  far-reaching competence to 
regulate specific matters itself. This power is based on laws 
empowering  the  Ministry.  In  addition  to  these  formal 
functions the Ministry is promoting a considerable amount 
of research in the field of labour and  social  security.  In 
addition  the  Federal  Ministry  has  the  competence  - on 
request of at least one contracting party  - to  extend  the 
application  of  collective  agreements  on  non-unionised 
workers by way of declaration of general binding. Finally 
the Ministry has the very important task to supervise the 
activities of other institutions,  among  them  the  Federal 
Labour Office. 
CHAPTER II: THE MEANS OF REGULATING 
WORKING CONDITIONS 
1. The Constitution 
The constitution is the top in the hierarchy of sources. It 
plays a dominant role in the field of labour law.  This is 
especially true for collective labour law where legislation is 
very  fragmentary.  The  problems  not  regulated  by  the 
legislator have to be solved by recourse to the constitution. 
Thus for example all the rules on industrial conflict were 
developed by interpretation of principles laid down in  the 
constitution. But the constitution also plays an important role 
in individual labour law. It should be  borne in mind that 
many legal provisions, concerning the contractual relation-
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ship, originate from a totally different period, namely from 
the tum of  the century. They are embedded in the Civil Code 
of 1900.  Thus  many  of those  provisions  are  no  longer 
compatible with basic principles laid down in the constitu-
tion.  This  is  why  the  constitution,  also  in  the  area  of 
individual labour law, is shaping the legal framework to a 
great extent. Since the principles laid down in the constitu-
tion are very vague and unspecific, the leeway for interpreta-
tion is rather wide. Thereby it is evident that this recourse to 
the constitution is increasing the powers of the interpreting 
agencies, particularly the courts. 
In labour law mainly two articles of the constitution are of 
predominant importance: art. 9 section 3 guaranteeing the 
freedom of association and art. 14 guaranteeing the private 
property,  including the private property of means of pro-
duction. 
Freed  om of association  in the German context has  three 
dimensions:  the individual's freedom to set up an associ-
ation, to join an association, to remain in an association, and 
to be active in an association (so called "positive 
11 freedom of 
association) as well the individual's conflicting freedom not 
to join an association or to leave an association (so called 
'~gative
11 freedom of association). The borderline between 
those two conflicting freedoms happens to be one of the most 
difficult and most controversial problems of German labour 
law. The third dimension refers to the so called collective 
freedom of association understood  as  a  guarantee of the 
association's existence as well as of its activities. 
The constitutional guarantee of private property on means of 
production is understood to  be  the legal  basis for  mana-
gement's prerogatives. It again is one of the most difficult 
tasks to draw the borderline between the scope of collective 
bargaining and workers' participation on the one hand and 
the scope of this constitutional guarantee on the other hand. 
2. Ordinary Legislation 
In spite of what has been said on the dominant role of the 
constitution, it should be pointed out that in the FRG  the 
level of protective legislation is comparatively high. Thus 
ordinary legislation is particularly important in so far as it 
sets minimum standards for all workers, whether they are 
union members or not. Since the competence to legislate in 
the field of labour law is given to the Federal Legislator, it 
is  almost exclusively Federal  legislation which has  to be 
taken into consideration. In spite of the federal structure of 
the Republic this evidently leads to a homogeneous pattern 
of  labour law in all the different states. If  constitutions of the 
states or ordinary laws contain provisions on labour law, 
they are only applicable in so far as they do not contradict 
Federal law. Federal law always takes priority even if the 
Federal source has a  much  lower standard than  the state 
source.  For example,  ordinary Federal legislation always 
takes priority over state constitutions. 
The problem is that the various legal provisions, stemming 
quite often from very different periods, are spread over so 
many specific Acts that it is difficult, even for the expert, to 
oversee the whole structure. This is why, in the seventies, an 
attempt was made to combine at least the principal rules of 
individual labour law into one single code. Thus with the 
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from 1970 to  1977, a draft of an Act on the Employment 
Relationship  was  prepared  which  tried  to  combine  the 
existing rules, and which at the same time tried to reform the 
whole structure. This turned out to be a futile attempt. The 
draft has remained a draft until the present day. The reason 
for this is simple: it has become impossible for the legislator 
to obtain the necessary majority for comprehensive codifica-
tion in this area. Thus the legislator, as it seems, is only able 
to legislate on specific problems and even here it is becom-
ing increasingly difficult. 
In the former GDR a comprehensive Labour Code containing 
all  the  rules  of labour  law  had  existed.  According  to 
Article 30 para.  1  No.  1  of the  Unification  Treaty,  the 
parliament of the unified Germany is supposed to codify as 
soon as possible,  'the law referring to the individual employ-
ment  relationship  as  well  as  the  protective  standards 
referring to working time, work on Sundays and holidays 
and the specific protection of  women~ No. 2 of the same 
paragraph extends this legislative program to the codification 
of  health and safety standards. In the meantime the legislator 
has fulfilled its task in reference to working time. 
In 1992 a group of  labour law professors from East and West 
Germany  elaborated  a  draft  for  an Act on  Employment 
Contract Law. The German Law Association in 1992 with an 
impressive majority recommended legislative measures on 
the basis of this draft. For a long time, however, it looked 
again as if nothing would happen. In May 1995, the govern-
ment of Saxony has presented a draft for such an Act in the 
Federal Council. Other state governments plan to follow this 
example with respective drafts. Nevertheless, doubts whether 
these initiatives will lead to a Federal Act are justified. It is 
very unlikely that such a comprehensive codification will be 
achieved. The mechanism of legislation, being constrained 
by diverging pressure groups, seems to have great difficul-
ties in gaining the necessary majority for such an ambitious 
project. In addition it is questionable whether in view of the 
European integration it is desirable to increase the rigidity of 
the national law by such a codification. 
The  legislator,  in  many  cases,  delegates  the  power  to 
regulate a specific matter to administrative agencies or other 
bodies.  The constitution  requires  that  such  a  delegation 
should  be exactly  circumscribed  in  the  law  in  order  to 
eliminate  the  danger  that  the  administrative  agency,  or 
another body, in fact is playing the role of the legislator. 
Basic decisions cannot be delegated by the legislator. 
3. Court Decisions 
Court decisions play a very important role in the field of 
labour law. This is not only true where the courts specify the 
general clauses and general terms of  law, but also where they 
have to fill in the gaps left open by the legislator. According 
to the Act on Court Procedure in Labour Matters the Federal 
Labour Court has the sole power to develop the law further. 
In fact  the Federal Labour Court has become at least as 
important as the legislator as far as regulations in the field of 
labour law are concerned. Thus it is not surprising at all that 
a big discussion on the proper role of the courts, compared 
to the legislator, is going on in the Federal Republic. The 
question is how far the actual role of the courts, especially 
the Federal Labour Court,  is still in accordance with the 
principle of separation of legislative and judicial power as 
laid down in the Constitution. 
4. Collective Agreements 
Collective bargaining in the Federal Republic of Germany 
almost exclusively takes place on a high level, be it region-
wide or for a whole industry. Before the reunification the 
latter used  to  be nation-wide but now separate collective 
agreements are concluded for the eastern and the western 
part of  the country. Within those two parts the segmentation 
between different regions - at least to a great extent - is 
merely formal. Thus, to just give an example, in the metal 
industry the territory of the whole industry is divided in 
regions. Collective bargaining separately takes place within 
each region. In reality however these bargaining activities 
are highly centralised: they are coordinated by the headquar-
ters and (for the reasons described above) the claims are very 
much the same. In addition it turns out that - at least in the 
big majority of the cases - the results reached in one area 
more or less become the model for the other areas. 
Even if in Germany inter-industry agreements do not exist it 
would be a wrong perception to understand the collective 
agreements  in  the  different  industries  as  being  totally 
disconnected from each other. The big unions are acting as 
a sort of  trend setter. This especially applies to the margin of 
wage increase. Consequently the homogeneity of collective 
bargaining results exceeds by far the limits of one industry. 
Since - at least in principle - the topics of  bargaining in the 
public and in the private sector are very much the same, this 
trend setting role may be performed by a big union of the 
public or the private sector. Since the trend-setting role is 
interchangeable  between  private  and  public  sector  it  is 
evident that there is - at least to a relevant extent - homoge-
neity between bargaining results reached in both sectors. 
The normative part of collective agreements (in contrary to 
the  obligatory  part  which  deals  with  rights  and  duties 
between the contracting parties) directly affects the indi-
vidual employment relationship.  In other words, if rights 
embedded in normative clauses of collective agreements are 
violated,  the individual worker or the employer to whom 
these clauses apply, has recourse to court assistance. But it 
should  be  kept  in  mind  that,  at least  in  principle,  such 
clauses only cover union members being employed by an 
employer  who  himself  is  a  member  of the  employers' 
association which signed the collective agreement. 
The relationship between legislation and the normative part 
of  collective agreements is rather complicated. If  there is an 
Act which  stipulates a  minimum standard,  the collective 
agreement cannot fall  below but only rise above this stan-
dard. 
If  the law does not set a minimum standard but only provides 
regulation put at the disposal of the contracting parties, it is 
possible for  the collective agreement to disregard such a 
regulation. Often, however, the legislator does not expressly 
declare whether a  law  is  setting a  minimum standard or 
whether it is at the disposal of contracting parties. This can 
only be determined by interpretation. 
Finally, the legal provision may be such that no deviation 
whatsoever is allowed, whether it is for the better or for the GERMANY 
worse of the worker.  Again,  it has to be determined by 
interpretation where such a provision exists. 
The relationship between collective agreements and court 
decisions is even more complicated. This is not a problem 
where the courts are merely specifying general clauses and 
general terms. Here they are supposed to explain the legal 
provision, therefore it is evident that the relationship is the 
same as the relationship to  the respective legislation.  The 
real problem arises where the courts are setting standards not 
simply implicated by existing legislation. This judge-made 
law sets minimum standards and thus, in principle, excludes 
clauses  in  collective  agreements  which  fall  below  this 
standard. 
In Germany the normative provisions of  a collective agree-
ment can be extended to those employers and workers who 
are not members of the respective organizations:  by  the 
declaration of  general binding. Thereby minimum standards 
can be guaranteed for all workers employed in the respective 
branches or  regions.  However,  this  does  not  apply  for 
enterprises from other EU-member countries acting on the 
German  territory with their own workers.  They still  are 
entitled  to  employ  their  workers  on  lower  conditions. 
Especially in the construction industries this has led to unrest 
due to the hilh unemployment rate among German workers 
of this sector. The dumping practice of such enterprises is 
considered to be unfair competition. Therefore, the German 
government has pushed very much the project of an EU-
Directive on the Posting of  Workers. 
5. Work Agreements 
The works council and the employer may sign work agree-
ments containing normative clauses,  having basically the 
same effect on the individual employment relationship as 
normative clauses of collective agreements.  There  is  an 
important difference though, work agreements always cover 
all the work-force whether they are union members or not. 
This basic disparity creates enormous problems of harmoni-
sation between  the two sources of law.  The relationship 
between collective agreements and work agreements is, for 
many reasons, one of the most difficult problems of labour 
law. 
Work  agreements  dealing  with  remuneration  or  other 
working conditions are only allowed when the same matter 
is not treated in a collective agreement. For work agreements 
to be unlawful, the fact suffices that the specific matter is 
usually regulated in collective agreements in the region and 
branch. 
If  a collective agreement exists, it is sufficient that it covers 
the region and the branch, no matter whether it applies to the 
specific establishment and to the employment relationships 
within this establishment. This implies that,  even in esta-
blishments where neither the employer is a member of the 
employers' association nor the workers are union members, 
remuneration or other working conditions cannot be regu-
lated by work agreements. 
This very rigid rule only applies to work agreements on 
matters where the works council has no right of co-deter-
mination. In these cases, as already mentioned, the works 
council has no power to induce the management to sign such 
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an agreement. The reason is to prevent the works council 
competing with the unions. Such a competition is considered 
to endanger the strength of the collective bargaining system. 
Should the system of  collective agreements break down, then 
there would be no adequate substitute at plant level when 
work agreements cannot be enforced by the works council. 
Therefore, in order to safeguard the strength of the system 
of  collective  bargaining,  the  prerogative  of regulating 
working conditions must be reserved to the parties of the 
collective agreement. 
According to the law, it is up to the parties of the collective 
agreement to decide whether or not, in spite of the general 
rule just explained,  work agreements supplementing and 
specifying the collective agreement are allowed. This may be 
done by including a so called opening clause through way of 
collective agreement. 
In matters where the works council has a real co-determi-
nation right the conflict between collective agreements and 
works council's power must be solved in a different way, 
otherwise the provisions of the collective agreements would 
only lead to the expansion of management's decision-making 
powers and diverge from the intent of the Works Constitu-
tion Act. Therefore, conflicts are solved as follows: it is still 
the prerogative of the parties to the collective agreements to 
regulate matters themselves, but once they have dealt with a 
matter it does not mean a complete loss of the power of the 
works council. First, the position of the works council is 
affected only if the plant is covered by a collective agree-
ment. Secondly, co-determination is only excluded when the 
collective  agreement  is  so  detailed  and  specific  that  no 
margin is left for alternative decisions. For all aspects where 
the  collective agreement  leaves  a  leeway  for  alternative 
decisions by management, the works council's co-determina-
tion right must be respected. 
6. The Structural Change of Collective Bargaining 
Today collective bargaining in Germany faces three major 
problems: The fighting against unemployment and loss of 
the existing jobs, the maintenance of Germany as an impor-
tant industrial site and the rising of the working conditions 
in East Germany to the western level. 
Since 1984 the reduction of working time has become the 
most  important  measure  in  fighting  unemployment  by 
collective agreements.  The employers do not oppose this 
strategy any longer. The reduction of working time as such 
is no longer the controversial issue but the trade-off to be 
paid for this goal.  Employers strive for more flexibility. 
This implies the possibility to regulate working time patterns 
differently for individual workers and. groups of workers 
within  a  certain  margin  predetermined  by  the collective 
agreement. And it especially implies a flexible distribution 
of working time throughout the week, including at least in 
principle Saturdays  and  Sundays  as  far  as  this does  not 
contradict with the law.  This concept has so far been the 
basis  for  a  number of collective agreements  and  this  is 
reflecting a general development. The even more important 
change  in  the  agreements  on  working  time  reduction, 
however,  has  been  the  fact  that  the unions'  doctrine of 
'Working time reduction without reduction of  wages "had to 
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reduction  is  inevitable.  This is  a  challenge for  the  trade 
unions' legitimacy.  It only can be  met if the same agree-
ments contain job guarantees at least for a certain limited 
period. This has been achieved in some pilot agreements. 
This policy has led to a new structure of  collective bargain-
ing. Since flexibility can only be achieved by taking account 
of the specific circumstances of specific plants, the imple-
mentation of such agreements by necessity has to take place 
on  the  decentralised  level  of the  plant.  Therefore,  the 
collective agreements provide only a general framework and 
have to be specified by work agreements. This leads inevita-
bly to an ever increasing integration of  works councils into 
the  collective  bargaining  structure.  Thereby  the  works 
councils get a chance to improve their image and to gain 
more power. How this power increase may be reduced and 
how it will be possible to more effectively limit the works 
councils'  activities  by  clauses  in  collective  agreements 
presently are key issues to be discussed by labour lawyers 
and in trade union camps. 
In addition the traditional system of centralised bargaining 
in Germany has come under pressure by the fact that more 
and  more  enterprises  (especially  on  the  territory  of the 
former GDR,  but also to a smaller extent in the West) are 
unable to cope with the minimum standards guaranteed by 
the collective agreements In the new East German states this 
became  especially  evident  in  the  context of a  collective 
agreement concluded in 1991  for the metal industry.  This 
agreement provided for a gradual annual wage increase to 
reach an equalisation with the conditions in West Germany 
after a  few  years.  I  very  quickly  turned  out  that  many 
enterprises could not keep up with these minimum standards. 
Therefore,  the agreement  had  to  be modified.  The time 
frame has been extended and- more important- a specific 
clause was embedded into the agreement according to which 
exceptions are allowed under certain very restricted condi-
tions. The decisive force leading to this change was the fact 
that  in  spite of the  original  collective  agreement  works 
councils and employers in quite a few enterprises agreed to 
undercut the minimum conditions for the sake of the survival 
of the  enterprise.  Such  practices  ignoring  the  collective 
agreements also can be found in West-Germany. This has led 
to a discussion on the question whether collective agreements 
should expressly allow works councils and employers to set 
up  lower standards by work agreements within a certain 
margin  defined  in  the  collective  agreement.  The  main 
problem in this context consists in the question of what the 
parties to the collective agreement can do to maintain the 
control of what happens. It seems as if this discussion will 
go on for some while, solutions are not yet in sight. 
7. The Function of Individual Labour Contracts 
Evidently the individual labour contract remains to be the 
exclusive source of law in cases where neither protective 
laws  nor  collective  agreements  and/or work  agreements 
apply. This may especially be the case for leading personnel. 
White collar employees above a certain income level  - at 
least as  a  principle - are beyond  the scope of collective 
agreements. For them the individual contract is an important 
instrument of regulation. 
The second  important  function  played  by the  individual 
contract has to be seen in the extension of standards regu-
lated in collective agreements on those who are not covered 
by  those agreements:  the non-unionised workers.  Even if 
according  to the law the normative clauses of collective 
agreements only  cover those who are unionised,  this  in 
actual practice most often does not mean that non unionised 
workers  would  be  treated  differently.  They  practically 
always get the same. The instrument to achieve this goal is 
the individual labour contract. 
Finally and most important: the individual labour contract 
serves mainly to improve the individual working conditions 
already guaranteed by other sources in favour of the em-
ployee. 
CHAPTER Ill: CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. The Federal Constitutional Court 
The Federal Constitutional Court verifies the compatibility 
of  legislative acts, as well as court decisions of other courts, 
with  the  constitution.  The Federal  Constitutional  Court 
consists of two chambers, each having eight judges. Half of 
the judges of  the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by 
the  Federal  Parliament,  the  other  half by  the  Federal 
Council. The term of office is 12 years, re-election is not 
possible.  Quite a  few  of the most characteristic traits of 
labour law are due to  the Federal  Constitutional  Court's 
decisions. This refers especially to the regulations for strikes 
and lock-outs. 
2. The Labour Courts 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Labour Courts are 
the dominant mechanism for resolving conflicts of "rights 
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in individual as well as in collective labour disputes. The 
roots of the system date back to the 19th century. But the 
real  starting point of Labour Courts as a special branch of 
the court system, was the Labour Courts Act of  1926. Until 
then the common courts for civil law matters were competent 
for labour disputes. 
The German Labour Court system comprises three levels: 
Labour Courts of  the first instance, Appellate Labour Courts 
and the Federal Labour Court. The courts of the first two 
levels are state institutions. The Federal Labour Court is a 
Federal  institution.  There are in  the Federal Republic of 
Germany  124  Labour Courts at present.  The number of 
Appellate Labour Courts is 18: North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Bavaria have two each, in each of the other states there is 
only one Appellate Labour Court. 
The Labour Courts and the Appellate Labour Courts are 
financed by the states. The individual states are responsible 
for the establishment of the courts and for the delineation of 
the districts after consultation with the major unions and em-
ployers'  association  in  the  respective states.  The Labour 
Courts and the Appellate Labour Courts are administered by 
the Ministry of  Labour in the state in which they are located. 
The Federal Labour Court was created in 1953 by express 
order of the constitution of 1949. It is administered by the 
Federal Minister of  Labour. 
The Labour Courts are composed of one or more panels, 
each with a professional judge as chairman and one lay judge GERMANY 
each from the employer and employee sides. In courts with 
more than one panel, the jurisdiction of the individual panels 
is determined by an organisational chart set up by the courts 
themselves. 
The Appellate Labour Courts are authorised exclusively to 
hear appeals against decisions of labour courts in the first 
instance. As in the Labour Courts, they also have panels 
composed of  one professional judge as chairman and one lay 
judge each from the ranks of employers and employees. 
Under certain conditions, judgements handed down by the 
Appellate Labour Courts  may be appealed to  the Federal 
Labour Court.  The Federal Labour Court at present com-
prises ten  divisions called senates.  Each senate has  three 
professional judges and one lay judge each from employer 
and employee sides. 
The  professional  judges  of the  Labour  Courts  and  the 
Appellate Labour Courts are appointed by an authority under 
state law,  usually the state Minister of Labour.  They are 
jointly selected by the Minister of Labour and the Minister 
of Justice who are assisted by an advisory committee. The 
advisory  committee is  tripartite and  consists of an  equal 
number of representatives of the state's major trade unions, 
employers'  associations  and  the  labour  judiciary.  The 
committee is established by the state Minister of Labour who 
selects its members from lists of candidates proposed by the 
unions  and  the  employers'  associations.  The committee 
members representing the labour judiciary are appointed by 
the Labour Minister in consultation with the Minister of 
Justice. 
The professional judges of the Federal Labour Court  are 
appointed by the President of the Federal Republic from 
proposals made jointly by the Federal Labour Ministry and 
the  electoral  committee  for  judges.  This  committee  is 
composed of  all state Labour Ministers and an equal number 
of  members elected by the Federal Parliament. The Federal 
Ministers of justice and  the  body  which  represents  the 
interests of  professional judges of the Federal Labour Court 
must also be consulted, although neither has a veto power. 
The  employers'  and  employees'  associations  have  no 
institutionalised right to participate in the selection of the 
professional federal labour judges. 
All judges, whether they are professional or lay judges, have 
an equal vote. Thus, in theory, the professional judge in the 
Labour Court and in the Appellate Labour Court could be 
overruled by the lay judges, since the decisions are made by 
majority vote. But in fact it is the professional judge who 
normally dominates the panel by virtue of his status as a 
legal expert. Professional judges at all three court levels are 
appointed for life. They cannot be recalled or transferred. 
3. Mediation 
While compulsory arbitration in collective bargaining was a 
significant feature of the Weimar period,  this mechanism 
does no longer exist and is even understood to be incom-
patible  with  the  constitutional  guarantee  of freedom  of 
association.  Compulsory arbitration was replaced by vol-
untary mediation. This means that it is up to the parties of 
the collective agreement whether they establish a mediation 
procedure and it is also up to the parties to decide on the 
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effects of mediation. Meanwhile mediation agreements are 
concluded for  practically all  areas of the private and the 
public sector. There is however, no homogeneous pattern to 
such agreements. They differ from industry to industry. 
4. Strike and Lock-out 
The absence of compulsory arbitration has increased the 
importance  of strike  and  lock  -out  as  conflict  resolving 
instruments.  Even if in Germany practically no statutory 
provisions refer to industrial action, there is nevertheless a 
detailed legal regulation on this matter.  Law on industrial 
action almost exclusively is judge made law. 
According to the Federal Labour Court, industrial conflict 
must  be  exclusively  understood  as  complementary  to 
collective bargaining. To put it differently: industrial action 
is only allowed in so far as its purpose is the achievement of 
a collective agreement and the achievement of  aims that can 
be regulated by collective agreements. Any industrial action 
for other purposes, whatever it may be, is understood to be 
illegal from the outset. A very important implication of this 
interrelationship between collective bargaining and industrial 
action is the fact,  that a strike only can be carried out by a 
party competent to conclude a collective agreement, a union. 
Thus it may be said that the right to strike in the Federal 
Republic of Germany is a union's right and not an individ-
ual's right.  Even if in the past the number of strikes and 
lock-outs has not been very high, this does not mean that 
those  instruments  are  unimportant.  The  mere  threat  of 
industrial  action  leads  to  compromises  which  otherwise 
would not be reached. This preventive effect of industrial 
action only can be understood in the context of the general 
attitude in Germany: each disturbance of the normal course 
of  production more or less is perceived to be a danger for the 
well-being of the national economy as such. 
It has to be stressed that in recent years industrial conflict in 
Gennany significantly has changed its face.  In times of high 
unemployment it evidently is difficult for trade unions to 
motivate their members to go on strike. Thus unions devel-
oped a strategy which not simply puts pressure on employers 
but which on the one hand helps to mobilise the members 
and on the other hand minimises the strike activity of those 
who participate in industrial action. This strategy is called 
'new mobility~ During the negotiations the unions call for 
short  strikes  which,  day  by  day,  are  shifted  from  one 
establishment to another within the region to be covered by 
the collective agreement. This strike has another advantage 
for the unions: while unions in "normal
11 strikes have to pay 
rather remarkable strike benefits this does not apply in the 
case of "new  mobility~ In other words: while due to finan-
cial  reasons  the  union  could  not  afford  to  perform  the 
"normal" strike for an extended period of time, there is no 
such  limit for  the strategy of "new  mobility~ While the 
Federal Labour Court at least in principle has legitimised 
this new strategy, this very question still is pending in the 
Federal  Constitutional  Court.  Its  decision  will  have  a 
tremendous impact on strike practice in Germany. 
As already mentioned in Germany remarkable strike benefits 
are paid to workers that are on strike ore are locked out. 
This does not apply to workers indirectly affected by a strike 
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Labour Court their employers are not obliged to pay their 
wages. This leads to a strong pressure on the union to end 
the strike. For this reason the question whether the Federal 
Labour Office has to pay unemployment benefits to  those 
workers  who  temporarily  are  without  remuneration  has 
become an important one. The formerly generous provision 
was changed in the late eighties. Now such payments only 
very exceptionally are to be made by the Federal Labour 
Office. Whether this is violating the unions' constitutionally 
guaranteed right to strike has been a controversial issue. The 
Federal constitutional Court has recently denied this ques-
tion,  but it made at the same time clear,  that  the future 
development might as well lead to a different understanding. 
How the employers will use the lock-out in the future will be 
an important factor in this discussion. 
5. The Arbitration Committee 
Strikes and lockouts as means of resolving conflicts between 
works council and employer are expressly prohibited by law. 
Therefore a special dispute resolving body, called an arbi-
tration committee, is provided for. 
Under the law there are two possibilities: the establishment 
of  a permanent arbitration committee or an ad hoc arbitration 
committee for each case as required. In practice, the perma-
nent committee is  never used  because it  is  believed  that 
actions of  a permanent body could be predicted if one knows 
the persons on the committee in advance. 
The arbitration committee consists of a certain number of 
members  appointed  by  the  employer,  an  equal  number 
appointed by the works council, and a neutral president who 
chairs the committee. 
If  the employer and the works council cannot agree on a 
matter being subject to co-determination, either side may 
request a decision of the arbitration committee. The com-
mittee's decision is binding on the parties and has the status 
of a work agreement.  However, the committee's decision 
may still be subject to review by the Labour Court. Since the 
Labour Court's powers  in  so far  are rather  limited,  the 
arbitration committee's decision in actual practice most of 
the time is the final word. 
CHAPTER IV: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
To a  significant extent  international  sources  are shaping 
labour law and industrial relations in Germany.  They not 
only comprise the regulations and directives promulgated by 
the respective organs of the  EEC  but also  the Charter of 
Human Rights of  the European Council, the European Social 
Charter, the International Treaty on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and many conventions of the International 
Labour  Organisation.  These  international  sources  either 
apply indirectly by way of implementation through national 
legislation or directly (as in the case of EC-regulations). 
It is almost exclusively the Federal legislator being involved 
in adapting the legal  framework to the standards fixed  in 
international sources. The focus of the parties to the collec-
tive agreements, to the work agreements and to the individ-
ual contracts - at least so far - is not on the international 
scene but almost exclusively on resolving problems within 
the domestic framework.  In other words:  in order to learn 
whether the national  legal order in Germany corresponds 
with the requirements of international sources it is necessary 
to  analyse  the  development  of the  domestic  legislative 
framework, including the interpretation given by the Courts. 
On the whole correspondence with international sources does 
not lead to big problems in Germany. The reason for this is 
simple: in most areas the standards in Germany anyway are 
above the level of international standards.  Thus conflicts 
only can arise in exceptional cases. This, however, happens 
in reference to important questions. 
To  quote  an example:  It  is  not  quite clear whether  the 
unlawfulness of strikes not organized by a union or the fact 
that  strike  is  banned  for  civil  servants  no  matter  what 
function they perform is in accordance with the European 
Social Charter or the fLO-Conventions Nr.  87 and 98. 
It  is  only  recently  that  the  implementation  of European 
Directives causes difficulties. The provisions of the Treaty 
on  Freedom  of Movement  were quickly and fully  imple-
mented in Germany. The same is true for the three directives 
of  the seventies on protection of workers in case of transfer 
of  undertakings,  collective  dismissals  and  insolvency. 
Especially as far as the Directive on Transfer of  Undertak-
ings is concerned the Federal  Labour Court has gone far 
beyond the standards requested by the Directive. Neverthe-
less, the German jurisdiction had to face corrections by the 
European Court of  Justice ('Christel Schmidt j. This has led 
to a widespread discussion in Germany. 
Due to a clear signal from the European Court of  Justice the 
Federal legislator in 1994 corrected still existing deficiencies 
regarding the Directive on equal opportunities for men and 
women. It, however, should be mentioned that the Federal 
Labour Court has gained merits in faithfully implementing 
the ban on indirect discrimination. But even there recently 
dissentions with the European Court of  Justice have arisen, 
still being subject to controversy. 
The Directives on the Employer's Obligation to Inform Em-
ployees of the  Conditions  Applicable to  the  Contract of 
Employment Relationship and on Working Time are already 
implemented in Germany: by the Act on Documentation of 
the Employment Relationship of 1995 and by the Act on 
Working Time of  1994. The Framework Directive of  1989 
and the Directive on European  Work.r  Councils have also 
been implemented. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE ACTORS 
1. The three main actors in the Greek system of 
industrial relations: the State, the employers 
and the workers 
The State,  with its myriad institutions and  governmental 
organisations, occupies a key position not only because of 
the multiple roles it plays as a public authority, as a major 
employer  and  as  a  negotiating  partner,  but  particularly 
because it is the State which does most of the regulating 
when it comes to  working conditions.  The workers have 
trade unions which speak for them at various levels, as do 
their works committees,  general  assemblies and  even  the 
strike committees and action committees.  The employers 
take part in the regulation process as individuals, through 
the employer's prerogatives which are theirs by law, and 
collectively,  within  the  employers'  associations  which 
have the right to conduct negotiations and conclude collec-
tive agreements. 
The word 'actor' is not a concept used in classical texts on 
labour law.  Greek legal  tradition and jurisprudence hold 
that it is the State which determines the framework and the 
limits of the rules established by the social partners, hence 
the notion of actors such as it exists in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries  is  wholly  foreign  to  them.  In  recent  years,  studies 
introducing the notion of 'industrial relations' do not em-
ploy the term  'actors' but prefer the word  'agents' when 
referring in particular to the workers' trade unions and the 
employers' professional organisations. 
2. The actors and their institutional organisations 
The following is a very brief outline of the workers' trade 
unions, taking in the political unions which play a crucial 
role in  labour relations,  especially  in  the private sector, 
and of the employers' associations. Although civil servants 
have  their own  trade  unions  separate  from  those  in  the 
private sector, the role of the State, always a redoubtable 
actor in Greece, all-present and quasi all-powerful, is not 
always very clear.  The fact  that  the civil  service unions 
have no bargaining rights helps to push this actor into the 
background  where  the  various  studies  and  analyses  are 
concerned.  However, there are now vigorous demands for 
collective labour agreements to be extended to the public 
sector, which seems to be in keeping with the present Go-
vernment's action  programme which  includes  promoting 
the debate on the recognition of the right of civil servants 
to collective bargaining. 
(a) The trade unions 
(i) Introduction 
Before going into the structure of the Greek trade unions, 
we need to define the global framework within which  'of-
ficial' trade unionism acts. Trade unions in Greece have a 
sort of dual structure at national level. There is an official 
structure i.e. generally recognised by the government, and 
an  unofficial  structure,  backed by  the opposition parties. 
This peculiarity - which surfaced shortly after the unions 
had organised themselves  nationally  in  1918  - occasion-
ally  goes  into  abeyance  for  a  brief but  happy  spell  in 
which unity has  a  chance to  prosper.  This happened  re-
cently,  for example,  from  1982-1985.  So,  while Greece 
has  a  single  trade  union  confederation,  the  General 
Confederation  of Greek  Workers,  which  styles  itself the 
supreme and unifying force which brings the majority of 
the country's trade unions under one national umbrella and 
which  represents  the  interests of all  workers,  in reality, 
Greek trade unionism is far more complex. Existing side-
by-side  with  the  single  Confederation  are  trade  unions 
which  maintain very  close links  with  the main  political 
parties  but which  have  no corporate  status  and  are not 
officially  recognised  by the Government.  These political 
trade  unions  make  up  the  opposition  union  movement. 
They have no right to engage in industrial action and col-
lective bargaining, so  they press their claims through the 
professional organisations which belong to the movement. 
They have considerable real impact, particularly the ESAK-
s,  which is close to the communist party and has a great 
following among industrial workers, construction workers 
and accountants. The political unions close to the two re-
vamped communist parties, although numerically smaller, 
are well-supported in the service sector: all echelons of the 
education system,  banks,  hospitals.  The same applies  to 
the union close to the Conservative Party which until 1982 
was  the  sole  official  representative  of the  interests  of 
Greek workers (DAKE). 
The  two-tier  structure of Greek  trade  unionism  actually 
shows that it is far too dependant on the political parties -
whether in government or not-, that it has little say in the 
regulation of working conditions and  that it is motivated 
in  its  efforts  not  primarily  by  the  real  interests  of the 
workers as  such,  but by political expedience in a  'politi-
cians' world'.  Leaving aside the historical  reasons - and 
others - which have combined to forge this Greek version 
of  trade  unionism  (dictatorships,  civil  war,  lagging 
industrialisation, the importance of farming  for the econ-
omy),  there is one permanent feature which it is hard to 
explain:  the  Greek  unions'  financial  dependence  on  the 
State. The legal system previously in force prescribed that 
the large sums of money collected through the system of 
compulsory  contributions  entirely  unconnected  with  any 
form of affiliation were not managed by the unions but by 
the Ministry of  Labour. The Ministry distributed a tithe to 
the unions according to its own criteria which very often 
tended to work out in favour of the union closest to  the 
party in power
1
• 
Finally, Law 191511990 provided for the total abolition of 
State  intervention  in  the  funding  of trade  unions  from 
1992. 
(ii) Structure and Organisation 
Most Greek trade unions are organised by trade or by pro-
fessional category. Organisations based on occupational or 
industrial  branch  are  now  few  and  far  between.  Trade 
unionism  at  company  level,  which  used  to  be  virtually 
unknown,  has  been developing fast  since  1974,  but par-
ticularly after 1982. 
I.  On the subject of: financial dependence, see G. KOUKOULES,  1he 
Greek trade unions:  economic autonomy and dependence  1938-
1984,  Athens  1984;  legal  provisions  allowing  State  control  of 
trade unions,  seeP. KRAVARITOU-MANITAKIS,  Droit du  Travail, 
democratie et crise, loc.cit. p. 116-121. GREECE 
The hierarchy  of the  trade  unions  is  as  follows:  Article 
1 (3) of  Law 1264182 identifies trade union organisations at 
three levels:  organisations of the first degree include un-
ions which have acquired corporate status under the Civil 
Code (there are now 4000 of these), groups of individuals 
formed  in companies with  fewer  than  40 employees and 
the  local  branches of larger or pan-Hellenic  trade union 
organisations. Second-degree trade union organisations are 
federataions made up of at least two trade union organisa-
tions from the same branch of economic activity or trade 
and workers' centres comprising at least two trade unions 
or local trade union branches with their headquarters in the 
same region. 
The federations, which are normally formed at national le-
vel, represent the vertical union structure, while the work-
ers' centres organised locally (towns with their peripher-
ies)  make  up  the  horizontal  structure.  The  powers  and 
activities of these two structures overlap and their relation-
ship tends to be rather fraught.  Third-degree organisations 
include the confederations made up of at least two second-
degree trade union organisations, i.e. the union federations 
or the workers' centres. The most representative confeder-
ation  is  the  General  Confederation  of Greek  Workers 
(GSEE).  The other four confederations are fairly  insignifi-
cant. There are 90 federations and over 100 workers' cen-
tres.  Works  unions  have  their  own  federation  of works 
unions in industry (OVES). 
The number of trade union organisations in Greece is very 
high,  partly because their basic structure is outdated,  ar-
chaic and anarchical and partly because some of them do 
not engage in real  union activities.  Their raison d'etre is 
to  serve,  support and enhance the prestige and  power of 
the political trade unions. 
The  bodies  of  the  General  Confederation  of  Greek 
Workers  are  the  pan-Hellenic  Congress  (this  is  the  su-
preme body  made  up  of representatives  of the  workers' 
centres  and  the  federations;  it  meets  once  every  three 
years), the General Council, which takes the place of the 
former,  the 35-member Board of Directors, the Executive 
Committee and the Supervisory Committee. 
Union  membership  is  around  30%.  Although  Law 
1264182 prohibits dual union membership, which of cour-
se doubles  membership  figures,  there  are as  yet  insuffi-
cient data on this question.  In  the private sector,  particu-
larly in the small and medium-sized firms, union member-
ship  is  very  low.  Yet  the  phenomenon  of falling  union 
membership observed in  other countries over the past ten 
years has not been observed in Greece. Quite the contrary: 
union membership in Greece has risen slightly. 
Trade unionism in State-run enterprises - either governed 
by  the  'socialisation' Law 1365/83 or not  - and  in  the 
banking sector presents a number of special features (e.g. 
union  membership  of between  85-100%,  dynamism  of 
proper union  activity).  Despite  the  fact  that  there  are  a 
large number of unions organised round a trade both in the 
State-run Electricity Board (DEHI),  in the Telecommunica-
tions Board (OTE)  and elsewhere, these nevertheless man-
age to have a considerable say in the regulation of working 
conditions thanks to their majority affiliation to  a second-
degree union organisation. Trade unionism in these enter-
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prises is currently in the vanguard of the social struggle in 
Greece. 
Sailors:  the  merchant navy  is  a  key  sector of the Greek 
economy. Workers are organised by trade: captains, engi-
neers,  sailors,  electricians,  cooks.  The sea-farers'  unions 
are  affiliated  to  the  Pan-Hellenic  Maritime  Federation 
(PNO),  set up in 1920. The PNO  is the official spokesman 
representing the interests of all seafaring categories.  Since 
Greek  legislation  on  corporate  participation  bodies  and 
procedures does not apply to the merchant navy, sea-farers 
have no works committees on their ships and have noun-
ion rights in the workplace. 
(b) Public sector: the higher administration 
of  civU service unions (ADEDY) 
Salaried  employees  contracted  under  administrative  law, 
i.e. employed by  the State, the communes and other cor-
porate entities in administrative law, have their own trade 
union organisations distinct from those in the private sec-
tor.  Still,  the  civil  service  unions  are  structurally  very 
similar to the private sector unions. The Higher Adminis-
tration of Civil Service  Unions  - set up  in  1945  - is  the 
union organisation which represents all public sector em-
ployees and is the official spokesman vis-a-vis the govern-
ment.  Its  70-odd  members  include  branch  federations, 
pan-Hellenic unions or branch associations,  and the most 
representative local  unions.  ADEDY's  administrative bod-
ies  are  the  pan-Hellenic  Congress,  the General  Council, 
the Executive Committee and the Supervisory Committee. 
Trade unionism in the civil service has much the same pro-
blems as its private sector counterpart, though they tend to 
be less serious.  Membership figures  in the grassroots un-
ions,  financial  independence of all  organisations and  the 
high level of training of trade unionists in the public sector 
are the main differences with the private sector. The civil 
service  unions  do,  however,  have  problems  making  up 
their minds  on  whether  to  stand  united  or divided:  fre-
quently - in times of crisis- the union organisations either 
pull  out of the  Higher Administration or else  set  them-
selves up, de jure or de facto,  as coordination committees 
which form a sort of union opposition to  the official or-
ganisation and are active in their own right. Although it is 
true that these tend to be more dynamic,  they are inevita-
bly steeped in the political machination which dogs Greek 
trade unionism generally. 
(c) The employers' professional organisations 
(i) The Federation of  Greek Industries 
Greek employers do not have a single organisation which 
represents them all. This is due to the fact that employers' 
unionism  is  organised on  the basis of economic activity, 
i.e. industry, trade, craft trades, the merchant navy. With-
in  each  area  of activity,  employers'  organisations  look 
after their own branch of activity. In industry, the Federa-
tion of Greek  Industries  (SEV),  founded  in  1907,  takes 
pride of place.  SEV  is partly a straightforward association, 
partly  a  union  of first  degree  associations.  Its  members 
include  8  local  industry  associations,  40  associations  of 
industrial branches and over 300 individual firms.  SEV  is 
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ployers at the ILO.  It is supposed to represent the interests 
of Greek industry as a whole at the highest level. Some of 
the  largest  Greek  companies  are  not  members  but  they 
harmonise  and  bring  their  activities  into  line  with  SEV 
decisions,  generally collaborating in  friendly  understand-
ing.  A substantial  proportion of small  and  medium-sized 
firms are not members either, but often oppose the Federa-
tion's  social,  economic  and  institutional  rulings,  being 
unable to carry them out. The main bodies of the Federa-
tion  are  the  Board  of Directors which  is  responsible  for 
management and budget administration and also represents 
disciplinary  authority,  and  the  Members'  Assembly,  the 
highest body which decides any matter not within the pro-
vince of another body, of which there are several second-
ary ones
2
• 
(ii) The Association of  Industries in Northern Greece 
This  is  an  employers'  organisation  - set  up  in  1915  -
which  operates  in  Northern  Greece  and  represents  some 
250 industries in the region. The Association of  Industries 
in Northern  Greece (SVEE) does not belong to  the Feder-
ation of Greek  Industries,  but works hand  in  hand  with 
this body while representing the interests of industry in its 
own region nationally. 
(iii) Trade, the merchant navy and others 
There are several  organisations in  the trade arena,  of the 
first, second and third degree. These include the Chambers 
of Commerce in  the principal cities,  the League of  Joint-
Stock and  Limited Liability  Companies.  The  leading  or-
ganisation  in  the  Merchant  Navy  is  the  Union  of Greek 
Shipowners (EEE), a first-degree organisation representing 
over 100  shipowners which  first appeared  in  1916.  Only 
shipowners with vessels exceeding 1500 tons can be mem-
bers of EEE.  There are also  a  number of unions  of the 
same degree- owners of cargo and transport vessels etc. -
which represent their own sector for collective bargaining 
purposes.  The banking sector is  represented by the Bank-
ing  Union;  the hotel  and catering sector by  the Pan-Hel-
lenic Federation  of Hotel  Keepers,  etc.  Unlike the  large 
trading  firms,  small and  medium-sized commercial  enter-
prises and  craft trades are organised on the same lines as 
the workers'  trade unions,  with  separate unions,  federa-
tions and confederations which operate nationally. 
While  the  absence  of a  central  organisation  bringing  all 
employers under one umbrella is made good by the Feder-
ation of Greek Industries,  in  other areas  this  lacuna does 
complicate the regulation of working conditions. 
3. Organisational and operational bases and guarantees 
The organisational  and  operational  bases  and  guarantees 
for actors on the social and economic stage are rooted in a 
triad:  individual  union  freedom  (positive  and  negative), 
the freedom to form unions and the freedom to operate as 
a  union.  The legal  foundations  of the organisational  and 
operational activities of professional organisations are en-
shrined in the 1975 Constitution, while Law 1262 of  1982 
on  'democratisation  of the  trade  union  movement  and 
2.  The  social and professional organisations in  Greece,  p.  19  and 
on. 
guarantees for workers' union rights' regulates a number 
of issues. 
According to  the constitutional clauses on the right to as-
sociate (Article 12), Greeks have the right to set up unions 
and non-profitmaking associations in full compliance with 
the law,  which  may  not impose prior authorization.  The 
right to associate is recognised by the Constitution both in 
respect of worker's organisations and employers' organisa-
tions.  It is worth noting that the law on the  'democratisa-
tion of  the trade union movement' applies to workers' or-
ganisations  only.  While  the  right  to  associate  includes 
recognition of union  freedom,  as  indeed it always has  in 
Greece  in  previous  Constitutions,  the  1975  Constitution 
goes a step further in that it obliges the State  to take all 
requisite measures  to protect union freedom  and  the  free 
exercise of the rights connected with it. For example, Arti-
cle  23 (3)  of the  Constitution  dissociates  union  freedom 
from  the  right  to  associate  - while guaranteeing  it  - to 
tum it into a separate,  independent right.  This applies to 
union freedom  in all  its aspects:  as  a positive right,  as a 
negative right and in the pluralist sense. 
4. Function, roles, powers and responsibilities 
in the private and public sector 
(a) The private sector 
With Greek trade unionism locked into a two-tier structure 
at national level,  the workers' unions form an  alternative 
power structure both within and outside the official  insti-
tutions. This function is at its most manifest in the (indus-
trial) actions organised by trade union opposition.  At the 
same time,  the  single Confederation represents  the  inter-
ests of all  workers vis-a-vis  the Government;  it has  sole 
collective bargaining power and engages  in  a number of 
other activities:  e.g.  it participates in the framing of poli-
cies of interest to the workforce. 
There are several laws which provide for and regulate the 
participation of trade unions in  various national,  regional 
or local  bodies  which  are  expected  to  submit  opinions, 
proposals,  reports.  The unions also help to  manage some 
of the workers'  funds and  take part in the tripartite com-
mittees  to  resolve  collective  labour disputes.  Legally  es-
tablished  workers'  organisations actually  enjoy  consider-
able legal prerogatives at the national, regional, local and, 
since  1982,  at  company  level,  since  their  activities  are 
both  promoted  and  backed  by  the  law  and  may  be  im-
proved  through  negotiation.  In  recent  years,  company 
unions have seen their bargaining position as champions of 
wage  claims  and  in  other areas  more  firmly  established. 
All  the  same,  the  bargaining  agenda  is  restricted  at  all 
levels to wages and benefits.  The most recent (1991) na-
tionwide collective agreement with an institutional content 
deals  with  the  contribution  of employers  to  vocational 
training,  the  setting  up  of the  Institute for  Health  and 
Safety  at  Work  (ELINY AE)  and  the  reform  of the  opera-
tional  structure  of public  bodies  under  the  Ministry  of 
Labour's  authority.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
Greek unions have nothing like the bargaining powers or 
the  general  function  of unions  in  countries  like  Italy  -
which have a say in issues such as fiscal policy, rent rules, 
health policy and the like - or even France and the Federal GREECE 
Republic of Germany.  This  'weakness' of the Greek un-
ions is largely linked to the question of trade union unity. 
The duties of the employers' organisations include repre-
senting their members'  interests,  taking part in collective 
bargaining and participating in bodies responsible for the 
resolution of collective disputes. They are also members of 
the various tripartite and bipartite committees involved in 
framing  policies,  advisory  and  consultative  duties  and 
formulating proposals. 
(b) The public sector 
In the public sector, it is important to separate the role of 
trade unionism in the civil service sector and that of the 
trade unions in the public sector of the economy, since the 
two are very different.  Trade unions in the civil  service, 
particularly those affiliated to the civil service union (ADE-
DY),  chiefly  focus  on the civil service statute,  career op-
portunities, the disciplinary powers of the administration, 
their participation in the various decision-making fora of 
immediate concern to themselves. The trade union organi-
sation in the public sector have no bargaining powers. Yet 
they  usually  formulate  proposals  preparatory  to  the  na-
tional  budget  debate  and  organise  collective  actions  in 
support of their claims. In addition, the public sector un-
ions,  often those in the  'trade union opposition',  formu-
late  opinions  and  take  action  in  areas  of wider interest, 
such as fiscal policy, health policy or anti-inflation policy. 
The role of trade unions acting for public corporations and 
public utilities goes well beyond their right to bargain and 
to conclude collective agreements,  indeed to  their right -
unique as it is - to call strikes. They are highly dynamic, 
very  effective  and  set  an  example  to  other  sectors. 
Although Law 1363/1985 on the socialisation of public-
sector companies, whilst associating the workers with the 
management and supervisory bodies, was intended to pro-
mote the participation, not of the unions but of individual 
staff members,  the trade unions,  though  weakened,  con-
tinue to play an important role . 
5. Representativeness of the actors at different levels 
The representativeness  of professional  organisations  is  a 
fundamental concept in Greek law.  The prerogatives con-
ferred  by the law are only valid for so-called representa-
tive organisations.  This rule applies both to the workers' 
and  to  the employers' organisations.  Under the old legal 
system  (Law  3239/1955  and  Decree-law  186/1969),  re-
pealed in  1990,  only two  unions could be recognised as 
representative.  One was called  the  'most  representative', 
the  other  simply  'representative'.  This  differentiation, 
which first surfaced in 1937 - under the Metaxas dictator-
ship -was revived in  1955 by the Law on collective dis-
pute settlement and again by Decree-law 186/1969,  itself 
amended  to  become Decree-law  7311974,  now  in  force. 
According to the clauses in  question,  only representative 
trade organisations had the right to start a dispute or en-
gage  in  bargaining.  A  maximum  of two  organisations 
could have representative status in each branch.  None of 
the other organisations  had  negotiating  powers  or other 
functions. 
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Law 1876/1990 on free collective bargaining introduced a 
new type of representativeness without, however, adopting 
the principle of trade union pluralism: on the contrary, it 
has  imposed the concept of the single,  majority trade un-
ion.  Thus,  a  single  organisation  is  recognised  as  being 
representative at each negotiating level, depending on the 
number of trade union members who voted at the last elec-
tions to appoint the trade union's board of management. 
Whether  or  not  representativeness  exists  is  determined 
whenever  it  is  called  into  question.  Any  organisation 
authorised to sign a collective agreement and whose repre-
sentativeness at that level is challenged may appeal within 
ten days after the start of negotiations.  The appeal is ex-
amined by a special committee for the protection of trade 
union  representatives  (Article  15  of  Law  1264/1982), 
which gives a ruling at the first and final instance. 
It is important to emphasise that in Greece the concept of 
competence of trade unions is different from  the concept 
of capacity. It is not enough for the trade union to be rep-
resentative (capacity)  in order to conclude a valid collec-
tive agreement. It must, in addition, in accordance with its 
statute, be competent at the level - local, sectoral, trade or 
company - at which negotiation is taking place. 
Third-degree  organisations  - the  most  representative  at 
national level - are laid down by law. These are: the Gen-
eral Confederation of  Greek Workers for the workers, the 
Association of  Greek Industries and the Chambers of  Com-
merce of Athens and Thessaloniki for the employers. The 
most representative organisations at branch and local level 
are those with the highest membership. A similar scenario 
applies  at company  level:  union  rights and  facilities  are 
only  granted  to  the  most  representative company  union. 
The limited number of organisations which may be regard-
ed  as  representative  and  the  fact  that  only  numbers  are 
taken  into account in  determining this gives rise to well-
deserved criticism. 
6. The functions of the joint and tripartite bodies 
Greece has  several  tripartite bodies on which employers, 
workers and the State are represented. The State generally 
has  the most delegates.  These play an advisory role, but 
their interventions are sometimes decisive.  The tripartite 
bodies may be of: 
(a) general interest: 
•  the  Higher Labour Council  which  advises on social 
policy  issues,  on  the  need  to  extend  a  collective 
agreement erga omnes or on the temporal  extension 
of a collective agreement and on working hours; 
•  the  Advisory  Council for Social  Policy  and Labour 
Relations,  which  advises  on  all  written  questions 
dealing with labour relations, tabled by workers' and 
employers' representatives alike, and liable to be set-
tled  by  law;  on  questions  returned  by  the  relevant 
Minister on social  policy or social  security,  and on 
any draft bill or decree dealing with  the aforementi-
oned subjects; 
•  ESAP, the National Council for Development Policy, 
a  body  which  has  taken  over  from  the  Social  and 
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tions and powers:  advising  on .  and  formulating  pro-
posals for  the government with  respect  to  economic 
and social policy and national development; or of 
(b) specific interest: 
•  bodies set up at the Ministry of  Labour or social ser-
vices such as  the  Technical and Vocational  Training 
Council, the Social Security Council and others. They 
have advisory powers; 
•  representations to independent bodies such as the La-
bour Force  Organisation,  the  Workers'  Centre,  the 
Workers' Housing Centre, ODEPES and others; 
•  bodies or committees responsible for settling collec-
tive labour disputes or other labour conflicts and dis-
putes in the field of insurance. These include the me-
diation and arbitration body, the tripartite cooperation 
committees,  the  committee  which  rules  on  trade 
unionist  dismissals,  the  various  committees  of the 
Social  Security  Board  and  other,  less  important 
organisations. 
7. The national administrations and the government 
institution as actors in the social and political arena 
and as employers 
In their role as employers, the national administrations and 
government offices are heavyweights by virtue of the sheer 
number of people they  employ.  The State  is  one of the 
largest employers in Greece,  giving employment to  some 
half a  million  workers.  Of course,  there  is  a  difference 
between  the  national  administrations  (these  include  the 
various  ministries  and  the  civil  service  in  general)  and 
such  government  offices  as  the  Telecommunications 
Board, the Electricity Board, the Greek Railways, the Na-
tional Bank of Greece and  the Agricultural Bank and  in-
deed  the port authorities, the National Tourist Board, the 
Productivity Centre, and others. 
It is generally felt that the national administrations employ 
too  many  workers  (this  is  certainly  true  if we  compare 
their number with the number of civil  servants employed 
in  other,  larger EEC countries,  but at the same time it is 
also a traditional way of solving some employment prob-
lems)  and  are by defmition  slow and  bureaucratic.  They 
are a force which seldom takes  the initiative in the social 
and economic arena. This may have something to do with 
the salaries paid to government employees, which are none 
too generous except in the very highest echelons. Yet civil 
service jobs have always been  coveted  in  Greece because 
of the job security they offer (kratikodieti). There is in the 
civil service a kind of resigned acceptance of the low pro-
ductivity and often dubious efficiency of their work. There 
is  a general  lack  of initiative and  dynamism.  Given  that 
working  hours  in  national  administrations  extend  from 
7.00 in the morning to  14.00 or 15.00 in  the afternoon, 
and that income is inadequate to cover real and superficial 
needs,  many people,  particularly men,  have a second job, 
which is, of course, undeclared. 
For this  reason,  the  present Government  is  promoting  a 
draft bill to modernise public services in Greece. The bill, 
which seeks to reduce the public deficit, increase the com-
petitiveness of those public services now open to competi-
tion, while at the same time improving the quality of ser-
vice offered to users and rendering the public sector flexi-
ble, functional and profitable, is based on three main prin-
ciples: 
•  modification of the legal status of public services; 
•  adoption of 'enterprise plans' lasting 3-5 years; 
•  changes in  appointment procedures for  the  board of 
directors and the managing director. 
Productivity bonuses for staff, as well as the possibility of 
rewards or penalties for the board of directors in the light 
of the results obtained are also under consideration. 
It should also be stressed that since Greece became a mem-
ber of the European Community (1981), a fresh wind has 
been  sweeping  through  the  services of the  Ministry and 
bodies which come into contact with and collaborate with 
their EC counterparts. This is certainly true of the Ministry 
of  Labour, the social services in the Health Ministry, em-
ployment organisations such as OAED (Employment Board) 
and  other bodies  involved  in  vocational  training,  health 
and hygiene and women's affairs. 
The atmosphere in Government institutions is very differ-
ent,  given  the nature of their work and  their production, 
which requires a different organisation of work,  different 
working relations and a certain amount of dynamism. This 
dynamism  may  be detected  in  particular in  public sector 
enterprises and public utilities in which, in spite of the fact 
that the State is  in overall control, employer-worker rela-
tions  are  completely  different.  There  is  a creativity  and 
richness which is totally lacking in the civil service. How-
ever, these are attributable in particular to the initiatives of 
the staff and not so much to the qualities of the employer. 
Of course, the latter has not had the same reactions and the 
same  opposition  to  the  development  of the  trade  union 
movement  and workers'  demands  as  the employer in  the 
private  sector,  which  has  allowed  staff in  public  sector 
enterprises and public utilities to obtain this power which 
some  regard  as  formidable.  In  addition,  the  company 
'socialisation ' act of 1983 has given staff in these institu-
tions an important role in social, economic and even polit-
ical  terms:  they  are required to  take steps to promote the 
economy,  boost productivity,  foster national and  regional 
development and look after the environment. 
'Socialisation' is an experiment which, through its assem-
blies representing local government,  trade unions,  service 
users or the products of these institutions is of great signif-
icance  and  may  open  up  new  prospects  for  all  of these 
actors, all of whom still somehow owe allegiance to or are 
controlled by the omnipresent Greek State. 
CHAPTER II: THE MACHINERY OF REGULATION 
1. Sources of regulation: a swnmary 
Greek labour law took shape in the early years of this cen-
tury,  in  the  form  of legislation  on  subordinate  labour 
adopted at the instigation of the State. Since then, the reg-
ulation  of  working  conditions  has  developed  multiple 
sources. In addition to  'law and custom', all legal acts, no 
matter what  their origin  - State,  professional or interna-
tional - which have a regulatory character are regarded as 
sources of labour regulation. The 1975 Constitution recog-GREECE 
nised this plurality, although it still occupies a preponder-
ant place itself as a source of labour law. 
The Greek legal order naturally recognises the category of 
sources comprised of legal acts of professional origin such 
as  collective  agreements  and  arbitration  rulings,  as  we 
shall  see  below.  Their impact  in  terms  of regulation  is 
well-defmed (worse,  the hand of the State is clearly dis-
cernible).  In Greece  therefore,  State  rules  constitute  an 
overwhelming source of regulation of working conditions 
and  of professional  and  trade  relationships.  At  company 
level these have come to be regulated or rather, set down 
in detail by a series of laws of recent extraction. Greece is 
still  labouring under what can  only  be called  a  form  of 
atavism stemming from the way in which the first rules on 
working  conditions  came  about.  In  effect,  this  was 
designed  to  prevent  the  social  actors  from  establishing 
their own rules on labour relations even within the estab-
lished  order.  In this  respect and  within  these  limits,  the 
situation  in  Greece  is  certainly  diametrically  opposed  to 
that in Italy. 
International law ranks high in the hierarchy and as  such 
plays a leading role,  not least in the promise it holds out 
for the future.  Similarly, jurisprudence is  gaining  in  im-
portance,  although  not  specified  as  a  source  of law  in 
Greece.  The  same  applies  to  company  practice  which, 
however, is regarded as a source of labour law. 
2. The Constitution and Social Rights 
The current Constitution,  voted  in  1975  after the  fall  of 
the dictatorship,  is a watershed compared to its predeces-
sors. It recognises social rights (Articles 21-24) and lists a 
number of general principles which enshrine fundamental 
rights (Article  2{1),  4,  25  and  106).  The Constitutional 
clauses on labour law fall into two main categories: 
•  those which,  having  a  direct  impact on  labour law, 
also form its constitutional basis; 
•  those which  indirectly  affect  this  branch of the  law 
while forming its general constitutional basis. 
Provisions  directly  connected  with  labour  law  include 
those referring to labour law, to equal pay for equal work, 
to  recognition  of the  right  to  collective  bargaining  and 
collective  agreements,  to  the  abolition  of forced  labour 
(Article  22),  to  the  protection  of union  freedom,  to  the 
recognition of the right to strike (Articles 23 and 12). 
Social rights: 
Labour law as laid down in Article 22(1) of the Constitu-
tion, stipulates that: 
(a)  work is a right protected by the State; 
(b)  the State must take whatever steps are needed to cre-
ate an economic climate conducive to employment; 
(c)  the State must regulate the economic and social posi-
tion of urban and non-urban workers in order to en-
sure  a  regular  improvement  of their  material  and 
moral well-being. 
Greece has a free market economy, but this does not mean 
that its provisions have no legal consequences for workers, 
particularly for wage-earners. The real potential of labour 
law and the ways in which it is used as a legal instrument 
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to preserve the status quo, foster social progress (position) 
or restrict employers'  prerogatives  have  yet  to  be fully 
explored.  The  same  applies  to  the  State's  obligation  to 
take the necessary steps to keep the labour market healthy 
and  to  the right of workers' organisations collectively to 
negotiate problems concerning employment and their right 
to strike, to protest and to assert their right to work if the 
powers-that-be default. 
The  right  to  equal  pay  for  equal  work  is  a  principle 
enshrined in Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The right to 
equal  pay  applies  to  all  workers  irrespective  of sex  or 
'other distinctions': nationality, race, religion etc. 
The right to associate and to union freedom is confirmed 
by  Articles  12  and  23(3)  (see  Chapter  1,  paragraph  3 
above). 
The  right  to  collective  autonomy.  According  to  Article 
22(2) of the Constitution,  general working conditions are 
laid  down  by  law,  'supplemented  by freely  negotiated 
collective labour agreements and, where these fail, by the 
rules  laid down  by arbitration'.  Although  it  is  not  yet 
clear to what extent collective agreements count in laying 
down general working conditions, free collective bargain-
ing  is  constitutionally  guaranteed.  The Constitution  also 
recognises the normative part of collective agreements, but 
in its reference to arbitration, the last in line, no mention 
is made of the word 'compulsory'. 
The right to strike is guaranteed by Article 23(2)(1) of the 
Constitution  which  stipulates  that  striking  is  a  right,  a 
right exercised by legally constituted trade union organisa-
tions  with  a view  to  protect and  promote workers'  eco-
nomic and  professional  interests in  general.  The right to 
strike is extended to civil servants and the staff of public-
sector enterprises and  public utilities except that here the 
right to  strike is subject to  restrictions defined by special 
laws, which may not, however, abolish the right to strike 
or  prevent  it  from  being  legally  exercised  (Article 
23(2)(3)).  Only  magistrates and  members of the national 
security forces are forbidden to strike (army, fire brigade, 
rural  poli~e, cf.  Article 23(2)(2)). 
Then there is  the ban on forced labour of all descriptions 
(Article 22(3)(1)), a clause which strengthens the freedom 
to work deriving from other provisions, i.e. Article 22(1) 
(right to work) and 5(1).  The same article lists a number 
of exceptions. 
The ban on forced labour stipulates that special laws gov-
ern the requisitioning of personal services in the event of 
war or mobilisation or in  order to organise the country's 
defence or meet other needs arising from a disaster or lia-
ble  to  endanger  public  health.  The same  applies  to  the 
provision  of personal  labour  to  the  local  authorities  to 
meet  local  requirements  (Article  22(3)(2)).  All  these  ex-
ceptions are rigorously restrictive. 
The Constitution also recognises the right to social secur-
ity.  According  to  Article 22(4),  the  'State takes  care of 
workers ' social security, as prescribed by law'. 
This brief outline of Constitutional provisions dealing with 
social  rights and  clauses  indirectly affecting  the  right to 
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for  labour  relations  and  working  conditions  generally. 
However,  it does  show how important and  indeed,  how 
rich, if unplumbed, a source of labour law and the regula-
tion of working conditions the Constitution and its specific 
provisions  really  are.  Of the aforementioned  provisions, 
some have direct impact on the labour relationship, either 
individual or collective (equal pay, right to strike), where-
as  others refer to  the legislator to regulate these relations 
in  keeping  with  Constitutional  intent  (e.g.  the  right  to 
work,  the  right to  collective bargaining and  the  right to 
conclude collective agreements). 
Part II of the Constitution on individual and social rights 
ends by stipulating that the rights of Man, as an individual 
and as a member of society are placed under the protection 
of the State, all of whose bodies and offices have an obli-
gation  to  ensure  free  exercise  of these  rights  (Article 
25(1)).  This Article also  stipulates that the  State has the 
right to  demand of all  citizens that they do  their duty  in 
terms of social  solidarity (Article 25(4));  and  finally,  the 
law  is  now  interpreted  as  meaning  that  constitutionally 
guaranteed  individual  and  social  rights  must  be  upheld 
against all  threats  and  all  comers.  These  rights  are pro-
tected vis-a-vis the State and its organisations on the one 
hand  and  vis-a-vis  third  parties  on  the  other,  since  the 
latter are vulnerable not only to abuses of State power, but 
also to the overwhelming economic and social force of the 
private sector. 
3. Legislation: the powers of parliament and 
the prerogatives of legislative regulation 
Legislation,  the second  source of State and  domestic  la-
bour law in Greece is known as ordinary legislation. This 
has been the most important source of labour law since its 
inception until this very day. Although Article 26(1) of the 
Constitution places the legislative function with the House 
of Deputies and  the  President of the Republic,  the  very 
same  Constitution  gives  the  country's  'executive  bodies' 
powers normally reserved for the legislative, on an excep-
tional basis and on terms laid down by the law itself. 
Legislation  may  come  in  the  shape  of laws,  decrees, 
ministerial  orders or orders  from  another  regulatory  ad-
ministrative body.  The formal  laws (and indeed,  material 
laws in so  far  as  they  lay  down  rules of law)  passed ac-
cording  to  the rules by  the  House of Deputies and  pub-
lished by the President (Article 42(1))  include framework 
laws (Article 43(3)). These are voted by the House in  full 
session  only.  They  are  intended  to  lay  down  a  general 
framework  and  outline directives.  More  specific  regula-
tions are subsequently brought in by decree. 
Article 44(1) of the Constitution also provides for the pro-
mulgation  of emergency  laws:  'in  exceptional  circum-
stances  when  there  is  urgent  and unexpected  need,  the 
President of  the Republic may, acting on a proposal by the 
Council  of Ministers,  promulgate  acts  with  legislative 
content'.  These acts  must  subsequently  be  forwarded  to 
the  House  of Deputies  for  ratification.  The Constitution 
forbids any delegation of the power to pass regulatory acts 
by administrative bodies - other than the President of the 
Republic - except in order to regulate issues of more spe-
cific,  local,  technical  or highly  detailed  import  (Article 
43(2)).  Legislative delegation  must  therefore be special, 
limited and if need be subjected to specific conditions and 
restrictions. 
The rules it issues with respect to labour law are second-
ary.  Greek labour legislation is made up of a wide variety 
of texts,  some of which go back to the early years of the 
century when labour legislation first  raised its head,  and 
they  suffer  from  a  certain  lack  of coherence  and  coor-
dination. Greek labour legislation is riddled with inconsis-
tencies,  dogged by a lack of precision, the indiscriminate 
spread of provisions over a wide range of heterogeneous 
texts, clogged with a surfeit of detail or, by contrast, par-
simonious  to  a  degree,  it  expresses  itself in rough-hewn 
demotics; no wonder that it has so far defied any attempt 
at codification, though not for lack of trying (a concerted 
effort was  made to draw up a labour code between  1964 
and  1967). In 1978, when Greece was preparing for EEC 
membership, Greek labour legislation for salaried workers 
was brought together and codified for publication in 1981. 
Had a proper labour code been drafted, it would of course 
have had  to  specify  the  'general conditions of labour' as 
laid down by Article 22(2) of the Constitution, in line with 
the  programmes  announced  by  the  Conservative  Labour 
Minister  on  the  eve  of elections  (but  he  did  not  win 
through). To complete the collection, we must mention the 
new regulations on worker participation in the enterprise, 
which will effectively replace some of the old rules such 
as those on union rights. 
Limitations and trends 
The limitations of State regulatory power have  fuelled  a 
very  intensive  legal  debate  in  Greece,  particularly  since 
the introduction of austerity measures and a wage freeze in 
1983  and  1985.  The main  thrust of the debate was pro-
vided  by  the Legislative Act of  18.10.1985 which banned 
all collective wage bargaining- when this was effectively 
the only kind of bargaining common in Greece anyway -
until  the  end  of 1987.  The  resulting  jurisprudence and 
literature are extremely interesting. 
The act was adopted by special procedure as laid down by 
the Constitution (Article 44), without prior consultation of 
the social  partners or indeed  without any  form  of social 
dialogue or attempt at consensus whatsoever. 
The question  which  legal  pundits  posed  was:  'To  what 
extent do special circumstances, as mentioned in the Con-
stitution,  warrant a procedure designed to  restrict union 
freedom and collective bargaining rights as guaranteed by 
the Constitution (Article 22(2)), by means of  a legislative 
Act of  Government 
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• 
Jurisprudence was divided:  some lower courts argued that 
the  ''more general social and economic interest 
11 principle 
did not justify intervention and restriction of the right to 
collective autonomy.  Otherwise, the majority view in the 
legal  profession  held,  any  impediment  to  State  omnipo-
tence might be lifted and at the same time annihilate col-
lective autonomy.  But the highest legal  echelons,  includ-
3.  A.  MANITAKIS, Collective autonomy as an individual right and a 
constitutional  institution.  Comments  on  the  legislative  Act  of 
Government  of 18.10.1985,  Constitution  and labour  relations, 
Athens 1987, p. 201  and on. GREECE 
ing the Council of  State, did not go along with this reaso-
ning. Their position drew criticism on two counts: one on 
the way they interpreted constitutional rules and the other 
on  their  traditionalist  stance  in  support  of government 
wage policies. 
Then  the  doctrine
4  puts  forward  some  interesting  argu-
ments, stressing that  "restrictions arising from legislation 
which represent the right of  trade union organisations to 
speak out independently do not deprive them of  their bar-
gaining powers nor do they abolish their right to fight  -
by striking  - to defend their professional interests " while 
recognising that a ban on  negotiating a wage freeze  and 
suchlike is  only justified if it is  the outcome of negotia-
tion, of a social dialogue between the State and the social 
partners. 
Also, a word about the regulatory role of the civil service: 
the civil service increasingly passes administrative acts by 
delegation, such as statutory decrees, executive decrees or 
ministerial orders,  to  put the finishing  touches  to  labour 
legislation.  While there are indeed objective grounds  for 
this - regulation of special cases, need for technical know-
how etc.  - Greece does appear to be making rather exces-
sive use of this technique. 
One explanation may be the  "desire of  the State to keep a 
close  watch  on  issues  concerning  labour  law~ proof if 
anything of the importance of the State in  labour regula-
tion.  In  other  EEC  countries,  such  issues  are  generally 
handled  independently  by  the social  partners.  Greece on 
the other hand appears to have an  'unfortunate' tendency 
to hand more regulatory power to the State. 
4. Collective agreements 
(a) Conclusions, scope, range of 
application, erga omnes effect 
Foreword.  Until  recently,  collective agreements,  while a 
source of labour law (Article 22(2)) of the Constitution), 
were not of overriding importance in Greece when it came 
to establishing rules on working conditions. This was due, 
among other things such as the weakness of the trade un-
ions, to the very limited aim imposed by the archaic rules 
in  force,  i.e.  Law 3239/1955.  This text also  forged  too 
close a  link  between  bargaining and  compulsory  arbitra-
tion, which was still a key institution in the functioning of 
collective labour relations in  Greece.  The legal  rules un-
derpinning collective bargaining and collective agreements 
came in for sharp criticism on the part of the trade unions, 
which had been arguing for years that they were the chief 
impediment to  the development of the  instruments of ne-
gotiation and were long overdue for reform. 
Law 1876 of  1990 on free collective bargaining represents 
a  departure  from  Greek  law on the subject and  from  its 
history,  even  though  this  is  not  obvious  to  a  European 
lawyer reading the laws in force on collective agreements. 
The law actually puts an  end to the tradition of vigorous 
State interventionism,  the  delimitation  of the  objects  of 
negotiation, the rigidity of procedures: flexibility was one 
of the main principles behind this reform. The Greek law 
on collective agreements may therefore be described as an 
4.  Op. cit. p. 207 and on. 
63 
extension of the objects of negotiation, a new negotiating 
procedure with a reorganised structure and  new functions 
which go hand in hand with the strengthening of the legis-
lative autonomy of trade unions which has never been seen 
before. 
In  Greece,  collective  agreements  are  governed  by  legal 
statute.  They  are  defined  as  a  written  agreement  signed 
between representative workers'  organisations and repre-
sentative  employers'  associations  or  a  single  employer. 
The object of the negotiation and the collective agreement 
may  include individual reports,  collective reports and the 
financial  decisions of the company which affect working 
relations. 
The law distinguishes between five categories of collective 
agreements:  general national  collective agreements which 
cover  all  employees  in  the  enterprise;  branch  collective 
agreements applicable to all wage-earners in enterprises or 
establishments in one town or region in that branch; com-
pany collective agreements applicable to all staff; national 
collective agreements by trade applicable to all workers in 
that trade;  local  collective agreements by trade applicable 
to  workers in  that  trade working  in  a given  town  or re-
gion. 
Collective agreements comprise a compulsory section and 
a normative section. The compulsory section concerns the 
obligation to reach a settlement, which must be expressly 
provided for,  the obligation to apply the collective agree-
ment  to  members  of the signatory  organisations and  the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. The normative nature 
of the collective agreement is apparent from the automatic, 
direct,  compulsory manner in  which the collective agree-
ment is applied ipso facto to  individual contracts, oppos-
ing clauses being void and automatically replaced by more 
favourable clauses of the agreement. 
In  principle,  collective  agreements  are  binding  only  on 
members of the professional organisations which took part 
in  the negotiations,  but there are two  exceptions to  this. 
Firstly,  the  general  national  collective agreement applies 
to  all  wage-earners  in  the  country.  Secondly,  if the em-
ployer is bound by a collective agreement, he is obliged to 
apply it to  individual contracts he concludes with his em-
ployees,  regardless of the trade union  membership of his 
staff (Article 8(3) of Law 1876/1990). 
Trade  union  organisations  and  employers  who  are  not 
bound by a collective agreement may  become party to  it 
provided that they fall  within the territorial or professional 
scope of the agreement,  and  give written notice of their 
accession to the signatory organisations and are subject to 
the  same  formalities  required  for  entry  into  force  of the 
agreement. 
On the basis of an order from the Minister of Labour and 
after seeking an opinion from the Higher Labour Council 
a collective agreement may be extended to all workers in a 
branch or profession, provided that the employers in ques-
tion employ at least 51 % of the wage-earners in the branch 
or profession involved.  The extension does not alter the 
scope  or  the  content  of the  collective  agreement  con-
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ing to its extension and remains in force for the duration 
of the extended collective agreement. 
(b) The link between legislation and 
collective agreements (bargaining) 
The  relationship  between  the  law  and  collective  agree-
ments  is  covered  by  Article  22(3)  of the  Constitution 
which,  as  we have seen,  stipulates  that general  working 
conditions must be laid down by law and supplemented by 
free  collective  bargaining.  Doctrine  and  jurisprudence 
concur that  this  clause restricts  the common  legislator's 
omnipotence as  regards the regulation of working condi-
tions.  At the same time it guarantees the professional or-
ganisations'  regulatory  powers,  indirectly  it is  true,  but 
unmistakably  nevertheless.  The  problem,  which  Greek 
jurisprudence and  legal  doctrine have still  not  resolved, 
concerns the scope and confines of  collective autonomy. 
(c) New trends towards decentralisation 
of collective bargaining 
As a result of the reform of 1990, there has been a major 
reorganisation of collective bargaining: the law has added 
two  new  levels  of negotiation  - company  and  branch 
level - to the existing professional and multisectoral (na-
tional) levels of negotiation. The rule of hierarchy between 
the various levels of collective bargaining has been abol-
ished.  Disputes between the various levels are settled by 
the 'favour' principle. Comparisons are drawn on the basis 
of a set of contractual clauses: there are two sets- clauses 
relating to wages and other contractual provisions.  Com-
parison must be comprehensive. 
The  law  (Article  10(2)  1876/1990)  defines  the  'favour' 
principle in only one case: company and branch collective 
agreements  introduced  under  the  reform  may  amend  a 
collective agreement concluded at professional  level,  not 
only in a manner which is more favourable, but also in a 
manner less favourable to workers. 
Legislative  decentralisation  of negotiation  has  not  been 
accompanied by an  expansion of negotiation at company 
level.  Collective  agreements  at  company  level  have  re-
tained their traditional content. 
Even productivity bonuses, which are a common occurren-
ce,  are not expressly part of a collective agreement.  The 
same backwardness  is  found  in  the  'social plans' which 
accompany  restructuring and collective redundancies  and 
have a normative effect. Although provision was made for 
these in Law 1387/1983, trade unions and works councils 
still refrain from concluding them or are far from consid-
ering  them  as  alternative  measures  to  redundancy  or as 
measures for the support and reintegration of employees. 
However, even companies which meet all the requirements 
necessary for concluding collective agreements continue to 
apply other atypical  methods of negotiation between em-
ployers and employees,  taking as a basis the professional 
agreement to which they are bound. 
It could  be  said  that  the collective bargaining  system  is 
going through a transitional phase:  it bears the stigma of 
the unproductive methods of a not-so-distant past,  which 
keep repeating themselves, and is at the same time seeking 
to  explore  the  opportunities  offered  by  the new  institu-
tional framework which the actors view with uncertainty. 
S. The role of the tribunals: jurisprudential 
law and constitutional jurisprudence 
In  the  Greek legal  order,  the tribunals have no statutory 
powers. The effects of legal decisions are confined to the 
'matter judged'.  Jurisprudence  is  not  a  source  of legal 
regulation.  Yet  all  agree  that jurisprudence plays  a  key 
role and has decisive impact on the formation of the rules 
of labour law.  Jurisprudence has,  in time,  enabled Greek 
labour law to build up a body of concepts - such as the 
working  relationship  - and  principles  - such  as  equal 
treatment - and establish itself as a source of protection of 
the wage-earner.  The  'regulation'  on  the  termination of 
employment contracts is another such example. It is thanks 
to jurisprudence, drawing on Article 281 of the Civil Code 
on  abuses,  that workers are now guaranteed the right to 
employment. In other areas of collective labour law, juris-
prudence has played a more restrictive role:  the object and 
scope  of collective  bargaining  is  a  case  in  point.  The 
Council of  State concluded very early on that questions of 
an institutional nature should be excluded, thereby depriv-
ing labour law of  a rich source of development through the 
machinery of collective autonomy. 
Another point to bear in  mind is that there are no labour 
tribunals in  Greece  (save  for  the  'arbitration  tribunals', 
cf.  Chapter  III,  C/b).  Social  cases  are judged  by  civil 
courts sitting as labour tribunals. In our view, the shortage 
of specially trained judges well-versed in the logic of la-
bour law coupled with the more general lack of 'industrial 
culture' and the German influence on Greek doctrine and 
jurisprudence mean that Greek court rulings in the field of 
labour  law  tend  to  be  rather  out  of step  with  'modern 
times'. This is true in  the legal  sense as  far as  the provi-
sions and the spirit of the Constitution are concerned, and 
also in the economic sense, in view of the economic crisis 
and  the  new  problems  created  for  labour  law  and  for 
workers.  Broadly speaking,  and although  there are some 
exceptions, a narrow 'civilist' attitude continues to prevail. 
By and large, the same comments apply to  'constitutional 
jurisprudence'. The Greek system set up to keep an eye on 
the constitutional purity of its laws is very similar to that 
in  force in the United States:  all courts and  tribunals,  in-
cluding the courts of first  instance (county courts),  exer-
cise 'control of  the constitutionality' of the law. In consti-
tutional  jurisprudence,  which  chiefly  concerns  Article 
22(2) of the Constitution,  the very diversity of interpreta-
tion  finds  expression  in  the  existence of this democratic 
system of control which enables the higher courts to offer 
their own  interpretation.  There is  also a special  Supreme 
Court for these issues which has no great significance. 
6. Custom and practice as a source of regulation 
Industrial  customs  constitute  a  source  of labour  law  in 
Greece  by  virtue of Article  1  of the  Greek  Civil  Code 
which stipulates  that  'rules  of law  are  contained within 
laws and customs '
5
•  Industrial customs which supplement 
the prescriptions of written law give no trouble:  they are 
5.  MITSOU, op. cit. p. 89 and on; KARAKATSANIS, op. cit. p.48. GREECE 
used  as  rules  of law  in  individual  employment  relation-
ships. Industrial customs liable to do away with or change 
a public order rule are another matter. If  'the custom does 
not do away with a  law~ the ban  must be  implemented 
with  discernment  in  labour  law:  an  industrial  custom 
which runs counter to a jus co  gens rule will be null and 
void, but a  'most favourable' custom which is  in the na-
ture  of a  provision  is  valid  and  can  take  its  place.  The 
supremacy  of industrial  custom  'most favourable  to  the 
workers' in  legal  terms  also  applies  to  local  custom  or 
special customs already  in existence,  save where the law 
expressly stipulates otherwise. 
Yet the  importance of industrial  custom as  an  unwritten 
source of labour law is very limited and of no real signifi-
cance. The emergence of new industrial custom is likewise 
very restricted.  On the  other hand,  industrial  practice  is 
more highly developed and plays a more important role in 
the Greek business world. 
Industrial  practice  or custom  - or company  practice  -
though widespread  in  Greek  legal  tradition and jurispru-
dence,  have  no  regulatory  force,  opinia  necessitatis  is 
lacking  and  they  are not  generally  applicable.  Industrial 
practice is really no more than working conditions tacitly-
agreed between the employer and his staff, and these may 
be replaced
6 at any time.  Yet a minority of the legal pro-
fession take the view that industrial practice is a source of 
law with regulatory force because: 
a)  it  determines  de  facto  the  content  of  individual 
employment contracts in a general and abstract sense; 
b)  it is  compulsory by  mutual  and  tacit consent of the 
employer and his workers. 
In  fact,  what  we  are  dealing  with  is  company  custom, 
which only differs from traditional custom in  so far as  it 
arises and operates within a single company or establish-
ment.  The minority view would appear to be more in step 
with the peculiarities of the formation of sources of labour 
law. 
7. International law and its regulatory 
impact in the national context 
According  to  the  Greek  Constitution,  the  rules  of 
recognised international  law and  international agreements 
and  conventions  duly  ratified  and  implemented  are  part 
and  parcel  of Greek  domestic  law  and  take  precedence 
over any contrary provisions of the law (Article 28(1)(1)). 
Thus international labour conventions (ILO)  as well as hi-
and  multilateral  agreements  take  precedence  over Greek 
domestic labour law and invalidate any contrary provisions 
in national law unless the latter are more favourable to the 
workers. Although the rule of international law is applied 
to  both  individual  and  collective  labour  law,  and  takes 
automatic  and  mandatory  effect,  the  country's  two  su-
preme legal authorities (the Council of  State and the Court 
of  Appeal) are taking their time to  comply with constitu-
tional  imperative.  The Court of  Appeal, in a 1980 ruling 
on ILO Convention No 98 recognised - taking its cue from 
jurisprudence formulated prior to  the establishment of the 
6.  MITSOU op. cit. p. 93  and on; KARAKATSANIS,  Company practice 
(in Greek), Xenion Festschrift flir P.  Zepos, v. III,  Athens 1973, 
p. 62 and on;  KOUKIADIS, op. cit., p.  132. 
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Council of  State - that the rule spelt out in Article 4  'Was 
not a rule of  law but merely a guideline for domestic legis-
lation  in  the countries acceding to the convention ~ This 
interpretation  has  come  in  for  stinging  criticism  by  the 
legal profession as a body and it is unlikely to be upheld. 
By  far  the  most  original  of the  internationally-inspired 
provisions  of the  Greek  Constitution  is  Article 28(2)(1) 
and (2), which stipulates that it is possible, with a view to 
serving  the  national  interest  and  promoting  cooperation 
with other States, to grant - by means of a treaty or agree-
ment  and  a  three  fifths  majority  - the  powers  normally 
granted by the Constitution to the bodies of international 
organisations. This clause was included when Greece was 
preparing to join the  European  Community,  but  it goes 
much  further  than  mere  compliance  with  EEC  rules.  It 
stipulates that Greece can freely, by voting a law by abso-
lute majority of all  deputies,  restrict national  sovereignty 
provided this  is  in  the national  interest, does not infringe 
human rights nor undermine the foundations of democratic 
rule,  and  on  condition  that  it  upholds  the  principles  of 
equality and reciprocity (Article 28(2)(3)). Law 94511979 
ratifying  Greece's  accession  Treaties  to  the  European 
Communities  was  adopted  by  the  majority  stipulated  in 
Article 28(2) (which also covers the majority stipulated in 
Article 28(3).  In effect,  this  means  that Community law, 
and  by extension  Community social  law is  now part and 
parcel of the international sources of Greek law. Now that 
the Greek State has accepted these restrictions to national 
sovereignty, the rules of law spell out in the Treaties and 
in the acts passed by Community bodies- in so far as they 
are binding and statutory as regards working conditions-
are incorporated into Greek domestic law,  take automatic 
and compulsory effect and take precedence over any con-
trary provision in Greek domestic law. 
8. Conflicting rules and the hierarchy of sources 
(a) Conflicting rules 
Wherever a particular working  condition  is  regulated  by 
rules  stemming from  different sources,  the resulting con-
flict is solved by reference to the hierarchy which applies 
to  the  sources  of  labour  law  and  the  principles 
underpinning them
7
•  In essence,  these say  that the lower-
ranking  rule  must  be  compatible with  the higher-ranking 
rule. The lower rule may not be different if the higher rule 
is  a jus cogens  rule.  However,  if they  are jus dispositi-
vum,  they are subject to the principle of the most favour-
able rule (for wage-earners).  This squares with the object 
of labour  law,  which  is  to  ensure  minimum  protection. 
The principle of the most  favourable  rule - or the  most 
favourable condition for the worker where individual em-
ployment relationships are concerned - is  fundamental  to 
Greek labour law:  it is  upheld both by Greek legal  tradi-
tion  and  by  the  courts.  All  the  same,  this  principle  is 
sometimes breached in  favour of the principle of specific-
ity or even of the principle of order, in the case of corpor-
ate in-house regulations where they regulate working con-
ditions for the staff as a whole.  This principle is a fairly 
recent one and is upheld by part of the legal profession. It 
has  had  some impact on jurisprudence in  the  Council of 
7.  MITSOU, op. cit. p. 119 and on;  I<ARAKATSANIS, lAbour Law op. 
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State  (it only  applies  to  public-sector enterprises)  but  is 
not rooted in Greek positive lawi. 
(b) The hierarchy of sources 
The hierarchy governing the sources of labour law is lar-
gely  founded  in  the  Constitution,  which  formally  '}Juts 
each  rule in  its  place~ In principle
9  the  hierarchy  is  as 
follows:  Community rules top the list and,  in each of the 
areas they cover, they take precedence over any other rule, 
including constitutional rules. Constitutional labour provi-
sions come second,  and  international  labour regulations, 
which operate on an  'infra-constitutional' yet supra-legis-
lative basis,  rank third.  Ordinary legislative labour provi-
sions take fourth place, followed by collective agreements, 
arbitration  rulings  and  in-house  regulations.  These  have 
their  own  internal  hierarchy,  which  reflects  their  legal 
impact and  their scope.  Sixth  in  line are corporate rules 
based on in-house regulations drawn up by the employer. 
The seventh and last echelon is taken· up by industrial cus-
tom and  practice.  All  the rules at all  levels are governed 
by the principle of the most favourable rule for the work-
ers. 
9. The working relationship and the different 
sources of regulation in a dynamic perspective 
While  all  the  aforementioned  instruments  have  some 
impact  on  labour  relations,  it  has  recently  been  shaped 
primarily by  European  law,  labour regulations,  by juris-
prudence  and  corporate practice  (and  more  change  is  no 
doubt  to  come,  with  bills  on  atypical  employment  and 
collective agreements,  but nothing specific yet).  In-house 
regulations will become even  more  important,  since they 
will hencefo.rth be drawn up jointly by  the works council 
and the employer. Jurisprudence means more flexible em-
ployment relationships through its effect on State legisla-
tion. Labour contracts on the other hand still have little or 
no  impact  on  the  shaping  of employment  relations  in 
Greece,  unlike  other countries.  Corporate  practice  how-
ever -in many large and medium-sized companies at any 
rate - does  have  important  implications  for  the  employ-
ment relationship and the employer's powers. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND 
METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. Industrial action and major causes of conflict 
Nationwide  industrial  conflicts,  with  attendant  general 
strikes,  mobilisation and  workers taking to  the streets en 
masse have long been a traditional feature of Greek social 
and political life. Their objectives are not strictly speaking 
economic or social  in  the accepted  sense,  and  the  stakes 
are higher than can  be resolved by  'mere' collective bar-
gaining.  Rather,  they  are broad-based,  extended  disputes 
which are used as a vehicle for criticising or condemning 
specific areas  of government policy.  In  the  Greek  social 
tradition, this type of industrial action is usually organised 
by  the ·union  opposition.  In the  majority  of cases,  such 
8.  MITSOU, Sources, op. cit. p. 122. 
9.  Some authors put the Constitution in first place. Cf. KARAKATSA-
NIS, Labour Law, vol. A, p. 59. Others give equal rank to inter-
national  rules  and  ordinary labour legislation.  Cf.  DEUYANNIS-
KOUKIADIS, Labour Law, op. cit., p. 106. 
action  is  highly  politicised,  in  other words,  kept  under 
tight  party  control.  Yet  in  recent years,  there have been 
fewer  purely political  strikes and  more strikes for wider 
social and economic reasons. 
Industrial  action  for  collective  agreements  at  branch  or 
professional level  in  Greece has always been restricted in 
scope.  It usually  focuses  on  wage  claims,  benefits,  the 
reduction  of working  time.  Only  in  rare  times  of great 
social  unrest  (particularly  the  period  1974/77)  has  there 
been any  action  for  industrial  democracy  or worker par-
ticipation.  Yet in recent years there has  been a steady in-
crease  in  the  number  of collective  disputes  at  company 
level against the threat of redundancy, for jobs and against 
company closures. 
In Greece,  strikes are often ill-prepared and  inadequately 
organised.  They  are  often  spontaneous  expressions  of a 
heroic struggle, as was the secondary school teachers' stri-
ke in June 1988.  Heroic, because most Greek unions lack 
the strike funds  and  machinery to sustain such action, es-
pecially when it erupts without proper planning. This lack 
of planning - or of resources - meant that an  admittedly 
small number of companies became locked in lengthy and 
costly strikes in the early 1980s in hopes of securing their 
'socialisationlnationalisation '.  This  was  at  a  time  when 
ideas  such  as  'self-management'  and  'workers'  control' 
still had some credibility with the workers who were hop-
ing  to  achieve public sector employee status.  In the end, 
the sole result of their struggle was to weaken the position 
of their  respective  companies  which  were  then  plunged 
into serious financial  difficulties.  This type of action has 
since  disappeared,  and  the  emphasis  at  present  is  very 
much  on  safeguarding  employment  rather  than  on  pay 
claims in  these  struggling companies - which have been 
placed under State control on an ad hoc basis. 
Collective action  in  public  sector  enterprises  and  in  the 
banking sector is quite another story: in the banking sector 
especially,  it  is  well-organised  and  to  the  point.  The 
unions have sufficient strike funds and often take the lead 
in corporate bargaining in the public sector; public-sector 
employees  being  regarded  as  earning  the  highest  wages 
and having the reputation of a strong corporatist mentality. 
Industrial  action  for  the  renegotiation of company  agree-
ments in Greece starts in late autumn or early winter, with 
one company being singled out as an example - possibly a 
company  in  the  industrial  zone  of Tbessaloniki.  The re-
sulting  agreement will  set  the  tone  for  others  to  follow. 
This is also the time when the global collective agreement 
comes up  for  ~review', with the branch-level and  profes-
sional agreements following suit. This schedule is by and 
large  followed  in  most  years.  Then  again,  Greek  labour 
relations are still imbued with a degree of anarchy which, 
coupled with unforeseen developments, has been known to 
result in unexpected collective action and social unrest. 
2. Strikes and lock-outs 
(a) The different kinds of strikes 
and their relative importance 
It should be  noted  first of all  that  strikes are a very  fre-
quent  phenomenon  in  Greece.  The country has  the third-GREECE 
highest  number  of industrial  conflicts  in  the  European 
Community
10
•  Although  declining  in  recent  years,  the 
number of strikes brought before the courts
11  is still con-
siderable.  The  whole  phenomenon  of industrial  action 
being brought within the legal sphere is highly characteris-
tic  of Greek  labour relations.  On  the  other hand,  most 
strikes tend to be brief, which somewhat atones for their 
number. 
Most  Greek  strikes  are  union  strikes.  The  Constitution 
itself grants union organisations the right to decide to call 
a strike: Article 25(2)(1) says that 'i'o strike is a right exer-
cised by legally constituted union organisations ~ a prin-
ciple reiterated  in Article 19(1) of Law 1264182.  Article 
20(1)(/) of the same Act extends this right to associations 
of persons which fulfil the conditions required for them to 
be regarded as  company-level union organisations.  Wild-
cat strikes, which have become increasingly rare in recent 
years, are not considered legal
12
• 
In the case of strikes in the private sector,  the law stipu-
lates that 24 hours' notice must be given. The trade union 
organisation  or the  employer  may,  before or during  the 
strike,  invite the opposing party  to  a  conciliation proce-
dure called a  'public dialogue' because it is open to repre-
sentatives  of associations,  professional organisations,  the 
administration and the press.  The public dialogue,  which 
does not imply suspension of the strike, takes place within 
48 hours of the invitation being announced and is presided 
over by a mediator selected from the list drawn up by the 
mediation and arbitration body. If  the parties do not reach 
an  agreement,  the  mediator  issues  his  report during  the 
next 24 hours; this may be published in the press (Article 
3 of  Law 222411994). 
Political  strikes  in  the  broad  sense,  directed  against  the 
State and  its  bodies  - to  take  or refrain  from  measures 
involving the protection or the promotion of the economic, 
professional or union interests of the worker or his safe-
ty - are legal in Greece and the unions make liberal use of 
them. A case in point were the strikes against Article 4 of 
Law 1365 on the 'socialisation' of enterprises when it was 
put to the vote in  1983. This was intended to restrict the 
right to strike:  Article 4  was abolished  in  1988.  On  the 
other hand,  political  strikes  in  the narrow sense are not 
regarded  as  legal,  except  in  extremely  rare cases  where 
they  are  called  to  defend  constitutional  institutions  and 
rights and national independence. 
So-called  'joint' strikes - strikes combining  professional 
and  political  motives  - have  a  major impact  in  Greece. 
These  are  strikes  directed  at  the  employer  but  which 
require  State  involvement  before  they  can  be solved.  In 
1983, joint strikes triggered by the Government's austerity 
measures and wage freeze fuelled impassioned debates.  In 
a  very important ruling (920/1983),  the Athens  Court of 
First Instance had recognised the strike to be legal, a view 
shared by a majority in the profession.  Yet  the jurispru-
10.  Uon DASSIOS, lAbour law, the strike, Vol. B/11,  Athens 1984, p. 
794 and on. 
11.  Nikitas  AUPRANTIS,  Strikes  and employer's  reactions,  op.  cit. 
Dikaio ke politiki, 8, 1984, p. 209 and on. 
12.  Except ex post facto where they are taken up by  the competent 
union (cf. L.  DASSIOS,  op. cit., p. 809 and on, bibliography and 
jurisprudence quoted). 
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dence which followed declared the strike to be illegal. The 
interpretations given are closely related to the whole issue 
of 'more general interest' as spelt out in Article 106 of the 
Constitution.  The problem  resurfaced  in  the  autumn  of 
1985 when the government unilaterally adopted the legis-
lative act of government without first  consulting the un-
ions, negotiating with them or even informing them. 
In  Greece, socio-political strikes are as a rule general stri-
kes  conducted  by  the  opposition unions,  but there have 
been cases where they have been decided and conducted by 
all unions across the spectrum. The January 1987 strike in 
the private and public sector in support of multi-sectoral 
bargaining was such a strike,  calling for the abolition of 
the 1985 austerity act. 
Greek  law recognises  the  solidarity  strike:  such  a  strike 
may be called to protect and promote the legitimate inter-
ests of workers in general as  spelt out in Article 19(1) of 
Law 1264182. But a solidarity strike may also be called in 
support of the workers in different companies or establish-
ments  belonging  to  the  same  multinational  firm  as  the 
workers coming out in  sympathy.  In  this case,  the main 
strike  must  have  immediate  impact  on  the  economic  or 
professional  interests  of Greek  workers  and  it  must  be 
called by the most representative third-degree professional 
organisation,  i.e.  by the General Confederation of Greek 
Workers (GSEE). 
It is  worth taking a closer look at the legal  regulation of 
the solidarity strike as spelt out in Article 19(1)(b) of Law 
1264/82 because, although too seldom used in practice,  it 
is  nevertheless of great interest to  European  labour rela-
tions. Temporary stoppages are the most widespread form 
of worker mobilisation in  Greece.  The advantages to  the 
workers are several:  their pay packets are only minimally 
affected, they are usually effective and (according to Arti-
cle 20(1) of Law 1264182) may be called following a deci-
sion by  the union council.  Another recent trend,  particu-
larly in enterprises, and only in the case of strikes, not of 
stoppages,  is  the  increasing number of sit-ins during the 
strike and  indeed  a  general  rise  in  staggered  strikes and 
go-slows.  (Finally,  it is worth bearing in  mind that legal 
studies on the strike phenomenon abound, but Greece has 
no social/economic surveys on the subject.) 
(b) Safety service and minimum service 
Trade unions which  call  a  strike are obliged  by  law to 
provide  'safety' staff to  ensure the safety of installations 
and to  prevent damage and accidents during the industrial 
action.  The law  formally  prohibits  the hiring of staff to 
replace striking employees during the strike. 
In addition, in the case of public services and public utili-
ties, trade unions must also provide a minimum service to 
satisfy the public's essential requirements (Article 21 (2) of 
Law 1264/1982, as amended by Articles 3(1), 2 and 4(1) 
of Law 1915/1990) during the strike. The list of staff re-
sponsible  for  providing  the safety  service  and  the  mini-
mum  service  is  negotiated  between  the  employer of the 
establishment and the most representative trade union or-
ganisation.  The parties  must  reach  an  agreement  by  25 
November of the current year, which will enter into force 
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the mediation procedure which begins within  15  days in 
the event of failure,  and must refer to the committee for 
the protection of trade union representatives. 
(c) The lock-out ban 
The Constitution, while recognising the right to strike, is 
silent on lock-outs. Law 1264182 on the other hand, unlike 
previous  regulation,  formally  prohibits lock-outs (Article 
22  (2)).  In effect this means that the employer no longer 
has the right to decide a  'defensive lock-out' in retaliation 
against brief stoppages,  a  right previously  recognised  in 
jurisprudence and by part of the profession. 
However, the spirit and the objective of the ban have not 
yet quite penetrated Greek jurisprudence which still comes 
up with debatable rulings on acts such as dismissal, with-
holding  pay,  paying  anti-strike  bonuses  and  other  em-
ployer reactions against strikes
13
• 
3. Conflict resolution 
(a) The machinery for dispute settlement 
The main method of resolving collective disputes in Gree-
ce was until recently compulsory arbitration.  This proce-
dure  involving  State  intervention,  which was  introduced 
during  the  Metaxas  dictatorship,  was  governed  by  Law 
3239/1955, which was repealed in 1991. Now, the aim of 
the new Law 1876/1990 is to resolve conflicts through the 
principle of collective autonomy. 
Recourse  to  compulsory  arbitration,  the  direct  result  of 
which was the suspension of the right to strike,  hindered 
any attempts by the  p~rties involved to solve the conflict 
and, at the same time, transferred responsibility for solv-
ing the conflict to the State. This allowed the State to ap-
ply its incomes policy via arbitration rulings,  the number 
of which  was  equal  to  the  number  of collective  agree-
ments.  Arbitration  courts  comprised  a judge,  an  official 
from the Ministry of Labour and a  representative of the 
employers'  and  workers'  organisations.  The Ministry  of 
Labour had  the  right  to  demand  compulsory  arbitration 
directly without any prior attempt at conciliation. 
The rigid structure of this conflict-solving procedure led, 
even  before  the  introduction  of Law 1876/1990,  to  the 
creation of a kind of voluntary arbitration open to work-
ers'  representatives  and  employees  in  large  companies. 
The conflict was resolved through the intervention of the 
Ministry of  Labour and its representatives, always on min-
isterial  premises.  This  procedure  was  followed  for  the 
conclusion  of national  multisectoral  general  agreements. 
The Ministry of  Labour's principle was not to let an arbi-
tration  ruling  replace  a  collective  agreement  at  national 
level, but in most cases workers' trade union organisations 
demanded application of the compulsory arbitration proce-
dure. 
The new  method  of solving disputes  introduced  by Law 
1876/1990 is in direct contrast to the previous regulations: 
voluntary procedures provide the basis for  the settlement 
of a collective dispute.  Provision is made for conciliation 
and mediation procedures and for voluntary arbitration in 
13.  cf.  Nikitas  AUPRANTIS,  Strike,  op.  cit.  Some  members  of the 
profession question the legality of the ban (cf. KARAKATSANIS). 
stages.  Any  dispute,  either individual or collective,  may 
be the object of conciliation. The arbitrator is a Ministry of 
Labour official  whose  role  is  to  reconcile  the  opposing 
opinions of the parties  in  order to  settle  the  conflict as 
quickly as possible.  The new mediation procedure is par-
ticularly interesting because,  for the first time in the his-
tory of the Greek system, opposing parties become regula-
tors of their own conflict  since they  have  the power to 
determine contractually  the conditions  for  mediation and 
arbitration. Only in the event of  disagreement does the law 
provide for recourse to the mediation and arbitration body 
(OMED) and the selection of a mediator - or the drawing 
by lot in the absence of  an agreement - from the list drawn 
up. 
Arbitration  is the last resort for settling disputes.  Volun-
tary  arbitration  is  the  main  method,  and  this  procedure 
may be applied at any stage of negotiation by joint agree-
ment of the parties or unilaterally  if the  opposing party 
refuses to reply to an invitation to mediate or by the trade 
union organisations when  the employers'  side rejects  the 
mediator's proposal. The arbitrator is selected or drawn by 
lot from a list established by the OMED, as in the case of 
the mediator. The OMED is a legal entity governed by pri-
vate law whose headquarters are in Athens.  It is adminis-
tered  by  a  board of 11  members.  The main weakness of 
the above system is the possibility of unilaterally request-
ing arbitration, which is tantamount to compulsory arbitra-
tion,  which,  moreover,  is  open  to  any  company  in  the 
public or private sector.  However, the statistics show that 
the OMED operates quite effectively:  it has so far received 
99  requests  for  mediation  in  1992,  128  in  1993,  116  in 
1994 and  112 in  1995.  Half of these conflicts resulted in 
the signing of a collective agreement via a mediator. Each 
year a small number of these (between 40 and 48) are re-
ferred back for arbitration, resulting in a compulsory rul-
ing. 
CHAPTER IV: ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND PARTICULARS 
1. The national situation in an international setting: 
key features of the national system 
In order to understand the essential features of the Greek 
national  system  governing  the  regulation  of  working 
conditions, several points need to be borne in mind: 
•  The regulation of working conditions in Greece is lar-
gely statutory. 
•  The Greek  system  of regulation  which  differs  sub-
stantially from  that of other Member States,  chiefly 
because of a number of peculiarities and indeed lacu-
nae in  the field of collective action, yet belonging to 
the same legal family as that in some other continen-
tal systems (France, Germany), has undergone signif-
icant  change  and  innovation  over  the  past  fifteen 
years.  Sweeping changes were introduced by the 1975 
Constitution, which features a large number of social 
rights and guarantees for Greek workers, and further 
modifications  attended  Greece's  accession  to  the 
Common Market,  particularly  the  legislation passed 
post-accession to comply with  'EC social law'. GREECE 
•  Collective autonomy is very limited in the regulation 
of working conditions.  At the national  level,  social 
dialogue has hardly got off the ground. 
The object of negotiation is severely restricted by a two-
fold legal obstacle: a new legal regulatory framework with 
which the actors have not yet familiarised themselves and 
jurisprudence erring heavily  on the  side of state regula-
tion, thus undermining the autonomous sources of regula-
tion of working conditions,  despite constitutional  provi-
sions. 
The question is, should these legal impediments be blamed 
on the lack of unity displayed by Greek unions and on the 
party, in particular the Communist party, (government and 
opposition) stranglehold on the Greek trade union move-
ment? There is little doubt that the political dependence of 
Greek  trade  unions  and  their  inability  to  agree  among 
themselves on even a modest joint platform, on joint col-
lective action and a joint stand for purposes of social dia-
logue  has  severely  inhibited  their  bargaining  activity. 
While the legal obstacles are undoubtedly due to a variety 
of reasons, less economic (importance of farming and late 
and limited industrial development) than political and his-
torical (civil war and dictatorship), the very real and deep 
divisions  and  the  fact  that  unionism  remains  a  burning 
issue  are  hardly  conducive  to  modernising  bargaining 
structures. A case in point is the much-vaunted reform of 
the 1955 Act on Collective Employment Agreements which 
has seen the birth and demise of a string of working par-
ties  and  draft  bills.  The systematic  exclusion  of certain 
political unions from membership of the single Confedera-
tion and the lack of some other framework or tradition for 
social dialogue at this level has meant that the opposition 
unions have tended to reject and criticise a whole phalanx 
of government  proposals  on  principle  (the  principle  of 
opposition) because this is their tried and  tested  way of 
exerting  pressure  and  maintaining  their  profile.  Clearly 
this is a vicious circle stemming from the simple fact that 
there is no machinery for consensus, which would bring in 
all the social forces and all the parties involved at an early 
stage, and one which has meant that the  'traditional' au-
thoritarianism of the Greek State has firmly  taken root in 
the regulation of  working conditions. 
The democratisation of company structures is a very recent 
phenomenon in the Greek system of employment relation-
ships. The exercise of union rights on the shop-floor was 
only instituted in 1982, health and safety committees were 
not brought in until  1985 and the works councils act was 
adopted only a few years ago (May 1988). The new legal 
framework which introduces new participative bodies and 
procedures in Greek enterprise is  largely Community-in-
spired,  consolidating  a  practice adopted  in  several  large 
Greek companies  since  1974.  Overall,  however,  worker 
participation  and  the democratisation  of company  struc-
tures are still anything but common fare in the Greek so-
cial context today. Resistance to the regulation of partici-
pation structures in private-sector enterprises - not in pub-
lic sector companies - is due in equal measure to the sur-
vival of the old mentality (so-called cultural resistance) on 
the part of both employers and workers and to the changes 
precipitated by the economic crisis: restructuring, dismiss-
als,  introduction of new technologies and  new  forms  of 
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employment, decentralisation in the workplace and the rise 
of sub-contracting, home working, piece work,  'invisible' 
work for industry, etc. 
As a result, the Greek system of legal regulation of work-
ing conditions (possibly as archaic as Portugal's compared 
to the other Member States) has in the past decade had to 
deal  with changes of two orders,  running neck-and-neck. 
One course has led to its  modernisation. It has introduced 
participation  structures,  incorporated  the  bulk  - mostly 
novel and innovative in Greek terms - of  EC law. This has 
brought the  Greek  system  largely  in  line with  the  main 
currents of regulation in other Member States regarded as 
well ahead in the social stakes. 
At the same time however, the economic crisis has been a 
destabilising  factor  in  the  pursuit  of  the  participative 
mode.  It  strengthens  the  old  'civilist'  mentality  in  the 
Greek  courts.  Greek  jurisprudence  has  in  recent  years 
shown clear signs of undermining the protection granted to 
wage-earners and of interfering with vested rights. Judge-
ments often reflect the dire economic situation currently 
faced  by Greek enterprise.  At the same time,  in practice 
the  employment  relationship  is  beginning  to  evolve  in 
ways not bargained for by the legal regulation of working 
conditions,  which  remains  largely  true  to  its  historical 
roots. Of course, atypical employment, often not based on 
any contractual arrangement, has always been a feature of 
the Greek economy,  but it is  now on the increase,  very 
often in the form of a second, undeclared job. Greek legis-
lators have regulated some flexible forms of employment 
and  working  time,  although  others  are  rapidly  gaining 
importance.  The  most  appropriate  form  of regulation  is 
being sought in  this case,  which does not seem to be an 
easy matter. 
2. Elements of convergence and 
divergence in the EC context 
(a) Elements of convergence 
Greek labour law belongs to the same family of Civil Law 
operating in  France and Germany,  so,  to  begin with,  it 
already  shares  a  number of key  features  with  its  fellow 
European  countries.  The Greek  system of regulation  of 
working conditions certainly obeys the tenets of interna-
tional law - as represented by the international Treaty on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the International 
Labour  Conventions,  although  Greece  has  perhaps  not 
signed and ratified as many of these as could be wished. 
The same applies to European social law, as enshrined in 
texts such as the European Social Charter,  in addition to 
Community law proper. 
Secondly, the implementation of Community Directives in 
Greek  domestic  law  has  fostered  substantial  change  in 
areas such as the free movement of workers and the pro-
tection of Member States' citizens.  Greece is well on the 
road  to  coordination  and  harmonisation.  Yet  in  Greece 
something more is involved: the structure and the develop-
ment of Greek law now bear the unmistakable imprint of 
EC membership. And in the third place, its new, modernis-
ing  legislation owes  much  to  the efforts to  bring Greek 
labour law in  line with the regulations in  force  in other 
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afforded the national legislator,  both the government and 
the social partners are engaged upon a wide-ranging debate 
on  Community Europe, which is beginning to shape new 
ideas and sometimes, forge new practices. These, in a nut-
shell, are some of the elements of  convergence. 
(b) Elements of divergence 
(i) The predominance of State regulation 
Working conditions in Greece are largely State-regulated. 
While other EC countries may similarly experience a high 
degree of State regulation, it is of a quite different order: 
in Greece, there is little room for collective autonomy and, 
where  collective  agreements  are  concluded,  these  have 
virtually no impact on the regulation of working condi-
tions. 
(ii) The difficulty in establishing social 
dialogue and obtaining a consensus 
One  element  of divergence  is.  the  difficulty  which  the 
Greek  system  experiences  in  establishing  a  nationwide 
social dialogue which would bring together - apart from 
the State - employers' representatives (there is no problem 
with  these)  and  delegates  from  all  the  Greek  political' 
unions to draw up or negotiate a joint policy on working 
conditions. 
Following the experience of the 1991  national  multi-sec-
toral  collective agreement,  there has been a tendency  for 
the Greek social partners to adopt a strategy well-known in 
Italy,  France  and  Spain:  negotiated  laws:  commissions 
comprising workers' and employers' representatives study 
the institutional aspects of work-related issues and present 
their conclusions in  the form of draft laws.  In this way, 
the social partners express their interest for the promotion 
of the social  dialogue.  For its part,  the present Govern-
ment is also seeking social dialogue and intends to attempt 
to conclude tripartite agreements as has been done in Italy. 
On the institutional front,  the belated creation of Greece's 
Economic and Social Committee (OKE) by Law 2234/1994 
provided the basis for the consolidation of the social dia-
logue.  Its  duties  involve  formulating  a  reasoned  opinion 
on fundamental  issues concerning labour relations,  social 
security,  taxes and socio-economic policy,  particularly in 
the  field  of regional  development,  investment,  exports, 
consumer protection and competition.  With regard  to  the 
above-mentioned matters,  the  OKE  must be consulted be-
fore  the laws are adopted  by  Parliament.  The OKE  com-
prises a  President and  48  members,  and  is  made  up  of 
three groups which represent the employers, workers and 
other professional categories, respectively. 
(iii) Representation and participation 
in Greek enterprise: first steps 
Although union representation at company level and some 
participation procedures date back to  1974, which saw the 
birth of a  'corporate movement' in some of the larger com-
panies in  Athens  and  Thessaloniki,  the company  and  its 
participative  institutions  did  not  get  onto  the  legal  map 
until  1982, when Law 1264 on the democratisation of the 
union movement was passed. This Law, which constitutes 
a major step in Greek labour law,  recognises union rights 
in  the  workplace  and  provides  for  'supportive'  arrange-
ments instituting facilities for union activity in the work-
place. For the very first time, employers were required to 
meet with  representatives  of the  unions  in  the company 
-at their request- to listen to them and to take the neces-
sary steps to solve any problems thus brought to their no-
tice.  Coupled  with  these  first  participative  procedures, 
there is the possibility of in-house bargaining to improve 
union rights. 
Law 1365/1983 on the  'socialisation' of business focuses 
on labour relations in public-sector enterprises and public-
utilities and  introduces worker participation in  corporate 
management,  planning and control. The workers, together 
with  the State,  local  government and other social  group-
ings  cooperate  in  formulating  fundamental  options  and 
decisions attuned to the national interest and the needs of 
society as a whole.  One third of the delegates on the su-
pervisory bodies - such as the representative social super-
visory assembly and the board of directors -are made up 
of workers. Workers' representatives can become members 
of  the  management  committee.  In  public-sector  enter-
prises,  new representative bodies - Workers'  Councils -
have advisory powers. 
In  1985,  Law 1568 on the  health  and  safety  of workers 
made legal provision for the first time for health and safe-
ty  committees  in  companies  employing  more  than  50 
workers.  Companies employing between 20 and 50 work-
ers have a workers' representative with substantial consul-
tative  powers  to  deal  with  health  and  safety  issues.  Fi-
nally,  the  Law on  the  Works  Council  was  implemented 
only a few years ago in the spring of 1988. This law was 
passed at the same time as the International Labour Con-
vention (no  135) on the Protection of  Workers' Represen-
tatives in  the Workplace.  This new law makes  provision 
for  the  institution  of a  second  representative  body  in 
private-sector enterprises  employing  at  least  50 workers 
and  in  those employing  more  than  20 workers provided 
there is no company union. The Law provides for a whole 
set of participative  rights:  information, joint discussion, 
consultation,  joint  decision-making  even,  among  other 
things,  on  matters  such  as  the  drafting  of the  in-house 
regulations  by  common  consent.  What  matters  is  that 
Greek companies have suddenly gone from an almost total 
absence of regulations on representation and participative 
procedures to a situation where there are several such bod-
ies.  Predictably, these lack the experience and the tradition 
which would help  them to  function  dynamically,  to  take 
root and to develop.  In other words, the legal framework 
exists where its offshoots often do not.  Health and safety 
committees have developed significantly over the past two 
years,  but  company  unions  are  less  securely  implanted 
now  that  works  councils  are  beginning  to  emerge.  The 
works council,  still  in  its infancy,  seems less threatening 
to employers: at all events, the Greek system is still find-
ing its feet and we shall gave to wait and see how things 
develop. 
In  the meantime,  the old-style authoritarianism which tra-
ditionally  helped  to  shape  labour  relations  and  working 
conditions - an attitude equally manifest on the part of the 
State and on that of the employer and aided and abetted by 
the  unions'- and  workers'- failure  to  provide  an  alter-
native  - is  dogging  attempts  to  impose  the  new  legal GREECE 
framework  in  a  country  which  manifestly  has  still  not 
come to terms with its industrial culture. 
(iv) Legislation regulating new, 
Oexible types of employment 
New types of employment have proliferated very quickly 
in Greece in recent years, yet legislation or even collective 
negotiation on the  subject between the  social  partners  is 
still wanting. This has resulted in an unusually high num-
ber of fixed-term contracts, apprenticeships and probation-
ary  contracts,  not to  mention  sub-contracting  which  bas 
become a veritable rage even among multinationals. Tem-
porary  work  is  banned  in  Greece,  yet  some  temporary 
working exists in specific areas such as tourism, congress 
organisation, etc. Home working bas also taken great stri-
des,  as  has  piecework  performed  outside the  enterprise. 
This work is often intended for industry and export and is 
done mostly by women.  This category of worker, highly 
dispersed  and  ill-organised,  tends  to  be regarded  as  self-
employed although they are as a rule in a position of effec-
tive dependence.  There is  also the problem of inspecting 
the health and safety conditions in which they work. 
As  we have already seen,  the employment contract plays 
an important role in Greek employment relationships. The 
protection which  it was possible  to  develop  for  workers 
was  based  in  particular  on  the  open-ended  employment 
contract:  the  employment  relationship  is  usually  stable. 
The guarantees  inherent in  open-ended  employment con-
tracts mean that the Greek system is very rigid. 
However,  in reality,  flexibility of employment in  Greece 
is different from the image portrayed in  legal texts:  flexi-
bility does  exist,  but most often  in  the  form  of employ-
ment without a contract,  particularly in  the  form  of sub-
contracting, outside processing, bomeworking and pseudo-
self-employed  employment  relationships.  The  result  is  a 
contrast in Greece between rigid regulation of the employ-
ment  contract  and  the  lack  of intermediate  flexible  con-
tracts  (excluding  fixed-term  contracts and  part-time con-
tracts) on the one band, and the extreme degree of flexibil-
ity in practice on account of flexible types of employment 
without a contract. 
Greek legislation on flexible contracts consists of:  (a) an-
cient legislation from the  1920s relating to the fixed-term 
contract, for example, or from the 1950s,  such as  legisla-
tion on shiftwork or homeworking;  (b) very new legisla-
tion  introduced  by  Articles 38-41  of Law 1892/1990 on 
part-time work, sbiftwork and the organisation of working 
time. However, these provisions are inadequate and do not 
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fully regulate the flexible contract which they introduce-
moreover, they are contained in a law devoted to develop-
ment and constitute only a small part of this.  They have 
been adopted hastily and without sufficient preparation in 
order to give urgent recognition to incomplete regulations 
on flexible employment.  At the end of the 1980s, under a 
Socialist government, at least two bills were presented on 
the recognition of new types of employment and flexibil-
ity.  However, these bills were withdrawn in the wake of 
fierce  opposition  from  trade  union  organisations  of all 
ideological/political  colours.  The  Conservative  govern-
ment  quickly  adopted  the  above-mentioned  legislation as 
soon as it came to power. Thus Greek law on flexible con-
tracts is not at all comprehensive, and does not appear to 
be a real  modem body of legislation on flexible employ-
ment contracts, since these are always placed on an  equal 
footing with stable employment contracts. 
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CHAPTER  1:  THE ACTORS 
1.  The main  parties involved in the regulation of wor-
king conditions include not only the trade unions and em-
ployers' associations but also  the organisations represen-
ting  workers  at  company  level,  such  as  the  workplace 
branches of trade unions and, most importantly, the unita-
rian  elected  bodies  (works  councils  and  staff delegates) 
and individual employers themselves. 
In  the Spanish  industrial  relations  system,  leaving  aside 
for the moment the importance of national legislation and 
case law,  which will be discussed later in this document, 
autonomous regulation of working conditions is essentially 
by  means  of collective  bargaining  and  agreements  and 
mechanisms providing for worker participation at compa-
ny level. Collective bargaining at a level above that of the 
company is the exclusive preserve of the trade unions and 
employers'  associations,  and participation in  negotiations 
is subject  to  a  minimum  representativeness  requirement. 
There is, however, a form of collective bargaining at com-
pany level which is quantitatively significant and gives the 
workplace union  branches,  the  works  councils  and  staff 
delegates certain negotiating opportunities.  In  practice,  it 
is these workplace representatives, who are elected rather 
than being an integral part of the official union structure, 
who have the real  responsibility for collective bargaining 
at company level.  Over recent years, however, it has gra-
dually become more common,  in  certain large firms,  for 
the  union  representatives  themselves,  particularly  the 
branch members, to take over responsibility for the negoti-
ation of company collective agreements.  An assessment of 
the parties involved in the regulation of working conditi-
ons can therefore not be restricted to the unions and em-
ployers' associations, but must also cover the works coun-
cils and  staff delegates and,  as  mentioned,  the important 
role played by individual employers. 
Company-level agreements, for which there is legal provi-
sion  in  respect  of certain  areas  of negotiation  (mainly: 
important  changes  in  working  conditions,  suspension  of 
employment contracts or collective redundancies; but since 
the 1994 legal reforms, extended to other areas such as job 
classification,  promotions,  itemised  pay  statements,  one-
off bonuses,  reduction of staff representation in  line with 
staff cutbacks,  etc.},  play an important role in  industrial 
relations, being an expression of the will of the workers' 
representatives  within  the  company  and  therefore of the 
above-mentioned  elected  bodies  at  the  workplace.  The 
weight of individual agreements is, however, limited, ex-
cept in  the case of definition of specific working conditi-
ons for the highest-skilled workers.  There are starting to 
be more individual agreements between employers and the 
workers  concerned,  which  provide a  means  of changing 
the existing statutory or contractually-agreed working con-
ditions.  Serious doubts have been expressed, both in prin-
ciple and in actual case law, as to the legitimacy of chang-
es  introduced  through  such  agreements.  While  it  is  true 
that there is a tendency to  regard them as invalid because 
they represent a stopgap measure where in fact a collective 
agreement (with the workers'  representatives)  is  required 
in order to alter working conditions established by collec-
tive agreement,  there is another school of thought which 
considers that any individual innovation in working condi-
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tions is acceptable provided it is not prejudicial to the sta-
tutory minimum protection guarantees. 
Be this as it may, although the employer, given the collec-
tive bargaining structure described above,  still has an im-
portant role to play in regulating working conditions, the 
move, observed in other countries, towards more individu-
al agreements in the definition of working conditions has, 
as yet, had little impact in Spain. 
The  employers'  associations,  which  are  organised  by 
branch of activity at provincial or Autonomous Communi-
ty  (or regional) level, are part of a central Spanish confe-
deration  of employers'  associations  (Confederacion  Es-
paflola de Organizaciones Empresariales- CEOE). Its role 
as  the leading representative body for employers in Spain 
in  undisputed and  it covers  both  the  public  and  private 
sectors. There is therefore no separate association for pu-
blic sector employers. The 'representativeness' of the CE-
OE and its affiliated associations is fully acknowledged at 
all  levels of employer representation and  the functioning 
of the employers'  associations  overall  is  relatively  well 
integrated. There is only one organisation specifically for 
small  and  medium-sized  businesses,  in  the  form  of the 
CEPYME.  This organisation is,  however, also affiliated to 
the CEOE, with which it maintains a close cooperative rela-
tionship.  Although  representation through the CEPYME is 
formally distinct from that of the CEOE, in practice there is 
no  difference,  the  similarities  being  such  that  employer 
representation  can  reasonably  be  regarded  as  a  unified 
whole, and there is no need for further clarification of its 
internal organisation. 
The trade union structure, on the other hand, has traditio-
nally been much more heterogeneous. There are two main 
national confederations: the Trade Union Confederation of 
Workers' Commissions (Confederacion Sindical de Comi-
siones Obreras - ccoo}, which originally had links with 
the Communist party but has gradually developed an auto-
nomous  policy  while  emphasising  its  internal  diversity, 
and the General Workers Union (Union General de Traba-
jadores- UGT},  which historically has links with the Soci-
alist  party,  although  relations  and  communications  be-
tween  the two  have  gradually  cooled  over the  past  few 
years ..  The representative weight  of these  two  unions  is 
very similar, as will be seen later, and far exceeds that of 
the other organisations.  One of these,  the ELA-STV, occu-
pies a special position - attached to the Basque Nationalist 
Party  (PNV}  and  having  Christian  Democrat  leanings,  it 
operates only within the Autonomous Basque Community 
where,  as  explained  below,  it enjoys  majority  status and 
thus has powers of action which are normally reserved for 
the  most  representative  national  organisations.  There are 
other trade union organisations which operate only within 
a specific Autonomous Community and are the most repre-
sentative union within that Community, but which do not 
have the same  kind of majority  as  the  ELA-STV.  One of 
these is another Basque union (the  LAB,  which maintains 
close  links  with  the  Herri  Batasuna  political  coalition, 
itself closely associated with the  ETA  terrorist organisati-
on; another example is the Galician Trade  Union Associa-
tion (Converxencia  Intersindical  Galega  - CIG},  which is 
linked to the Galician nationalist faction (Bloque Nationa-
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union in this Autonomous Community, after the ccoo and 
UGT. 
Alongside these organisations there are other national uni-
ons which carry a certain weight in some sectors or geog-
raphical areas without quite achieving a prominent degree 
of representativeness.  Examples  are  the  Workers'  Trade 
Unionist  Confederation  (Union  Sindical  Obrera  - uso), 
which began as a Christian movement advocating self-re-
gulatory Socialism,  and  later lost its  ideological  referen-
ces, and the General  Confederation of Labour (  Confeder-
acion General de Trabajo  - CGT), which took over from 
the anarchist union CNT, historically important but, becau-
se of internal problems and its radical union policy, unable 
to  attract enough voters and therefore permanently among 
the ranks of the minority unions.  The CGT has,  however, 
recently  become  more  active  and  participated  in  various 
electoral procedures sometimes with considerable success, 
as  in the case of the SEAT company.  An important role is 
also  played  by  certain  unions  many  white-collar sectors, 
such  as  the  Independent  Trade  Union  Confederation  of 
Public Servants (  Confederacion Sindical lndependiente de 
Foncionarios- CSIF), which seeks to pro&ect the professio-
nal interests of civil servants. With no obvious ideological 
bias,  it  represents  almost  30%  of public  administration 
staff,  thereby ranking as  highly as  the ccoo and  UGT  in 
this sector. 
The unions are structured geographically and by branch or 
activity sector. Normally, they are divided into provincial 
branches which  all  belong  to  the  corresponding  national 
federation,  this  in  tum  forming  part of a confederation. 
Sometimes they are organised by Autonomous Community 
or by region (this, of course, only in the case of the natio-
nal  unions).  For certain occupations,  however,  the  rele-
vant occupation-based unions have a particular importan-
ce,  normally  dealing  strictly with  matters  concerning  the 
defence of the profession.  They have no organic external 
links or are at most allied to other trade union organisati-
ons in other sectors defining themselves as independent. In 
the  fields  of health,  education,  transport  and  air  traffic 
control, these unions have a decisive role. 
Since  the  1985 Trade  Union  Freedom  Act (LOLS),  it has 
been possible to set up  company-based  trade union  bran-
ches  operating  at  the  level  of the  individual  production 
unit.  However, such branches exist alongside the unitarian 
elected bodies intended to represent all workers, i.e. either 
the staff delegates or the works councils, depending on the 
size  of the  company.  In  the  Spanish  industrial  relations 
system,  the  main  representative role within  companies  is 
assumed by the staff delegates or works councils, who are, 
generally speaking, also responsible for collective bargai-
ning and the conclusion of collective agreements at compa-
ny  level and are party to the specific agreements provided 
for  by  law  in  certain  cases.  Furthermore,  as  explained 
below, despite the fact  that works councils and staff dele-
gates have obvious links with the trade unions and  play a 
key  role in  the  organisation and  implementation of their 
electoral procedures,  they  do  not  formally  belong  to  the 
trade  union  structure.  They  therefore  operate  to  a  large 
extent on an individual basis and are not always controlled 
or influenced by the unions. This factor is a source of ten-
sion  within  Spanish  industrial  relations,  the  conflict  be-
tween  the two systems of representation manifesting itself 
frequently. 
The  works  councils  and  staff delegates  represent  solely 
and directly the interests of all workers within the compa-
ny,  with no  representation of employers'  interests.  Their 
members are appointed for four years via an electoral pro-
cedure based on a direct, universal and secret ballot. Their 
activities,  and  therefore also  the  election  procedure,  are 
based on the individual workplace, which means that com-
panies  operating  on  various  different  sites  have  several 
different  representative  bodies.  In  workplaces  with  be-
tween 6 and 49 employees,  representation is by means of 
elected  staff delegates,  whereas where there are over 50 
employees, it is via works councils. The law makes expli-
cit  provision  for  specific  representation  covering  all  the 
sites  on  which  the  company  operates,  in  the  form  of a 
Multi-Plant  Committee,  the  establishment  of which  de-
pends on appropriate provision being made in the applica-
ble  collective  agreement,  which  also  defmes  the  powers 
and  rules  of procedure  of that  Committee.  There  is  no 
longer a need  to  make provision for such a committee at 
group level, since in early December 1994 the government 
presented a bill on implementation in  national law of Di-
rective EC/94/45 on European Works Councils. 
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In  the Spanish industrial relations system,  the importance 
of the election of works councils and  staff delegates goes 
beyond  the appointment pure and  simple of workers'  re-
presentatives within individual companies and plants. The-
se elections  also  reflect  affiliation  to  the  various  unions 
sufficiently accurately for their results to be used as a basis 
for direct calculation of the degree of representativeness of 
the union confederations. 
2.  Trade union and employers' association activities are 
based  on constitutional and  legislative recognition and on 
rights which, in the case of the trade unions, stem from a 
considerable number of existing legal guarantees. 
Article 7 of the Introductory Section of the Spanish  Con-
stitution makes specific reference to trade unions and em-
ployers'  associations,  implying  a  degree  of institutional 
recognition which makes them key elements in the consti-
tutional system. It is no coincidence that Article 7 follows 
immediately  upon  the  Article  recognising  the  political 
parties as an expression of political pluralism, as  a means 
of giving a voice to the public will and as an essential ve-
hicle for political participation. 
Under Article 7 of the Spanish Constitution, the trade uni-
ons  and  employers'  associations  contribute  to  defending 
and  promoting  their  own  social  and  economic  interests. 
Quite apart from the explicit recognition of these organisa-
tions as such and of their importance, they are recognised 
as  performing an essential function in  defending and pro-
moting  social  and  economic  interests,  which  means  that 
their existence and powers of action must he authorised in 
a broad range of fields.  They are therefore free  to  set up 
and operate, obviously within the limits of the Constituti-
on and the law, the only condition being that their operati-
on and internal structure must be democratic. 
1.  This Act is currently (March 1997) in the final  stages of adoption 
by  Parliament, and could enter into force next month. SPAIN 
Section I of the Constitution, covering fundamental rights 
and duties, provides for the right of union association (Ar-
ticle 28) as well as a general right of association (Article 
22). Freedom of  union association is explicitly recognised, 
both positively (everyone has the right to join the union of 
their  choice)  and  negatively  (less  strongly  worded:  no 
citizen can be forced  to join a trade union).  The right of 
union  association  thus  expressly  includes  the  right  to 
found a trade union,  the right to join the union of one's 
choice and the right of unions to form confederations and 
to found international organisations or to join them. Arti-
cle  28.1  of the  Spanish  Constitution  makes  no  express 
mention of union activity as a legal right inherent in trade 
union freedom, but there have been various rulings by the 
Constitutional  Court categorically stating that union acti-
vity is  an  essential element of trade union  freedom  seen 
from a constitutional point of view.  This is important for 
legislative development, the actual practice of union acti-
vities and the viability of legal action in the form of  appeal 
to the Constitutional Court on the grounds of unconstituti-
onality. 
With regard to the persons covered by the concept of free-
dom  of union  association,  the  Constitutional  Court  has 
finally declared, after several years of debate on the legal 
principles, that Article 28.1 of the Constitution refers sole-
ly  to  trade  unions  representing  employees  and  does  not 
extend to  the employers'  associations.  The constitutional 
basis  for  the  latter  is  the  ordinary  right of association, 
which is  recognised  as  a  fundamental  right on  the  same 
footing as freedom of union association. Although there is 
absolutely  no  difference  between  the  organic  content  of 
this right and that applying to  the trade unions,  the  rele-
vant provisions are at different points in the Constitution, 
which could lead to differences in treatment,  particularly 
in respect of trade union activity and the provision of pu-
blic funding. 
Public  servants  are  expressly  protected  by  the  right  of 
trade union association in the terms of Article 28.1 of the 
Constitution.  Provision  is,  however,  made  for  the  form 
that freedom should take to be specified in the implemen-
ting legislation. The 1985 Trade Union Freedom Act esta-
blished a single system covering both workers on employ-
ment contracts and public servants,  making no distinction 
in  the essential content. There are nevertheless considera-
ble differences  in  the supplementary rules on  worker re-
presentation,  strikes  and,  particularly,  collective  bargai-
nmg. 
Specific rules have been laid down for certain public servi-
ce categories. Judges, magistrates and public prosecutors, 
for example, are excluded from freedom of union associa-
tion within the meaning of Article 28. They do, however, 
under Article 127 of the  Spanish  Constitution,  have  the 
right to  set up their own professional associations under 
conditions which prevent them from affiliating themselves 
to the general trade unions and exclude them from certain 
forms of union activity. Article 28 also provides for legal 
restrictions on the right of union association in  the armed 
forces or other armed services and bodies subject to milita-
ry discipline;  today,  legislation implementing the Consti-
tution  excludes  all  bodies  subject  to  military  discipline, 
including the Civil Guard, from freedom of union associa-
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tion.  For the police (national, regional and local), specific 
regulations have been drawn up distinct from the general 
system. 
Because of its  inclusion  in  the  Constitution,  trade union 
freedom  enjoys  an  extremely  high  degree  of protection. 
Constitutional  rules  are  directly  applicable  and  must  be 
implemented  by  means  of an  'organic' law (adoption of 
which  requires an absolute majority  in  Parliament).  This 
means that action for violation of the right to the freedom 
of union association  can  be brought before the ordinary 
courts via a priority summary procedure, with entitlement 
to  subsequent appeal  to  the  Constitutional  Court  for  the 
safeguarding of constitutional rights (of citizens or of as-
sociations  who  consider  that  their  constitutional  rights 
have been violated). 
This high level of protection is very fully  applied by the 
1985 Trade  Union  Freedom Act, which governs workers' 
right of union  association  (including  that of members of 
the public service and workers under contract to the public 
authorities},  both individually and collectively. It includes 
the right to form federations and confederations and found 
international  trade  union  organisations,  or  to  join  such 
bodies;  the right of such bodies to draw up their own in-
ternal rules and structure, and a guarantee that they cannot 
be suspended or disbanded except by a court decision on 
the  grounds  of serious  breach  of the  law.  Trade  union 
freedom also includes the right to engage in union activi-
ties at the workplace or outside it, which means a perma-
nent right to  engage in collective bargaining, to strike, to 
publicise individual  disputes and  to  stand for election to 
the organisations representing workers within the compa-
ny. 
For individuals, the right of union association includes the 
right to found a union without prior authorisation (and to 
suspend or disband it provided the proper democratic pro-
cedures are respected},  to join the union of one's choice 
(the  only  conditions  being  compliance with  the  union's 
internal  rules  and  the  right  to  resign  membership,  since 
membership of a union cannot be made obligatory}, and to 
engage in  trade union activities. The concept of trade uni-
on  association as  applied  to  individuals in  legislation in-
cludes  the  right  of trade  union  members  to  freely  elect 
their representatives within the union- on this point, trade 
union freedom is equated with the union's internal demo-
cracy. 
With regard to the persons covered by the freedom of uni-
on association,  self-employed workers who do not them-
selves  employ  other  workers,  the  unemployed,  retired 
persons and disabled workers may join or remain members 
of a union but are not entitled to found a union organisati-
on with a view to defending their own interests as such. 
The legal obligations to be met by trade union organisati-
ons are not defined in detail, any more than the obligation 
for their articles of association  to  be lodged with the ap-
propriate public  authority  for  the  location  concerned  for 
registration and publication in the Official Journal for that 
region.  Certain  information  on  the  union's  identity,  its 
internal  organisation  and  the  election  of its  leaders  (in 
accordance with democratic principles}, the legal status of 
its members and  its  financial  system constitute the  mini-76  THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
mum compulsory content of a  union's articles of agree-
ment.  Acceptance of these articles can only be refused  if 
one of these obligations is not fulfilled,  in which case the 
points concerned can be corrected. The trade union organi-
sation acquires legal  status with  full  powers 20 working 
days following  lodging of its articles of association.  Ho-
wever, the public authorities or any other party which can 
prove a direct legitimate and personal interest may request 
the legal  authorities to declare the articles of association 
unlawful. 
On the question of trade union responsibility, the existing 
legal requirements are very succinct. The trade unions are 
responsible for any action taken or agreements concluded 
by their statutory organisations but not for any individual 
action by their members unless such action is undertaken 
in their capacity as union representatives or it can be pro-
ved that they were acting on behalf of the union. Irrespec-
tive  of the  circumstances,  contributions  paid  by  union 
members cannot be confiscated.  This rule,  coupled with 
the  fact  that organisations  representing  workers within a 
company,  staff delegates  and  works  councils,  which  are 
empowered to  negotiate or to  call  workers out on strike 
and play a major role in negotiations and in the settlement 
of in-house disputes,  are not  formally  part of the  trade 
union structure and  do  not have any  direct link with  or 
dependence  on  the  trade  unions,  leads  to  a  situation  in 
which the latter find themselves almost completely devoid 
of responsibilities. 
A  further element in the system for recognition of trade 
union freedom is the extensive legally sanctioned scope for 
trade union action.  Before going  into any  further detail, 
however,  it must be emphasised that the law on the right 
of union association applies only to employees and not to 
employers.  Employers'  associations  are  still  covered  by 
the Law of  1 April 1977 rather than  by  the  Trade  Union 
Freedom Act (LOLS}. 
3.  Briefly,  the extent of the unions'  legally  recognised 
powers  and  freedom  of action  depends  heavily  on  their 
degree of representativeness.  Spanish  legislation  has  ex-
pressly  introduced  the  concept  of  'most  representative 
trade unions' which enjoy special legal status in terms of 
both institutional participation and trade union activity. 
As  previously stated,  the official  system for determining 
the degree of representativeness is based on support won 
in  electoral  ballots.  The representativeness of each  trade 
union  association  is  determined  objectively  according  to 
the results obtained by the candidates it puts forward  for 
election to works councils or staff delegations,  including 
the equivalent positions in the civil service. Although still 
recent,  this legal formula is  firmly established in the Spa-
nish  system,  and  enjoys  the  full  support of the  unions, 
employers and public authorities because it is well suited 
to the Spanish approach to industrial relations. The neutra-
lity and objectivity of this criterion, its simplicity and the 
ease with which the weight of each union can be calcula-
ted,  the standardisation of the election procedures for all 
employees, transparency in the development and control of 
these election procedures and the regular four-yearly reas-
sessment  of trade  union  influence  enable  the  system  to 
function smoothly. Exact calculation of trade union influ-
ence is based on the number of representatives elected per 
union (if none, no direct account is taken of the number of 
votes obtained by each union). There is generally a fairly 
direct link between the number of representatives and the 
number of votes (not always necessarily the case},  which 
tends to mean that the vote can be assessed more accurate-
ly in a small firm than in a large one. Until 1994, the de-
gree of representativeness of each union was assessed eve-
ry four years,  to coincide with the new term of office of 
the  staff  representatives.  However,  this  created  certain 
tensions  in  the  practical  running  of the  system,  mainly 
because it concentrated the election procedure into a very 
short period of time, thereby making for a confrontational 
electoral campaign which tended to destroy good relations 
between the main unions.  It was largely for these reasons 
that certain changes were made to the statutory system in 
1994, one of the results of which was to stagger the electi-
ons:  following the reforms, there was no longer a set date 
for calculating the degree of union representativeness, the 
current system being based on constant updating of statis-
tics on the representativeness of individual unions. To this 
effect,  the Trade  Union  Freedom  Act provides that desig-
nation as  'most representative' or 'representative' shall be 
notified when the union concerned takes up its functions, 
at which time it shall produce the appropriate documentary 
evidence supplied at its request by the relevant administra-
tive department. 
In  view  of the  foregoing,  the unions  can,  from  a  legal 
point of view, be divided into four categories: 
1)  The 'most representative unions' nationally are those 
which obtain a minimum of 10% of the seats in the orga-
nisations representing the employees of a company (inclu-
ding public authorities). A further criterion is that of 'in-
fluence', according to which the status of 'most represen-
tative union' is extended to all the organisations affiliated, 
federated  or confederated  to  a  national  union  with  this 
status.  Since this system was introduced, the only organi-
sations  which  have  achieved  this  designation  at national 
level are the ccoo and the UGT. 
2)  The  most  representative  unions  within  the  Autono-
mous Communities are those which, operating only within 
the Autonomous Community concerned (and therefore not 
belonging to a federation or confederation with other nati-
onal unions),  obtain within that Community at least 15% 
of the seats  in  the workers'  representative organisations, 
and  have  a  minimum  of 1  500  representatives.  On this 
basis,  not all  the Autonomous  Communities have unions 
with 'most representative' status; in fact, the only Autono-
mous  Community-based  unions are in Galicia (the CIGA) 
and the Basque region (the ELA-STV and the LAB}.  Again, 
the 'extent of  influence' criterion means that unions which 
are affiliated, federated or confederated with a wider trade 
union  organisation  at  Autonomous  Community  level  ac-
quire  'most  representative'  status in  accordance with  the 
criteria described above. 
3)  Trade unions which,  while not having  'most  repre-
sentative' status according to  the above criteria,  enjoy at 
least 10%  support in  their specific field are considered to 
be representative in  that field.  (Through this criterion,  it 
has  been  possible  to  recognise  the  representativeness  in SPAIN 
their field of the main professional trade unions in sectors 
such as the civil service,  health,  education,  transport and 
air traffic control). In this case, only the strict criterion of 
election success is taken into account, and not that of the 
extent of the union's influence via affiliated organisations. 
4)  The minority unions, i.e.  those which do not belong 
to any of the above-mentioned categories as  they  do  not 
meet the representativeness criteria described. 
The official powers and scope of the activities of the uni-
ons vary according to their respective degree of represen-
tativeness: 
•  All unions are guaranteed a general right to engage in 
union activities within or outside the company, inclu-
ding the power to call a strike, participation in indus-
trial disputes, the right to set up company-based uni-
on branches, to stand as candidate for election to the 
organisations  representing  the  company's  workers, 
and to participate in collective bargaining.  In the lat-
ter case,  the union concerned must meet the conditi-
ons,  i.e.  minimum representativeness of 10%  in  the 
particular geographical area or occupational field  co-
vered by the collective agreement. 
•  The  most  representative  unions  nationally  have  the 
following  powers  'in all geographical areas and oc-
cupational fields':  institutional  representation  to  the 
public authorities; collective bargaining in any geog-
raphical  area  or occupational  field  covered  by  the 
collective agreement,  irrespective of their degree of 
representativeness in  that field;  participation in  non-
judicial channels for  the settlement of industrial dis-
putes; organisation of elections (not only nomination 
of candidates)  to  the  organisations  representing  the 
company's  employees;  usufruct  of public  premises 
and any other representative function. 
•  The most representative unions at Autonomous Com-
munity level have the same powers within the territo-
ry of their Community, plus the right of institutional 
representation to the national public authorities. They 
are entitled to participate in the negotiation of natio-
nal  collective  agreements.  (The  fact  that  the  trade 
unions  in  the  Autonomous  Communities  have  these 
powers where other trade unions which are more re-
presentative at national level,  but which do  not have 
'most representative' status, do not is legally accepta-
ble because  of the  particular status  of the  Autono-
mous  Communities  in  the  national  administrative 
structure.) 
•  The most representative unions in a specific occupati-
onal field or specific region have the same powers in 
that  occupational  field  or region  as  the  other  'most 
representative unions', with the exception of the right 
of institutional representation to the public authorities 
and  the  right of usufruct of public  premises.  These 
exclusions  have,  however,  been  diluted  by  various 
court decisions. 
•  The Constitutional Court has issued a closer definiti-
on of the criteria for designation of the  'most repre-
sentative' national  unions  recognised  by the law  'in 
all  geographical  areas  and  occupational fields'  to 
prevent misinterpretation. To this effect, it has ruled 
that the law at no time authorises a union to act in a 
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field other than its own and that its powers of repre-
sentation in  a  specific  field  are subject  to  a certain 
degree of representativeness in  that field.  According 
to this line of thought, although proof of representati-
veness is not compulsory and even where the requisi-
te  degree of representativeness  is  not  achieved,  po-
wers of representation  are  still  subject  to  a  certain 
degree of representativeness,  which  leaves  the  mea-
ning rather vague. This is the case, for example, with 
the requirements for participation in collective bargai-
ning, which allow a union to be considered as  most 
representative at national  level  (whether this applies 
to the organisation itself or to its extended influence 
through affiliation to other organisations), even whe-
re  that  union  does  not  meet  the  representativeness 
conditions under the general requirements for partici-
pation in negotiations.  Looking at the rulings issued 
by  the  Constitutional  Court  as  a  whole,  there  is  a 
strong tendency for the first three of the above-menti-
oned trade union categories (most representative nati-
onally,  most representative within a specific Autono-
mous Community,  representative unions within their 
specific geographical area or within a specific occupa-
tion) to be placed on an equal footing, which tends to 
mean that powers of action are extended to all unions. 
The only difference is in the extent to which the po-
wers are implemented, which is still dependent on the 
degree of representativeness. There are specific deci-
sions  on  this  point,  concerning  such  matters  as  the 
cession  of  publicly-owned  property,  subsidies  and 
economic  assistance  under  the  general  State  budget 
(Presupuestos  Generales del Estado),  participation in 
the public authorities' advisory bodies, etc. 
The most representative national unions following the last 
elections are, at national level, the ccoo (37.8%) and the 
UGT (34. 71% );  at Autonomous Community level (Basque 
region), the ELA-STV in first place with 3.62% of the nati-
onal total and 39.44% of the Basque total, and, in fourth 
place, the LAB;  in Galicia, the CIG (1. 77% of the national 
total and 25.93% of the total for Galicia). Of the speciali-
sed unions at occupational level, the CSIF, representing the 
civil service, occupies a prominent position. 
On  this legal  basis,  there has in  practice been a sharp in-
crease  in  institutional  participation  by  the  unions  with 
recognised  powers.  These unions are represented in  vari-
ous industrial and social security organisations:  the social 
security and  unemployment office,  the National Advisory 
Committee  for collective agreements,  the advisory bodies 
in the Autonomous Communities, etc., economic organisa-
tions such as  the Central Committee on Prices, and admi-
nistrative bodies such as the National Schools Council and 
the university governing bodies. These organisations must 
be  consulted  before  certain  government  decisions  are 
adopted, whether such decisions are regulatory or executi-
ve (annual setting of the national minimum wage, regulati-
ons on special working hours, etc.). 
Given its  importance,  particular mention should be made 
of the National Economic and Social Council,  composed 
of representatives  of the  most  representative  unions  and 
employers' associations and of other socio-economic orga-
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nisations,  cooperatives  and  workers'  limited  companies, 
etc.), as well as independent experts. This Council is es-
sentially a consultative body advising the Government on 
social, economic and employment matters, particularly the 
drafting of bills or regulations. 
The  most  representative  trade  union  organisations  have 
also received aid in the form of subsidies from the general 
State budget (where applicable via the Autonomous Com-
munity budgets).  Originally,  these were selective and re-
stricted to the most representative trade unions.  In 1985, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the granting of subsi-
dies solely to the most representative unions was unconsti-
tutional,  as a  result of which  the Government withdrew 
this  condition and  the  subsidies are now available to all 
unions, scaled according to their degree of representative-
ness. 
The State also provides support by granting the unions the 
right of usufruct of publicly-owned property. This practice 
actually  began  before  it was  legally  sanctioned  and,  in 
1983,  the Constitutional Court  ruled  that it was not un-
constitutional as it did not prejudice trade union freedom 
because the right was unconditional. The Court did, howe-
ver, demand that differences in  treatment between unions 
in  this  regard  must  be justified  objectively.  The  Trade 
Union Freedom Act recognises the right of the most repre-
sentative unions to this  privilege,  but the  Constitutional 
Court  takes the view that the other unions should not be 
excluded.  In 1986, specific legal  rules were drawn up on 
the subject, making it possible for the right of the usufruct 
to be granted to  the unions and employers'  associations, 
priority being given to the most representative organisati-
ons. The aim is to respond directly to the occupational and 
organisational  needs  of  the  unions,  particularly  those 
which,  because of their greater degree of representative-
ness,  have  more  responsibilities  under the  Trade  Union 
Freedom Act and the other relevant legal provisions.  The 
law also provides for a national advisory body to be set up 
comprising representatives of the public authorities,  em-
ployers'  associations  and  the  most  representative  trade 
unions. A separate issue is the 'compensation' awarded to 
the UGT and,  to a considerably lesser extent,  to  the CNT 
for property confiscated after the Civil War. 
In addition to these powers and responsibilities and State 
support,  the  unions  have  wide  scope  for  action  within 
companies. All the unions are entitled to set up workplace 
branches,  which have the right to  organise meetings,  re-
cruit new members and campaign on behalf of the union 
outside normal working hours and provided the company's 
normal activities are not disrupted. Workplace branches of 
unions represented on the works council, or which have a 
staff delegate among their members, or otherwise meet the 
criterion of greater representativeness,  are empowered to 
negotiate collective agreements within the company (pro-
vided negotiation  is  via unions which,  combined,  repre-
sent the majority of the members of the Workers' Commit-
tee or of the company's staff delegates).  These workplace 
branches  are entitled  to  their  own  notice  board  and,  in 
companies with more than 250 employees, to specific pre-
mises for their activities. In· such companies, the workpla-
ce branches of unions  represented  on the works council 
(therefore not necessarily the most representative unions, 
if they are not represented on the council) may appoint one 
or more union delegates (up to a maximum of 4 in compa-
nies with more than 5 000 employees).  The status of the 
union delegates, as regards rights and guarantees, is basi-
cally the same as that of the workers' elected representati-
ves described below, and they are also entitled to attend, 
but not  to  vote at,  meetings  organised  by  the company 
Workers' Committee (or, for public-sector employees, by 
the  relevant  representative organisations)  and  by the  in-
house  health  and  safety  organisations.  These  delegates 
have the right to be consulted in advance on any company 
measures of a  collective nature affecting  the workers  in 
general and the union members in particular, especially in 
cases  of dismissal  or  disciplinary  measures  concerning 
them. 
The rights of the union representatives of the most repre-
sentative organisations elected at local, national or Auto-
nomous Community level are as follows: 
•  the right to take time off without pay as often as ne-
cessary to perform their duties; 
•  the right to take an extended period of leave in order 
to perform their duties, with a guarantee that their job 
will  be kept  open  for  them and  that they  will  keep 
their seniority within the company; 
•  access to all workplaces for the purposes of carrying 
out their union activities or representative functions, 
provided  the  employer  is  informed  in  advance  and 
there is no disruption of normal work. 
In  addition,  the union representatives (irrespective,  gene-
rally speaking, of the type of representation or the nature 
of the union) have the right to take paid leave in order to 
participate in  the bargaining committees negotiating col-
lective  agreements,  provided  that  their own company  is 
affected by the negotiations in question. 
Finally,  the unions  can  request the employer to transfer 
union dues directly from the salary of members, provided 
the prior consent of the workers concerned is obtained. 
Completing the picture in respect of protective legislation, 
provision is  made for penalising malpractice at work: any 
regulation,  agreement or decision  (whether pro- or anti-
union) of a discriminatory and unilateral nature concerning 
the unions is declared null and void; and workers or uni-
ons  who  consider that  their trade  union  freedom  rights 
have been violated are authorised to seek legal protection 
via the procedure for the safeguarding of fundamental hu-
man rights (the union of which the worker concerned is a 
member,  or any other organisation meeting the  'most re-
presentative' criterion, may assist workers lodging indivi-
dual complaints). At all events, any promotion or support 
of unions controlled by the employer or by an employers' 
organisation is regarded as anti-union activity. If  the court 
upholds the complaint in respect of violation of rights, an 
order is made for the immediate cessation of the unaccep-
table practices concerned and rectification of their conse-
quences. The case is then referred to the public prosecuti-
on department to establish any liability arising from possi-
ble criminal practice (the penal code provides for penalties 
for the prevention or restriction of the legitimate exercise 
of union rights or the right to strike). SPAIN 
4.  As  already  stated,  the  Spanish  industrial  relations 
system has a complex set of rules governing the roles of 
the employers' associations and  most representative trade 
unions.  Many  organisations at national  and  Autonomous 
Community  level  have  a  tripartite  structure  comprising 
representatives of the public authorities and of the most 
representative  trade  unions  and  employers'  associations. 
Some of these organisations have a purely advisory role, 
which does not, however, mean that they have no influen-
ce  or practical  impact,  while  others  have  administrative 
and decision-making powers. 
During the 1980s, an extensive series of general negotiati-
ons got under way, which resulted in various agreements, 
some bipartite and some tripartite (government,  employ-
ers, unions),  sometimes with the participation of both of 
the most representative unions (Trade  Union  Confederati-
on and Workers' Commissions- ccoo and the UGT),  so-
metimes only  with  the  UGT.  There was  a  precedent  for 
these agreements in the form of the  1979 agreement be-
tween  the  UGT  and  the  CEOE,  which  resulted  in  a  very 
comprehensive agreement on the regulation  of collective 
bargaining in 1980. Subsequent agreements had a decisive 
impact on the development of industrial relations and ma-
de possible a great many tripartite agreements in this field. 
The first of these was the National Employment Agreement 
signed in June 1981.  1983 saw a return to a bipartite ag-
reement, and in 1984 (during which there were no general 
agreements  at all  and  the  number of industrial  disputes 
soared) the main instrument was signed in the form of the 
Economic and Social Agreement (hereinafter referred to as 
the ESA) between the Government, the UGT and the CEOE. 
This Agreement was in force in 1985 and 1986. 
As from the 1985 ESA,  relations between the trade unions 
and the Government and between the trade unions and the 
employers' associations have become more complex and, 
to some extent, more contentious. This, along with certain 
other political, social and legal factors,  probably accounts 
for the fact that there have since been no new agreements 
arrived  at by  social  consensus.  The fact  is  that  general 
agreements  on  income  and  pay  rises  have  disappeared 
completely  from  the  social  dialogue  in  Spain.  Possible 
reasons for  this are the number of decisions taken at  the 
highest level  by union leaders and employers,  the strate-
gies  adopted  by  the  most  representative  unions  and  the 
general policy of  wage restraint. 
Otherwise, the lack of any general multisectoral agreement 
does not reflect a  general  lack of dialogue.  In  the  mid-
1980s, dialogue, including the social dialogue,  underwent 
a  general  change of direction.  General  agreements  were 
replaced by more pragmatic experiments based on multi-
sectoral agreements in specific areas.  Some examples are: 
the December 1992 national agreement on continuing trai-
ning,  the  tripartite  agreement on continuing  training  for 
employed workers, the October 1994 agreement replacing 
the 'Labour Ordinances' of the Franco regime with collec-
tive agreements,  and the 1996 agreement on out-of-court 
settlement of industrial disputes
2
•  Most of these are bilate-
2.  This practice has  continued under  the new conservative gover-
ment of the Partido  Popular:  reform of the public pensions sy-
stem  (1996),  updating  of  the  vocational  training  agreement 
(1997), labour market reforms (1997). 
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raJ  agreements  between  the  trade  union  and  employers' 
confederations,  with  no  direct  government participation. 
The actual  implementation and development of these ag-
reements,  however, very often requires government coop-
eration, in the form of consent or reform of certain natio-
nal  legal  provisions,  and,  particularly,  the  provision  of 
public funds to finance them.  For this reason it has beco-
me customary for bilateral agreements to contain a govern-
ment approval clause and petitions made for government 
support with the aim of achieving a consensus on specific 
legislative reforms, subsequently submitted to the govern-
ment in  the form of a bill. This was the case with the Ja-
nuary  1990 Government-Union Agreement on certain as-
pects of employment and recruitment, which gave rise to 
Law 2/1991 on the 1nfonnation Rights of  Workers' Repre-
sentatives in Matters of  Recruitment, and with the Septem-
ber  1992  agreement  on  the  electoral  system  and  union 
representativeness,  which  later gave rise to  a  revision of 
this aspect of the Workers' Statute.  There have been other 
agreements of this  type concerning the major production 
sectors,  including,  for example,  the June 1993 agreement 
for  the  public  metalworking  companies  within  the 
INI/TENEO  group.  Similarly,  in  some of the Autonomous 
Communities,  agreements  concluded  via  social  dialogue 
have become quite common over the past few years. 
Certainly, this development has boosted active participati-
on by the public authorities and government institutions in 
the management of socio-political affairs. The Government 
has  in no  way  abandoned  this  role and constantly issues 
guidelines and directives concerning the essential problems 
involved in  the development of industrial relations, there-
by having a crucial  impact on working conditions.  (This 
does,  however, create a further element of tension in the 
already difficult relations with the trade unions.) Basical-
ly, the Government is intent on pursuing a wage restraint 
policy, which has been a key factor in boosting economic 
recovery  and  growth.  Action  by  the  Government,  in  its 
capacity as employer not only of the civil service but also 
of other public sector workers, has taken the form of set-
ting a legal maximum (in the general State budget) on wa-
ge increases in the public sector.  This same public-sector 
has,  however, also provided the backdrop for certain key 
events which, by means of agreements to  which we shall 
return later, have re-established union participation in the 
administration of public enterprises. 
CHAPTER II: THE INSTRUMENTS 
1.  The regulatory sources applicable to industrial relati-
ons as  defined  in  law (Article 3 of the Workers' Statute) 
are:  Government  legislation  and  regulations,  collective 
agreements, the will of the parties concerned as manifested 
in  the employment contract,  and  standard practice in the 
occupation or geographical area concerned.  Before going 
into  detail  about  each  individual  source,  the  following 
points concerning the Spanish legal code should be noted: 
•  the  past  importance,  still  in  evidence today,  of the 
sources  of national  regulation  and,  particularly,  the 
extreme importance historically of the Government's 
legal powers,  which have only recently begun to  be 
contested; 
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nised as having full legal force and occupy the corres-
ponding rank in the hierarchy of official sources; 
•  the absence of any consideration of the individual will 
of the parties concerned in the employment contract 
in drawing up the regulations governing the contract; 
•  the limited role of customary practice, which, in the 
majority of cases, is very minor. 
The Constitution heads the list of national regulatory sour-
ces. The 1978 Spanish Constitution gives particular priori-
ty to social, and particularly collective, rights. The impor-
tance  of their  role  in  regulating  industrial  relations  has 
increased steadily, essentially for two reasons: 
•  firstly  because,  in  many  cases,  the  Constitution  not 
only  provides  the  basis  for  ordinary  legislation  by 
establishing the principles with which such legislation 
must comply, but also lays down specific obligations 
which are directly applicable and can be cited as such 
before the courts; 
•  secondly, because Spain has an appeals procedure for 
the safeguarding of constitutional law, which enables 
individuals who feel  their fundamental  constitutional 
rights have been prejudiced to appeal to the Constitu-
tional  Court  once  the  usual  appeals  channels  have 
been exhausted.  As  will  be seen  later,  these  funda-
mental  rights  include a  substantial  body  of employ-
ment  rights  which  have  enabled  the  Constitutional 
Court to formulate a coherent set of principles pertai-
ning to employment, with the result that constitutio-
nal principles are a major guiding force in the regula-
tion of industrial relations. 
In the field of social rights, the Constitution contains three 
sets of general principles and a series of provisions confer-
ring  specific  rights.  These  are  further  subdivided  into 
three  sections  according  to  the  nature of the  obligation 
concerned and the protection envisaged (which determines 
the  degree to  which  it  is  binding  in  industrial  relations 
practice and the level at which it is applied). 
These general principles are found in Articles 7,  9(2) and 
129. As explained earlier, Article 7 provides for constituti-
onal recognition of trade unions and employers' associati-
ons, the institutional role of these organisations being ex-
plicitly conferred in the Introductory Section of the Con-
stitution setting out the political bases for the organisation 
of the State.  This recognition  follows  immediately  upon 
that of the political parties and is intended to defend and 
promote  the  social  and  economic  interests  of the  trade 
unions  and  employers'  associations.  The  importance  of 
such  recognition needs no  explanation.  The trade  unions 
and employers' associations occupy an  important position 
in  the State's legal  and political structure - they are res-
ponsible for defending and promoting social and economic 
interests  and  are  guaranteed  absolute  freedom  to  define 
and  implement their activities. The only demand made on 
them, other than that they should comply with the Consti-
tution and the law, is that their internal structure and func-
tioning must be democratic. It therefore comes as no sur-
prise that Article 131 (2) of the Constitution should provi-
de for participation by the unions and employers' associa-
tions (in the form of their  'opinion and cooperation') in 
the drafting of an economic plan by  the Government and 
the constitution of committees to that end.  So far,  howe-
ver, the Government has drafted no such economic plan. 
In fact,  the Committee provided for in Article 131.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution was never set up by the Government 
because it was linked to a general economic planning mo-
del which was never implemented by the Government and 
the  creation  of such  a  Committee would  therefore  have 
been pointless. What was created, however, in 1991, was 
the Economic and Social Council to which reference has 
already been made. The basis for this was not Article 131, 
but the broader framework of the principle, enshrined in 
the Constitution, of promoting and facilitating participati-
on by citizens in the economic and social life of the coun-
try. The Economic and Social Council was set up to serve 
these objectives. It has 61  members, 20 of  whom represent 
the  trade  unions,  20 the  employers'  organisations,  3  the 
agricultural  sector,  3  the sea-fishing  sector,  4  the social 
economy  sector and  6  independent experts.  The Council 
serves as an advisory body in socio-economic and employ-
ment matters, on which it is empowered to issue an opini-
on. Consultation of the Council is obligatory in the case of 
bills intended as national legislation, and relevant legislati-
ve decrees and decrees considered by the Government to 
be of major importance in  this field.  Consultation on the 
draft  general  State  budget  is  completely  excluded.  The 
Government  can  also  request  the  Council's  opinion  on 
specific subjects or on  techniques used, e.g. to gauge the 
opinion of the social  partners on  the  first  report on the 
labour market  reforms  in  1993.  The Council  drafts  and 
submits to the Government an annual Memorandum on the 
socio-economic and labour situation in the country. It can 
also, on its own initiative or at the request of the Govern-
ment,  draw up a wide variety of reports or studies as the 
basis  for  certain  conclusions  or  recommendations.  The 
Council has, in fact,  drawn up on its own initiative reports 
of some significance concerning such matters as the socio-
economic situation of women  in  Spain,  the  independent 
procedures for settling industrial disputes, or the situation 
and  prospects  of Spanish  industry,  the  priorities  of the 
Spanish  Presidency  of the  EU  Council,  the  principle of 
cooperation by the economic and  social  intermediaries in 
Community  structural  policy,  the  employment  situation 
for  the  disabled  and  potential  ways  of integrating  them 
into the labour market, etc. 
Furthermore, Article 9(2) (which clearly takes its inspirati-
on from Article 3(2) of the Italian Constitution but refers 
to  'citizens'  rather  than  'workers')  compels  the  State  to 
encourage the appropriate conditions for full  and effective 
exercise of the right to  freedom and equality, to eliminate 
the obstacles preventing or hindering the achievement of 
these objectives and  to  facilitate  participation by all  citi-
zens  in  political,  economic,  cultural  and  social  affairs. 
Despite the rather general wording of this principle and its 
reference to  'citizens' without any further distinction,  the 
Constitutional  Court uses  it as an  interpretative criterion 
in its decisions on the correct application of the legislative 
function and activities of the public authorities in the field 
of labour law. 
Finally, Article 129 provides for social security participa-
tion by the persons concerned and instructs the public aut-
horities to encourage the various methods of financial par-SPAIN 
ticipation in companies and facilitate access by workers to 
ownership of the means of production (as well as promo-
ting cooperatives). 
Following  the  general  rules  set  out  in  the  Introductory 
Section of the Spanish Constitution, Section I, which enu-
merates a whole range of fundamental rights and duties, is 
concerned largely with social rights, particularly collective 
social rights. As explained above, these rights are applica-
ble at three different levels  and  give varying  degrees of 
protection; in practice, then, their importance and implica-
tions vary. 
a)  The first level, which constitutes the core content of 
the  Constitution,  includes  the  recognition  of trade 
union freedom and of the right to strike.  These are 
the social  rights which enjoy the most extensive re-
cognition and the greatest degree of protection,  and 
they  are  included  in  the  category  of fundamental 
rights and public freedoms. They are protected by the 
priority  summary  procedure  in  the  ordinary  courts 
and by the possibility of appeal to the Constitutional 
Court  under  the  procedure  for  the  safeguarding  of 
Constitutional  law.  This  means  that  the  holders  of 
these rights,  whether workers or organisations with 
legal  personality  (particularly  trade unions),  can,  if 
their rights are in any way violated, request the pro-
tection of the courts via a  special  priority summary 
procedure. They are also entitled, once all other appe-
als  channels  have  been  exhausted,  to  appeal  to  the 
Constitutional Court requesting restitution of the vio-
lated  right(s),  supporting  their  claim  solely  on  the 
basis of an infringement of the constitutional princi-
ple in question. This protection (added to the fact that 
a)  application is compulsory under laws adopted by 
an absolute majority in Parliament and b) that a two-
thirds  majority  must  be obtained  before the  corres-
ponding constitutional principle can be amended, and 
the legislative chambers must subsequently be dissol-
ved) has given the Constitution an important role in 
the organisation of industrial relations and has spaw-
ned a  full  and a detailed body of constitutional case 
law, which will be discussed later. As has been seen, 
recognition of trade union  freedom,  both individual 
and collective, is very extensive and the only limitati-
ons on  the right to  strike are those dictated  by  the 
need  to  maintain  a  skeleton  staff to  keep  essential 
public services operational.  In  recognising  the right 
of workers to strike, the Constitutional Court is see-
king to r-rotect the rights of the individual rather than 
of the group or trade union, which has important im-
plications which will be examined later in this docu-
ment. 
This level of application also includes other essential 
rights which, while not specifically social, are of un-
deniable  importance in  the field  of industrial  relati-
ons. One example, enshrined in the Constitution and 
for which a  legal  definition exists,  is a  broad anti-
discrimination rule which  is  constantly  cited  in  the 
courts and is the focus of a considerable proportion of 
the Constitutional Court's case law. 
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b)  The next  level  of application  covers  the  rights  and 
duties of citizens in respect of which there is no spe-
cial appeals system nor any possibility of  appealing to 
the Constitutional Court on the grounds of safeguar-
ding Constitutional law.  Protection of these rights is 
through the ordinary courts and ordinary procedures, 
the  Constitutional  Court  being  involved  solely  and 
exclusively  where  the  constitutionality  of the  laws 
applying the corresponding rules is called into questi-
on either through an appeal on the grounds of uncon-
stitutionality, which is not a possibility open to priva-
te individuals, or if constitutionality is queried by the 
courts. These rights and duties must be implemented 
by law, respecting their 'essential content' (this being 
the main subject of any examination of their constitu-
tionality by the Constitutional Court). 
The said rights include the right to work and the duty 
of work, the right to freedom of choice of profession 
or job, and the right to remuneration adequate for the 
needs of the worker and the worker's family, with no 
discrimination according to sex.  As can be seen,  the 
extent of individual rights is relatively modest,  both 
in terms of the wording and as regards the protection 
afforded.  In compensation, the Constitution explicitly 
stipulates that a  Workers' Statute must be drawn up 
having force of law.  The systematic inclusion of this 
obligation in the text of the Constitution and the prin-
ciples to which it gives rise implied that a legal text 
was needed to establish unambiguously the individual 
rights of workers and application of the fundamental 
freedoms  in  the  field  of industrial  relations.  Legal 
application of this constitutional obligation (the 1980 
Workers' Statute, to which reference has already been 
made) is, however, simply a new version, with adap-
tation to the Constitution where necessary, of the ear-
lier Act  regulating employment contracts,  employee 
representation  within  companies,  collective  bargai-
ning and  the basis of the labour authorities' discipli-
nary powers. 
Apart  from  these  individual  rights,  the  Constitution 
provides  for  collective  rights  at  this  level,  making 
express  reference  to  the  enforceability  of collective 
agreements (providing the basis on which their legal 
validity is recognised and ensuring that they are bin-
ding  in  the same way  as  any  other legal  provision, 
going beyond the degree of obligation applying to a 
private contract). The right of employers and workers 
to  take action  in  the event of industrial  disputes  is 
also recognised. This was with a view to establishing 
constitutionally  the  right  to  take  industrial  action, 
apart from strikes, and, more particularly, to recogni-
se  lock-outs,  although  this  is  not expressly  mentio-
ned.  The law may  restrict  this  right as  it deems  fit 
(provided the requirement for maintenance of essenti-
al public services is maintained). 
Unlike the social rights recognised and guaranteed by 
the Constitution in the terms described, the rights and 
obligations of citizens also include those of the mar-
ket enterprise, which places an obligation on the pu-
blic authorities to protect the functioning and produc-
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tives of the economy  in general  and,  where applica-
ble, of economic planning.  There can  be little doubt 
as  to  the importance of this  recognition of the  free-
dom  of enterprise  and  the  explicit  support  for  the 
market economy  system,  and  of the commitment  to 
promote productivity, which is positively reflected at 
constitutional level. 
c)  Finally, there is a third level comprising general, so-
cial  and economic  principles.  These rules  are  obvi-
ously set out in the much more general form of 'prin-
ciples'. Claims arising from these constitutional rules 
can only be asserted in  the ordinary courts and only 
on  the  basis  of the  laws  implementing  them.  Even 
given some degree of constitutional control over these 
laws, obligations under the Constitution are obvious-
ly very general and the legislature therefore has con-
siderable leeway  in  interpreting  them.  This  applies, 
for  example,  to  the  commitment  to  implementing  a 
full  employment policy, promotion of vocational trai-
ning and retraining, inspection of health and safety at 
work  and  guaranteeing  minimum  rest  periods  for 
workers by limiting the working day and establishing 
regular paid holidays,  the commitment to  supporting 
an  adequate  public  social  security  and  pension 
system,  and  the obligation on  the State to  safeguard 
the  social  and  economic  rights  of Spanish  workers 
abroad and  make  appropriate provision  for  their  re-
turn. 
2.  This  extensive  constitutional  regulation  of  social 
rights is  supplemented by a similarly extensive system of 
legal regulation. The Constitution itself compels the legis-
lature  to  draft a  'Workers' Statute' and adopt implemen-
ting legislation in  certain fields,  including collective bar-
gaining, industrial disputes, trade union freedom, the right 
to strike, the right to a minimum wage.  As a result, there 
are two  legal  instruments of major importance in  the in-
dustrial relations field: 
•  The  Workers'  Statute.  This  contains  extensive  and 
detailed  regulations  on  individual  contracts  and  the 
employment  relationship,  as  described  in  part  II of 
this report. It also regulates the mechanisms for (non-
union)  worker  representation  in  companies,  and  all 
matters concerning collective bargaining and collecti-
ve agreements. 
•  The above-mentioned Trade  Union  Freedom Act, im-
plementing the recognition of trade union freedom  in 
the Constitution,  defines the concept of 'most repre-
sentative trade unions' and  makes provision for their 
presence in production units (via company-based uni-
on branches). 
This  has  gone  some  way  towards  counterbalancing  the 
previous predominance in  the Spanish legal  code of laws 
of governmental,  non-parliamentary  origin.  The  require-
ment  for  implementing  legislation  prevents  the  Govern-
ment  from  legislating on certain subjects,  and  the use  of 
decree-laws has also been restricted so  that the procedure 
is  now only possible in  cases of extreme urgency  and  is 
subject to subsequent ratification by Parliament; it is ban-
ned  altogether  for  regulating  any  matter  concerning  the 
rights,  freedoms  and  obligations  of citizens  included  in 
Section  I  of the  Constitution  (including  the  social  rights 
referred to  above).  There are, however, certain important 
areas,  such  as  the  right  to  strike and  industrial disputes, 
for which legislation is still inadequate, and in such cases 
the legal  code in  existence prior to  the  Constitution (and 
adopted by  decree-law)  is still in  force,  with the amend-
ments and repeals introduced by the Constitutional Court. 
It  is  important to  remember  that  the  national  Parliament 
has exclusive legislative competence in the social field, the 
regional Parliaments having no powers in  the area of la-
bour legislation.  While the latter is  the exclusive compe-
tence  of the  State,  however,  its  implementation  may  be 
delegated to  the Autonomous Communities.  Furthermore, 
where  the  Constitutional  Court  is  concerned,  the  term 
'legislation' must be interpreted in its broadest sense, as it 
includes not only laws but also the implementing regulati-
ons  that go  with  them.  According  to  the  Constitutional 
Court,  this is precisely because the point of these constitu-
tional rules is to standardise the system of labour regulati-
on,  which would otherwise be impossible.  The executive 
and  legal  powers  of the  Autonomous  Communities  are 
therefore restricted to the organisational aspects, including 
the  administration's  internal  structure.  The  only  leeway 
for  innovation  in  the  legislation they  have developed has 
been  in  certain  areas  of employment  policy,  essentially 
through the granting of subsidies or tax and social security 
concessions in return for the creation of  jobs. 
3.  The State's regulatory powers have, as already stated, 
tended  to  concentrate on  the  issuing of legislation  when 
establishing working conditions in the Spanish legal code. 
These powers, which have considerable impact, are exerci-
sed  not  only  by  the  Government  but also  by  individual 
ministers  (particularly  the  Minister  of Labour)  and  the 
administrative  authorities  responsible  to  various  govern-
ment  departments.  The  Constitution  has  restored  the  ba-
lance  between  these two  sources of legislation and  remo-
ved  the legislative powers of individual ministers (and, of 
course,  the departments  under them),  who are now only 
entitled to  adopt regulations implementing higher-ranking 
legislation  and  generally  only  where  they  are  expressly 
authorised  to  do  so.  Regulatory  powers are therefore re-
stricted to  the Government.  Nevertheless, despite the pre-
eminence of the  law,  the  Government has,  over the past 
few  years,  issued  a  considerable  number of regulations, 
most of which implement legal provisions on matters con-
nected with remuneration, working hours, special working 
hours  and  the  various  forms  of employment,  or concern 
the  regulation  of areas  not covered  solely  by  Jegislation, 
particularly matters concerning employment policy. In the 
latter sector in particular, the Govemment··generated regu-
lations still play an important role and the law only provi-
des a general reference framework. 
In  some instances,  case law itself has helped  to  maintain 
the  balance  between  legislative and  government  regulati-
ons. The decree regulating breaches of the law by employ-
ers  in  the  field  of industrial  relations,  for  example,  was 
cancelled by  the Supreme Court, which led  to subsequent 
adoption by Parliament of a law in this field. 
Furthermore,  with  regard  to  collective  bargaining,  the 
possibility  of government  regulation  of working  conditi-
ons by branch of activity has practically disappeared from SPAIN 
the Spanish legal code.  Only where a particular aspect is 
not covered by the law and there is no possibility of access 
to another collective agreement or of its extension,  is  the 
Government entitled to regulate working conditions within 
a specific sector.  So  far,  however,  this possibility has ne-
ver been implemented in practice. 
It  would  therefore  appear  that  a  new  balance  has  been 
struck  on  a  permanent  basis  between  legislation  and 
government-generated  regulations,  the  role  of the  latter 
being to implement the former in the fields expressly pro-
vided for by the appropriate legislation, which limits their 
'independent'  regulatory  function  to  various  aspects  of 
labour relations, particularly those concerning employment 
policy, with an emphasis on employment promotion mea-
sures. 
4.  In the Spanish legal code, as already stated, collective 
agreements are one of the sources of labour law.  Constitu-
tional recognition of collective bargaining includes recog-
nition  of the  binding  nature  of collective  agreements, 
which has provided the basis for legal recognition of their 
validity, according them greater legal force than any obli-
gation under a private contract.  The Workers' Statute,  as 
the ordinary  implementing  legislation,  further  gives  such 
agreements erga omnes force,  making them directly appli-
cable to all workers and employers covered by  the agree-
ment in question.  At all  events,  the reliability and repre-
sentativeness  of the  negotiating  parties  is  assured  by  the 
stipulation  of certain  conditions  as  regards  the  majority 
required to  elect the members of the negotiating commit-
tee,  the valid constitution of that committee, and the final 
adoption  of the  agreement  negotiated.  Collective  agree-
ments  are  therefore  genuine  and  legitimate  legal  instru-
ments and as such have their place in the hierarchy of legal 
sources.  The need to ensure that obligations arising from 
collective agreements are observed in the same way as any 
other laws and that any breach of them is correspondingly 
penalised has therefore been emphasised  in jurisprudence 
(the law provides,  for example,  for administrative penal-
ties for employers failing to comply with the legal clauses 
( 'nonnativos ') of collective agreements). 
Traditionally,  collective agreements  have  always  had  the 
function  of regulating,  in  accordance with  legal  guideli-
nes,  matters which cannot be covered by general regulati-
ons but are of a nature to  require an approach specific to 
the activity sector,  geographical area or company concer-
ned.  Another of their roles is to  'improve' legal  procedu-
res  where the balance of powers and  the  situation of the 
sector  or company  concerned  allow.  In  both  cases,  but, 
logically,  especially in the second,  the traditional attitude 
was that collective agreements should be completely sub-
ordinate to the law, which meant that obligations under the 
law (or government regulations) could not be  ignored,  as 
this  would  partially  invalidate  the  agreement,  the  clause 
concerned being overridden by the obligation with which 
it failed to comply. This primacy of the law is still possi-
ble,  even  in  the case of laws  adopted after the collective 
agreement, if the content is directly relevant to that agree-
ment.  In adopting this view, the courts are essentially re-
garding the protection of workers' rights in the same light 
as  the protection of individual  rights by  the courts them-
selves.  That is why specific individual appeals for the ap-
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plication of legal  obligations which have been  ignored or 
violated by  collective agreements are often examined wit-
hout  the  need  for  prior  annulment  of the  agreement  in 
question via the established procedures. 
The majority of recent case law has, however, increasingly 
reflected  a new interpretation of the relationship between 
collective agreements and the law. Based on constitutional 
recognition of collective agreements and their new role in 
industrial  relations,  the  view  now  is  that  the  content  of 
collective agreements,  as representing the free will of the 
parties concerned and as an expression of the constitutio-
nal  right to  collective bargaining,  must  comply  with  the 
minimum requirements of labour legislation  (i.e.  it must 
be advantageous to  the worker in terms of improvements 
in working conditions).  There are, however, certain cases 
in  which  collective agreements are permitted to  derogate 
from  national  provisions.  While  generally  applying  the 
principle of the most advantageous provision, legal practi-
ce does,  in  fact,  allow for certain elements of agreements 
to  be  less  favourable,  provided  that  the  overall  impact 
remains favourable to the worker. 
The 1994 legal reforms,  also known as  labour market re-
forms,  had an even more decisive impact and gave rise to 
a major shift in the balance of power and influence in res-
pect of the various sources of law, which had a particular 
impact  on  the  role  of the  collective  agreement.  The  re-
forms hinged around significantly reducing State legislati-
on, prompted by a desire to make collective agreements of 
central  importance  in  establishing  the  regulations  gover-
ning  employment,  both  individually  and  collectively  - a 
reduction  produced  in  pursuit of an  objective which was 
also intended to  increase flexibility and the adaptability of 
jobs  to  change,  and  increase  company  productivity  and 
competitiveness.  This brought about a considerable  trim-
ming  of State  legislative  machinery,  both  quantitatively 
and  qualitatively.  On  the  quantitative side,  apart  from  a 
general streamlining of State legislative instruments,  pro-
visions  of an  essentially  regulatory  nature  are  implicitly 
ex pan ding  the  scope of collective bargaining  procedures. 
On  the qualitative side,  the nature of State regulations is 
changing as  a result of various legislative mechanisms:  a 
reduction in the inviolability requirements with correspon-
ding amendment of the basic institutional principles, and 
more  recourse  to  collective  bargaining,  opening  up  the 
scope for collective agreements, other types of regulation, 
etc. 
These legislative refoflllS are intended to  give much  more 
weight  to  collective  bargaining,  particularly  in  terms  of 
expanding its scope and removing certain- formal obstacles 
to  the conclusion of collective agreements. If  State inter-
vention  is  to  be  reduced  in  favour  of collective  agree-
ments, it is not enough simply to remove existing guaran-
tees  or to  reduce  them  quantitatively.  The formulae  em-
ployed  to  this  effect  under  the  reforms  are  much  more 
varied than  might be supposed.  As a result,  the relations-
hip, ever complex,  between the law and collective agree-
ments, which is  seen as  a main source of employment re-
gulation,  is  taking on various new facets.  The complexity 
of the interrelationships in the regulatory system is increa-
sing as  certain expressions which were hitherto relatively 
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State provisions, ex novo referral to collective agreements, 
increased innovative capacity in the complementarity rela-
tionship,  etc.  Elsewhere, the distinction between the vari-
ous ways in which  the relationship ·between  the  law  and 
collective agreements operates is becoming  blurred,  with 
the result that they can be difficult to classify into the tra-
ditional  theoretical  types.  New  types  of relationship  are 
emerging, along with the possibility of transposing Com-
munity Directives via the collective bargaining process. 
The scope of collective agreements extends to all employ-
ers and  workers  in  the  fields  concerned,  who  thus  form 
part of the corresponding bargaining unit. The vis expansi-
va of the scope of agreements has also been emphasised in 
jurisprudence, extending to cover activities closely linked 
with those expressly included. Definition of the bargaining 
units  is  left to  the  discretion of the  negotiating  partners 
themselves.  Generally speaking, collective agreements are 
negotiated  for  the  company  or branch  or activity  sector 
concerned, and in the latter two cases this can be at local, 
provincial,  regional,  Autonomous Community or national 
level. Where a collective agreement has been duly negotia-
ted in a particular sector and geographical area,  the agree-
ment subsequently applies to all employers and workers in 
the field concerned, whether or not they are  'represented' 
by the parties concluding the agreement.  General validity 
of the  collective  agreement  is  therefore  a  legal  require-
ment;  the  erga  omnes  applicability  of the  agreement  is 
guaranteed by law and the negotiating parties have no po-
wer  to  oppose it.  Collective agreements  without general 
applicability, applying only to the employers and workers 
represented by the negotiating parties, are, however,  per-
mitted  by  law.  This  is  the  case  where  bargaining  takes 
place outside the legally-defined requirements or by  indi-
viduals  who  are  not  empowered  to  negotiate  generally 
applicable  collective  agreements.  In  practice,  however, 
such  'extra-statutory  collective  agreements'  are  almost 
indistinguishable  from  the  erga  omnes  collective  agree-
ments, for two main reasons:  applicability may extend de 
facto  to  all  employees  because  the  employer  offers  the 
remaining  workers  the  possibility  of subscribing  to  its 
content individually, and in some cases this has even been 
seen as a legal obligation on the grounds that there would 
otherwise be discriminatory  treatment of those  excluded; 
the second reason is that, while the validity of such extra-
statutory collective agreements is disputed  in  legal  theory 
and  practice,  it is  now generally recognised that the con-
tent of these agreements has a legal force which overrides 
individual autonomy to  the extent that any  individual ag-
reement which derogates from the provisions of extra-sta-
tutory  collective  agreements  is  automatically  considered 
invalid/unlawful. 
The structure of collective bargaining remains largely de-
centralised. Over 4,000 collective agreements are negotia-
ted each year (the exact figure varies - in  1995 there were 
- 4, 713). The number of workers concerned is quite high, 
the total figure for the same year being 7,467, 100, which 
represents almost all  employed workers. The most impor-
tant aspect of the collective bargaining structure is that the 
statistics reflect a high degree of atomisation of collective 
bargaining units.  Furthermore, the Spanish collective bar-
gaining system has traditionally been notable for the extre-
me brevity of the period for which its agreements remain 
in  force.  There appears to  have been some progress here 
over the past few  years,  however,  the duration of agree-
ments  tending to  increase.  In 1995,  for example,  42%  of 
collective agreements remained in force beyond the year in 
which they  were concluded,  and concerned 70%  of wor-
kers.  The degree of decentralisation of collective bargai-
ning is due to the number of collective agreements apply-
ing  to  a  limited  number  of workers,  the  most  common 
type  of agreement being  provincial,  and  tending  to  con-
cern a production sector with a limited number of compa-
nies:  in  the  reference year,  1,088 provincial sectoral  ag-
reements were concluded, representing 85.4% of all secto-
ral agreements and covering 4 105 856 workers, or 61.4% 
of all  workers covered by sectoral agreements.  Company 
agreements  within  relatively  small  firms  are  even  quite 
common. Of all collective agreements negotiated in  1995, 
72%  were company  agreements and  28%  were more ex-
tensive in scope, although the number of workers included 
in  that  scope  varied:  86.34%  were  covered  by  sectoral 
agreements and only 3.61% by company agreements. The 
average number of workers covered per collective agree-
ment is also quite high: the reference average in  1995 was 
1  , 612 workers; but this rate varies depending on the type 
of agreement,  the  average  being  only  305  workers  per 
company agreement and 4,977 per sectoral agreement. 
The  Spanish  collective  bargaining  system  is,  therefore, 
still  marked  by  excessive  dispersion  of the  bargaining 
units despite a gradual tendency towards greater concentra-
tion and  recent attempts at centralisation.  There are diffi-
culties  in  negotiating  general  collective  agreements  by 
branch of activity and at national level. A further problem 
is that differences in  income levels in the various Autono-
. mous  Communities hinder the standardisation of working 
conditions. 
Over the past few years, there have been attempts to reme-
dy  this situation by  means of intersectoral agreements in-
tended to  serve as reference guidelines for collective bar-
gaining. This type of agreement and the role it plays have 
already been described above. Within certain sectors there 
are also framework or general agreements which have pro-
vided  an  opening  for  collective bargaining on  a national 
scale, which has been particularly important for the sectors 
within which  collective bargaining at provincial level  has 
tended  to  predominate,  and  has  also  established  in  these 
sectors certain rationalisation measures for their own col-
lective  bargaining  structure  by  specifying  ~hich aspects 
should  be  regulated  at  national  level  and  which  can  be 
either fully  or partially delegated to  lower negotiating le-
vels.  Examples of such experiments are found in the natio-
nal  general agreements in  the construction and metalwor-
king sectors.  Furthermore, at the end of December 1994, 
the  'Labour Ordinances' introduced under the Franco re-
gime  were  completely  abolished  along  with  the  sectoral 
regulations which  for  many  decades acted as  a substitute 
for  national  collective agreements.  With  the abolition  of 
these  'Labour Ordinances ',  a new  negotiating  process  is 
emerging which could lead to the creation of new national-
level  bargaining units able to  concentrate and  rationalise 
the  collective  bargaining  structure  in  Spain  in  identical 
terms. SPAIN 
Furthermore, the new demands brought about by technolo-
gical  change and  new structures within  industry,  and  by 
the relatively centralised collective bargaining model  ope-
rating in such areas as the establishment of working condi-
tions, are making a means of adapting abstract conditions 
to the specific situation of individual companies or simply 
coping with the daily changes within individual production 
units increasingly essential. As stated, the 1994 legislative 
reforms provided for this alternative via the conclusion of 
company agreements of varying content and scope as  re-
gards the possibility of changing arrangements negotiated 
during the collective bargaining process proper. The mat-
ters covered are quite extensive, including aspects such as 
job classification,  promotions,  itemised salary statements, 
non-standard  working  hours,  one-off bonuses,  transfers, 
changes in working conditions, suspension of the employ-
ment  relationship,  collective  redundancies,  adaptation  of 
worker  representation  to  staff cutbacks.  In  most  cases, 
these are 'subsidiary' agreements in that they are intended 
to  cover  gaps  left  by  collective  agreements  and  cannot 
contradict any aspect of those agreements. However, there 
are  situations  in  which  company  agreements  concluded 
between the company management and employee represen-
tatives  may  change  the  provisions  of a  collective  agree-
ment.  This is the case,  for example,  with situations such 
as  substantial  changes  in  working conditions  in  terms of 
the distribution of working hours (but not the duration of 
the  working  day),  shift  work,  the  system  (but  not  the 
amount) of remuneration;  another example is  the case of 
companies whose economic stability may be threatened by 
the  pay  increases  provided  for  in  the  sectoral  collective 
agreement, in which case they  may  opt out of the agreed 
system by negotiating another specific agreement with the 
workers' representatives via a company agreement to exert 
greater control over pay increases. 
5.  In Spain, the courts play an important role in defining 
labour relations. Assessment of the right to  legal protecti-
on (as conferred by the Constitution) and the tendency to 
view  worker  protection  mainly  from  the  angle  of legal 
protection in these terms means that there is a high degree 
of court involvement in working conditions and the courts 
play an important role in interpretation. 
The Supreme Court,  at the head of the judicial hierarchy 
in ordinary law, deals with possible conflicts between ru-
lings by the lower courts or between these and the rulings 
of the Supreme  Court  via  the  appeals  procedure,  which 
enables  it to  establish  a uniform  interpretation  of labour 
legislation. The rulings of the Supreme Court are not pure-
ly on questions ,of principle, but are directly applicable to 
the parties concerned by the particular dispute in question. 
The Constitutional Court also  has considerable influence 
on the way in which the law affects working conditions. It 
has  an  important  interpretative  function,  particularly 
through its rulings on appeals in respect of the individual 
safeguarding  of constitutional  rights,  to  which  reference 
has already been made, by looking beyond the immediate 
case in question to determine the criteria for application of 
labour law. 
'Customary practice' is still a source of labour legislation, 
although  the lowest-ranking of all  the sources.  To be  re-
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garded as  a basis,  such practice must be both  'local' and 
'occupational'.  Sometimes,  express  reference  is  made  in 
legislation  to  customary  practice  as  a  subsidiary  source. 
This applies,  for  example,  to  establishing  the amount of 
work which can be demanded of an individual worker, the 
date and time of payment of wages and allowances and the 
compulsory  notice period  in  the event of resignation by 
the worker.  Customary practice plays only a very limited 
role in defining working conditions in general. 
International  legislation,  on  the other hand,  plays an  im-
portant part in the Spanish system.  The courts frequently 
refer to  international regulations and their detailed exami-
nation. It is important to realise that the rules contained in 
international collective agreements and treaties are directly 
applicable in Spain, once they have been incorporated into 
national  legislation  following  ratification  and  publication 
in the national Official Journal.  It has been maintained in 
some areas of legal  theory and practice that these instru-
ments have an executive power above that of the law itself 
(at  least in  cases where the collective agreements go bey-
ond setting out general principles, laying down an obliga-
tion to promote national policy and legislation in line with 
its  prescriptions).  Furthermore,  since  the  Constitution, 
international legislation has increased in importance, being 
regarded  as  of extreme  significance  for  the  purposes  of 
interpretation, since it is stipulated that the rules on funda-
mental rights and freedoms recognised by the Constitution 
must be interpreted in  accordance with the  Universal De-
claration of  Human Rights and the international conventi-
ons and treaties in these fields which have been ratified by 
Spain.  This significance has  already  been  extensively  re-
flected  in  the case law of the Constitutional Court, which 
does indeed  refer to  the  Universal Declaration of  Human 
Rights in interpreting rules on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms  recognised  by  the  Constitution,  as  well  as  to 
international treaties, particularly the ILO conventions rati-
fied by  Spain, the interpretative value of which is clear in 
the light of the Constitution. The ILO recommendations are 
also examined and taken into account by the Court, which, 
while emphasising  the  difference  between  these  and  the 
collective agreements, allows that they can serve as useful 
criteria in  interpreting or clarifying the latter agreements, 
while having no executive force. 
The Constitutional Court also, however, takes account of 
the case law of the courts or other bodies responsible for 
the  interpretation  and  application  of these  rules,  and  the 
resulting evaluation.  The decisions of the  ILO  Committee 
on  Trade  Union  Freedom,  for example, are systematically 
examined,  as  is  the  case  law  of the  European  Court of 
Human  Rights,  whose interpretation is  regarded as  being 
of crucial  importance  for  Spain  because of the  reference 
made  in  the Constitution.  Such examination goes somew-
hat beyond what is  required,  in  that interpretation of the 
international rules does not necessary imply acceptance of 
the  interpretations  made  by  the  courts  and  other  bodies 
examining them.  The Constitutional Court also affirms the 
need to  interpret the legislation as well as the constitutio-
nal  principles by  making  reference  to  international  sour-
ces. 
6.  With regard to the Workers' Statute,  the hierarchical 
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a)  Firstly, the national legislative and government sour-
ces in their usual order of importance. 
b)  Secondly, the collective agreements. 
c)  Thirdly, the will of the parties, applying the principle 
of the inviolability of workers'  rights,  which  means 
that  working  conditions  which  are  less  favourable 
than  those  provided  for  in  legislation  or collective 
agreements are unacceptable. 
d)  Finally,  local  and  occupational  customary  practice, 
which can only be invoked where there is no relevant 
agreement or legislation, and only with the agreement 
of the parties concerned, which means that, under the 
contractual agreement established between  the  latter, 
they  can be annulled unless  there is  a testimonial or 
express  reference  is  made  to  the  above-mentioned 
customary practice. 
Where conflicting rules are applicable, whether national or 
contract-based, the decision is generally in favour of those 
which are, overall, most beneficial to workers (and not the 
most  favourable provisions of each),  involving an  annual 
calculation of the items which can be quantified.  The mi-
nimum inviolability requirements must be respected in all 
cases. 
The main problems arise in connection with the respect in 
collective agreements of these minimum  legal  rights.  On 
this  point,  case  law  traditionally  makes  collective agree-
ments entirely subordinate to  the law.  It  is  only recently, 
and then only with a great deal of caution, that collective 
agreements have acquired a certain right to  override legal 
procedures and, as we have seen, they are beginning to be 
used  in preference to  legislation,  except where they  have 
been contested and subsequently declared invalid in accor-
dance with the established  procedures.  Be  this as  it  may, 
this  tendency  towards  a  system  based  on  trade  union  or 
collective protection rather than legal protection, which as 
a  result  is  more adaptable and  more  flexible,  means  that 
the  legal  data  on  which  conventional  case  law  is  based 
should be reviewed. 
A further point is that the will of the parties concerned by 
the employment contract has very little say  in the Spanish 
system.  Legal practice has only recently begun to  accept, 
on the basis of civil law,  the idea of an  individual agree-
ment between employer and worker amending the working 
conditions established by law or by an  agreement.  Agree-
ments in which the worker concerned appears to have been 
pressurised  into  relinquishing  his  rights  are,  however, 
unacceptable. 
7.  In  the Spanish industrial relations system,  individual 
disputes  are,  almost  without  exception,  settled  by  the 
courts. There is a great deal  of court activity surrounding 
working conditions, and out-of-court settlements are rare. 
There  is  also  frequent  intervention  by  the  administrative 
authorities  via  the  Labour  Inspectorate  in  an  attempt  to 
settle a dispute by imposing an  administrative penalty on 
the employer if there is prior evidence that the applicable 
rules  have  been  breached.  This  type  of intervention  is, 
however,  increasingly being contested and  is  disapproved 
of by the courts, as  it often impinges on their own juris-
diction. 
Private  procedures  for  settling  industrial  disputes  have, 
under the Spanish industrial relations system, so far shown 
a revealing degree of impotence. The reasons for this were 
essentially the  degree of State intervention,  bordering on 
the excessive,  in industrial disputes,  the lack of collective 
autonomy,  the  distrust  of the  social  partners in  this  res-
pect,  and  the  inadequacy of the relevant regulations.  All 
this,  however,  changed  radically with  the  1994 reforms, 
which  included  certain  fundamental  innovations allowing 
the  development of effective conciliation,  mediation  and 
arbitration  procedures.  There  had  already  been  certain 
experiments at regional level in the form of multisectoral 
agreements  in  some  of  the  Autonomous  Communities 
(Basque region, Galicia,  Catalonia, Valencia, etc.) with a 
view  to  establishing settlement procedures for disputes of 
this nature.  The biggest step in this direction is the natio-
nal  multisectoral  agreement  of January  1996  concluded 
between the most representative trade union confederations 
and employers' associations.  This agreement provides for 
out-of-court settlement of industrial disputes and has made 
centralisation of the conciliation,  mediation and,  to  a les-
ser extent, arbitration procedures in  the event of differen-
ces  between the various representatives a real possibility. 
The fact  that,  via this agreement, an  undertaking by both 
parties to  submit to  a compulsory mediation procedure is 
assumed where one of the parties so requests,  before any 
pressure is  exerted via strike action,  is a major step  for-
ward. 
As  far as  the methods used to  force a solution to disputes 
is concerned, there has been a significant move away from 
strikes in the private sector but an increase in this form of 
action in the public sector. Certain types of strike are con-
sidered illegal,  and  specific legal  measures have been put 
in  place to  guarantee security,  maintenance and  essential 
public services.  These are currently the main concerns as 
far  as  strikes are concerned.  The vast  majority of strikes 
are viewed on a par with collective bargaining and imple-
ment the right to strike in the traditional way. 
Lock-outs are authorised only as  a policing measure or to 
protect persons, goods or company installations. 
In  practice,  however,  particularly during certain  types of 
strike  (intermittent  or in  strategic  sectors),  they  are also 
authorised  as  a  legitimate  weapon  in  industrial  disputes 
and  are considered as  such,  though not expressly.  by  the 
courts. 
8.  Seen  in  an  international context,  the Spanish system 
still depends heavily on the law and the Government in the 
regulation of working conditions, and the role of collecti-
ve bargaining is still quite limited, despite the predictions 
as  to  its  future  development.  Traditional  legal  practice, 
which is  individualistic and probably leads to overregulati-
on  of industrial  relations,  still  predominates.  There  are 
major elements of convergence in  a Community context. 
The main protagonists in the field of labour relations are 
perhaps insufficiently willing to take on the role which is 
theoretically theirs,  along with all  its consequences.  Wit-
hout wishing to deny this general characteristic of the Spa-
nish  legal  system,  the  importance of the  1994 legislative 
reforms  of the  labour  market  must  also  be  stressed.  As 
described above,  these reforms have meant a considerable SPAIN 
reduction in State intervention in terms of both the amount 
and the nature of State legislation, and of action taken by 
the labour administration.  As stated in  the recitals of one 
of these Acts,  reforms in  the  labour field  must  maintain 
the differentiating elements of traditional European policy 
in terms of trade union freedom, collective bargaining and 
social  protection.  Preserving  these  values  is  compatible 
with  greater  competitiveness,  but  means  reviewing  the 
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institutional  framework  of industrial  relations as  well  as 
the  negotiating  practice of the  social  partners,  to  ensure 
that  in  these  two  areas  guaranteeing  workers'  rights  is 
compatible with the development of the employers' activi-
ty and the capacity to adapt. This will provide the necessa-
ry conditions for flexible management of human resources 
geared both to the economic situation of the company and 
to the fluctuations in the market concerned. 88  THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDIDONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE ACTORS 
1. The concept of actors 
The concept of  actors has no place in French legal tradition. 
The reasons for this are twofold. To begin with, and not-
withstanding the pronouncements of  some schools of thought 
on the "creative force of  the law" (pronouncements with very 
limited impact anyhow), regulation is held to be the work of 
one or several authors rather than actors. In other words, the 
emphasis is clearly on the instrument or body to which a rule 
can be attributed.  The fact  that a  law is negotiated,  for 
example, is not taken into consideration as such. The idea of 
studying  actors  is  one  propounded  by  sociologists  and 
political scientists and rather goes against the grain of legal 
tradition, which has little time for the complexities of rule 
gestation. On the other hand, while the doctrine of labour 
law has indeed long recognised the fact that the State has no 
monopoly over the legal regulation of working conditions, 
it  nevertheless  regards  the  State  as  having  supervisory 
powers over the production of rules by forces other than 
itself. Collective bargaining and rule-making by employers 
are recognised, regulated and sometimes even prescribed by 
law. The State creates order and establishes a hierarchy of 
rules.  This view, which in France certainly seems to  be 
justified  in  principle,  nevertheless  has  one drawback:  it 
means we cannot really study the groups, bodies and subjects 
which between them produce the rules. 
We need only use the concept of  actors if  we tum away from 
employment relationships as such to look more specifically 
at  industrial relations  and  if,  in  studying  the  rules,  we 
concentrate on some of them, i.e. those on the creation of 
normative rules. 
2. Identification of the actors 
It is convenient to refer to the quasi-classic trilogy: the three 
types of actor - employers' organisations, trade unions and 
government organisations - which between them make up 
the system of  industrial relations. But things need to be clar-
ified in more detail. 
On the business front, employers' organisations alone will 
not do. Entrepreneurs are undoubtedly actors in the regu-
lation stakes, in that they are real and legitimate agents in 
collective  bargaining,  management  prerogatives  being 
recognised by the State as sources of regulation (see section 
29 below).  With regard  to workers,  the actors  may,  for 
simplicity's sake, be grouped together as trade unions. But 
here too, we must beware of the relative lack of clarity in 
this formulation. This is because French history - though not 
alone in this respect - has produced a wide variety of actors, 
or collective forms of organisation of  workers.  There are 
coalitions (manifest  in  strike committees or coordination 
committees during disputes, for example the nurses' strike in 
October 1988), trade unions, works councils (the historical 
alternative to the trade union), workers' delegates (represen-
tation by a single person), workers' assemblies, trade union 
sections and shop stewards. 
Finally, "government organisations 
11 is a catchall expression 
for a complex reality. Government organisations are com-
plex in structure, especially considering that the State is also 
an  employer,  an  administration  with  the  prerogatives of 
public  power and  both  the subject and the object of the 
bargaining process. 
SECTION 1 : EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATIONS 
AND TRADE UNIONS 
§1. DESCRIPfiON AND ORGANISATION 
A. Employers' organisations 
3. The structure of employers' representation 
The  Conseil  National  du  Patronat  Franfais  (National 
Council of  French Employers) (CNPF),  which has association 
status,  is  a  union  of territorial  groups  and  professional 
federations. These groups and federations, as well as their 
affiliated organisations, represent approximately one million 
commercial and service enterprises employing over three 
quarters of all employed workers, according to the CNPF's 
own figures. 
The Confederation generale des petites et moyennes entre-
prises (General Confederation of Small and Medium-sized 
Businesses) {CGPME),  an offshoot of the CNPF,  maintains 
close links with the latter. 
The role of the CNPF in collective bargaining with the trade 
unions was very limited until the end of the 1960s. A few 
powerful federations, such as the Union des industries metal-
lurgiques et minieres (mining and metalworking employers' 
union) {UIMM),  had the upper hand in local branch negotia-
tions (i.e. at regional, departmental or town level), and the 
CNPF's rules did not empower it to commit its members. 
This obstacle was lifted in 1969, and the CNPF declared that 
it represented not only the employers but also the undertak-
ings themselves'. Since then the authority of the CNPF over 
its members has grown. Either by cause or effect, nation-
wide  multi-sectoral  bargaining  has  also  developed  quite 
considerably  since  1968,  and  has  been  particularly  in 
evidence over the last two years. 
That is not to say that the federations have completely lost 
their autonomy or indeed that firms adopt common policies. 
The  French  system continues  to  be  characterised  by the 
influence of  the federations (or at least by some of them) and 
by marked disparities between the social policies pursued by 
individual companies. The main consequence of the influ-
ence of the federations is often the maintenance of branch-
level  bargaining  in  its  historical  framework,  i.e.  split 
according  to  membership of the federations.  In general, 
federation membership is not organised on unifcrm sectoral 
lines, an important point to remember from th~ Community 
perspective. 
B. Trade unions 
4. The structure of the trade union movement 
Broadly speaking, the French trade union movement presents 
a three-tier structure, comprising: 
(a)  primary units- trade, occupational, business or indus-
trial unions; 
(b)  associations -which may be either geographical and 
multi-sectoral,  with  local,  departmental  or regional 
groupings, or else be coordinated on occupational lines, 
1.  F.  SELLIER, La confrontation sociale en France,  /936-1981, PUF, 
1984, p. 63. FRANCE 
focusing on groups of  activities or on a product market, 
with the professional federations; 
(c)  national multi-sectoral groups - the confederations. 
Within a  dynamic perspective,  four aspects  must be em-
phasised. 
(a)  The classification of unions  by trade or occupation 
category has gradually become less relevant.  Unions 
organised by craft/trade, where they survive, tend to be 
affiliated to the large confederations,  some of them 
having managed to hang on to a little autonomy. There 
are some important exceptions, however. There are still 
some unions, organised by trade or occupation, which 
do not belong to a confederation, e.g. in the transport 
industry, municipal transport, railways, air transport, 
and the civil service. 
An even more special case is the Federation de l'Edu-
cation  Nationale  (National  Education  Federation) 
(FEN), one of the largest in membership terms, which 
covers  all  groups of teachers  and  auxiliary  staff in 
education.  Following the post-war split between  the 
CGT and the CGT-FO,  it refused to join a confederation 
(see  section  (c)  below).  The  decline  of groupings 
organised by trade or occupational category may be the 
reason why the trade unions find it difficult to organise 
workers in the event of  disputes confined to a particular 
trade or occupation (such as the 1986 rail dispute or the 
nurses' and health workers' dispute in 1988). 
(b)  Trade unionism among white-collar workers is to some 
extent peculiar to the French system. Each major con-
federation has its own federation of white-collar work-
ers, but there has also been a separate confederation of 
white-collar workers since 1944 - the Confederation 
franraise de l 'encadrement-Confederation generale de 
cadres (French White-Collar Confederation- General 
Confederation  of Managerial  Staff)  (  CFE-CGC).  Its 
membership is falling, but it helps to keep alive the idea 
of  the white-collar worker as one of the cornerstones of 
the French system of industrial relations. 
(c)  In addition to the CFE-cGc (see  (b)  above),  there are 
four major multi-sectoral groupings or confederations: 
the Confederation gbzerale du travail (CGT), which was 
~.-t up in 1895; the Confederationfranraise democrati-
que du travail (CFDT), established as the secular exten-
sion ,  of the  Confederation franraise des  travailleurs 
chretiens (cFrc) (1964); the Confederation generale du 
travail-J<"t.--.rce ouvriere  (CGT-FO), the result of a split in 
the CGT in 1947; and the Confederationfranraise des 
travailleurs  chretiens  (CFfC),  which  was  created  in 
1919.  There are other multi-sectoral  groupings but, 
with few members, a limited area of activity and a lack 
of clearcut policies, they do not carry much weight. 
(d)  New groupings have recently seen the light of day. One 
of them,  the  Federation  Syndicale  Unitaire  (FSU), 
basically  brings  together  the  white-collar  workers' 
unions, some of which have been excluded from the 
FEN  (see  (a)  above).  Another, still in the process of 
being formed,  was able to pull its weight during the 
extensive strike action in the public sector towards the 
91 
end of 1995.  It is being set up as  a  reaction to  the 
policies of certain confederations (see (c) above). 
5. Organisation of the large multi-sectoral confederations 
(CGT, CFDT, CGT-FO, CFfC) 
(a)  There is no doubt that membership numbers are falling 
in France, at least in the case of the CGT and the CFDT. 
Why this is so is not entirely clear. There are two sets 
of figures for the CGT.  According to the CGT itself, it 
had 2.3 million members (active and retired workers) in 
1977 and about 1.7 million in 1984, whereas the Metal 
Industry Employers' Federation (UIMN) puts its number 
of active members at over  1.6 million in  1977  and 
835 000 in 1984
2
•  The CFDT, which had more than a 
million active members between 1974 and 1979, admits 
to having lost between 100 000 and 200 000 since then. 
It claimed to have 900 000 active and retired members 
at the end of 1986. The CGT-ro boasts relative stability, 
even a slight growth in membership since 1974, and at 
the end of 1984 claimed nearly 1.2 million active and 
retired members. The corresponding figure for the CFfC 
at the end of 1986 was 160 000. 
A battle of figures,  then, but also a fundamental fact of 
life in the French trade union movement: compared to 
other EU countries, trade union membership in France 
is  low,  between  9%  and  15%  according  to  some 
sources. But this has always been the case, except for 
the period immediately following World War 1e. 
All  sorts of explanations have been  put  forward  to 
explain this phenomenon, including union ideologies, 
the conflict inherent in pluralist unionism, and changes 
in the means of production. We shall confine ourselves 
to just two considerations. 
To begin with,  French trade unionism has a militant 
tradition. 
Union membership has a high value in itself, given that 
it does not bring any particular advantages. Collective 
agreements  are  generally  applicable,  and  it  would 
probably be unlawful for members of a signatory union 
to be granted special privileges (see section 23 below). 
The  unions  do  not  directly  manage  social  secu-
rity/protection institutions, so union membership does 
not make a worker better off in social welfare terms. 
Finally, the union does not usually make payments to 
strikers during an industrial dispute. 
Secondly, in contrast to the low rate of union member-
ship, the confederated unions boast a strong following, 
which can be illustrated by two examples. In company-
level  industrial elections,  the unions affiliated to the 
major confederations receive around two thirds of the 
votes cast, though the figure is steadily declining. The 
lists  comprising  non-federated  unions  or non-union 
candidates received less than 18% of the votes in 1966-
67, 23%  in  1976-77, 28%  in 1986-87 and 34.7% in 
1992-93.  In  elections  for  the  Industrial  Tribunal  in 
December 1992, which were marked by a high rate of 
2.  See: Liaisons Sociales, No  10071  of 15 October 1987. 
3.  H.  BOUZONNIE,  L 'evolution  des  effectifs syndicaux depuis 1912: 
essai d 'interpretation, Revue fr. des affaires sociales, 1987, No 4. 92  THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDmONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
abstention (60%), the lists presented by the five largest 
confederations (CGT,  CFDT,  CGT-FO,  CFTC  and CFE-
CGE)  obtained  93%  of the votes cast.  The contrast 
between strong electoral response and low membership 
is obviously significant for the development of trade 
unionism,  but  it  also  shows  that  the  problem  of 
representativeness is more than a matter of membership 
figures alone. 
(b)  How and where is the power located in  these union 
organisations? Broadly speaking, the large confedera-
tions have identical structures. The highest authority is 
the congress, which brings together all shop stewards. 
In practice, the national council or committee, made up 
of the departmental or regional unions and the federa-
tions, plays a more active role if  only because it meets 
more frequently and is made up of the people who form 
the backbone of the confederation machinery. 
Management structures vary from one confederation to 
another, but all feature a larger "committee"- type body 
and  a  smaller  "executiv~  ~ appointment  to  which  is 
governed by procedures in which more or less overt co-
option is allied to the need for relatively homogeneous 
management. 
The confederation formula was originally intended as a 
lightweight structure. This is still essentially true of the 
CGT-FO,  although  power  does  increasingly  tend  to 
become  personalised.  In  the  other  confederations, 
centrist trends have emerged, as a result of the shrink-
ing of  the militant basis and more cumbersome adminis-
trative, supervisory and coordination machinery. Yet it 
would  be  wrong  to  underestimate  the  strength  of 
intennediary organisations, unions or federations whose 
representation on the national committee or council is 
proportional (with certain limitations) to their member-
ship levels. On several occasions in recent years, these 
organisations (the CGT as much as the CFDT) appear to 
have  had  a  decisive  hand  in  influencing  and  even 
changing  the  policies  adopted  by  the  confederated 
organisations. 
§2. THE BASES AND GUARANTEES UNDERLYING 
ORGANISATION AND ACTION 
6. French law distinguishes between 
three different dimensions 
(a)  Individual trade union freedom is that which has the 
strongest base and the firmest guarantees. This is the 
freedom to join or not to join a union and the freedom 
to take part in trade union activity. 
Individual union freedom is enshrined in the Constitu-
tion. The preamble of the Constitution of  27 October 
1946, to which the 1958 Constitution refers, states that 
''anyone may defend his rights and interests through 
union activity and join a union of  his choice~ 
Taken literally, this formula gives the broadest possible 
meaning to who exactly enjoys trade union freedom: 
i.e.  everyone, or rather all workers and all entrepre-
neurs.  The legislative  formulae  are  stricter:  Article 
L.  411-5 of the Code du travail (Labour Code) recog-
nises that any employee has the right to join a union 
and Article L.411-6 spells out the right to participate in 
the administration or management of a trade union. But 
it  is  a  fact  that  trade union  freedom  is the right of 
everyone,  for  the  defence of work-related  interests. 
Furthermore, employers' groups often have the same 
legal  form  as  a  trade  union.  The  Code  du  travail 
sometimes  gives  employed  workers  more  extensive 
guarantees of the right to exercise this freedom. 
The wording of  the Constitution would probably suffice 
to condemn any legislative initiative which sought to 
question the individual right to join a union or take part 
in union activity. More specific guarantees have been 
enacted  against  employer  interference,  comprising 
criminal penalties in the case of discrimination on the 
grounds of union membership or union activity and 
civil penalties rendering null and void any action on the 
part of an employer that runs counter to trade union 
freedom  (see  Articles  L.  412-2  and  L.  481-3  and 
L.  122-45 of  the Code du  Travail).  Finally, French law 
prohibits any form of coercion vis-a-vis the unions (see 
Article L.  413-2 of the Code du Travail). 
(b)  The right to set up a union was granted by law in 1884 
(Act of  21  March).  The current Article L.  411-2 of the 
Code du  Travail  incorporates the original  text:  'iln-
ions ... may be  freely established~ The only stipulation 
is  a  procedural  one:  the  unions's  articles  must  be 
registered (see Article L.  411-3 of the Code du  Travail). 
So the legal requirement is the same for trade unions 
and associations.  This makes sense since the Conseil 
constitutionnel  (Constitutional  Council)  has  already 
decreed that any law which seeks to subject the estab-
lishment of an association to prior authorisation by the 
administrative or statutory authority is in breach of the 
Constitution
4
•  The only limit to this protection stems 
from the concept of 'ilnion "itself: a union must have a 
work-related aim (see (c) below), and its members must 
exercise a similar or connected activity. However, this 
concept only applies to "primary "unions, not to group-
ings of trade unions,  which under the law enjoy the 
same freedom of establishment (see Articles L.  411-21 
to L.  411-23 of the Code du  Travail). 
On  the other hand,  no special provisions proter,t the 
trade union's freedom to operate. This is inferreJ from 
the freedom of establishment and from the principles 
which apply to groups set up under private ~aw. How-
ever, judges tend  to  apply  these  same  principles  -
sovereignty  of the  members'  assembly,  the  general 
principles of  disciplinary law - when dealing with cases 
involving a trade union decision. 
(c)  In France, the bases and guarantees of the trade union's 
freedom  to  act are  formally  restricted  to  individual 
freedom to act (see:  Preamble to the 1946 Constitution: 
"anyone may defend his rights and interests through 
union  activity~ on the guarantees of individual free-
dom, see (a) above). 
The main thrust of the debate on the bases and guaran-
tees of trade unions'  freedom  to act focuses  on two 
4.  Constitutional Court,  16 July  1971,  in:  Official Journal,  18 July 
1971. FRANCE 
issues. First of  all, the legal framework of trade union-
ism has no connection with the right to strike and the 
right to collective bargaining,  even  though  the law 
stipulates that representative trade unions are the sole 
agents of collective bargaining. French law simply has 
no comprehensive arrangements for collective action. 
The other issue is that trade unions are regarded as 
groupings set up  under private law,  enjoying  legal 
status and pursuing a special objective.  This special 
objective is the "study and defence of  rights and the 
material  and moral  interests,  both  individual  and 
collective,  of the persons  referred to  in  its  articles" 
(Article L.  411-1 of the Code du Travail based on the 
Act of  21  March 1884 and amended by the Act of  28 
October 1982) and it supposedly sets the limits of union 
activity. In practice, however, it is quite impossible to 
define these limits with any accuracy. Yet trade unions 
are also legal entities and as such may be held responsi-
ble for the damaging consequences of any wrongdoing. 
A number of trade unions ( 
11 primary 
11 unions, associa-
tions, federations and confederations alike) have been 
the target of civil liability proceedings in  the recent 
past, following labour disputes which they had orches-
trated or otherwise supported. 
The concept of union immunity has not yet found  its 
way into French law, although an abortive attempt was 
made in 1982 to formulate a more precise definition of 
civil liability in labour disputes, on the understanding 
that the assets which a union needs in order to operate 
cannot be seized (Article L.  411-12(2) of the_Code du 
Travail). 
§3. FUNCTIONS, ROLES, PREROGATIVES 
AND RESPONSffiiLITIES IN THE PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
7. Workers' organisations 
The functions of the trade unions vis-a-vis their members 
and the State can be outlined in a simple analysis. In their 
relations with employees, the French unions, while continu-
ing to handle claims, have increasingly turned into forces of 
countervailing power. In handling claims they do not enjoy 
any special prerogatives. Apart from in the public sector, 
French  unions  have  no  legal  powers  relating  to  the 
organisation of disputes. 
They do, of course, have a role to play in that respect (see 
section  35 below),  and  there is  the matter of their civil 
responsibilities,  but they  have  neither been  granted  nor 
indeed asked for special prerogatives. As a countervailing 
power, on the other hand, they enjoy considerable statutory 
prerogatives, ranging from recognition of their monopoly 
right to negotiate collective agreements with general (erga 
omnes) effect (which is now being eroded, see section 21 
above), through participation in a variety of expert institu-
tions  (e.g.  the  Conseil  Economique et Social),  advisory 
bodies (at national, regional and local level), management 
bodies (e.g. administration of the social security system) and 
organisations set up to resolve disputes (e.g.  conseils de 
prud  'hommes,  which are first-instance industrial tribunals 
with joint representation), to the statutory promotion of their 
activities at company level. 
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The French trade unions' relations with the State are appar-
ently simple and complex at the same time. Their role in the 
regulation of working and employment conditions would 
appear to be confined to bargaining on anything not covered 
by France's close-meshed network of statutory rules and 
regulations. Yet appearances can be deceptive, and the trade 
unions' links with the State are a case in point. Their actual 
complexity is borne out in at least two ways. For one thing, 
the State encourages trade union activities, a stand amply 
illustrated by the legal prerogatives granted to the unions. 
Secondly, centralised bargaining has taken great strides in 
F ranee over the past twenty years. Depending on the aims 
pursued, such bargaining may be institutional or legislative 
in scope. An example of institutional bargaining would be 
the negotiations on the establishment and then on the reform 
of  the  unemployment  insurance  scheme.  Examples  of 
legislative bargaining can be found in the sphere of voca-
tional  training,  redundancy,  working  hours,  and  even 
insecure employment.  These are areas in which  national 
collective agreements paved the way for changes in the law, 
which by and large has taken the outcome of negotiations on 
board. 
Turning to the dynamics of the trade unions' functions, the 
underlying trend appears to  be an upsurge in the unions' 
representative and rule-making activities. The larger unions 
have grown into fully-fledged work authorities, almost semi-
public bodies. In some ways the situation is something of a 
paradox: the extension of the trade unions' functions and of 
the corresponding prerogatives took place at the very time 
when their real representativeness was on the wane. Could 
there be a causal link between the development of preroga-
tives and the decline in representativeness? 
However, caution must be the watchword in comparing the 
extension of  the French trade unions' role with the situation 
in  other EU countries.  In France,  the purpose of central 
bargaining is still almost exclusively the management of the 
labour market and the regulation of working conditions. The 
unions still  have little or nothing  to  do with the  State's 
fiscal,  monetary  and  health  policies.  The  battle  against 
inflation  is  still  largely  waged  through  public  sector 
decision-making, in which the unions have little say. 
8. Employers' organisations 
By and large, what goes for the trade unions goes for the 
employers' organisations where the increase in representative 
and  normative  functions  is  concerned.  The difference is 
essentially one of interpretation. 
Another significant difference springs from the economic 
role played by the employers' organisations. They have no 
specific statutory prerogatives in the economic policy sphere 
(in the widest sense),  but they can bring plenty of other 
11resources 
11 into play. 
The phenomenon is too well-documented in the European 
Community to  dwell  on at any length.  Let us just draw 
attention  to  the  important  role  played  in  France by  the 
expert,  supervisory  and  even  regulatory  committees  and 
bodies in which the employers' organisations are represented 
or to which they appoint either representatives of the 'Work 
environments 
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9. The public sector 
The role and prerogatives of the trade unions in the public 
sector are rather original. A word of  warning, however. The 
11public sector,. is scarcely a monolithic entity when it comes 
to labour law and industrial relations. Above all, we need to 
distinguish the civil service and the public sector. The latter 
in turn makes a distinction between bodies and enterprises 
which carry out administrative tasks on behalf of the State or 
public authorities, and those engaged in economic activities 
governed, in principle, by private-sector labour law. 
Trade unions in the civil  service are closely  involved  in 
defming the status of officials. Their institutional presence 
in joint bodies  means  they have a  say  in civil  servants' 
careers and the administration's disciplinary powers.  The 
general status of  civil servants includes the "right to conduct 
preliminary nationwide discussions with the Government in 
relation to pay increases~ In practice, a formula has been 
introduced  in  which  preliminary  talks  are  held  with  the 
unions before the State budget is  drawn up.  The unions' 
position  is  essentially  the same in  bodies and enterprises 
entrusted with administrative functions, with minor adjust-
ments where necessary. 
In  the  public  economy  sector  (often  referred  to  as  the 
industrial and commercial sector), which was considerably 
enlarged by the nationalisation of, in particular, the major 
banks and insurance companies in  1982 and then reduced 
again by privatisation operations in  1986 and again after 
1993, the essential difference, in addition to the common-
law  regulation  of  industrial  relations,  stems  from  the 
presence of  elected staff representatives in the administrative 
and  supervisory structures.  Although  the  unions have  no 
monopoly in presenting electoral lists, trade union sponsors-
hip has been the rule since these participatory mechanisms 
were reformed by the Public Sector Democracy Act of  26 
July 1983. 
Various studies carried out show that the trade unions have 
not really gained much influence through co-administration 
and shared supervision. 
The Act of  13 July 1963 gave the trade unions a special role 
and  added  responsibility  in  the  management  of labour 
disputes.  They alone have  the  power to  call  a  strike,  in 
return for which they must respect a procedure, the mainstay 
of which is advance notice of strikes. Note, however, that 
the scope of this special system is not defined by reference 
to the civil service or to the public sector, but by reference 
to a concept which is wider than the former and different 
from the latter, namely "public service~ 
§4. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE 
ACTORS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
10. Representativeness of the trade unions 
The concept of  representativeness lies at the very heart of the 
French industrial relations system.  The main prerogatives 
(see sections 8 and 10 above) are reserved by law for the 
representative unions. Thus, representativeness means both 
the capacity to respond to the ambitions and represent the 
interests of groups of people, and participation in the social 
order. 
What makes the concept of representativeness a truly crucial 
one, however, is the fact that it accommodates both social 
history and the possibility of future change. 
For  example,  French  trade  union  history  being  one  of 
division, representativeness a  Ia franfaise means pluralist 
rather  than  majority  representation.  By  the  same  token, 
viewed against a backcloth of pluralism and low membership 
figures,  representativeness  in  France is understood to  be 
relative and proportional, not absolute.  All this sounds as 
though  the  French concept of representativeness  is  fairly 
flexible,  but this  is  not entirely  true.  In fact,  historical 
representativeness very much takes pride of place.  A few 
concrete details will help to illustrate what we mean by this. 
At national level, a Government Act (Decision of  8 April 
1948, amended by Decree of  31 March 1966) declared five 
confederations to be representative. Four of these {CGT-FO, 
CFTC,  CFDT) were multi-sectoral while the fifth (cFE-cGC) 
represented a single category. Originally, the sole purpose of 
the Act was to specify which organisations were entitled to 
negotiate collective agreements capable of extension. Today 
however, the Act is regarded as having an absolutely general 
effect. The limited list of  representative organisations applies 
to all the nationwide prerogatives connected with representa-
tiveness. However, since 1968 a new rule which highlights 
the importance of  historical representativeness has gradually 
been applied.  At all  levels other than national level,  i.e. 
branch level, regional level, departmental or local level, and 
company  level,  affiliation to  one of these five  nationally 
representative confederations brings with it representative 
status and the right to exercise prerogatives as important as 
the conclusion of  collective agreements, pre-election negoti-
ations at company level and the presentation of first-round 
ballot  lists,  and  allocation  of resources  for  trade  union 
activity  in  the  company.  Clearly,  representative  status 
stemming  from  affiliation  to  a  confederation  does  not 
necessarily reflect the union's real following at its own level. 
It is also the channel through which support for confederated 
unionism is enhanced. 
The system does not prevent other trade union organisations 
from obtaining representative status at other levels.  Inde-
pendent and  non-confederated unions,  for example,  have 
representative status in the civil service. But it is for these 
unions and these alone that the concept of representativeness 
on pluralist and relative grounds comes into play. Both the 
administration, when it comes to appointing members of a 
committee or a public body, and the judiciary, when it is a 
matter of industrial  elections,  the exercise of trade union 
activities at company  level  or participation  in  collective 
bargaining, will almost invariably want to know whether the 
trade union applying for representative status has a sufficient 
following among the workers it represents compared to other 
unions. 
11. Representativeness of employers' organisations 
Employers' organisations or groupings need not be repre-
sentative for the purpose of bargaining or the conclusion of 
collective agreements.  The scope of agreements will just 
depend on the size of the organisation's membership. 
Representativeness  is,  however,  required  of employers' 
organisations  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  collective FRANCE 
agreements  capable  of extension  (i.e.  multi-sectoral  or 
branch  agreements)  and  for  the  establishment  of public 
advisory or management bodies at national or regional level 
(see sections 12 and 13 below). 
SECTION 2: FUNCTIONS OF JOINT 
OR TRI-PARTITE BODIES 
12. Private joint bodies 
The law and collective bargaining in F ranee have combined 
to give birth to joint institutions at national, local or com-
pany level. 
One such national institution which sprung from collective 
bargaining activity is the management board of the associa-
tion  which  runs  the  national  unemployment  insurance 
system, UNEDIC. Others include certain disciplinary commit-
tees at company or branch level. The Industrial Tribunal, 
which is an industrial court of first instance, is also a joint 
body.  The works council (a statutory institution) in  some 
respects  would  seem  to  be a joint body  in  France,  as  it 
consists of members elected by the workforce and the head 
of the company. However, this is misleading, as it is chaired 
by the head of the company, which means it is not a joint 
institution. It votes only on a very limited range of issues. 
The underlying principle of  joint institutions in France is a 
dual one. On the one hand, the aim is to extend agreement-
based activity in the field of  social protection. 
Where there is an agreement-based system of protection, it 
is  usually  managed  by a joint institution.  However,  as  a 
protection system gradually becomes an instrument of labour 
market management (the unemployment insurance system is 
a case in point), problems are likely to arise in respect of the 
autonomy of the system and  its  management  machinery. 
Experience with the unemployment insurance system over 
the last ten years certainly bears this out. On the other hand, 
joint representation also means that some attempt is made to 
institutionalise the methods for resolving labour disputes, 
based more or less on negotiation. This reasoning explains 
the level  at which,  or the framework  within which, joint 
bodies responsible for setting labour disputes are formed. 
13. Bipartite and tripartite public bodies 
N  eo-corporatism,  or  the  State-manager  syndrome,  the 
proliferation of  public bodies in which representatives of the 
"world of  employed labour" get together with the "world of 
business "is a salient feature of the French system. 
Such bodies are usually tripartite and play an advisory role. 
They include - to name but a few - the Conseil Economique 
et Social (CES),  the planning committees (CGPs),  the Com-
mission nationale de la negociation collective, the Comite-
superieur  de  l'emploi,  and  the  Conseil  national  de  la 
fonnation professionnelle. Their role is an advisory one, and 
the final  decision lies with the government (or administra-
tion). Yet this is really taking too narrow a view. 
In some cases, consultation is compulsory (e.g. the Commis-
sion nationale de la negociation collective in its role con-
cerning the extension of collective agreements or fixing the 
minimum wage), and the expertise of some of these bodies 
carries considerable weight in the social debate. 
95 
Tripartism and consultation are words which do no more 
than describe a general trend. The organisations responsible 
for  managing  the  social  security  system  are  bipartite  in 
structure and their role goes much further than mere consul-
tation. 
However,  it  is  true  that  the  administration exerts strong 
control, and the organisations'  autonomy is further curtailed 
by  the  fact  that  their activities  are  prescribed  by  public 
choice. Public control and the extension thereof are at the 
heart of the major reform started in 1996. Further inroads 
are  made  into  tripartism when  the bodies concerned also 
have important organisational, regulatory, supervisory and 
economic functions.  In the realm of credit, banking, stock 
market operations and consumer protection, to name but a 
few relevant examples, organisations have been set up with 
often extensive regulatory and supervisory powers.  Their 
composition must reflect the dual principle of representation 
of interests  and  technical  competence,  which  does  not 
necessarily ensure union participation in a manner equal to 
that of other interests. 
SECTION 3: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
GOVERNMENT BODIES AS ACTORS AND EMPLOY-
ERS 
14. Public authorities 
There are many ways in which the State can intervene.  It 
draws  up an  economic policy,  of which wages and costs 
form an integral part. It has a policy of regulating working 
conditions through the action it takes to shape the framework 
for negotiation. Last but not least, the State is an employer 
(see section 15 below). 
Despite  the  fact  that  wage-fixing  properly  belongs  to 
collective bargaining and individual negotiation, the public 
authorities often have a decisive impact on the level  and 
structure of pay. Trade union opposition to State control of 
pay has often been said to be stronger in France than in other 
Community countries. 
Yet on two occasions during the past 15 years such opposi-
tion  has  failed  to  stop a direct wage freeze  which results 
suggest was even more successful than anticipated. The State 
also uses the public sector as an instrument of global wages 
policy. The motive force of the public sector is never more 
evident than when private-sector operators refer to govern-
ment decisions to justify their own choices. However, in the 
public sector (i.e. all State-controlled activities), power is 
much more balanced than in the private sector. The rate of 
union membership is higher, as is the level of  job security. 
The major disputes at the end of 1995 started in the public 
sector, but all observers agreed that private-sector workers 
reacted to the actions of public-sector workers with a degree 
of support verging on solidarity. 
Relations  between  the  State  and  the  large  employers' 
organisations and trade unions are complex. The power of 
the State, which is rooted in the strength of its administration 
and the semi-presidential political system, means that even 
if agreement between the organisations sometimes succeeds 
in bringing about a change in government policy or legisla-
tion,  negotiations  are  frequently  spurred  by  government 
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15. The State as employer 
Any assessment of the importance of the State as an em-
ployer depends on whether we consider only the individuals 
employed by the State or public authorities, or whether we 
add to this the vast number of people employed by state-
controlled enterprises. In all, these are generally considered 
to amount to more than one-third of all employed workers. 
In order to  highlight the  role of the State  in  regulating 
economic activity, we should have to gauge the strategic 
weight of certain sectors dominated  by so-called  public-
sector  enterprises  {aeronautics,  electronics,  computers, 
telecommunications, heavy electrical engineering, banking 
and  insurance),  in  the last  three cases  taking account of 
recent privatisation. 
The State's ambitions to act as a role model in its capacity of 
employer go back a long way. Many social innovations have 
originated in the public sector (lato sensu) and, as we have 
seen (see section 14 above), global wage policy generally 
takes its cue from the public sector. 
CHAPTER II: THE INSTRUMENTS OF REGULATION 
16. The sources of regulation: a swnmary 
The French system of regulation of employment relation-
ships and industrial relations still owes much  to the eco-
nomic conditions prevalent at the end of the 19th century. 
This was when the State began to issue rules to  regulate 
employed labour (as opposed to self-employment). 
The fact that regulations of State origin were given pride of 
place no doubt owes as much to political compromise as to 
the needs of  the economy and the workers' desire for greater 
protection. 
Although political compromise is no longer as topical,  its 
impact on French social culture persists - and indeed,  it 
seems difficult even now to envisage any radical questioning 
of the role of the State without causing considerable up-
heaval.  This statement,  although perhaps over-simplistic, 
does  explain  why  deregulation  has  been  much  less  in 
evidence in France, or rather why the State has produced 
rules to bridge the gap wherever it has decided to withdraw 
from central stage. 
State rules relate not only to labour (working hours, working 
conditions), but also to the organisation and representation 
of the interests of the partners in industrial relations. This 
means  that union activity within the company,  collective 
bargaining  and  the  conclusion  and  implementation  of 
collective agreements, and workforce representation in the 
company are the subject of  often very detailed State rules. In 
other words, French legislation is not only protective, but it 
also constitutes in itself a genuine body of industrial rela-
tions law. 
Important though it is, State regulation is not the only source 
of regulation. Collective agreements are an increasingly im-
portant source of  regulation, judging from the number of 
agreements concluded. Custom and the unilateral regulatory 
powers of employers are also regarded as sources of law. 
The  predominance  of  State  regulation  is  nevertheless 
decisive, not only on account of its scale but also because it 
introduces an order between the different sources. Indeed, it 
controls the non-State production of rules by reason of the 
very regulations which it establishes (e.g. the way in which 
the law fixes the rules on collective bargaining and the legal 
effectiveness of  collective agreements), by its recognition of 
certain  sources  (e.g.  custom),  and  sometimes  even  by 
prescribing the use of non-State rules (e.g. the obligation on 
companies to produce in-house regulations). 
SECTION  1: STATE SOURCES 
§1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
17. Principles of constitutional law: 
identification and effectiveness 
The preamble to the 1946 Constitution, to which the present 
Constitution of 1958 refers, contains a number of statements 
which mark a break with a more formal understanding of 
democracy. It describes as "principles particularly relevant 
to our times "the right to work (everyone has both a duty and 
a right to work, without discrimination on grounds of  origin, 
opinions or beliefs), union rights (see section 6 above), the 
right to strike (exercised within the framework of the laws 
regulating it), the right to engage in collective bargaining 
and monitor company management (all workers may partici-
pate via their delegates in determining working conditions 
and running the company), the right to social security, and 
equal treatment for men and women. But the Constitutional 
Council used different formula from the preamble, which 
refers to the fundamental principles recognised by the laws 
of the Republic,  principles which are considered to have 
received  legislative  approval  before  1946,  such  as  the 
principle of freedom of association, to which must be linked 
the principle governing  the right to set up  a  union  (see 
section 6.b above). 
These principles do more than just set the tone. The right to 
work, for example, which of all principles might appear to 
be the least liable to direct legislative effect, was invoked by 
the  Constitutional  Council  to  indicate  the  limits  of an 
attempt at legislative action which, for the sake of work-
sharing, would prevent certain people from gaining access to 
employment (Conseil Constitutionnel, 28 May 1983 and 16 
January 1986). It is also sometimes invoked by the courts, 
one of which for example managed to invalidate a clause of 
a collective agreement which set a maximum age limit on 
recruitment
5
• 
Strictly speaking,  the effectiveness of constitutional prin-
ciples is restricted by the very system set up to keep watch 
over the constitutionality of the law. This system confines 
the role of the Constitutional Council to the prior assessment 
of laws, i.e. before they are promulgated. French law does 
not yet recognise the legal exception of unconstitutionality. 
A law once promulgated is said to be irrefutably in keeping 
with the Constitution. There is regular talk of  changing the 
system to enable individuals to appeal to the Constitutional 
Council (safety checks would be provided) and allow the 
exception of unconstitutionality to be brought into play. But 
nothing has happened as yet. 
To gauge  the effectiveness of these principles,  however, 
more than a simple check on the constitutionality of laws is 
5.  Cour d'Appel Versailles,  11  March 1985; Revue trimestrielle du 
Barreau de  Versailles,  1986, no  1, p 108. FRANCE 
needed.  Administrative and  legal  courts not infrequently 
refer  to  constitutional  principles.  The  former  check  the 
legality of regulatory activity, the latter vet private initiat-
ives. For example, the Council of  State has made it clear that 
no statutory power may prevent foreign workers from living 
in France with their families, and it has done this by refer-
ring to a constitutional principle, namely the right to lead a 
normal family  life
6
•  Since then,  the Council of State has 
agreed to apply various provisions of the European Conven-
tion on the protection of  human rights, including Article 8. 
Another example: the Cour de cassation, in view of consti-
tutional recognition of the right to strike,  has  ruled that 
collective agreements which regulate and therefore limit it, 
are null and void
7
• While not nearly as animated as in other 
Community countries such as Spain or Italy, the constituti-
onal debate in F ranee on the right to work has gone beyond 
academic argument. 
It is easy to see that French reluctance to pass legislation on 
the right to strike may  well  be connected with a  fear  of 
constitutional censure. 
§2. LEGISLATION AND OTHER 
STATE OR PUBLIC SOURCES 
18. Legislation - parliamentary competence 
In France, statutory sources remain pre-eminent. That is not 
to say that the social partners, e.g. trade unions or employ-
ers'  organisations,  play  a  secondary  role.  Bargaining  is 
playing an increasing (and more or less formalised) role in 
the legislative process (see section 7 above). 
The Constitution for its part seeks to define what,  in the 
State's normative action, falls within legislative (parliamen-
tary) competence, and what is part of  regulatory competence. 
According to Article 34 of the Constitution, it is up to the 
law to lay down rules concerning the fundamental principles 
of labour law,  union law  and  social  security  legislation. 
Other  rules  come  under  the  aegis  of regulatory  power. 
Establishing a dividing line has without doubt reduced the 
role of  legislation, as intended. However, the actual dividing 
line is difficult to trace (the concept of Jundamental prin-
ciple nbeing rather flexible), and this is one of the tasks of 
the Constitutional Council,  although  its  decisions do not 
contain any clear guidelines in this respect. 
Three further points must be borne in mind.  First of all, 
even if the rules regarding fundamental principles fall within 
parliamentary competence, this does not mean that legisla-
tion will not be both very detailed and highly diversified. 
The law includes special  measures for certain sectors and 
categories of workers, provides for a complex typology of 
the different types of  employment contract and working time 
arrangements,  and  uses  many  different  workforce  size 
categories (several hundred) to modulate workers' rights and 
guarantees, the resources granted to trade unions and, more 
generally, employers' obligations. 
Secondly, most State, legislative and regulatory provisions 
are incorporated in the Code du Travail (Labour Code) to 
which trade unions and employers' organisations alike attach 
considerable  symbolic  value.  The former  regard  it  as  a 
6.  Conseil d'Etat, 8 December 1978, arm, Droit social, 1979-57. 
7.  Cass. Soc. 7 June 1995: Droit social, 1996, 37. 
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system for protecting workers,  whereas the latter have at 
times denounced it for being too rigid. Both are correct to 
some extent. 
The code is non-exhaustive compilation of texts. Many State 
provisions on employment relationships are missing (laws on 
employees' inventions or on ailing industries, texts from the 
Civil Aviation Code, the Rural Code, the Maritime Labour 
Code,  etc),  but these  gaps  do not prevent the  Code  du 
Travail from being regarded as the bible of rules on paid 
employment. 
The third point is that the total sum of French legislative 
rules ~;pecific to employment relationships (whether codified 
or not) can hardly be regarded as self-sufficient. Employers' 
organisations, trade unions and indeed experts in labour law 
have a tendency to affirm the autonomy of the special rules 
which make up that branch of law called labour law. How-
ever, the Code du Travail and the courts still refer to civil 
law,  particularly  where  contractual  and  non-contractual 
obligations are concerned.  The exact impact of civil-law 
rules  and  principles  is  not easy  to  define,  but the  links 
between civil law and labour law of State origin are not far 
removed from those existing between general and specific 
law. 
19. No nonnative competence 
for regions and departments 
The decentralisation movement which got under way in 1982 
has not affected  the sources of labour law,  or rather the 
levels at  which  labour law  is  formed.  Nevertheless,  the 
regions  and  departments  did  acquire new powers in  two 
areas likely  to  affect labour law:  vocational  training and 
social action and assistance. 
Yet decentralised normative competence is still weak in these 
areas,  as  the  basic  principles  of legislative  competence 
remain  unchanged  (see  section  18  above)  and  because 
existing State legislation has been upheld despite the transfer 
of competence. 
20. Regulatory power: limitations and trends 
The division of power between legislation and regulation, in 
accordance with the Constitution (see section 18 above), has 
enhanced the role of regulation, though it remains secondary 
to legislation. 
Two trends highlight the importance of regulatory powers 
(i.e. the regulatory power exercised by the Prime Minister 
by means of  decrees, or special regulatory powers exercised 
through ministerial or prefectural decree). The first of these 
dates back a long way, to when the legislative order made 
provision for different procedures for administrative inter-
vention. The most classic example of this is the ministerial 
decree extending  collective agreements,  which gives  the 
Minister of Labour a means of control over collective bar-
gaining. There are also, however, enabling regulations for 
setting up specific regimes to govern the duration of working 
time or for identifying the sectors in which jobs are usually 
subject to fixed-term contracts, not forgetting authorisation 
procedures,  usually to permit individual initiatives on the 
part of employers (in this case, the administrative act does 
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which do not comply with the statutory model (e.g. Sunday 
opening hours). These government measures usually involve 
the representative organisations (see section 7 above) in the 
decision-making process. 
The second trend originates from the State's selective inter-
vention on the labour market. State intervention is first of all 
financial  and  is  also  subject to  enabling  legislation of a 
budgetary nature. However, the generosity of this enabling 
legislation leaves plenty of  regulatory power for the adminis-
tration. 
The main thrust of labour policy, notably where it relates to 
so-called  "social  policy for  coping  with  unemployment 
11 
(which encourages early retirement for older workers and, 
through grants and reductions in costs, the recruitment of 
unemployed young people),  conforms  to  this  model  and 
more money is being spent on it. 
In 1993 spending in this field, not counting public financing 
of  unemployment benefits, rose to more than FRF 165 billion 
(as against FRF 120 billion in 1986), and a debate began on 
the reorganisation of  these "employment  aids~ As part of this 
employment policy, the exercise of regulatory power in the 
shape of  decrees and orders is cut back in favour of  a process 
which uses memoranda and internal procedures, a system 
which allows for both precision and flexibility and recog-
nises (as well as disciplines) the powers of discretion. This 
has  produced  an  important  though  somewhat  unstable 
combination: an multi-sectoral collective agreement which 
draws  on  this  type  of State  intervention  or  budgetary 
enabling legislation, and a range of administrative rules to 
provide organisation and give direction. 
SECTION 2: SOURCES OF AGREEMENT 
21. Unifonnity and variety of collective agreements 
A special feature of the French system is that the collective 
agreement  has  legal  status.  The  collective  agreement  is 
State-regulated first, a source of law second. It is a highly 
effective instrument in law (see section 13 below), yet sub-
ject to a number of  basic legal rules, the first of which is that 
the representative trade unions have a monopoly to negotiate 
and conclude agreements which are then legally effective. 
There is, however, a new trend, the implications of which 
are not yet clear. An multi-sectoral agreement signed on 31 
October  1995  (see section 24 below),  which needs  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  law  (under  discussion),  states  that 
collective bargaining in undertakings With  no trade union 
representation may be carried out by elected representatives, 
but qualifies this dispensation from trade union monopoly by 
imposing supervision by a joint committee, in principle at 
branch level. This trend has deeply divided the confedera-
tions (see section 4 above). 
The fact that the collective agreement has legal status raises 
two  questions:  one  concerns  the  importance  attached  to 
collective bargaining, which takes places outside the legal 
framework,  the  other  the  effectiveness  of  agreements 
concluded outside this framework. 
In practice, undertaking-level bargaining with elected work-
force  representatives  (works council  and workforce dele-
gates) is extremely widespread, even though such representa-
tives have no legal power to negotiate agreements producing 
the  same  effects  as  'trade  union 
11  agreements.  Yet  the 
effectiveness  of these  so-called  "atypical» agreements  is 
undeniable. When their legal effect is questioned, the courts 
will not put them on a legal par with trade union agreements, 
yet  they  do  not hesitate  to  ensure  their implementation, 
regarding them as unilateral commitments on the part of the 
employer or as common law agreements whose provisions 
have been accepted by employees. The trend described above 
should lead to recognition, subject to certain conditions, of 
elected  representatives'  ability  to  conclude  collective 
agreements. 
The law itself now distinguishes between collective agree-
ments ("conventions j  intended to regulate employment and 
working  conditions  and  social  aspects  as  a  whole,  and 
specific collective agreements ("accords j  covering just one 
or more of these aspects  (Article L  132 of the  Code du 
Travail).  However, in practice this distinction means little. 
While the status of the specific agreement is established by 
law, the level at which bargaining takes place is a matter for 
collective  autonomy.  The social  partners usually  step  in 
here, at least with regard to working time (see section 24 
below).  There are  in  fact  three  main  levels of collective 
bargaining: branch level (where bargaining may be depart-
mental, regional or national), a format largely rooted in the 
way the employers' organisations are constituted (see section 
3 above), multi-sectoral level and undertaking (or establish-
ment) level. 
By the same token, specific collective agreements themselves 
can be differentiated according to their status (specific agree-
ments as defined by  law,  and other specific agreements), 
their content (agreement or contract) and the level at which 
they are negotiated. This study will only deal with collective 
agreements and specific agreements as defined by the law. 
22. Relationship between the law 
and collective bargaining 
The link between the law and collective bargaining should be 
studied first in a formal, then in a dynamic perspective. 
(a)  To define thefonnal relationship, three questions must 
be answered. First of  all, is there an area where the law 
holds exclusive sway and permits no negotiation? This 
question was examined in a now famous opinion of the 
Council of  State
8
,  which still serves as a reference. 
In principle, no agreement can alter imperative provi-
sions or principles extending beyond the confines of 
labour law (powers of public officers, fixing of penal 
charges,  restrictive legislation on index-linking, etc). 
The concept of "absolute law and order" legislation not 
liable to change by an  agreement has,  however,  lost 
some of its explanatory quality as centralised legislative 
negotiation  has  gathered  momentum  (see  section  7 
above).  This  has  sometimes  encouraged  the  social 
protagonists to agree on legislative change when in fact 
they were in no legal position to do so (e.g. the multi-
sectoral agreement of 20 October 1986 on dismissal 
procedures, which lays down the powers of the employ-
ment administration), changes subsequently endorsed 
by Parliament. Secondly, is there an area which is the 
8.  Opinion of22 March 1973: Social lAw 1973.514. FRANCE 
exclusive  prerogative  of collective  bargaining,  not 
subject to the law? This question has never really been 
properly  addressed  in  France,  though  it  might have 
been when the law froze the effects of collective agree-
ments on wage levels (in 1977 and 1982). But there 
appears to be an implicit consensus that the law can do 
anything  (i.e.  can  intervene  wherever  it  sees  fit). 
Finally, what happens when the law and negotiation 
clash in areas where they both play a role? 
The principle in France is that the rule most  favourable 
to employees should take precedence (Article L.  132-4 
of the Code du  Travail).  Yet this principle has been 
fraying slightly at the edges since 1982, in what is still 
a  firmly  restricted area:  the organisation of working 
time. The law itself recognises that a collective agree-
ment may depart from the statutory model without the 
employees necessarily gaining any advantage from this. 
These so-called overriding agreements are subject to 
special  rules  and  have met with a  certain degree of 
success. They do constitute a break with convention, 
but it is necessary to consider the nature of the fields 
they cover; since 1936 working time in F ranee had been 
the subject of detailed State rules.  The procedure of 
overriding agreements reflects the desire for diversifica-
tion in working time arrangements, subject to certain 
conditions. The aim behind such diversification in some 
cases is to safeguard and create jobs, in others to boost 
the competitiveness of undertakings. 
(b)  The dynamic relationship between the law and collec-
tive  bargaining  is  fairly  clear.  The  law  appears  to 
restrict collective bargaining by forbidding any change 
in "absolute law and order"  rules and by confining the 
right to  conclude collective agreements producing a 
general effect to representative trade unions.  In fact, 
these apparent restrictions have little or no impact on 
the actual bargaining itself. On the contrary, the French 
system seems  geared  to  encouraging and  promoting 
collective bargaining. 
There are a variety of ways in which French legislation 
promotes collective bargaining. It encourages negoti-
ators  by  backing  the  representative  trade  union 
organisations,  and  promotes  negotiation  itself  by 
making it a legal duty to negotiate on certain issues. 
Chief among  these,  at company  level,  are effective 
wages and working time negotiated annually (Article 
L.  132-27 of the Code du Travail) and at branch level, 
minimum wages  (annually)  and  grading  (every  five 
years), Article L.  132-12 of the Code du Travail). 
23. Implementation and effect of collective agreements 
Collective agreements have legal status, which means their 
legal effects are the same as those of the law. To be effec-
tive, they must be signed by one representative trade union. 
This stipulation actually gives some trade unions consider-
able power regardless of their actual  position in the area 
covered by the negotiations. This is because French union-
ism is  pluralistic,  trade union  membership  is  low,  and a 
union may be regarded as representative by the simple fact 
of being affiliated to an organisation regarded as representa-
tive at national level. 
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So what exactly is the legal effect of a collective agreement? 
In fact it is two-dimensional: it ranges in scope and density. 
As  regards scope,  the collective agreement applies to all 
workers in the companies covered by the agreement, whether 
they belong to a trade union or not. This is what is known as 
a general or erg  a omnes effect. Collective agreements must 
state which undertakings are covered, whereas this obviously 
is not necessary in the case of undertaking-level agreements. 
The scope of branch-level agreements is defined partly by 
membership of  one of  the signatory employers' organisations 
and  partly through the company's (main) activity,  which 
places it in the area of activity covered by the agreement. 
These two conditions are as a rule cumulative. All the same, 
the first condition, membership of a signatory organisation, 
is not necessary where the agreement is the subject of an 
extension  order by  the  Minister  of Labour.  As  regards 
density, collective agreements are remarkably effective since 
the law grants automatic and imperative effect. They need 
not be incorporated into individual employment contracts 
and their provisions take undisputed precedence over any 
contractual  stipulations less favourable to the worker.  No 
derogations are allowed. 
This  system,  which  evolved  over  the  years  and  was 
enshrined in its current form in an Act passed in 1950 and 
updated in  1971  and 1982, incurs little serious hostility on 
the part of either employers or trade unions, so that it is safe 
to regard it as one of the cornerstones of French law. Only 
the Confederation de l 'encadrement (see Section 4 above) 
has recently questioned the virtues of this structure. 
24. Centralisation and decentralisation 
in collective bargaining 
(a)  Collective  bargaining  has  traditionally  taken  place 
mostly at occupational branch level.  This is due to a 
wide variety of structural and strategic factors.  These 
include the way in which employers' organisations and 
trade  union  federations  used  to  be  constituted,  the 
employers' interest in establishing minimum conditions 
for competitiveness between businesses, and the work-
ers' interest in forging solidarity, etc. However, in the 
1970s this level of bargaining looked set to lose ground 
to centralised multi-sectoral bargaining and company-
level negotiation. 
A look at the figures suggests that in the end this did 
not happen.  15  basic collective agreements were con-
cluded in  1995 (compared with 13  in  1994), together 
with  14  specific agreements  (41  in  1994) and  939 
supplementary or amending agreements (880 in 1994  )
9
• 
However, an analysis of the sectors or branches con-
cerned and the contents of agreements suggests that not 
too much should be read into these figures. For exam-
ple, the new collective agreements cover small sectors 
or update existing agreements. Specific agreements (on 
one or several topics) are relatively few in number. The 
number of  supplementary agreements above all reflects 
the desire of employers' federations to update existing 
agreements. 
(b)  Company-level bargaining has blossomed although not 
in an entirely linear manner (8 550 agreements regis-
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tered with the Ministry of Labour in  1995 as against 
7  450  in  1994,  excluding  agreements  on  financial 
participation by workers).  But there are some fairly 
considerable disparities, as only 40% of these agree-
ments have been concluded in industry and only 29% in 
the tertiary sector, which has more employees. Pay and 
working hours are by far the most common subjects of 
negotiation. 
(c)  Multi-sectoral negotiation plays a role which is now 
becoming essential.  It is not the number of specific 
agreements signed which is the most significant aspect 
(five agreements in 1995 compared with two in 1994, 
37 supplementary agreements in 1995 as against 61  in 
1994}, but rather it is their content and scope which 
count. Two of the agreements signed in  1995  (both 
dated 31  October) should be singled out here. 
The subject of  the first is collective bargaining itself. Its 
primary aim is to define the roles of the different levels. 
Extensive functions are attributed to branch negotia-
tions,  but  a  large  measure  of autonomy  is  left  to 
undertaking-level negotiations. It is the branch which is 
required  to  organise  representation  of workers  em-
ployed  by  small  and  medium-sized  businesses.  The 
logical extension of these arrangements, with a certain 
degree of control by the branch organisations, will be 
collective bargaining with elected  representatives  in 
undertakings  with  no  trade  unions  (see  section  21 
above). 
The subject of  the second agreement is employment and 
the reorganisation of working time. The principal aim 
is to employ bargaining to establish rules on working 
time which combine the interests of competitiveness 
with  the  maintaining  or  increasing  of employment 
levels. This multi-sectoral agreement states that negotia-
tions should be held in all branches, and specifies time 
limits. Since July 1986 12 branch agreements have been 
concluded in a sample of 128 branches (out of the 330 
listed by the Ministry of  Labour), without employment 
as such normally being an explicit subject. 
(d)  Clearly, the relationship between the levels of negotia-
tion is a major concern of the large organisations. The 
agreement of31 October 1995 bears witness to this. But 
their desire to consolidate the role of branch negotia-
tion, particularly in dealing with employment problems 
linked to the organisation and duration of work, en-
counters many obstacles. In any event, multi-sectoral 
bargaining causes two concerns for the large organisa-
tions  (or at least  some of them);  it  is  necessary  to 
separate collective bargaining and follow-up action, and 
to make problems of work organisation the focal point. 
25. Future trends 
The forecasts established nearly ten years ago remain valid. 
First  of all,  the  possibilities  of adapting  the  collective 
bargaining system are diverse, which testifies to its capacity 
to adapt,  or its  relative versatility.  Secondly,  the  fringe 
system is evolving towards a certain separation of collective 
bargaining or, at least, a desire expressed by certain organi-
sations to limit the ascendancy of the law. 
In fact, the continuing pressure of unemployment on wage 
trends does not help fortify branch-level bargaining. On the 
contrary,  it encourages undertaking-level  autonomy.  The 
new aspect, in which there is still some uncertainty, lies in 
the efforts made by the large organisations to construct a 
bargaining space around problems of  work organisation and 
employment. This space is unsuited to branch-level bargain-
ing, as it is difficult to develop new models. Some employ-
ers' organisations attempt and reach agreements on greater 
working time flexibility, possibly with compensation in the 
form of shorter working hours. However, in the context of 
high unemployment, the branch barely manages to be the 
negotiating level at which rules on the sharing of productiv-
ity gains are laid down. 
Obstacles to developments are the resistance of workers to 
the growing sacrifices demanded of them and of the State's 
general role as protector of groups hit by unemployment and 
structural changes. 
SECTION 3: THE ROLE  OF JUDGES 
26. Which judges? 
To begin with, it should be borne in mind that the machinery 
for resolving  '~odal"disputes in France is highly dispersed. 
This dispersal  is  manifest in  the judiciary,  which comes 
under the overall regulatory control of the Cour de cassa-
tion,  or  Supreme  Court.  Individual  labour  disputes  are 
settled by the Conseils de prud  'hommes  (industrial tribu-
nals), which are joint bodies consisting of equal numbers of 
members elected by workers and employers, whose decisions 
can be referred to the Courts of Appeal ( Cours d' appel} 
made up of professional judges. But disputes over in-house 
workforce elections are brought before a professional judge 
in  the district court (tribunal  d 'instance},  while disputes 
between companies and trade unions, particularly where they 
concern collective agreements, fall within the competence of 
the regional court (tribunal de grande instance}, also made 
up of professional judges. Prosecutions for infringing rules 
carrying legal penalties are common, and are also brought in 
the regional court. 
There is also dispersal between the judiciary and the admin-
istrative orders.  Since the administration often has to take 
action on matters concerning industrial relations and employ-
ment relationships,  these are regulated by a vast array of 
administrative acts, any disputes on which have to be settled 
by  administrative  judges  (administrative  tribunals  and 
Council of  State). 
Constitutional case law must be mentioned with caution, 
since the Constitutional Council (see Section 17 above) is 
strictly a supervisory authority which monitors legislative 
activity. 
27. Legal activity and production of rules 
Case law is a thriving sector in France. But what exactly do 
we mean by case law? 
There is no need for a precedent in order to refer a matter to 
court.  Neither the law nor any self-imposed principle of 
justice requires the judges themselves to follow their own 
earlier rulings. All the same, the practice of overturning case FRANCE 
law - changing the content of legal opinions - is not devoid 
of importance. 
Yet there are a number of reasons why jurisdiction is widely 
acknowledged  as  a  source of regulation.  For one thing, 
judges want their decisions to be coherent. For another, the 
regulatory, unifying function of the Supreme Court and the 
Council of  State is well-developed and is given added weight 
by the publication of selected examples of their rulings in 
official anthologies. 
Finally, and indeed above all,  the legal profession  itself 
(judges,  lawyers,  barristers,  company  and  trade  union 
solicitors),  by  commenting  on  judges'  rulings  and  by 
systematically and rhetorically referring to their decisions, 
acknowledges that judges hand down decisions which help 
to create rules. The fact that students of labour law are made 
to study judges' rulings extensively and the very way in 
which specialist literature is set out are also linked to the role 
of case law in France. 
Judges' influence is, however, restricted by the existence of 
a close-webbed network of State regulations and contractual 
rules. 
But these rules are often couched in terms that leave them 
open to interpretation. The proliferation of standards and 
framework-concepts (a real and serious cause of dismissals, 
for example) bears witness to this. Above all, this is one of 
the channels  most commonly  employed  in  the judge-led 
production of rules. 
SECTION 4: CUSTOM AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
POWER TO REGULATE 
28. Custom as a source of regulation 
Custom is widely recognised as a source of regulation; the 
law refers to it for example in matters connected with giving 
notice. Judges regard custom as a source, and it is they who 
have defined the conditions for identifying customs and their 
legal framework, which is closely related to that for col-
lective agreements. 
There are some instances of multi-sectoral custom (for exam-
ple, the three-month period of notice for white-collar stafO, 
but generally speaking the scope of custom is restricted to 
the undertaking, establishment or workshop. It is especially 
relevant when it comes to fixing wages and wage increases, 
to the organisation of working time, and to the exercise of 
union activities by the undertaking's workforce representa-
tives. The  judges' definition of custom is a habitual practice 
which is endorsed by the employer. 
29. Entrepreneurial power to regulate 
Employers unilaterally decided many of the rules in force at 
undertaking level, indeed they are sometimes required to do 
so by the law. Internal regulations are a case in point. These 
constitute the undertaking's disciplinary charter (and must 
include the health and safety rules in force). 
In  addition  to  the  internal  regulations,  a  more  or  less 
loosely-framed set of unilateral rules deals with wages, the 
payment of bonuses, worker mobility and suchlike. When 
called upon to intervene, either by the employer or by one or 
more workers wishing to restrict the discretionary nature of 
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the employer's prerogatives, judges will acknowledge that 
they are effective, pronouncing them, as the case might be, 
to  be part of employment contracts or of the  unilateral 
commitments made by the employer. 
SECTION 5: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
30. The importance of international sources 
and their effect in the domestic order 
Globally speaking, rules laid down by international, multi-
lateral  and  bilateral  agreements  in  force  in  France  are 
respected. This does not mean of course that their interpre-
tation is always straightforward or that there are never any 
disputes over implementation, though this is probably less 
true  of Community  rules  arising  from  the  Treaties  or 
secondary legislation. 
In  fact,  international  rules  can be divided into different 
categories according to their purpose. If  they have domestic 
conditions in view and if they seek to align or harmonise 
State legislation, then French labour legislation very rarely 
clashes with them. But where rules arising from international 
sources seek to regulate international aspects (for example 
the position of immigrant workers and their families), they 
are  far  more  likely  to  come  into  conflict  with  French 
domestic law. In such cases the legal effect of international 
agreements in the domestic order has been questioned. 
The effect of international agreements is regulated by Article 
55 of the Constitution which stipulates that "properly ratified 
or approved treaties or agreements upon publication  take 
precedence over the relevant domestic laws, provided each 
agreement or treaty is implemented by the other  party~ The 
final part of the text, which imposes a condition - reciproc-
ity - is an area of difficulty. 
According to one much-followed school of thought
10 and the 
case law of the Supreme  Court  (First civil chamber,  not 
followed in this by the other chambers)
11
,  only the govern-
ment can invoke lack of reciprocity. 
At the heart of the debate is the conflict between a treaty and 
a law, which may sometimes be settled by conciliation; the 
law after all has to make provision for the situations targeted 
by the treaty. However, this is not always the case, and the 
scope of  Article 55 of the Constitution has long been a bone 
of contention. 
The Conseil d'Etat (Supreme Administrative Court), after 
previously referring to an earlier law on a treaty
12,  recently 
handed down a ruling which has attracted much attention
13 
and in which it abandons this stand and falls into line with 
the Supreme Court, which guarantees priority application of 
the treaty
14
• 
10.  SeeP. LEGARDE, lA condition de reciprocite dans l'application des 
traites  internationaux: son  appreciation par le juge interne,  in: 
Revue critique de droit international prive, 1975.25. 
11.  See: Cass.  civ.  6 March  1984, in: Journal de droit international, 
1984.859, Revue critique de droit international prive, 1985.109. 
12.  See:  Conseil d'Etat, 22 October 1979:  in: Actualite juridique de 
droit administratif, 1980.39, 30 April 1982, Dalloz 1983;48. 
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However, this does not mean that the Conseil d'Etat has 
modifying its stand on the relationship between a directive 
and a law. 
In another ruling which  made  many  waves,  the  Conseil 
d'Etat denied the right of a citizen of another EC Member 
State to invoke a directive (in this case the so-called  'faw 
and order"' directive of25 February 1964, as interpreted by 
the Court of  Justice) against a law15,  even though the Court 
of  Justice bad ruled that at least some clauses of this particu-
lar directive bad statutory force.  However, without abandon-
ing its position, The Conseil d'Etat ensures that the adminis-
trative authorities comply with Community directives. Thus 
it ruled
16 that those authorities, after expiry of the time-limit 
set for transposition of  a directive, cannot continue to remain 
contrary regulations or adopt new, conflicting regulations
17
• 
SECTION 6: THE HIERARCHY OF SOURCES 
IN A  DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
31. Hierarchy of sources 
Sources are multiple, yet they obey an order imposed by the 
State.  The law expressly  stipulates  that  agreement-based 
sources must respect the minimum requirements of State 
regulation.  Modifications  by  collective  agreement  are 
possible, save where the State rules are of the "absolute law 
and order" variety (see section 22 above), and provided the 
changes are more favourable to the worker. The principle of 
law and order, known in France as  ~ocial  public order"'has 
both a hierarchy and ways of combining with others. Judges 
have extended its application to other sources and a hierar-
chical structure is beginning to emerge: the law, collective 
agreements,  custom,  unilateral  regulatory  powers of the 
employer.  Any combination between  these  sources  must 
obey the principle of most favourable treatment of workers. 
This hierarchical structure is not formally breached if the 
collective agreement or custom is enabled by the law to set 
rules. It is breached however, when the collective agreement 
is empowered by the law to set aside a State rule without the 
outcome necessarily being favourable to the workers. Such 
is  the  case  with  overriding  agreements  (see  section 
22(a)  above).  The  thing  to  remember  is  that  the  most 
favourable treatment principle is in this instance suspended 
by the law itself. In any event, overriding agreements raise 
one major question: how to monitor their proliferation. Only 
two aspects of this question have been addressed so far. 
Should overriding agreements be recognised at all levels  -
branch and company? Ought not the negotiating parties to be 
more representative than they are now? In order to make 
essential derogations relating to the organisation of working-
time, an Act of  28 February 1986 stipulated that a specific 
branch-level agreement had to be  extended by ministerial 
order. A later Ad (19June 1987) removed this requirement, 
putting undertaking-level agreements on a par with branch-
level agreements in this respect. 
As to whether negotiating parties should be more representa-
tive, this question has so far given rise, in undertaking-level 
15.  Conseil d'Etat, 22 December 1978, Dalloz, 1979.156. 
16.  Conseil d'Etat, 3 February 1989,  in: Actualite juridique de droit 
administratif, 1989.387. 
17.  Conseil d'Etat, 28 February 1992, in: Actualitejuridique de droit 
administratif, 1993.141 . 
bargaining, to a  rather delicate and little-used mechanism 
which  gives  the most  representative  trade  unions  (those 
having gained over 50% of the votes cast in the most recent 
union elections in the company) the right of opposition. The 
principle of  majority has thus become established, though in 
terms of opposition to the enforcement of a rule rather than 
its making. 
32. Sources in a dynamic perspective, 
and the employment relationship 
Legislation has been taking more of a  back seat in recent 
years. This has not resulted in fewer State rules but rather in 
State rules of a different order. This development has been 
especially  marked in  the regulation of working  time and 
forms  of employment.  State  law has  perceptibly,  if only 
partially, changed its stand on this issue. Rather than opting 
for (relative) standardisation of labour relations, the State 
has preferred to encourage diversity to the point of incorpo-
rating it into its own machinery. It has explored three main 
avenues  which  highlight  the  dynamic  development  of 
sources. One such avenue has been to limit, through legisla-
tion,  the  ascendancy  of labour law;  this  new attitude is 
reflected in policies on the 
11social treatment» of  unemploy-
ment, with in-house training formulae which largely fall 
outside the realm of labour law. This approach is less often 
used  today.  Another avenue has been State regulation of 
certain types of  employment (temporary employment, fixed-
term contracts, part-time contracts, seasonal or intermittent 
work recently  replaced  by the 
11annualised part-time for-
mula j. This means denser State regulation, but in a different 
direction,  since  it  offers  new options  under appropriate 
supervision. Finally, the law now allows specific collective 
agreements (which must be concluded according to well-
defined  rules)  to organise the diversification of working 
time, using the machinery of ''overriding »agreements. Such 
flexibility  as  this  supposes is  very much  flexibility a la 
fram;aise,  with  more  rather  than  less  State  regulation. 
Clearly,  it  is  hard  to  get away  from  the concept of the 
preeminence of the law, which, even as it stimulates rather 
than blocks diversity, must still keep a close watch on future 
development. 
CHAPTER Ill: DISPUTES 
SECTION  1  : THE DIFFERENT KINDS 
OF STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS 
33. Strikes 
The French legal order first recognised the right to strike in 
1946. The preamble to the Constitution,  to which the present 
Constitution of  1958 refers, stipulates that 'the right to strike 
is exercised within the framework of  the laws which regulate 
it': thereby indicating that the law would have the monopoly 
in strike regulation. Legislative action has been confined to 
defining the  impact of strikes on  individual  contracts of 
employment (Article L. 521-1 of the Code du Travail) and 
establishing procedures and a set of substantial rules govern-
ing strikes in the public service sector (amended Ad of  31 
July 1963, included in Articles L.  521-2 et seq.  of the Code 
du Travail). 
The legal framework of the right to strike is therefore in the 
main supplied by case law. The case law definition of what FRANCE 
constitutes a strike permits an initial legal classification of 
the type of  strike: a strike is a concerted stoppage of work in 
support  of work-related  claims.  The  right  to  strike  is 
therefore detennined by the conditions in which the strike is 
initiated and by its objective. 
On the circumstances in which a strike is initiated, there has 
to be a stoppage of  work (thereby excluding working-to-rule 
and go-slows), and the stoppage has to be a concerted act, 
which means minority strikes are authorised but not individ-
ual strikes, at least not in principle, unless they are part of a 
general strike movement. The objective of the stoppage must 
be to support work  -related claims,  which means  that ex-
tended  political  strikes  in  the  strict  sense  are  excluded. 
However,  after some hesitation,  the Supreme  Court has 
decided that it is not the task of  judges to assess the content 
of  claims or whether they are justified. A strike is conceived 
as an instrument of  pressure, a piece of bargaining machin-
ery. Nor does French law refuse to see a strike as a means of 
expression. 
But what is  really  important  is  the comparative  latitude 
enjoyed by workers regarding the right to strike. Strikes may 
be nationwide, or they may be confined to a single branch, 
undertaking or factory. They may take place anywhere. They 
may be token strikes, sustained strikes, repeated strikes, and 
strategies may vary endlessly.  No prior notice is required 
except in the public sector. Provided the objective is work-
related -which is difficult for judges to monitor precisely -
all  manner of quantitative  or qualitative  claims  may  be 
included, regardless of whether or not they are connected 
with collective agreements. 
The protagonists are very attached to this legal concept of 
strikes. Although there is the occasional call for more State 
regulation,  the  proposals  put  forward  so  far  have  been 
vague, with only minority backing. 
34. Trends 
Global statistics need to be handled with care. The Ministry 
of  Labour tries to monitor the number of strike days (indi-
vidual working days lost), but there are many other instru-
ments of  industrial action for which no statistics are available 
at all. Moreover, where they do exist, they are compiled on 
the basis of records kept by labour inspectors. 
If  we accept this way of measuring the incidence of indus-
trial action, four basic facts emerge. 
(a)  From 1977 to 1986, measured in tenns of the number 
of individual  days  lost,  the  incidence  of industrial 
action  fell  sharply.  The  number  of stoppages,  the 
number of  workers involved and the length of stoppages 
all declined. This trend underwent an abrupt turnabout 
in  1987  and  1988,  with a  resurgence of protracted, 
hardcore strikes. 
Another fall  was  then  followed  as  from  1992  with 
another increase in conflicts. The end of 1995 saw what 
is already being referred to as a real "social spasm'~ 
The triggering factor was the government's announce-
ment of far-reaching social security refonns, giving rise 
to considerable discontent.  Over a one-month period 
demonstration  followed  demonstration,  and  many 
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public  companies  and  administrations  were  hit  by 
strikes. A knee-jerk reaction from workers with good 
jobs and  favourable  conditions?  Or a  deep  crisis of 
confidence? Interpretations vary. What is clear at the 
moment is the consideration achieved by certain trade 
union organisations. It was also a whole generation's 
first experience of social crisis. 
(b)  A substantial proportion of strikes are in the industrial 
sector, where the number of  jobs is in decline but which 
is still the traditional stage for overt conflict, and in the 
public sector. 
(c)  Statistics attempt to classify strike action according to 
motive.  From 1977 to  1986, the number of disputes 
over jobs gradually caught up with pay disputes. But 
between 1987 and 1991, pay disputes returned to their 
traditional position in centre-stage. This alternating of 
reasons has continued since (jobs in  1992-93, pay in 
1994). The social crisis at the end of 1995 showed the 
futility of  such classification, in that the movement was 
the result of an accumulation of grievances. 
(d)  Not all disputes stem from union activity. Almost one 
in five owes nothing to union initiative, while the role 
played by the different trade unions varies considerably. 
The CGT is the most likely to be involved. Only about 
a  quarter of all strikes involve more than one trade 
union. The action at the end of 1995 gave the organisa-
tions back their prominent role, especially in tenns of 
their decentralised structures. 
The economic situation is again very tight, after years 
of  wage austerity, particularly in the non-market public 
sector. Today's political economy is marked by scan-
dals, large and small.  And the last elections promised 
change.  All  these  factors  have led  to  a  situation in 
which industrial relations seem to be rediscovering a 
taste for conflict. 
Yet conflict comes in many guises. Disputes over pay 
are beginning to lose ground to other disputes over the 
safeguarding or recognition of occupational identities. 
Not to mention movements which denounce the impo-
tence of governments and emphasise the lack of credi-
bility in their actions and promises. 
35. Lock-outs 
French law does not recognise the lock-out as such. Nor do 
the employers'  organisations seem anxious to secure any 
legal recognition for it.  It is true that under French law, or 
case law as here, the employer's powers of organisation in 
the event of a  strike remain  intact,  which means that  in 
practice he has plenty of scope for palliative action, such as 
moving  production  to  another site,  subcontracting work, 
using non-strikers, etc. 
It  is  also  true  that  French  trade  unions  do  not  provide 
financial support for strikers, so employers are not tempted 
to prolong a dispute in the hope of bringing the unions to 
their financial knees. In practice, the reason why employers 
sometimes  decide to  shut up  shop,  or close part of their 
operations, is to avoid having to continue paying non-stri-
kers.  In  other words,  lock-outs  in  France will  rarely be 
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most  usual  reason  is  simply  to  stop  production  for  the 
duration of the  dispute.  The Supreme  Court  has  proved 
understanding of this entrepreneurial initiative when non-
strikers have attempted individual action to secure payment 
of their wages. 
36. The machinery for conflict resolution 
French law features three specific and optional procedures 
for the settlement of  collective labour disputes. Conciliation, 
which involves bringing the protagonists before a committee 
in  search  of agreement,  mediation,  where  a  person  is 
appointed to devise the basis of an agreement and put it to 
the  parties  involved,  and  arbitration,  which  involves 
appointing someone to settle claims equitably or according 
to the rules of  the law, with the possibility of final appeal to 
the Higher Court of  Arbitration (made up of professional 
magistrates). 
These non-compulsory  legal  procedures  are  rarely  used. 
During  the  period  1975-1987  (figures  supplied  by  the 
Ministry of  Labour), 28 disputes were brought before the 
National  Conciliation  Committee  (7  agreements),  325 
disputes were brought before the regional committees (84 
agreements), and 48 cases were submitted for mediation (19 
agreements following recommendations by the mediator). 
The number of cases of arbitration is not known,  but 13 
cases were brought before the Higher Court of  Arbitration 
(though there has been none since 1985). 
Do judges play an important role? Industrial tribunals have 
no direct band  in  disputes,  but are involved  only  when 
individual legal action is brought as a result of  a dispute. Yet 
the courts do play a role in disputes. Their interventions can 
take several original forms.  Rulings are made by summary 
civil procedure, by injunction or on evidence at very short 
notice. Many judges, when asked to examine a request for 
expulsion of strikers occupying premises or a trade union 
appeal for the lifting of a lock-out, an expert's report or the 
preservation of  evidence, will appoint a qualified third party 
(variously known as the consultant, representative, techni-
cian  or conciliator)  to  propose a  compromise which  the 
judges  feel  may  lead  to  a  settlement.  And  indeed  these 
initiatives, though not easy to assess in global terms, seem 
to bear out the judges' hopes. They give full rein to negotia-
tion, which is the main way of resolving disputes and thus 
these help to pave the way for a settlement. 
Some  agreements  actually  themselves  provide  for  the 
procedures and institutions of conciliation.  Here the em-
phasis is on prevention.  Such agreement-based machinery 
now exists in several branches and some of the larger com-
panies.  Its  growth,  however,  is  hampered  by  continued 
reluctance  on  the  part  of trade  unions  and  employers' 
organisations alike. 
CHAPTER IV: FRENCH  LAW IN A COMMUNITY 
CONTEXT- SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
37. The impact of the Community 
framework on French law 
(a)  In assessing the impact of the Community framework 
on French labour law, it is customary to look at how 
Community Acts are implemented in domestic law and 
whether they have given rise to a substantial change in 
domestic rules. In this case we find the situation much 
as expected. 
The  Community's  efforts  to  promote  coordinate, 
approximate or harmonise national labour legislation 
have been  well-received  in  France.  In part,  this  is 
because France traditionally regards the law as preemi-
nent. Difficulties might have arisen over the ways in 
which French law was adapted, but in fact they did not 
-although the main reason is more political, in that the 
French government only contributed to the establish-
ment ofEC rules in areas where French law had already 
reached the level envisaged by the Community. This 
explains why French resistance has been most marked 
in the area of free movement of workers and the social 
status  and  levels  of protection  of citizens  of other 
Member  States,  since  these  are  the  areas  in  which 
France has the most ground to make up. 
(b)  If we are to appreciate the full  impact of EC  law in 
France we need to push our investigations further. To 
what  extent  are  the  structures  and  development  of 
French labour law a response to its inconsistency with 
the national law of other Member States? 
This question certainly seems relevant in France, since 
'Community Europe »has in recent years become a kind 
of  catchall grounds for either promoting, restricting or 
opposing change. 
38. Characteristics of the French system 
of regulating working conditions 
(a)  Compared  to  other countries,  the French system of 
regulating  working  conditions  is  constructed  on 
markedly juridical lines. That is not to say (and indeed 
that is not what the French legal tradition, which prizes 
juridical composition as an instrument of interpretation, 
intends)  that  French  law  is  qualitatively  strong  on 
worker protection.  What it  does  mean  is  that  State 
regulation is, more than elsewhere, a feature of indus-
trial relations. 
'Legislation» affects not only individual employment 
relationships, but also work-related relations in general. 
By and large, only collective labour disputes are exempt 
from  this form of State regulation,  but this is made 
good by the application of  rules established in case law. 
There is little prospect of any substantial lessening of 
this juridical imprint, since it has the support of  all the 
actors- support that is somewhat ambiguous, as at least 
some  trade  unions  rather  regard  the  system  as  an 
extension of the  "republican compromise"underlying 
the political, economic and social order which emerged 
at the end of the 19th century, while entrepreneurs are 
well  aware that  it gives  them ample scope for new 
initiatives  and  enables  them  to  exercise  unilateral 
prerogatives. Yet support there is, and two examples 
will illustrate this. One is a reminder. The diversity of 
conditions of employment is an established fact and is 
no  doubt  becoming  more  pronounced.  In  some  EC 
Member States it rests on the decentralisation of the 
sources of regulation. FRANCE 
In France, it takes the form of  juridical organisation of 
different types of employment (enrichment of the legal 
typology of contracts) and legally-supervised approval 
of the  variety  of agreement-based  models  for  the 
organisation of working time (see section 22 above). 
The second example is drawn from the law on industrial 
relations. There was strong left-wing pressure in 1981 
and  1982 to enshrine in legislation both the fruit of 
experience and the rulings of case law in the realm of 
worker representation in the enterprise. This codifica-
tion subsequently ran into criticism from employers and 
the  conservative  opposition.  Yet  not  once  was  the 
principle questioned between 1986 and 1988, when that 
opposition again had a parliamentary majority. 
(b)  Do the French have the same unshakeable confidence in 
collective bargaining  as  others  have?  It is  true  that 
collective bargaining has taken great strides in France 
over the past 20 years. 
Yet conflicting  union  pluralism,  the  fact  that  trade 
unions  have  problems  attracting  membership,  the 
influence of the State in  central  bargaining,  and  the 
qualitative disparity of  topics addressed by branch-level 
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and company-level  bargaining tend  to  undermine its 
solidity. Voices emanating from the business world, the 
machinery  of State  and  indeed  the  fringes  of trade 
unionism  are  calling  for  modernisation  bargaining, 
whereas most trade unions are calling for the rekindling 
of  distributive bargaining. With the different hypotheses 
as  to  how  collective  bargaining  will  develop,  it  is 
difficult to make a prediction. 
These brief reminders suggest two highly tentative con-
clusions. 
The development of collective bargaining  in  France 
seems to be affected by the experience of other coun-
tries. It is in this area therefore that Community com-
parisons seem most effective. The achievements of the 
"European  social dialogue 
11  and  a knowledge of the 
scope,  levels  and  outcome  of bargaining  in  other 
countries are two factors which could help to steer the 
French bargaining system. On the other hand, there is 
but little hope of convergence in the identification of 
actors  and  the  role  of the  different  instruments.  If 
anything,  matter  rather  than  manner  can  produce 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Irish industrial relations are governed. by a number of relati-
onships between the following parties: 
•  the State,  as represented by the government t of the 
day; 
•  the various State-owned organisations with regulatory 
powers or acting as employers; 
•  the private sector employers; 
•  employers' organisations; 
•  the trade unions within the  Irish  Congress of Trade 
Unions; 
•  the smaller number of trade unions outside the ICTU; 
and 
•  other pressure groups, such as the farmers'  organisa-
tions. 
All of the above groups and organisations influence working 
conditions, and the regulation of working conditions, in Ire-
land. However, as we shall see below, the relative impor-
tance and strength of these bodies and groups has changed 
somewhat in recent years, leading to noticeable changes in 
industrial relations behaviour and trends. 
The State and public sector employment 
Despite some reductions in the workforce in  recent years, 
Ireland still has a fairly large public sector. Broadly for the 
present purposes the public sector comprises the civil service 
(i.e. employees working within government departments and 
ancillary services),  local  government (i.e.  employees em-
ployed by county councils and other local authorities), the 
public sector industries (including for electricity and trans-
port), and public sector administrative/ research organisa-
tions. 
Apart from the civil and public service, which comprises the 
largest group of employees in the country, the public sector 
also contains some very significant industrial and  service 
employers. Examples would include the Electricity Supply 
Board, Board na Mona (which cuts and processes turf and 
peat products), An Post and Telecom Eireann (the postal and 
telecommunications services respectively), Aer Lingus (the 
national airline), and Coras Iompair Eireann (the national 
bus and train transport company). Some institutions formerly 
in the public sector have·been wholly or partially privatised, 
and further plans are now being discussed in this context. 
The  local  government  system,  although  fairly  strictly 
controlled by central government, nevertheless has a large 
workforce which  is  locally administered.  The number of 
employees in  local  government is  estimated  to  be  in  the 
region of 35,000. 
It is clear therefore that,  quite apart from the State's role 
both as  employer and  as  legislator,  it has  a  considerable 
influence on working conditions generally because of the 
sheer size of its workforce and its spread throughout almost 
all sectors; in other words, the State's treatment of its own 
employees can and frequently does have a 'knock-on' effect 
on the employees of other organisations. 
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Although precise figures are hard to come by, it is generally 
estimated that the State and the various State bodies employ 
over 10 per cent of the national workforce
1
• 
Employers' organisations 
A number of employers' organisations exist in Ireland, but 
there is  really  only  one association  which  caters for  the 
entire range of employers' both public and private sector, 
both industry and services based: that is the Irish Business 
and Employers' Confederation (IBEC).  lBEC was extablished 
in  the early  1990s through a merger of the Federation of 
Irish Employers and the Confederation of  Irish Industry; the 
Federation of Irish  Employers was in tum formed  in the 
early 1940s (then as the Federated Union of  Employers) as 
a  result of the  Trade  Union  Ad 1941;  this  provided  in 
Seaion 6 that  all  organisations which intend to  carry on 
'negotiations for the fuing of  wages or other conditions of 
employment' are required to obtain from the Minister for 
Labour a so-called  'negotiation licence '
2 we return to this 
later.  This  provision  meant  that  employers'  associations 
needed to register themselves as trade unions in order to be 
able to engage in collective bargaining, and as a result the 
FUE was formed and registered. 
There are also some other employers' organisations, such as 
the  Construction  Industry  Federation,  the  Irish  Printing 
Federation, and the Electrical Contradors' Association. As 
their names suggest, these bodies are concerned with certain 
sectors of the economy, and apart from their role as em-
ployers' associations, they also act as pressure groups and 
advisers in their specific sectors. 
Trade unions 
Ireland is still a strongly unionised country, with a compara-
tively large proportion of the national workforce in trade 
union membership. The majority of union members are in 
trade unions which  themselves  are affiliated  to  the Irish 
Congress of  Trade  Unions,  a central umbrella body estab-
lished in 1894
3
• The ICTU has a number of functions: it gives 
advice to member trade unions, it represents them in legal or 
other proceedings if desired,  it carries out a research and 
training function  for  trade unions,  and it organises inter-
union relations. So, for example, the ICTU has a comprehen-
sive framework of regulations, contained in its constitution, 
which govern transfers between trade unions; these regula-
tions are designed to prevent trade union,  'poaching', i.e. 
the attempts by one trade union to recruit existing members 
of  another union. The ICTU also has, as we shall see in later 
chapters, rules governing the conduct of industrial action, 
and picketing in particular. 
1.  See:  FERDINAND  VON  PRONDZYNSKI  and  CHARLES  McCARTHY, 
Employment Law, 1989, p. 14-15. 
2.  See: FERDINAND VON  PRONDZYNSKI,  Freedom of  Association and 
ilulustrial Relations, 1987, Mansell Publishing Ltd., p. 25-26; and: 
A.  KERR  and G. WHYTE,  Irish  Trade  Union  Law,  1985,  Profes-
sional Books, p. 50-62. 
3.  See:  CHARLES  McCARTHY,  Trade  Unions in Ireland: 1894-1960, 
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The overall trade union membership figures for the Republic 
of Ireland are as follows
4
: 
Total no. of trade unions 
Total membership 
No. of unions in ICTU 
Membership of ICTU unions 
Largest trade unions: 
60 
477,900 
52 
441,300 
Services Industrial Professional Technical Union (SIPTU) 
199,000 
IMPACT (public sector trade union)  27,000 
Amalgamated Transport and General workers' Union 
20,000 
It is estimated that trade union members make up nearly 50% 
of the national workforce. 
Of the trade unions affiliated to the Irish Congress of  Trade 
Unions,  10  unions,  with a  total  membership  of approxi-
mately  70,000, have their headquarters  in  Great Britain. 
However, their Irish branches operate on a largely autono-
mous basis. 
Finally,  although  there  are  in  total  60  trade  unions  in 
Ireland, the membership is by no means evenly distributed. 
As can be seen from the above table, the three largest trade 
unions  have  over  half of the  total  national  trade  union 
membership, while a total of 26 trade unions have less than 
2,000 members each and together have less than 5 per cent. 
of the unionised labour force in membership. 
Freedom of association 
As  we shall  see  in  later chapters,  trade unions and  their 
members  are  protected  by  a  variety  of legal  measures. 
Broadly these are: 
•  Article 40 of the Constitution; 
•  the Trade Union Acts 1871-1941; 
•  Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977; 
•  the Industrial Relations Act 1990. 
Article 40. 6.1. iii of the 1937 Constitution protects 'the right 
of  the citizen to form associations and unions '
5
• This means 
that every citizen has right to form, join and take part in the 
activities of a  trade  union,  subject  to  the  right  of trade 
unions to refuse to accept into membership anyone whom 
they  do  not  wish  to  see joining.  The  Constitution  also 
appears to give a right not to join trade unions, but we shall 
return to this point in Part III. 
The Trade Union Act gives some protection to trade unions 
which have registered and  which  have acquired  from  the 
Minister for Enterprise and Employment a 'negotiation licen-
ce'. The Industrial Relations Aa 1990 provides in Section 13 
that a trade union cannot be sued in tort in  the context of 
industrial  action:  i.e.  a  trade  union  cannot  be  sued  for 
defamation, negligence, nuisance and other torts, and trade 
union funds cannot be used for the payment of damages in 
such  actions,  where the cause of action  relates  to a trade 
di~'}Jute; however, union officials and members can be sued. 
Finally, Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 pro-
4.  Source: Department of Enterprise and Employment. 
5.  For  a  detailed  analyses  of this  constitutional  provision,  see: 
FERDINAND  VON  PRONDZYNSKJ,  Freedom  of Association  and 
Industrial Relations, 1987. 
vides that a dismissal  for trade union membership and/or 
activities  is  unfair and  thus  illegal:  we  return  to  this  in 
Part II. 
There are a number of institutions in Ireland with the task of 
mediating or adjudicating in the case of disputes between 
employers  and .employees.  The  most  significant  are  the 
following: 
1.  The  Labour Court.  The Labour  Court,  which  set  up 
under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 (but which is not 
actually a 'court' in the judicial sense), has a number of 
roles, but the most important one is mediation in trade 
disputes. We shall look at these roles in Part m, Title n. 
The Court also helps to administer certain bodies such as 
Joint Labour Committees and Joint Industrial Councils, 
which are special bodies with functions  in the area of 
colloctive bargaining. The Labour Court also adjudicates 
in disputes concerning equality of opportunity in employ-
ment under the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act 1974 and 
the Employment Equality Act 1977. 
2.  The Labour Relations Commission. The Commission was 
established under the Industrial Relations Act 1990.  It 
has  a  number of roles,  including conciliation in  trade 
disputes,  the  maintenance  of an  industrial  relations 
advisory service, the drawing up of codes of practice, the 
organisation of the Equality Service (under which Equal-
ity Officers make rocommendations in the first instance in 
employment equality cases), and research. 
3.  The Employment Appeals Tribunal. The EAT adjudicates 
in disputes involving legal rights of employees, particu-
larly in the area of dismissal. Disputes under the Redun-
dancy Payments Acts, the Minimum Notice and Terms of 
Employment Act 1973, the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 
(as amended),  the  Terms of  Employment (Information) 
Act 1994,  and  the Maternity  Protection  Act 1994 are 
taken to the EAT. 
4.  The Employer-Labour Conference. The ELC was set up in 
1970  to  administer  centralised  collective  bargaining 
arrangements  between  the  employers  and  the  trade 
unions.  Under its auspices the National Wages Agree-
ments and the  'National Understandings' of the 1970s 
were negotiated.  Although  the centralised agreements 
negotiated since 1987 have not been under the auspices of 
the ELC, it still exists as a forum for discussions between 
the social partners. 
There are also  some other  institutions  with  research  and 
advisory  functions,  such  as  the  Economic  and  Social 
Research Institute and the Irish Productivity Centre. These 
bodies have a membership made up of trade union, employer 
and government nominees. 
Industrial conflict 
Ireland tends to have a reputation for having large numbers 
of strikes,  but this reputation is  not entirely deserved.  In 
particular, it is worth noting that since the mid 1970s there 
has been a steady decline from year (with only two excep-
tions) in  the number of working days lost annually due to 
strikes.  In  1978  there  were  170  strikes  with  a  total  of 
449,187 days lost; in 1991 there were 52 strikes with 85,300 
days lost.  In other words, the number of days lost dropped IRELAND 
by 80 per cent during this period. The evidence is that this 
trend is continuing. 
Industrial action is regulated principally by two statutes: the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 and  the 
Industrial Relations Act 1990. The basic approach of these 
statutes is not so much to grant a right to strike, but rather 
to protect trade unions and their members from legal action 
if  they were engaged in a genuine strike or trade dispute and 
were not in breach of other laws (such as trespass, obstruc-
tion, etc.). 
As already mentioned, the Labour Relations Commission and 
the Labour Court are available to provide either conciliation 
(conducted by  so-called  Industrial Relations  Officers)  or 
mediation (called the 'investigation of  disputes', in which the 
Labour Court makes a recommendation as to how the dispute 
might be resolved). Overall, the success of these institutions 
in securing a resolution of disputes has been quite impres-
sive. 
CHAPTER II: THE ROLE  OF LABOUR LAW 
Since the late 1970s, the nature and purpose of labour law 
have been subjected to  radical  change,  the true extent of 
which is still only partly visible.  At that time the general 
view, accepted alike by academics and practitioners of both 
law and industrial relations would have been  that the low 
should adopt an abstentionist role in relation to collective 
bargaining and industrial action, while supporting the indivi-
dual employment relationship with a safety net of rights and 
obligations. This general picture was in part a reflection of 
the  influence of a small  number of British academics,  in 
particular Sir Otto Kahn Freund
6 and Allan Flanders
7
,  whose 
views dominated the Report of the Donovan Commission in 
the United Kingdom in 1968
8
• The latter report summarised 
the position as follows: 
'Vntil recent times it was a distinctive feature of  our system 
of  industrial relations that the State remained aloof  from the 
process of  collective bargaining in private industry.  It  left 
the parties free to come to their own agreement.  It imposed 
some, but few restrictions on the right of  employees to strike 
or of  employers to resort to a lock-out(  ...  )". 
This British abstentionist consensus - frequently described 
as  'voluntarism ' - fond  much  support in  Ireland as well, 
particularly amongst the trade unions. So in  1979 the Irish 
Transport and General Workers' Union published its opinion 
that the law should avoid  'direct intervention' in industrial 
relations and confine itself to  'supporting agreed standards 
of  practice' of protective legislation for workers
10
•  This was 
also underlined by the Commission of  Inquiry on Industrial 
Relations in its 1981  Report: 
"Industrial relations both in Ireland and in Britain have to 
a large extent been characterised by a commitment to legal 
6.  See in particular: lAbour and the Law, the published version of 
Kahn-Freund's 1972 Hamlyn Lectures; the most recent edition is 
that edited by PAUL DA vtES  and MARK FREEDLAND,  1983, Stevens. 
7.  See:  The  Tradition of Voluntarism  (1974)  12  British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 352. 
8.  Royal Commission on Trade  Unions and employers' Associations, 
1968, Cmnd 3623. 
9.  Ibid, para. 39, p. 10. 
10.  ITGWU,  Submission  to the  Commission  on  Industrial  Relations, 
1979, p.  11. 
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abstention,  sometimes  referred  to  as  'voluntarism'.  It  is 
generally assumed that our system is a  voluntary one,  by 
which we mean that the parties to the industrial relations 
process are free to agree, or not to agree, on the substantive 
principles  which  are  to  govern  their mutual  rights  and 
obligations and to  regulate their behaviour,  without the 
intervention of  the State  ~At. 
The changed economic and political conditions of the 1980s 
and  1990s  have  more  or less  shattered  this  voluntarist 
consensus. Various factors have contributed to this: growing 
pressure  from  employers  to  regulate  industrial  relations 
conduct by law; political pressures to restrain the perceived 
inflationary  effect  of free  collective bargaining;  and  the 
growing emphasis on legal, rather than trade union, protec-
tion of employees' rights and interests. So far this has not 
significantly changed the substance of labour law in Ireland 
(in marked contrast with Britain
12
;  but there is no longer a 
consensus in favour of legal abstention, and it is known that 
government departments are now keen to analyze both labour 
law and industrial relations practice in terms of the likely or 
possible macro-economic effects. More tangible changes in 
the law will probably follow. 
The 1980s probably marked the beginning of a new phase in 
our understanding of labour law
13
• The trend was set by the 
Commission of  Inquiry,  the report of which was drawn up 
without trade union participation since Congress withdrew 
from its deliberations. The Commission declared in its report 
that it had reached the following conclusions: 
i)  voluntary  means  alone are incapable of imparting the 
required  degree  of order  to  the  collective  relations 
between unions and management; 
ii)  the many serious consequences of the failure of existing 
voluntary  arrangements  have  made  it  imperative  that 
some alternative source of order be established
14
• 
The  Commission's  report,  partly  because of the ultimate 
absence  of trade  union  participation,  was  never  imple-
mented, but it was not totally uninfluential. The Federated 
Union of  Employers in particular, in numerous statements 
since 1981, called for a new legal framework in which the 
right to  take  industrial  action  would be severely circum-
scribed  in  return  for  the growing corpus of employment 
legislation protecting workers'  individual rights.  The gist 
both of the Commission's report and of the FUE position was 
that the  law  should be used  to  formalise and  standardise 
industrial  relations  procedures,  and  that  disputes  should 
either  be  channelled  through  compulsory  dispute-settling 
machinery  or  be  resolved  through  judicial  or  tribunal 
awards.  These  views  have  not  as  such  been  adopted  in 
legislation, but the Industrial Relations Act 1990 does reflect 
a slightly more interventionist legal approach, for example 
in  its  requirement that a  secret ballot must be conducted 
before industrial action may lawfully be conducted. 
11.  1981, Pl. 114, para. 24, p.  10. 
12.  See e.g.: LORD WEDDERBURN OF CHARLTON, lAbour lAw Now: A 
Hold and a Nudge (1984) 13 IU 73. 
13.  See:  FERDINAND  VON  PRONDZYNSKI,  The  Changing Functions of 
Lahour lAw,  in:  PATRICIA  FOSH  and  CRAIG  R.  LITTLER  (ed.), 
Industrial Relations and the Law in the 1980s, 1985, 176. 
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It seems likely therefore that the scene is set for increased 
legal intervention in industrial relations. A large part of the 
justification for this is that the law will not only preserve 
order but also protect the interests of individual workers 
against abuses by employers. If  this is so, then it becomes 
the more important to analyze the substance of employment 
law to determine the extent to which the law is currently 
fulfilling this function.  As will become clear from the en-
suing discussion, there is a lot which still needs to be done 
by the Oireachtas (Parliament). 
Collective bargaining 
The overwhelming  majority  of Irish  workers  have  their 
terms and conditions of employment settled through collec-
tive agreements. This applies not just to unionised employees 
but to others as well. It has been a long tradition in Ireland 
that  employers will  tend  to  adopt the  general  collective 
bargaining trends in granting pay increases, even if they don 
not directly bargain with trade unions. 
Furthermore, there has since 1987 been a series of national, 
tripartite agreements governing both pay and consitions on 
the one hand, and economic and social policy on the other. 
In  October  1987  the government,  the  Irish  Congress  of 
Trade Unions, the employers' associations and some other 
interest groups concluded an agreement, to last for a three 
year period, on economic and social developments including 
pays. This agreement was called the Programme for National 
Recovery. This was followed by the Programme for Eco-
nomic and Social Progress in 1991, and the Programme for 
Competitiveness and Work in  1994.  Since this process of 
national agreements began  the overwhelming majority of 
localised agreements between employers and trade unions 
have followed the pay terms set nationally. 
In Ireland there is some uncertainty as to whether collective 
agreements are legally enforceable documents. Until 1977 it 
was generally thought that the English High Court decision 
of Ford Motor Co.  v.  Amalgamated Union of  Engineering 
and Foundry Workers
15 applied in Ireland as well; in this the 
judge had held that in collective agreements there was no 
intention to create legal relations and that such agreements 
were therefore not enforceable in the courts. But in the case 
of Goulding  Chemicals Ltd.  v.  Bolger
16  two  out of five 
Supreme Court judges in obiter dicta indicated that collective 
agreements did have legal force. There have been no further 
cases directly on this point. There is still some uncertainty 
therefore as to what the position is,  with most academic 
opinion still  favouring the view that such agreements are 
unenforceable. In any case, under Section 4 of the Trade 
Union  Act  1871,  agreements  between  trade  unions  and 
employers'  associations  (as  distinct  from  agreements be-
tween) are always unenforceable. 
The contract of employment 
Largely as a result of the tradition of voluntarism, as ex-
plained above, there is in Ireland relatively little of what on 
the continent of Europe would be described as  'collective 
labour law'. This means that the regulation of the employ-
ment  relationship  takes  place  largely  at  the  individual 
15.  [1969] 2 QB 303. 
16.  [1977] IR 211. 
contractual level.  The basis therefore of the substance of 
employment law tends to be the contract of employment. 
Irish employment law is therefore to some extent an exten-
sion of the law of contract. This is true even to the extent 
that statutory provisions with what one might call a collec-
tive  intent  (as  for example the provision which  protects 
workers from being dismissed because of there trade union 
membership  or  activities)  introduce  the  protection  they 
provide through collective bargaining is hardly reflected in 
the law at all. Apart from one peripheral reference, there is 
no statutory provision dealing with or defining collective 
agreements,  but  almost  all  statutory  provisions  in  the 
employment area are based on the contract of employment. 
This has meant that normal contractual doctrines, such as 
repudiation, frustration and fundamental breach, have been 
imported  into  the  employment  setting  as  well  with  odd 
results.  For example,  the  effectiveness of the protection 
against  unfair  dismissal  has  been  seriously  compromise 
because  this  protection  was  based  on  the  existence  of 
contracts of  employment and depended on the interpretation 
and application of contract law. In other words, because the 
contract of employment has been treated by the courts and 
tribunals as if it were just any kind of contract - with the 
same rules, for example, as a contract for the sale of goods 
- it has proved to be quite unsuitable in the context of labour 
law. 
CHAPTER Ill:  THE  COMMON  LAW 
The main thing to be noted about Irish employment law is 
that  it  is  part of a  legal  system  which  comes  from  the 
common law tradition. In other words, it initially developed 
through case law and court decisions rather than through the 
development of legal codes or statutes. This meant also that 
the  original  provisions of employment  law were largely 
judge-made, and largely fell  under the heading of contract 
law.  The common  law  tradition was of course a  British 
phenomenon, and was applied to Ireland by virtue of the fact 
that, until  1922, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom. 
Even after 1922 the Irish legal system has continued to be a 
common law one. 
As we have already noted, the problem with the common 
law in the employment context was that the ordinary contrac-
tual  principles  were  used  in  developing  the  idea of the 
contract  of employment,  with  some  undesirable  effects, 
particularly in the context of dismissal law. 
Statutory framework 
However, from the mid-19th century onwards there was also 
a  growing  body  of statutes  dealing  with  employment. 
Initially these statutes were passed to protect sections of the 
workforce which were thought to be particularly vulnerable, 
such as women and children working in factories, or persons 
who were not getting money payment for their work, and 
similar groups. The first protective statute was passed to 
compel employers to pay workers in cash rather than through 
benefits-in-kind.  This  was  swiftly  followed  by  the  first 
Factory Act, designed to introduce greater measures of safety 
at work. IRELAND 
However, the main body of statute law relevant to employ-
ment was passed in the 20th century. This body of law falls 
into two sections: 
1)  the statutes dealing with trade union organisation and 
industrial conflict, such as the Trade  Union Acts I 871, 
1941, 1971 and 1975, the Trade Disputes Act 1906, and 
the Industrial Relations Acts 1946, 1969 and 1990; and 
2)  the  statutes  dealing  with  the  individual  employment 
relationship such as the Conditions of  Employment Act 
1936, the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, the 1974 and 
1977 statutes dealing with equal opportunity in employ-
ment, the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 and 1993, and so 
forth. 
On the other hand, there is still no comprehensive code of 
employment  law,  and  many  aspects  of the  employment 
relationship are still not governed by statutes at all.  For 
example, the interpretation of the contract of employment, 
remuneration, and other matters are not generally the subject 
of statutory collective bargaining or collective agreements, 
and as we have noted above, collective agreements are still 
generally considered not to be binding documents. 
The Constitution 
It is  also necessary  to point out that Ireland,  unlike the 
United Kingdom, has a written Constitution. This document 
was passed by popular referendum in 1937, and has since 
been  amended  on  a  number  of occasions.  It  has  some 
relevance to employment law, particularly in relation to its 
protection of freedom of association. It can also be used to 
query the constitutionality of statutes, which happens from 
time to time. 
Overall, however, it must be said that the Constitution has 
been used only rarely in the context of employment law, and 
where it has been used it has not been very helpful to indus-
trial relations practice. This is so particularly in the sense 
that the judges have interpreted the Constitution as giving 
primacy to individual freedom, even to the extent of allow-
ing individuals to opt out of collective arrangements agreed 
by the  majority of employees.  On  the other hand,  some 
111 
constitutional judgements - such as that apparently ruling 
that the  'closed shop' is unconstitutional
17 
- seem by and 
large to be ignored by employers and trade unions, and they 
have thus had little impact on industrial relations practice. 
International influences 
Ireland is, of  course, a member of the European Union, and 
some of the body of Irish employment law has been influ-
enced by EU membership. This is particularly true of the law 
relating to sex discrimination, maternity rights, collective 
redundancies, and the rights of employees during transfers 
of  undertakings. For the most part the Irish government and 
parliament  have  been  quick  to  implement  Community 
Directives, although the content of the Irish regulations has 
not always been entirely adequate. 
Ireland  is  also  a  member of other relevant international 
bodies, such as the United Nations, the International Labour 
Organisation  and  the  Council  of Europe.  Furthermore, 
Ireland has ratified a number of conventions passed by these 
international  bodies;  however,  very  often  the  effect  in 
domestic law has been slight. For example, the Committee 
of  bulependent Experts of the Council of  Europe regularly 
describes a  number of provisions of the European Social 
Charter  relevant  to  employment of which  Ireland  is  in 
breach
18
;  usually the government does not respond to these 
comments, and no statutory amendments are undertaken as 
a result. 
In terms of international comparisons, it might finally be 
said that Ireland has a system of labour law which has, since 
the 1960s, developed a fairly extensive statutory framework 
of individual protection of employees, but which still has 
relatively little law dealing with collective labour relations. 
Even in the context of individual employment law, the Irish 
system has far less substance than that of most other member 
States of the European Community. 
17.  Educational Company of  Ireland v.  Fitzpatrick, [1961 ], IR 345. 
18.  See  e.g.:  COMMITTEE  OF  INDEPENDENT  EXPERTS,  COUNCIL  OF 
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Introduction 
Certain features of Italy's economic and social framework 
strongly influence industrial relations, and should be taken 
into account when assessing the development of these two 
trends,  including  procedures  for  "harmonization 
11  of the 
Italian system at European level. 
One of the most  significant general  characteristics is  the 
wide  variety  of  Italian  industry,  which  - as  is  well 
known - began  to  develop  relatively  late,  especially  the 
service sector. 
The present growth of the service sector in  Italy,  though 
significant,  does  not seem  likely  at  present  to  gain  the 
upper hand over the industrial sector. The industrial rela-
tions system and the practices of the partners are still al-
most exclusively  modelled  on  the  industrial  sector,  with 
the  result  that  the development of labour relations  more 
suited to  the different situations of the public and  private 
service sector seems very complex. 
The economic structure of the labour market is extremely 
fragmentary,  owing  to  the  high  percentage of small  and 
very small production units. 
This  traditional  nature  of Italian  industry,  linked  to  the 
delay  in  the  development  of a  free-market  system,  has 
been borne out and given a new look by  recent tendencies 
towards  decentralization  and  the  miniaturization  of 
production not just in the service sector but in industry as 
well. 
Although  the  proliferation  of  small  units  does  not 
necessarily imply a fragile economy, it does reveal a weak 
point in  industrial  relations  and  labour law  (not only  in 
Italy), as  both have always been related to  workforces in 
large-scale industry. 
The fall  in the average size of production units below the 
threshold  for  the  application  of national  and  contractual 
labour  law  (which  varies  from  country  to  country)  has 
gradually  restricted  most  of this  law  to  relatively  small 
groups of employees working in  the private sector,  even 
though it was originally intended to regulate the sector as 
a whole. 
This  gap  has  been  widened  by  two  further  employment 
trends.  The first  is  the  proliferation  of self-employment 
relationships,  which  have  reached  higher  levels  in  Italy 
than in other countries, judged by some to  be anomalous, 
as  it  indicates  occupations  of doubtful  status  and  social 
usefulness,  some  being  partly  or completely  within  the 
black economy.  The second  trend  is  the  great variety  of 
types of employment compared to  the prototype of tradi-
tional  full-time  permanent  employment  (i.e.  part-time 
work,  fixed-term contracts,  training and work experience 
contracts,  quasi-permanent,  cooperative,  and  also  casual 
work in the black economy). 
These trends are tending to damage the traditional patterns 
of industrial relations by altering them, or depriving them 
of  significance,  without  so  far  supplying  any  stable 
alternatives (not even as regards the regulation of individ-
ual  relationships).  Such  tendencies  are  in  fact  part  of 
wider-reaching changes affecting the quantity and  quality 
of the  workforce  which  Italy  nowadays  shares  with  the 
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maJonty  of industrialized  countries:  the  growth  of the 
service sector,  the  increasing  complexity  of labour mar-
kets, changes in occupational skills brought about, among 
other things,  by  the new technologies;  the change in  the 
proportions  of working  men  and  women,  different  age-
groups and the employed and unemployed; and the resul-
tant  supply  of casual  work,  which  is  not  wholly  deter-
mined by demand. 
This heterogeneity  is  accompanied  by  other examples of 
dualism,  which  strongly  affect  the  regulation  of labour 
relationships.  The disparity between the North and South 
of Italy, which can be seen from all the economic and so-
cial  indicators, continues to be the greatest contributor to 
national imbalance, and to date we see no sign of a tum-
around  in  this  tendency.  Statistics  on  unemployment  -
mainly concentrated in  the South - are just the tip of the 
iceberg. 
However, dualism between the private and public sectors 
in  labour relations is  common  to  all  countries,  even if it 
has  tended  to  decrease  in  recent  years.  This  dualism  is 
particularly  accentuated  in  Italy,  largely  because  of the 
enormous  size  of  the  public  sector.  The  percentage 
workforce  in  public  employment  is  average  to  high  by 
international standards. This figure has to be supplemented 
by employees in  publicly-owned industries which, though 
regulated  by  the  legislative  provisions  of private  labour 
law, have always had a special role, and often a controver-
sial role compared to private industry, in  the evolution of 
industrial relations. 
In  the  last  few  years  the  distinction  between  public and 
private  labour  relations,  which  has  been  only  partially 
rectified by the legal  recognition of collective bargaining 
in  public  employment,  has  revealed  signs  of increasing 
contradiction - and  not only  in  Italy.  It has  allowed  the 
survival of rigid and  formalistic  rules of workforce man-
agement which  make no  provision  for  the  monitoring of 
efficiency  and  effectiveness  and  are actually  an  impedi-
ment to them.  This trend can also be seen in certain areas 
of the service sector - such as banks and  insurance com-
panies,  which have always had  rules differing from those 
regulating industry as they are not exposed to international 
competition. 
It is  no  coincidence that fiercer international competition 
and the run-up to the Single European Market placed this 
separatism  in  a  critical  position  and  subjected  standard 
rules  and  practices  in  these  sectors  to  much  greater ten-
sions  than  in  industry.  In  fact,  the  regulation  of labour 
relations  in  public  administration  has  recently  been  the 
subject of a wide-ranging and  complex  legislative reform 
(Legislative Decree No.  29 of February 3,  1993),  which 
has the objective of bringing labour legislation governing 
the public sector as much as possible into line with legisla-
tion  governing the private sector.  This decree in  fact  not 
only  recognises  collective  bargaining  as  the  regulatory 
source of labour  relations  in  the  public  sector,  but also 
extends to the public sector, albeit with some adaptations, 
the rules governing individual private labour relations: this 
has  prompted  talk  of  l(privatisation 
11  of public  employ-
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The turbulent economic climate undoubtedly affects indus-
trial relations, but social and political issues also play their 
part.  The fragility of the pillars supporting Italy's indus-
trial  relations,  starting with trade unions and  bargaining, 
the traditionally highly strife-ridden nature of the system 
and  its  lack  of institutionalization  can  be  linked  to  the 
strong ideological and political polarization in  Italy.  This 
polarisation continues even after the political events of the 
last  years,  which  led  to  the  dismemberment  of the  two 
cardinal parties of the so called  jirst republic" (the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Socialists), and to the transforma-
tion of the major opposition party (the Communist Party) 
into a  reformist  party,  member of the  Socialist  Interna-
tional (PDS:  Democratic Party of the Left) and a minority 
neo-communist party (Rifondazione Comunista). The elec-
tions of March 27,  1994  saw  the country's traditionally 
strong  political  polarisation  reflected  in  a  confrontation 
between a progressive front  represented by  the PDS  and a 
conservative one guided by the businessman Silvio Berlus-
coni, who founded his own party for the occasion (Forza 
ltalia),  including the ex  fascist  party Alleanza Nazionale 
(National Alliance). 
The victory of the right wing block was soon reflected in 
industrial relations. The new government's attempt to push 
through  a  reform of the pension system without the con-
sent of union  organisations awakened  old  political  chain 
rattling and strong opposition which to a large extent was 
instrumental in bringing down the government. 
The  traditionally  high  degree of exposure,  or rather  the 
dependence on politics and parties of the Italian trade un-
ions is of political significance.  Despite a certain increase 
in union autonomy and thus in unity during the growth of 
pluralism, there has not been a corresponding strengthen-
ing of union-party links similar to those prevalent in other 
European countries with long traditions of reformist politi-
cal representation of labour. In politics, unresolved splits, 
a  certain  amount  of fragility  and  fragmentation  of civil 
society  and  the  pluralist  relations  associated  with  these 
mean  that the political  parties have undue influence over 
society and institutions, including those which control the 
economy. 
The recent  profound  changes  in  the  political  framework 
are likely to  be reflected in  union-party relations as well. 
The consequences of these changes cannot be foreseen  as 
yet.  If the  main  union  confederation  (CGIL)  still  has  a 
strong point of reference in the PDS Party, the same is not 
true of the other two major union confederations, CISL and 
UIL, orphaned of their political backing which came from 
the  Christian  Democrats  and  the  Socialists  respectively. 
According to observers this scenario may offer new impe-
tus to unions' unity. 
CHAPTER I 
1. The institutional framework of labour relations 
The most important point to bear in mind in any analysis, 
and  also at European level,  is that the Italian trade-union 
system (in the private sector) is still among the least regu-
lated and perhaps the most independent in  the industrial-
ized  countries with  market economies.  None of its  main 
constituent bodies, union freedom, the union as an organi-
zation,  the  collective wage agreement  or mechanisms  of 
self-protection  are regulated  by  legislation.  Italian  trade-
union law has evolved outside any legislative framework, 
diverging  significantly  from  the  constitutional  model 
which, while recognizing unions as basic components of a 
pluralist organization, places them in an institutional cate-
gory "with roles and  functions established by a clear regu-
lation of  powers~ 
The net result is at odds with neighbouring systems, from 
the point of view of the various bodies mentioned. Regula-
tion is less important and less detailed and the function of 
the bodies is shaped in different ways. This bears out the 
fundamental  importance of the  autonomist  principles  al-
ready mentioned, and classifies Italian legislation as a rare 
example of a loosely regulated system. 
A  similar  form  of legislative abstentionism  in  industrial 
relations which  promotes but does not regulate union ac-
tivity is  linked  to  the country's union  and  political  har-
mony.  This  harmony  initially  hindered  legislative 
intervention  (which  was  not  in  fact  necessary  given  the 
substantial weakness of industrial relations); but later on a 
strengthening of the  unions  became  necessary,  both  for 
employers  and  employees  as  the  economy  was  growing 
fast and political tension was high. This slow growth was 
partly to blame, however,  for the lack of institutionaliza-
tion of Italian  industrial  relations.  Moreover,  due to  the 
lack of legislation  the  "rules  of the game~ whether con-
tractual or practical,  that have given support to industrial 
relations  in  other countries  when  pluralism  was  on  the 
increase,  thus  tempering  the  instability  and  strife-ridden 
nature of these  relations,  have  been  slow  to  develop  in 
Italy. 
The lack of regulatory provisions persists, despite the fact 
that  Italian  trade unions  - as  all  other industrialized  na-
tions - have for some time been subject to disciplinary and 
special  measures  which  differentiate  them  from  all  other 
private associations.  These include provisions to  support 
union  activity  in  the  workplace  in  compliance with  the 
Workers' Statute (Law 300 of  1970); provisions already in 
place at the pre-corporative stage but which grew steadily 
in  number  in  the  late  post-war  period,  giving  the  most 
representative of the  unions  the power to  designate their 
representatives  in  public  bodies  with  varying  functions, 
mostly  of  an  administrative  nature  (CNEL  - National 
Council of  the Economy and Labour, the main social secu-
rity bodies, the government placement offices, and so on); 
the recognition of the  union  as  spokesman with govern-
ment bodies in  compliance with the Workers' Statute and 
with  constitutional  case  law  (which  legitimatizes  strikes 
for economic and political reasons), and with the practice 
of government bodies themselves. 
From 1976 onwards, relations between the social partners 
and  the State became more complex,  giving rise to some 
cases of tripartite concertation,  mainly intended to  tackle 
the serious inflation of that period.  Among other things, 
this resulted in legislation placing direct controls on labour 
costs  (especially  the  scala  mobile  - the  pay  indexation 
system) and consequently curbing the collective autonomy 
of the  social  partners  which  had  up  until  then  been  the 
arbiters in  this area.  This undoubtedly represented a shift ITALY 
away  from  the  abstentionist  model  and  continued  for  a 
long  time as  regards the  limits on  indexation,  but gradu-
ally lost its importance as inflation went down. 
The  demand  for  greater  institutionalization  of industrial 
relations, which is coming from many sectors as a reaction 
to  the increasing  instability of the economy  and  society, 
focuses  more on the legal  regulation of various aspects of 
industrial  relations  (disputes,  union  representation,  bar-
gaining) than  on types of regulation agreed  by  the social 
partners. 
This autonomist tradition will have to be borne in mind if 
realistic and  successful  action,  which  will  not  cause  ad-
verse reactions,  is  to  be taken.  This is also true of inter-
vention  at  EC  level  and  European  harmonization,  which 
will  presumably  require regulatory  machinery  agreed  be-
tween different nations and  social  partners.  This machin-
ery will therefore vary according to  national  systems and 
partners. 
Unlike  collective  relations,  individual  labour  relations 
have been subject right from  the start to  strict regulation 
by both the State (legislation and case law) and by collec-
tive bargaining.  Bargaining rules  which  effectively  regu-
late relations have grown up alongside legislation provid-
ing  widespread  protection,  usually  entailing  improve-
ments.  This wealth of measures has  been  reinforced by  a 
growth in  the activism of the judiciary, supported by more 
efficient procedures in the wake of Law 533 of  1973. 
2. Individual and collective aspects of labour law 
There are two basic aspects of the Italian labour law  sys-
tem- the individual and the collective. 
These two aspects have always been present and overlap to 
some extent in all modem labour law systems.  In  the Ital-
ian system, the collective dimension overshadows the indi-
vidual, as collective organization was born of the necessity 
to  offset the employee's weak position in  the labour rela-
tionship;  more  specifically,  collective  autonomy  consti-
tutes the main source of actual regulation of the individual 
relationship,  particularly  in  the  private  sector  but  now 
increasingly in the public sector as well, where its weight 
is  likely to be increasingly felt after the Civil Service Re-
form of  February 3, 1993 No.  29 (see above). 
Conversely, the collective organization of interests,  tradi-
tionally expressed by  the trade union,  has  its foundations 
in the laws inspired by the principle of union freedom and 
the legally recognized position of employees as  trade un-
ion activists 
This overlap  between  the  two  aspects  is  symptomatic  of 
the complexity of labour regulation: this not only means a 
greater number of different sources acting as  a regulatory 
reference  point  for  collective  issues,  but  makes  the  cre-
ation of regulations complex as they are the result of medi-
ation between individual and collective interests. 
It is this complexity which causes moments of tension - or 
even  real  conflict  - which  can  also  happen  in  the  most 
stable of legal  systems  and  historical  periods,  but which 
become  more  acute  in  times  and  places  characterized  by 
rapid changes. 
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The  most  acute,  and  in  some  ways  most  worrying,  are 
those cases which are the result of a reaction of the indi-
vidual  towards  the  collective,  especially  where  the  latter 
predominates.  In union law,  the critical area is the right of 
individuals - recognized in some instances by the law and 
in  others  by  case  law  - to  control  the  decisions  of an 
organization and to react to provisions considered harmful 
to individual and democratic interests. 
In the law on collective bargaining, the critical issue is the 
extent to which collective partners can make use of subjec-
tive individual situations during the production of regula-
tions and in  particular during the actual  operation of the 
agreement. 
Tension  between  the  individual  and  the  collective  is  re-
flected  in  corresponding  tension  between  the  sources  of 
labour law, particularly between autonomous sources (col-
lective bargaining and rules governing union conduct) and 
heterogeneous sources (law and case law). 
Such  opposition  assumes  different  forms  in  the  various 
systems depending on the respective historical roles of the 
individual  and  the  collective,  and  depending  on  whether 
sources are autonomous or heterogeneous. In fact,  legislat-
ive intervention is recurrent, especially that which protects 
individual rights from collective powers (as in bargaining 
and/or union action) which are held to be potentially too 
ample.  By the same token, case law has often given great-
er credence to  the individual  than  to  the collective stand-
point. 
However,  there  are  cases  where  the  reverse  is  true.  In 
many of the more firmly established regulations governing 
industrial relations (including Italy and the former Federal 
Republic of Germany)  legislation has favoured  the devel-
opment of collective bargaining,  in  some cases endorsing 
the  monopolistic  positions  of collective  partners  in  the 
negotiation  and  application  of contractual  regulations.  A 
significant example  is  the United States,  though  this also 
happens  in  Europe where  the  most  representative of the 
unions are privileged. 
In  recent times,  and  not only  in  Italy,  emergency legisla-
tion  has  made  it  possible for  bargaining to  diverge from 
previous  norms,  especially  where  important  issues  of 
rights  were  at  stake,  with  previously  established  rights 
being challenged. 
Even case law,  despite its strong inclination to  safeguard 
employees'  rights,  has supported these trends,  giving cre-
dence  to  the  organization's  case  rather than  the  individ-
ual's. Examples of this are cases of indirect discrimination 
and  disciplinary  measures  for  unions  (where  there  have 
been virtually no test cases), which endorsed rulings made 
in  collective bargaining aimed at giving greater flexibility 
to  labour law  in  crucial  issues  like pay,  the relationship 
between  the  different  levels  of bargaining,  and  worker 
mobility. 
3. Principles of collective labour law 
As  has been mentioned, the Italian union system is one of 
the most loosely regulated of industrialized countries.  Na-
tional  law  in  this  area  is  essentially  "promotional".  This 
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constitutional  law)  of certain types  of collective freedom 
common  to  all  modem  labour  law  - union  freedom  and 
hence pluralism (Article 39 [1] of the Italian Constitution); 
the  freedom  to  take  industrial  action,  which  becomes  a 
right in  the event of a strike (Article 40 of the  Constitu-
tion),  while lock-outs are not  recognized  as  a right;  and 
the  freedom  of collective bargaining,  now  recognized  in 
much of the public sector. These forms of collective free-
dom were enhanced and  made effective under Law 300 of 
1970,  which  is  still  the  fundamental  reference  for  union 
rights in  the workplace.  Compared  to  similar legislation, 
the Workers' Statute stresses the types of support for union 
action in  the workplace, which can  become highly strife-
ridden.  These include the recognition of the right to  as-
semble at  the workplace;  effective procedural  machinery 
for the suppression of anti-union conduct; the extension of 
protection  in  cases  of anti-union conduct by  work-provi-
ders to all employees, even those not belonging to a union 
(in  accordance  with  the  concept  of  general,  non-
monopolistic union representation);  the  limits of applica-
tion of Title I of the law on the employer's organizational 
powers,  and also one disadvantageous point - the  lack of 
participatory bodies in the company. 
Another  difference  in  the  Italian  system  is  the  balance 
between support the union as  an  organization and  protec-
tion of the individual employee's rights - both as a party 
to  the labour relationship (Title I of the Workers' Statute) 
and  as  a protagonist of union activities (Titles  II and  III). 
Union freedom,  recognized  at  constitutional  and  interna-
tional level and under Italian law, took a great deal of time 
to  be translated into inter-private partner relations,  and  is 
given by  these  provisions particular effectiveness  against 
the powers of the employer,  inclined as  Italian  law  is  to 
favour the rights of the individual. 
The Italian  style of union  is  supported  but not regulated 
and  is  fairly  stable,  as  evidenced  during  this  long  post-
constitutional phase.  Furthermore, to date it has not been 
affected  by  the  '~nterventionist " tendencies  of emergency 
labour law which has curbed labour costs but has not regu-
lated these issues. 
This  does  not  mean  that  tension  does  not  occur  in  this 
system.  The most  serious kind  derives from  the  dualism 
mentioned  at  the  beginning:  public-private,  small-large, 
and the crisis in union representation, especially in certain 
sectors (see below). 
In  small  companies  support  for  the  Statute  is  virtually 
non-existent, giving rise to a situation of laissez-faire to-
gether with substantial de-unionization, which is becoming 
increasingly widespread. 
In  public  employment,  more  direct  support  legislation 
(because  it  covers  bargaining)  has  been  translated  into 
complex regulations, with strong government intervention 
especially  towards the contracting parties.  The scope and 
incisiveness of heteronomous regulations has always char-
acterised public sector employment in Italy with respect to 
private sector employment: this is confirmed by the above 
mentioned  reform passed with Legislative Decree No.  29 
of  February 3, 1993. 
4. The social partners: trade unions 
and employers' associations 
The  least  regulated  area  of collective  labour  relations  is 
that  of the  partners  concerned:  unions  and  employers' 
organizations. 
a)  The  fact  that  these  organizations  are  among  associ-
ations  that are  not  recognized  does  not  stop  them  from 
being the sole reference point for the principal legal rela-
tionships - so they can stipulate collective agreements, call 
strikes and  be legitimate parties  to  legal  action.  In fact, 
this has helped to keep them out of the scope of case law 
intervention  in  internal  relations,  which  in  this  case has 
meant greater self-restraint than in other aspects of collec-
tive  relations,  and  explains  the  long-standing  diffidence 
typical of unions towards State intervention. 
The rejection of State intervention in internal union affairs 
and  activity has  been  the basis of traditional  opposition, 
established  for  both  social  partners  by  Article 39 of the 
Constitution,  which  made  legislative  support  and  espe-
cially erga omnes bargaining power conditional on unions 
having rules and obtaining official recognition, in addition 
to  single representative action being based on  the number 
of members. 
The absence of legal rules also affects union representation 
at company  level,  for  which  the  State recognizes certain 
rights in  the workplace,  but without establishing any or-
ganizational model. 
The only prerequisite for  legislative support in  this case, 
as  in others mentioned above,  is  that union representation 
must be within the framework of unions defined as repre-
sentative in compliance with a number of specific criteria, 
some  legislative  and  some  from  case  law  (membership, 
union  activity,  territorial representation,  representation of 
different sectors, and so on). 
Thus,  the concept of union representativeness has become 
a  filter  for  identifying  those  which  should  benefit  from 
special legislative support procedures, in place of registra-
tion,  which was envisaged by  Article 39 of the Constitu-
tion.  Owing  to  similar preoccupations,  Italian  legislators 
did not recognize that unions should have a general  right 
to  negotiate,  with a mutual  obligation on the part of em-
ployers. 
Legislators  held  that  a  sanction of this  kind  would have 
almost  inevitably  required  a  legislative  definition  of the 
partners  and  procedures  of negotiation,  and  thus  (to  a 
greater or lesser degree) of the union organization itself. 
In fact,  this has occurred in the public sector, which does 
envisage an obligation of this kind (a recent development, 
in  Outline Law 93 of  1983 and now in Legislative Decree 
No.  29 of  February 3, 1993). 
With  regard  to  plant  level  union  structures,  the  "Statuto 
dei  lavoratori" (Workers'  statute,  Law no.  300),  which 
governs union representation (Article 19), was the subject 
of a referendum in June  1995 aimed at its partial abroga-
tion.  This  referendum  was  promoted  by  smaller  unions 
and  was successful.  The article in  question was therefore 
amended  to  allow the constitution of union  structures in 
the workplace regardless of the degree of representative-ITALY 
ness of the unions  involved as  long as  these are party  to 
the collective agreements applied at the company in  ques-
tion. 
This attitude of promoting union action without regulating 
it was to encourage, after the post-war rebuilding period, a 
substantial  growth  in  union  organization  and  collective 
bargaining,  which  became  particularly  intense  between 
1968 and 1978. 
Unionization  has  now  reached  average-to-high  levels  in 
Europe, while previously it was extremely low. 
b)  The organizational pattern of Italian unions was based 
right from the beginning on a combination of vertical (fed-
erations at sectoral level) and horizontal structures - em-
ployees' associations and unions at territorial level culmi-
nating in the Confederation. This is quite an unusual com-
bination,  which has  something  in  common  with  Swedish 
unions. 
The presence of a strong horizontal component is  no  lon-
ger a sign of weakness as  it was originally, though it still 
is today in the French system.  Its function is to  follow up 
union initiatives which extend as  far as economic policies 
and control of the negotiating independence of sectors of 
employment. 
Union representation at the workplace,  traditionally weak 
in Italy,  strengthened towards the end  of the  1960s espe-
cially  in  industry,  with  the  proliferation of union  repre-
sentatives and works councils.  The organization followed 
a model similar to that of the single union pattern channel 
(shop-stewards). The transformation which has taken place 
in  recent  years,  due  to  the  changing  workforce  and  the 
difficult  relations  between  the  various  unions,  has  seri-
ously affected this single representation. 
Recent years have seen increasing efforts on the part of the 
unions to overcome their growing crisis of representative-
ness through the identification of new models of organisa-
tion at plant level.  One of the outcomes of these efforts is 
the tripartite agreement reached in July  1993  between un-
ions,  government and enterprises which addressed, among 
many  others,  the  issue  of union  representation  at  plant 
level. 
This agreement calls  for  the constitution of unitary plant 
level  structures with a mixed composition.  The composi-
tion, in fact,  depends for 2/3 on election by all  the work-
ers  in  the  plant,  regardless  of whether  they  are  union 
members or not. The remaining seats (113) are assigned to 
the  unions  which  signed  the  industry-wide  collective 
agreement applying to the company involved, and distrib-
uted among these in proportion to the votes they receive. 
This original new model  of union  plant level  representa-
tion  confirms  the  traditional  preference of Italian  unions 
for  ''single  channel" representation.  It was  in  the promot-
ers' intentions to see the model reinforced by a law modi-
fying  Article 19 of the  "Statuto dei lavoratori" (Workers' 
Statute).  After  the  referendum  which  partially  abrogated 
Article 19 there has been much disagreement on the expe-
diency of legislation governing plant-level union represen-
tation, and prospects are still vague and uncertain. 
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The  difficulties  encountered  in  the  past  years  by  plant 
level  union  structures  reflect  a  crisis  in  representation 
which  affects  the  whole  of the  trade-union  movement. 
Signs of this have been a fall  in the number of members in 
the  traditionally  strong  area  of blue-collar employees  in 
medium and large industry, which has been hit by restruc-
turing; moreover, there has been little support in tradition-
ally under-represented areas which are now growing, like 
middle and top white-collar staff, employees in the service 
sector and  in small production units.  In the service sector 
the threat comes from the spread of autonomous types of 
representation  - strongly  linked  to  sectoral  and  occupa-
tional  interests  (virtually  non-existent  in  Italy  to  date) 
which  express  their claims  with  considerable  immediacy 
and criticize the traditional union movement for excessive 
mediation as regards "general" objectives and interests. 
The  difficulty  experienced  in  responding  effectively  to 
such social and industrial changes is common to unions in 
all  the industrialized countries. In Italy, this is aggravated 
by  political divisions between  the three major union con-
federations which  result in  uncertainty,  at times in  strate-
gic inflexibility and also  in  delayed action.  These results 
are all the more evident when seen in the context of fresh 
initiatives on the part of companies and their organizations 
as regards industrial relations. 
c)  The organization of employers' associations is  tradi-
tionally  modelled  on  that of unions  - not only  in  Italy  -
and  this  has  resulted  in  the  same  dual  structure:  vertical 
and horizontal. 
The  horizontal  component  (territorial)  has  traditionally 
played a prevalent role, which has been greater than in the 
case of employees' unions, though for different reasons. In 
effect, only a few sector-level federations of Con.findustria 
(the Italian  Manufacturers'  Association)  - Federmeccani-
ca,  Federchimici  and  Federtessile - conduct  independent 
union  activity,  which  is  in  any  case  supervised  by  the 
Confederation. 
Generally speaking,  it is  significant that the solidarity of 
employers' associations,  their control over affiliated com-
panies  and  the  initiative  they  are capable of showing  in 
industrial  relations  are  all  traditionally  small-scale.  This 
reflects  to  a  large  extent  the  dualism  mentioned  above 
affecting the economic composition of the country and the 
associated  differences of interests among  the various sec-
tors of employers. 
Also significant -and typically Italian -is that employers' 
associations are not just structured by large sectors of the 
economy or company size (cf Confindustria, Confcommer-
cio,  Confagricoltura,  Confapi,  Confederazioni  dell 'Arti-
gianato  and  Coltivatori  Diretti),  but  also  by  type  of 
ownership, in the wake of the withdrawal in  1957 of pub-
licly-owned companies from  Confindustria and  the estab-
lishment  of Intersind  (publicly-owned  companies  in  the 
engineering  industry)  and  ASAP  (publicly-owned  compa-
nies in the petrochemical industry). 
The role played by these latter associations has been inde-
pendent and significant, especially in the 1960s when they 
helped  to  promote industrial  relations that were far  more 
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the other hand, appears likely to be less relevant due both 
to the present process of privatisation which public enter-
prises are undergoing and  to  the reduction of State inter-
vention  in  the  economy.  This  new  activism,  which  is  a 
relatively  new  development  on  the  part of employers  in 
industrial relations and largely reflects the crisis of union 
representation, appears to be supported by initiatives from 
individual  employers rather than  by  the  various associa-
tions. It is also partly for this reason that the way forward 
and  the intervention machinery are still not well defmed, 
though a basic objective is to achieve a more flexible man-
agement of human resources in response to fiercer interna-
tional competition. 
The possibility of establishing  labour relations without a 
union is seen as realistic only in certain types of small and 
high-tech  companies.  Elsewhere,  entrepreneurial  policies 
seem to fluctuate between attempts at involving unions in 
"participatory" relations (as symbolized by the IRI protocol 
discussed below) and at limiting in  an  "opportunist" fash-
ion  the influence of union associations and  therefore the 
scope of collective industrial relations. 
5. The role of the State in collective labour relations 
a)  The  State  as  a  legislator of industrial  relations  and 
labour  relations  in  general  has  already  been  discussed, 
with emphasis on its traditional role as the  "guarantor" of 
minimum standards for working conditions and support of 
union activity (especially in the workplace) with little in-
tervention to  regulate institutionalization. It has also been 
mentioned that no change of course is predicted, along the 
lines of greater legislative intervention,  either in  individ-
ual  labour relations  (where deregulation  is  in  fact  being 
almost  universally  mooted)  or  in  collective  relations, 
where types of institutionalization which are autonomous 
and/or agreed upon by the partners are now being sought. 
Moreover,  in Italy  various public institutions have  tradi-
tionally played an  important part in  different areas of in-
dustrial  relations;  in  particular,  in the management of the 
labour market,  vocational  training,  social  security and  in 
the settlement of industrial disputes. 
b)  Most of these  institutions are tripartite,  with one of 
the social partners predominating - i.e. one of the unions 
representing  the two  partners  - motivated  principally  by 
the type of interests at stake. 
A similar institutional configuration has been the norm in 
all Italian union and political bodies, which have also been 
disinclined to accept other forms of organic participation, 
especially at company level. 
It appears  that  participation  in  public  institutions  with 
powers over social and labour issues has  been  considered 
more feasible and less compromising than participation at 
company  level.  To judge from  their powers,  the  import-
ance  of such  tripartite  institutions  is  quite considerable, 
especially in  matters  such  as  the  administration of social 
security and  the labour market.  Their action  has  contrib-
uted  to  the establishment of routine procedures  for  these 
issues in  which the social  partners participate, and  to  the 
dissemination  of  managerial  and  administrative  skills 
among  hundreds,  even  thousands,  of union  representa-
tives.  In  fact,  these  institutions  are  present  not  only  at 
national level, but are also decentralized. As regards social 
security,  administration  is  decentralized  at  provincial 
level, while for vocational training and the labour market 
there is greater decentralization to the regions, which have 
become increasingly involved in  such issues over the last 
few years. 
The  experience  acquired  in  these  institutions  by  union 
representatives has helped to persuade them to accept the 
risky process of flexible management of the labour market. 
It has also ensured that unions keep control of the fabric of 
small companies which cannot be reached by direct union 
action. 
The potential  influence of these  institutions has been  re-
duced  by  a  series of obstacles:  the limits which the  law 
imposes  on  the  independence  of their  decision-making 
(especially  in  the case of the social  security bodies);  the 
labourious  bureaucracy  of structures,  which  has  affected 
organizational efficiency;  the prevalence of bargaining or 
dispute  practices  which  in  certain  cases  have  impaired 
smooth functioning and  the opportunities for cooperation 
between the sides.  Despite all  this,  these forms of institu-
tional  participation  at  both  national  and  territorial  level 
have proved to  be useful  for the stability of Italian indus-
trial relations, and thus will undoubtedly be of great value 
in the European framework. 
c)  Intervention by  the State has  played an  important -
though at times novel - role in  Italian history, as a direct 
agent for industrial relations in the cases of social concer-
tation  at  top  level  which occurred in  Italy between  1970 
and  1993. These cases include: 
•  the 1977 settlement and subsequent legislation on the 
cost of labour; 
•  the tripartite (Scotti) agreement of 22 January 1983; 
•  the settlement protocol and the decree on the pay in-
dexation system of February  1984;  and  to  a certain 
extent 
•  the agreement between the unions and  Confindustria 
in 1986; 
•  the tripartite protocol of July 23,  1993  between gov-
ernment,  union organisations and  Confindustria  (the 
confederation of employers). 
One of the common  features  of these  cases,  as  in  other 
settlements in  Europe, is  the direct and decisive interven-
tion  of the  State  through  public  resources  (tax  relief for 
employees,  partial  relief for  social  security contributions 
paid by  employers, and active labour policies) to facilitate 
the consensus between the social partners, considered nec-
essary  for  greater economic  stability;  and  particularly to 
encourage self-regulation as  regards wages and  industrial 
action,  in  addition to  the acceptance of employers'  needs 
for greater flexibility and productivity. 
The turbulent events  of 1984-85  (i.e.  the  refusal  of the 
Communist CGIL union to come to an agreement with the 
government on 14 February 1984, and the organization by 
the PCI -the former Italian Communist Party- of a refer-
endum  to  repeal  the  law  on  the  pay  indexation  system) 
showed  the  political  and  economic  hazards  of such  at-
tempts  at  concertation.  Afterwards  the  practice  of con-
certation  went  through  a  period  of relative  slowdown, ITALY 
even if relations between government and the social actors 
remained  open,  albeit  limited  to  specific  issues  (as  for 
example the reform of the wage indexing system). 
More recently,  concertation  at  the highest  level  was  the 
centre of an extraordinarily significant event, the tripartite 
agreement of July 23, 1993. The importance of this agree-
ment lies in the fact that it addresses, in innovative terms, 
the main issues of the Italian industrial relations system. In 
fact  this agreement not only outlines new methods of ne-
gotiating wages to replace the wage indexation mechanism 
which was abolished in July  1992,  so ending a long con-
troversy between  social  actors;  it also defines a new  col-
lective bargaining structure (see below) and  new  methods 
of constituting union representation in the workplace (see 
above). 
The agreement  also  outlines  specific  commitments  from 
the Government:  promoting a more flexible labour policy 
to favour employment, especially youth employment, sup-
port to  the production system by  favouring  research  and 
technological  innovation  and  the  reform  of  vocational 
training system. 
The relevance and scope of the issues faced in the tripartite 
agreement of July 1993 explain why it has been defined as 
the  '~onstitution "of the Italian industrial relations system. 
d)  The State's role as  employer is  considerable,  due  to 
the large size of the public sector (which has already been 
mentioned),  and  to  the correlation between  the strategies 
and treatment of the public sector in comparison with the 
economy as a whole (shown by  the recognition of collec-
tive  bargaining  in  public  employment,  this  being  con-
firmed  and  reinforced  by  the  provisions  of Legislative 
Decree No.  29 of  February 3, 1993). 
In fact, this trend is common to many industrialized coun-
tries.  A good  example  was  the  agreement  in  November 
1985 on  indexation in public employment which - for the 
first  time - set  the  pattern  for  the  private sector,  subse-
quently followed  by  the  public  sector (wage  indexing  in 
the public sector has  been abolished, just as  the tripartite 
agreement of July  1993  abolished  wage  indexing  in  the 
private sector).  Finally,  and  potentially important for  the 
economy  as  a whole,  are the  directives  the  public  sector 
employer must  follow  in  respect of wage negotiation,  in 
compliance with government budgets which set the annual 
ceiling  for  increases  in  the  cost  of labour deemed  to  be 
compatible with economic stability. 
However,  the  public-sector compliance  with  these  direc-
tives has been disappointing in  the renewal of agreements 
in 1984 and particularly in 1988. This proves that binding 
provisions are  more  flexible  for  public employment  than 
the  constraints  of international  competition  in  collective 
bargaining in the private sector. 
To try and remedy this distortion, legislative decree no. 29 
of February 3, 1993 called for the constitution of an Agen-
cy for the negotiating representation of  public administra-
tions (ARAN), with the task of representing public employ-
ers  in  collective  bargaining.  ARAN acts  on  the  basis  of 
directives it receives from the Government, especially with 
regard to the total funding available for renewal of collec-
tive agreements. 
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The  first  experiences  in  collective bargaining  subsequent 
to  approval of legislative decree 29/1993 seem to demon-
strate  that  the  directives  are  being  strictly  applied  and 
show  ARAN  to  have  a  substantially  different  negotiating 
attitude than previous negotiators on the public side, often 
too compliant. 
CHAPTER II 
1. An overview of regulatory sources 
Regulatory sources in  Italian labour law generally follow 
the  typical  pattern  of Continental  systems,  starting  with 
hierarchy:  at  the  top  are the constitutional sources which 
determine the fundamental principles, then routine govern-
ment legislation, regulations and regional laws. 
First of all,  there are certain specific features which need 
to be pointed out. The Italian Constitution contains guide-
lines  which  are  particularly  significant,  both  regarding 
union matters and individual labour relations. 
The union rules set out in Articles 39, 40 and 46 have not 
for the most part been implemented for political and union 
reasons.  This  still  hinders  the  evolution  of Italian  law, 
especially  in  view  of possible  adaptation  to  a  European 
system.  In  fact,  an  explicit proposal  has  been  made  that 
Article 39 be  reviewed  where  it  requires  the  recognition 
and registration of a union. 
Conversely, Article 36 - which deals with fair pay  - has 
exerted considerable influence especially in case law, as it 
has  provided the  opportunity  indirectly to  ratify the erga 
omnes application  of minimum  wage  rates  (approved  by 
collective  agreements  and  Article 37)  which  has  laid  the 
foundations for  fair pay for  men  and women,  minors and 
adults. 
Routine  legislation  is  extremely  important  in  respect  of 
individual labour law.  In recent years, it has also affected 
regional legislation, as  vocational training is the province 
of regional  government.  However,  regional  government 
has intervened - at times through legislation - and dictated 
provisions for the organization of the labour market, as an 
incentive to employment. 
Traditional labour law, seen as a form of protection for the 
employee as the weaker of the two contracting parties, can 
usually  not  be  waived  unless  it  is  in  favour  of the  em-
ployee (called the principia del favor). The minimum stan-
dards covering the different aspects of the labour relation-
ship are usually improved by collective bargaining, which 
dictates the effective regulation of the relationship. 
2. Relations between legislation and collective wage 
agreements, foc~ing on labour market regulation 
In recent years the traditional relationship between the law 
and collective wage agreements has undergone a two-fold 
change. 
Previously  it  was  impossible  to  waive  protective  provi-
sions  unilaterally,  but  this  is  now  changing.  Different 
types  of exemption  are now  admitted  including  those  in 
pejus on  the  part  of collective  autonomy,  which  aim  at 
relaxing constraints considered  insupportable in  the man-
agement of the labour relationship at company and market 120  THE REGUUTION OF WORKING CONDIDONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
agement of the labour relationship at company and market 
level. 
On the other hand, legislative machinery for the control of 
bargaining  autonomy  has  been  introduced,  by  means  of 
provisions in melius that cannot be waived, usually regard-
ing the cost of labour. 
One area where flexibility  and consequently modification 
of the relationship between the law and wage agreements 
is urgently required is in the regulation of the labour mar-
ket.  In Italy regulation has always been rather strict, due 
in  part  to  the  typical  imbalance  in  employment.  At  the 
heart of this strict regulation is the system of government 
placement offices, which are the compulsory channels for 
recruitment.  Traditionally,  the  principle  is  that  the  em-
ployer has to forward an application to the placement of-
fice stating the number of employees to be taken on (a rule 
aimed at distributing employment vacancies according  to 
impartial  criteria,  such  as  seniority  of  registration  on 
"placement"(i.e.  "unemployment1 lists). However, the in-
flexibility of the system compounded by  the  inefficiency 
of local  labour offices has exacerbated the inadequacy of 
this rule, which was first evaded de facto and  then grad-
ually modified by the legislator until  it was finally super-
seded by Law 223 of  1991. 
Law 223 substituted the old principle according to which 
employers were sent workers from the employment office 
on  the  basis of a  numbered  roll  call  with a  new system 
according  to  which employers could  tum to  the employ-
ment office and request the worker they intend to hire by 
name. Decree Law No.  326 of  August 4,  1995 takes this a 
step  further:  employers can  now  employ  people directly 
themselves, provided they notify the employment office of 
the name of the  person  hired  within  five  days  of hiring 
them.  This area of labour law can  therefore now be con-
sidered substantially deregulated.  For the rest,  Italian Jaw 
has been remarkably cautious in  attempting to deregulate 
long-standing provisions for the protection of employees. 
Certain departures from the law have been allowed, but on 
condition that there is an agreement between the partners, 
for example on the issue of the prohibition of night-work 
for women (Article 5, Law 903 of  1977) and limitations to 
the fixed-term contract (Law 56 of  1987).  The agreement 
between the partners often needs to be combined with ad-
ministrative measures  or supplemented  by  these,  the  ex-
emption being the ultimate responsibility of administrative 
measures - for example, exemptions from the inviolability 
of seniority in  the transfer of an  undertaking (new Article 
2112  of the  Civil  Code),  and  exemptions  to  placement 
provisions entrusted to the Regional Commission for Em-
ployment (Laws 140 of  1981  and 56 of  1987, now super-
seded by Law 223 of  1991). 
The most common proposals are not for total deregulation, 
but rather modification of provisions usually referred to as 
"re-regulation ''in an attempt to cut down the body of reg-
ulations  and  make  them  more  flexible,  supported  by  the 
joint contribution of the partners and  the  public authori-
ties. 
An essential system for the regulation of the labour market 
- many consider it the main one - is the Cassa lntegrazio-
ne  Guadagni  (lay-off  fund),  which  guarantees  80%  of 
basic earnings for employees in companies and sectors in 
difficulty or undergoing restructuring. The Cassa 1ntegra-
zione has been  a  very  effective way of safeguarding in-
come  and  employment,  thus  assisting  companies  going 
through a bad phase and their employees. In this sense, it 
has  been  an  indirect  way  of protecting  employees  from 
dismissal due to  staff cutbacks,  which have been  few  in 
number (despite the fact that Italy did not comply with EC 
directives  on  this  matter  until  Law 223  of 1991).  The 
lay-off fund  also indirectly encouraged  flexibility  in em-
ployment,  as  it  contributed  to  large-scale  structural 
changes  in  Italian  industry without the need  to  resort to 
mass redundancies. Similarly, it helped to safeguard union 
presence and action in cases of industrial restructuring. 
Recourse to the lay-off fund has been largely undifferenti-
ated,  with parties using  practices outside the law for  the 
obvious mutual benefits which can be gained from resort-
ing to this social  "buffer~ Consequently, various proposals 
have been made to redress these extremes and improve the 
control  of lay-off funds  leading  to  recent  reform of this 
issue by Law 223 of  1991. 
This  model  of flexibility,  negotiated  and  supported  by 
public  bodies,  appears  sufficiently  well-established  and 
amenable to the social partners to be able to last.  Thus, it 
is unlikely that it will be seen by the Italians as a key issue 
as regards the harmonization of European rights. 
The  regulation  of the  Italian  labour  market  has  always 
been  marked  by  two  critical  issues  - particularly on the 
European front  - with regard to a)  small and very small 
companies  and  production  units,  and  b)  the  efficacy  of 
protective provisions in general and their relationship with 
"promotional "provisions. 
3. Legal protection and its scope: 
the issue of a minimwn threshold 
The traditional reference point of Italian labour law and its 
vario'us components is the large industrial company and, in 
parallel, white-collar staff in the public service. This dom-
inance of the  large-scale dimension  tends  to  overshadow 
small production units and their growing importance. This 
has  two consequences:  firstly,  the  formal  extension - as 
undifferentiated  as  it  is  ineffective  - of many  systems 
modelled  on  large  industry  to  small  units;  secondly,  the 
exemption of small  units from  various aspects of routine 
regulations  (an  unduly  broad  formal  exemption  ranging 
from immunity from other liabilities under the law to the 
non-application of collective wage agreements in the black 
economy). 
Such  opposing  tendencies  have  precluded  until  recently 
any adaptation and specialization of regulations to the spe-
cific situation of smaller units.  Consequently,  the  fall  in 
the average size of production units below the threshold 
for the application of labour law to public employment and 
bargaining  (which  varies  from  country  to  country)  has 
progressively restricted the scope of labour law. 
The consequences have become even more serious,  given 
the fact that the law has shown little inclination or capacity 
to  address  the  labour  market  as  such,  by  going  beyond 
individual relations and companies. ITALY 
These  trends  are  common  to  all  industrialized  countries 
and have little by little impaired the regulatory capacity of 
labour law, which is  more serious than  forms  of explicit 
deregulation or the selectivity of safeguards. This trend is 
only  partly countered  by  Law 108 of 1990,  which  pro-
vided for (financial)  protection against unfair dismissals, 
even in the case of employees from small production units 
(which  had  previously  been  excluded  from  any  kind  of 
protection). 
It is therefore evident that the very concept of minimum 
protective regulation must be rethought, so it can address 
practical issues, in order to make it more effective. This is 
all the more important on the European scene,  where the 
issue at stake is how to flesh out a realistic and acceptable 
basic social threshold. 
It is unlikely that such a threshold can be built up from a 
combination of the different minima in the various coun-
tries. Selection is necessary,  but which does not sacrifice 
standards held to be essential. 
On  the subject of content,  this would appear to  concern 
not  only  the  basic  principles  (at  European  level  too)  of 
health and  safety,  but also  social  security  standards;  the 
safeguarding of  jobs, by ensuring against unfair dismissal; 
and  the safeguarding of professionalism (even where mo-
bility is necessary). 
Regarding the machinery of intervention, which is essen-
tial  for  effectiveness,  recent  debate  has  provided  some 
general indications which may be significant. 
a)  A minimum  ~afety-net  "for mobility within the exist-
ing  labour market is only  feasible  outside the  individual 
labour relationship,  if it is  to work on the principle of a 
Jail-safe " mechanism.  Such  a  system  is  barely  feasible 
where tenure of employment is rigidly guaranteed, while it 
can  benefit  from  a  series  of different  measures:  services 
and  incentives  for  mobility,  professional  retraining  and 
re-employment  through  the  proper  bodies  (e.g.  recruit-
ment agencies);  machinery for public and collective con-
trol  over  restructuring  and  thus  over  external  mobility; 
control  over  decision-making  processes  which  strongly 
influence conditions of employment at company level and 
in  the  labour  market;  and  types  of income  support,  for 
example in cases of redundancy not caused by dismissal to 
replace the present system of unemployment benefit.  Re-
form of this kind is all the more urgent for social security 
benefits,  following  the  crisis of the welfare state system 
which  has  spread  to  many  industrialized  countries.  The 
recent pension reform, implemented with approval of Law 
No.  335 of  August 8,  1995, falls  in  this context.  Said re-
form is centred around a change in the method of calculat-
ing  pensions:  from  being  based  on  the  wages  a  worker 
receives it is now based on the actual social security con-
tributions paid in. 
It has been suggested that labour law be divided into two 
"bands~  the  first  would  include  guaranteed  minimum 
wages and legal provisions (strictly regulated in Italy), but 
also  reappraisal  of contents  and  recipients;  the  second 
would not be based so much on fundamental  provisions -
legal  or collective - as on guidelines and  rules of proce-
dure. This would provide more room for flexible forms of 
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bargaining  and  collective  participation  - also  individual 
bargaining, especially on the part of employees with ave-
rage-to-high qualifications for whom the freedom to nego-
tiate employment conditions is a realistic prospect.  A re-
view of the external and internal limitations of labour law 
would imply a change not only in the method of establish-
ing standards, but also in control and disciplinary machin-
ery. 
b)  The  effectiveness  of the  first  '1Jand" of provisions 
(minimum  safeguards)  is  doubtful,  due  to  the  change-
ability and excessive fragmentation of the labour market. 
The disciplinary method has proved to be most ineffective 
where  violations  are  being  examined,  especially  penal 
ones. Awareness of this ineffectiveness explains the grow-
ing recourse (even in Italy) to incentive and control meth-
ods which condition the eligibility of companies - espe-
cially small  ones  - for various kinds of benefit,  and  the 
observance  of collective  bargaining  and  legal  standards. 
These include Article 36 of the Workers' Statute (the pro-
totype of this method),  measures to boost employment of 
young people (Law 863 of  1984); provisions under finan-
cial  law for assumption by the government of part of em-
ployers'  social  security  contributions,  and  rules  on  the 
eligibility for national and European funds directed at vo-
cational training. The effectiveness of these types of regu-
lation for such issues depends on the existence of machin-
ery  to  monitor compliance with  the  required  conditions. 
Owing to  a  scattered  labour market,  it is  less  likely  that 
this task will be carried out effectively by the local labour 
inspectorates than  by associations of the partners and the 
many  territorial  bodies with  mixed  participation that ad-
minister such services and benefits, supported by the com-
pulsory exchange of information where required between 
the public bodies  responsible for paying out the benefits 
and union organizations. 
c)  On the other hand, if the minimum social threshold is 
to be really adapted, it will have to contain more than just 
basic protection standards, by promoting better work con-
ditions and opportunities. 
The notion of labour law which not only protects but also 
promotes goes well back into history, but it has been used 
very  little  in  practice.  Most provisions  (and  not only  in 
Italy)  have  focused  on  the safeguarding of jobs and em-
ployees'  working  conditions,  and  the  (partial)  protection 
of redundant employees' incomes.  Less attention has been 
paid to  the creation of new jobs, the provision of job op-
portunities for the unemployed, the fight against discrimi-
nation and a better distribution of existing work. 
This is  the new  objective of labour law,  at both national 
and Community level. 
An increasingly important part is being played by legisla-
tion aimed principally at fighting sex discrimination in the 
workplace (Law 903 of  1977 and  more recently Law 125 
of  1991, with new methods such as affirmative action). 
d)  However, the need to redistribute and improve work 
opportunities is  now also affecting various groups of un-
derprivileged workers in the labour market: young people, 
those living in depressed areas like the South of Italy, and 
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elderly people will  undoubtedly  pose a number of novel 
problems for labour law and social security, altering both 
the  lifetime  work  cycle,  and  also  the  traditional  canons 
which determine unfitness for work. 
In  the past fifteen  years this issue has  become significant 
in other countries, pointing to  the need to reduce such an 
unusually  high  rate  of unemployment.  It is  no  longer 
merely a question of improving opportunities for  limited 
groups of employees but of redistributing the  few  vacan-
cies  that are available,  and  promoting  new jobs both  in 
permanent employment and self-employment. 
One proposal  is  to  look differently at  the question of re-
duction and  re-organization of working hours, as a means 
of redistributing  work  and  not  (simply)  of safeguarding 
workers' health. 
Another proposal  is  to  overhaul  the system of incentives 
used  to  date,  due to  the different scale on which it is  ap-
plied.  Better selection criteria and machinery for managing 
and controlling incentives are now needed,  in addition to 
new  kinds  of support  - especially  for  the  self-employed 
(services,  etc.).  For this  purpose,  labour law  machinery 
must interact with company law and fiscal  law and public 
economic  legislation,  both  at  central  and  local  level.  In 
reality, this is a whole new area of labour law, which will 
mean  its extension from  the individual  relationship to  the 
labour market  as  a whole,  and  also  to  company  law  and 
the economy. 
4. Activities of the partners: an 
overview of collective bargaining 
The collective wage agreement is part of private law in the 
Italian legal system, and  is not usually considered a source 
of law.  However  its  prescriptive  function  - now  widely 
recognized  - is expressed in  the regulation (whose provi-
sions cannot be waived except in  favour of the worker) of 
individual  labour  relationships.  The  political  importance 
of this  is  such  that it is  the  main  government procedure, 
used for nearly all key aspects of the labour relationship. 
This is  true in  practice (with complete agreement on  this 
by the social partners) and also under the law, as the Ital-
ian  system  gives  great  importance to  the  collective wage 
agreement,  to  the  extent of making  it  virtually  the  only 
procedure  used  for  regulating  individual  and  collective 
labour  relations.  In  fact,  Italian  law  has  always  been 
''one-track" from  this point of view.  Incidentally,  neither 
the use of participatory procedures for  solving individual 
and collective problems by means of cooperation nor theo-
ries  propounded  on  them  have  ever played  a  significant 
role. 
It is  no  coincidence  that  Article 46 of the  Constitution, 
which ratifies employees' rights to participate in company 
management,  is the weakest, or rather the  ''emptiest ·~  pro-
vision in the Constitution. 
It has only been in recent years that interest has started to 
grow in  types of collective action that differ from collec-
tive bargaining. Due to its central position, collective bar-
gaining  is  affected  by  the  lack  of institutionalization  and 
uncertainty  concerning  its  legal  status,  also  common  to 
other aspects of industrial relations. 
Collective bargaining in the private sector has traditionally 
been conducted outside specific rules with regard to proce-
dures, subject, and actors. This high degree of informality 
has been modified in  part by the provisions of the tripar-
tite  agreement  of July  23,  1993.  The  collective  wage 
agreement as such has acquired a legal identity on the ba-
sis of common law principles deriving from  "creative" case 
law. The effectiveness of the agreement cannot be waived, 
and  is  valid  only  for  those  belonging  to  stipulated  (em-
ployers') associations - the only case of this kind in Eu-
rope. 
The legal fragility of this system with the absence of erga 
omnes application (due to lack of implementation of Arti-
cle 39 of the Constitution, discussed below) was offset by 
the astounding development of unionization in  the  1960s 
and  1970s,  after which  the general  application of collec-
tive wage agreements began to appear feasible. 
However, in recent years the situation has become critical 
again, due to serious economic problems and the profound 
changes  in  labour relations already  mentioned.  This state 
of affairs has called into question the scope of actual appli-
cation  of the  agreement on account  of the  weakening  of 
union  representation.  Thus  there  is  now a  pressing  need 
for  legislation  which  would  guarantee  if not  the  erga 
omnes application of collective agreements (necessitating a 
review  of Article  39 of the  Constitution)  at  least  basic 
minimum  wages  for  sectors  where  collective agreements 
are not used  (such  as  small  companies and  marginal  sec-
tors).  Changes have even affected the prescriptive scope of 
collective agreements,  since  their contents do  not always 
achieve improvement but merely alteration, at times wor-
sening  wage  rates  and  regulations.  Furthermore,  this  af-
fects  areas of the traditional labour relationship - the do-
main where employers exercise power (see below). 
The low level of institutionalization of industrial relations 
in  Italy can  be seen just as clearly in the lack of develop-
ment of and  lack of sanctions as  regards the binding part 
of a wage agreement:  clauses of peaceful  conduct by  un-
ions,  and  clauses of coordination at  the various levels of 
bargaining. 
Only recently has a change in  tendency been noted,  with 
attention turning again to the use of bargaining clauses as 
a means of laying down the rules of the game and proce-
dures agreed upon between the parties (for example on the 
subject of cooling off and the prevention of industrial ac-
tion, discussed below). 
In  this  perspective  there  was  also  a  kind  of dualism  as 
regards  the  public  sector,  where  conversely  collective 
agreements were strictly regulated  by Law 93 of 1983 in 
respect of various aspects including procedures, partners, 
content and efficacy. 
This regulation, though it has ensured the nominal validity 
of prescriptive effects, has not contributed to the speed or 
certainty of procedures  (laborious due  to  endemic delay) 
nor has it strengthened the reliability of the partners or the 
development  of procedures  to  prevent  industrial  action. 
With approval of Legislative Decree No.  29 of  February 3, 
1993,  the  model  of collective  bargaining  in  the  public 
sector was brought closer to the one adopted in the private ITALY 
sector.  However collective bargaining in  the civil service 
still rests on detailed regulations, especially with regard to 
actors and procedures. 
5. The structure of collective bargaining 
The complexity of the Italian  system of wage agreement 
and  its precarious equilibrium are evident from  the struc-
ture of bargaining, which is -conducted at three levels -in-
ter-confederal,  sectoral,  company  and  at  times, 
territorial - a structure which is unique to Italy. 
The importance of the different levels and their reciprocal 
relations  have  altered  over  the  years.  The  role  of in-
ter-confederal  bargaining  grew  during  the  post-war 
re-building period, then between 1975 and 1985 alongside 
high inflation. Thus, this level is characteristic of times of 
crisis. It has,  in fact,  had a mainly protective function  in 
defining minimum prescriptive standards for pay or rights 
within  large sectors of the economy  (for example,  in  the 
early  post-war  period,  the  agreements  on  collective  and 
individual dismissals, on internal councils, and later on the 
Cassa  Integrazione  lay-off fund  and  the  pay  indexation 
system). 
This system may  even extend to  political  bargaining with 
the  State, as  has  happened  in  some cases of concertation 
already mentioned,  such cases taking on functions of con-
trol and calming of bargaining at lower levels. 
National  sectoral agreements have been the focal  point of 
the  system  since  the  1950s,  and  their  content  relates  to 
most  pay  and  working  conditions,  for  which  they  lay 
down standard regulations which may be supplemented by 
companies. 
During  the  1970s,  bargaining  was  extended  to  include 
qualitative aspects  in  the  management of the  labour rela-
tionship  (i.e.  environment,  workloads,  staff,  mobility, 
overtime) and company policies (with the introduction of 
union rights to  information on  and  monitoring of invest-
ments,  industrial  restructuring,  etc.).  Bargaining at  com-
pany level  proved decisive during the strong progression 
and  innovation of the system between  1968  and  1975.  It 
was decisive for the negotiation of agreements on pay con-
ditions  and  extra  provisions  in  addition  to  standard  na-
tional provisions,  linked to  specific production situations 
and  the ability  to  pay  of individual  companies,  with  no 
hard and fast  limits in  these areas.  Attempts to  pre-empt 
bargaining by deferment clauses in the national agreements 
were usually unsuccessful due to union resistance or oppo-
sition.  Only  recently  has  there  been  renewed  interest  in 
better coordination between  levels of bargaining  (see  be-
low). 
It is evident that the Italian system tends towards structural 
bipolarism  at  two  major  levels.  During  the  period  of 
growth  between  1968  and  1975,  these  two  levels  were 
national and  company-level  bargaining,  while in  the  fol-
lowing  decade  the  inter-confederal  approach  tended  to 
replace the sectoral level  in  the wake of the gradual cen-
tralization of the whole system. 
After 1985,  the trend swung towards a (further) decentra-
lization  of bargaining,  which  reduced  the  importance  of 
inter-confederal bargaining, and according to  some, seem-
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ed  set  to  overshadow the  role of national  sectoral  agree-
ments. 
This decentralization reflected general  trends in  the econ-
omy, encouraged by  the new and flexible industrial tech-
nologies.  It often appears to have been fostered  by entre-
preneurial  initiative,  in  spite of what happened  between 
1968 and  1975 when entrepreneurs tried to resist bargain-
ing  decentralization  by  imposing  limits  on  the  issues 
which it could tackle. 
However, on this occasion the move towards decentraliz-
ation was also checked and controlled by the centre.  Em-
ployers' associations themselves recognized the continuing 
importance of the  national  agreement  as  an  element  of 
stability  for  the system.  This was  particularly true in  the 
case of the multitude of small companies which constitute 
most of Italy's industrial structure and for which bargain-
ing at national level is really the only possible solution. 
Though there are few  data on the percentage cover of the 
different levels of bargaining, analysis of pay differentials 
shows that figures are high - from 30 to  40%  - from the 
point  of view  of company  size,  which  is  also  a  conse-
quence of the varying extent of company-level bargaining. 
The  multiplicity  of contractual  levels  and  above  all  the 
absence of a precise functional  coordination between the-
se,  understandable during a period of growth in  the sys-
tem,  has  progressively  become  an  element of instability 
and an  obstacle to its development. This explains why the 
social  actors were basically  in  agreement on the  need  to 
define new rules,  as evidenced by the outcome of the tri-
partite agreement of July 23, 1993. 
The  chapter  of the  agreement  dedicated  to  bargaining 
structures calls for two bargaining levels: a)  industry-wide 
national collective agreement and b) a second decentralised 
company or territorial  level  agreement (when  fragmenta-
tion  of a  specific  industry  sector  makes  plant level  bar-
gaining impracticable). This does not prejudice the role of 
the interconfederal level as a general political guideline for 
the system and a forum for concertation with the govern-
ment. 
The  tripartite agreement  also  establishes  the  duration  of 
industry-wide agreements,  set at four years for the provi-
sions governing non-wage aspects of labour relations and 
two years for those provisions governing wages.  The fact 
that wages can be renegotiated every two years is an effort 
to  find  a  substitute  for  the  old  wage  indexing  system 
which was abolished in a preceding interconfederal agree-
ment in July 1992. According to the new provisions, wage 
levels are set by industry-wide collective wage agreements 
with  reference,  among  other things,  to  the forecast  infla-
tion rate. To protect real wages it has been established that 
when wages come up for review every two years this ne-
gotiation  will  take  into  account  any  differences  between 
programmed inflation and  real  inflation. The second level 
collective agreements also last four years and can be stipu-
lated  on  the  basis  of timing  and  subjects  established  by 
national  collective agreements.  These allow  for  different 
wage levels to be set in relation to productivity and profit-
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The agreement of July 23,  1993 also sets a number of pro-
cedural rules to  support the collective bargaining process. 
Specifically  it  calls  for  the  negotiating  platforms  to  be 
presented at least three months before agreements' expire: 
this period and the month  following  the expiry date is  to 
be a 
11Cooling-off period • during which  no  form  of union 
conflict is permitted. 
Legislative Decree No.  29 of  February 3, 1993 outlined a 
similar bargaining structure for the public sector. 
It is also quite likely that the harmonization of European 
systems will have to  proceed with extreme caution, with-
out  trying  to  force  collective  issues  like  bargaining, 
which- even more than legal structures- are deeply root-
ed in  the tradition and socio-political equilibrium of each 
individual  country.  Tentative  efforts  by  the  partners  to 
establish  transnational  forms  of bargaining  (possibly  by 
means of Community guidelines) would appear more like-
ly  to  produce uniform bargaining practices than  inflexible 
legal measures. 
6. Labour case law 
From  the  formal  viewpoint,  court decisions  are not con-
sidered a source of law, but rather ways of enforcing exist-
ing  laws.  However,  it is  important to  bear in  mind  that 
decisions relating to enforcement generally contain plenty 
of room  for  manoeuvre.  In  labour  law  the  flexibility  of 
case  law  has  been  considerable,  especially  in  the  more 
critical areas of collective relations, where there has been 
no  legislation.  These areas  include the regulation  of the 
right to  strike, consequences of collective bargaining and 
minimum wage rates, and even matters where legal provi-
sions  are  particularly  elastic,  like union  rights  (as  under 
Law 300 of  1970), protection against dismissal, and equal 
pay. 
7. International sources 
International conventions are not self-executory in Italy, in 
principle. 
If they are to  be  effective in  union and  labour law,  they 
have to  be ratified with subsequent amendments of Italian 
legislation. 
In  some  cases,  the  concept  of amendment  may  be  fairly 
flexible,  in  so  far  as  international  directives  are  generic 
and can be implemented in different ways. 
For  example,  Italy  ratified  the  International  Labour 
Organization  convention  on  minimum  wage  rates  in  the 
1930s, when it was possible to guarantee minimum levels 
under the existing system of erga omnes collective agree-
ments. 
Subsequently, the corporative regime declined and collec-
tive wage agreements  became effective only  between  the 
partners (and  their associates},  so  it  is  doubtful  whether 
the  ILO directive can still be considered valid, despite the 
fact  that there are various ways of extending the scope of 
agreements  reached  via  collective  wage  agreement,  first 
and foremost by case law on Article 36 of the Constitution 
(see below) regarding fair pay. 
The nature of direct prescriptive sources derives from cer-
tain  rulings  made  by  Community authorities,  without the 
need  for  national  legislation.  This  is  true  of regulations 
and  rulings  on  specific  issues,  while directives are not a 
direct  source,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above.  In any 
case  the  vertical  effectiveness  of Community  directives, 
subject to the conditions set forth by the Court of  Justice, 
is well understood. 
The  influence of directives  - and  more generally  of the 
EEC - on national law is on the increase, but for the pres-
ent  it  is  still hindered by the distinctive characteristics of 
national labour law. 
CHAPTER Ill 
1. Industrial disputes: features and limitations 
One of the traditional features of the Italian legal system, 
which is a consequence of factors  mentioned above, is its 
intensely contentious nature. 
In  reality, this tendency towards conflict has always been 
among the strongest on  the international scene.  It is  only 
loosely  controlled  from  the  institutional  point  of view, 
given the lack of procedural rules, and is regulated only to 
an  insignificant  degree  by  economic  trends  - political 
events possibly having a greater influence. 
In  the past,  unofficial  strikes were widespread.  These in-
cluded lightning, on-off and staggered strikes, used by the 
unions to maximize repercussions for industry while mini-
mizing  the  costs  for  employees.  This  trend  is  also  ex-
plained by  the lack of financial protection for striking em-
ployees in  Italy,  such as  strike funds,  which are common 
in other countries. 
Equally widespread in Italy is the practice of political stri-
kes (or rather economic-cum-political ones},  which aim at 
achieving economic and  social  reform by  Parliament and 
the  government.  This  practice  is  very  much  in  line with 
the  vocation  of the  Italian  unions,  which  goes  beyond 
unionism and has been given authoritative endorsement by 
the Constitutional Court,  as  it is seen as an expression of 
political activity on the part of the unions and thus an inte-
gral  part of democratic  representation.  This  practice was 
again applied in  a spectacular way when nation-wide stri-
kes  were  held  in  the  fall  of 1994  to  protest  against  the 
pension reform drafted by the Berlusconi government. 
From the legal point of view, the Italian system is marked 
by a lack of systematic legislation on disputes; this contin-
gency is provided for in Article 40 of the Constitution but 
has never been resorted to.  In reality, legislative abstentio-
nism is  also  common  in  other European  countries which 
have failed  to establish comprehensive legislation for stri-
kes,  perhaps  mindful  of earlier experiences and  certainly 
hindered  by  the unions.  Consequently the limits of indus-
trial  action,  in  Italy  as  elsewhere,  are  characterized  by 
complex legal regulations. 
Case law has identified a number of limits on-strikes, mak-
ing use of more or less explicit guidelines in the legal sys-
tem,  such  as  the  general  principles  of contract  law  or 
extra-contractual liability, especially in the case of unoffi-
cial strikes. These principles derive from existing criminal ITALY 
and administrative provisions, also used under Italian law, 
though with substantial modification by the Constitutional 
Court. 
Some  legal  trends  have  proved  to  be  relatively  tolerant 
towards  strikes  - though  not  towards  lock-outs  - more 
tolerant in  fact than other systems.  Also significant is the 
fact  that the right to strike is recognized as being an enti-
tlement of employees and  not of the union  movement as 
such,  in  accordance with a traditional  view held  both by 
Italian  case  law  and  jurisprudence.  Consequently,  it  is 
impossible to outlaw wildcat or unofficial strikes as such. 
Another typical  feature of the Italian  legal  system is  that 
case law - like prevailing legal commentary - has always 
refused to accept an  "implicit 
11 obligation of peaceful con-
duct by  a union,  essential  to  the nature of the  collective 
agreement seen as a  ''peace  treaty~ which guarantees that 
unions  (if not employees)  will  refrain  from  direct  indus-
trial action aimed at achieving a premature review of the 
terms negotiated. 
Furthermore,  in  Italy  forms  of consensual  control  (i.e. 
cooling-off, conciliation and arbitration clauses) and nego-
tiated  prevention  of industrial  action  have  been  slow  to 
evolve.  The cooling-off clause for  conflicts called for  by 
the tripartite agreement of July 23,  1993  (see above)  is  a 
significant  though  limited  innovation  in  this  regard.  A 
framework  for  self-regulatory mechanisms,  only  recently 
tried out to any great extent, is also lacking. Public media-
tion in labour disputes is more widespread. 
These features  are part and  parcel of the same basic  rea-
sons which have kept Italian industrial relations informal, 
unstable and relatively free from regulation. This has hin-
dered  the growth of the  binding  and  institutional  part of 
collective agreements,  and  even  more the development of 
bipartite mechanisms for negotiating agreements,  forms of 
social  concertation  and  participation  at  company  level. 
From this point of view as well, the tripartite agreement of 
July 23,  1993 could represent a turning point, the implica-
tions of which will be measurable in the coming years. 
There have also been some significant modifications to the 
forms and regulation of industrial disputes in the last few 
years, caused by changes in the socio-economic framework 
and  the general attitude of the partners towards industrial 
relations. 
The most important point is the downward trend in all the 
indicators of industrial action (duration, intensity, partici-
pation)  with  a  particularly  marked  decrease  in  political 
confrontations. Conversely, there has been minor disputes 
not controlled by unions, which are implicitly or explicitly 
contrary to union rulings, especially in the public and pri-
vate service sector. These are fuelled by organized groups 
of employees who contest the leadership of the confederal 
unions as representatives. 
Both these trends are common to  other countries,  even if 
the rate and features of industrial action are still unique in 
Europe. 
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2. Control mechanisms and prevention of disputes 
Equally  significant  among  recent  developments  is  the 
search  by  the  social  partners  for  mechanisms  to  control 
and prevent industrial action, supported by  the public au-
thorities (and encouraged by public opinion). 
These are new  efforts,  which are part of a general  trend 
towards  greater  regulation  of Italian  industrial  relations 
and thus towards consensual stabilization. 
One particularly noteworthy example in  this  sense is  the 
machinery set up by the IRI  protocol, which has been imi-
tated by some sector-level agreements. 
In  the case of disputes regarding  important technological 
and organizational innovations, the partners are committed 
to  suspending direct action  (i.e.  strikes by  the union and 
changes to  the status quo by  the company) until every at-
tempt has been made at conciliation under the agreement. 
The agreement  also  sets  out  a  form  of quasi-arbitration, 
entrusted to a group of experts (three chosen by the union, 
three by  IRI)  to whom the partners may tum in any dispute 
regarding the application of the protocol. If  the experts do 
not reach an agreement among themselves, the parties may 
appeal  to  a  commission  of three  "super-experts 
11  (former 
presiding judges of the  Constitutional  Court).  However, 
the experts' ruling is binding only in respect of the frame-
work of industrial  relations  set out in  the protocol  itself, 
and  therefore cannot be enacted in  law.  This fact  reflects 
the  caution  which  partners  have  shown  in  entrusting  the 
settlement of disputes to third parties. The procedure actu-
ally worked in  the few  cases in which it was tried out (in 
fact,  the experts' ruling was unanimous) and was accepted 
by the partners and there was therefore no need to bring in 
the three  "super-experts~ 
The effort to  find  control mechanisms for disputes is par-
ticularly difficult  in  the public sector and  public services 
in  particular.  The  1983  ''outline  law" on  public  employ-
ment  went  no  further  than  requiring  of prior  notice  of 
strikes and  encouraging a self-regulatory code on the part 
of the unions, making this a condition for the eligibility of 
unions for negotiations with public sector employers. 
The rise  in  self-regulatory  codes,  though  significant,  has 
obviously come up against problems of scope, as codes are 
only  binding  on  employees  represented  by  the  unions 
adopting them. 
These codes have been impaired by the contentious behav-
iour  of groups  of employees  which  are  sometimes  very 
small  - but  whose  position  is  critical  and  may  strongly 
affect  users  of their  services.  These  employees  usually 
represent a wide range of interests,  which are frequently 
very different to the traditional image of staff represented 
by the major union confederations. 
The  next  step  was  the  enactment  of Law  146 of 1990, 
approved by  union agreement and aimed  at strengthening 
control machinery for disputes in public services. The law 
entrusts  union  bargaining  with  the  task  of setting  mini-
mum  service standards,  which all  employees and  compa-
nies must be able to guarantee to safeguard users. This law 
also  makes  the  established  practice of precettazione (i.e. 
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selves for work) more effective, a measure which has to be 
taken when minimum standards are not respected. Finally, 
Law  146  gives  monitoring  and  mediation  powers  to  a 
commission of experts (see below). 
3. Public mediation 
Mediation by public authorities - the Ministry of  Labour 
and its  local  bodies,  the prefetti (government officials at 
provincial level) and regional offices - all play an import-
ant role in settling disputes. 
Mediation is conducted informally;  there is no restriction 
on the freedom of action of the partners, and effectiveness 
is largely dependent on the authority of the mediator,  the 
pressure exerted by  public opinion and  the specific con-
text. 
'Political II mediation conducted by the Ministry of  Labour 
in  cases  of national  disputes,  or by  other ministries  for 
disputes  in  specific  sectors,  is  of major  significance.  A 
crucial  role  in  mediation  is  also  played  by  regional 
government  inspectors,  especially  in  disputes  relating  to 
industrial  recession  and  restructuring which have serious 
consequences on the locality. 
In  many cases,  political mediation of this kind has virtu-
ally  become  arbitration  - and  such  "persuasive" tactics 
cannot in practice be refused by the partners. Mediation is 
almost always  "guided~  meaning  that  public  authorities 
tend to favour settlements of disputes in keeping with ob-
jectives that are generally considered to  be politically de-
sirable. An example of this was the control of inflation in 
the major disputes of the 1970s, and the need to reconcile 
the  safeguarding  of jobs with  the  need  for  economy  in 
disputes over industrial restructuring and recession. 
The imprecise definition of the responsibilities and powers 
of mediators, the frequent overlapping of such powers and 
the informal nature of intervention are also symptomatic of 
weaknesses in  the current mediation procedure.  The situ-
ation  has  reached  the point where urgent requests for re-
form  have  been  made  by  various  parties,  which  would 
produce a clearer definition of mediators' powers, enhance 
the role of regional-level mediation and above all  encour-
age the setting up of an independent specialist public body 
for  conciliation  and  arbitration,  run  by  a  professional 
staff. 
Up to  now these proposals have not been  acted  on.  The 
creation of an  effective system  for  mediating conflicts is 
still one of the priorities in  order to modernise the Italian 
industrial relations system. 
One significant step  forward  in  this  sense was  made  by 
Law 146 of 1990 on  strikes  in  the  public  services.  The 
National  Safeguards  Commission,  set up  by  this  law,  is 
empowered to mediate and to assist the partners in  reach-
ing  settlements  on  minimum  service  standards  which 
should  be  guaranteed  during  strikes,  to  assess  the  ade-
quacy of the agreements reached and to monitor the behav-
iour of the partners during disputes. The commission must 
make a proposal,  in the case of dissent between the part-
ners,  on the minimum standards of service to  be guaran-
teed  during  strikes  - though  this  would  not be forma II y 
binding - and the proposal would be raised to the level of 
quasi-arbitration  as  far  as  these  minimum  standards  are 
concerned. In the light of the first five years of application 
of Law  146/1990,  the  fact  that  the  mediation  powers 
awarded  the  Safeguards  Commission  are  concerned  only 
with the definition of basic services which must be  gua-
ranteed  has  turned  out  to  be  a  major  limitation.  In fact 
labour  conflicts  in  public  services,  especially  within  the 
transportation  sector,  continue  to  weigh  heavily  on  ser-
vices' users. This explains why many observers are calling 
for a reform of Law 146/1990 to give the above Commis-
sion  greater  powers  of mediation  in  disputes  involving 
public services. 
CHAPTER  IV 
1. An overview of the Italian system 
in the European framework 
On  the whole,  Italian industrial relations follow a pattern 
of weakly organized pluralism. This is subject to recurrent 
bouts of tension caused by external factors (such as econ-
omic and  political  problems) and internal factors  (princi-
pally political divisions among unions). The indeterminate 
nature of laws  governing industrial  relations in Italy and 
the apparent fragility of the economy are exacerbated by 
difficult relations with  the political  system,  which  in  the 
last years have been aggravated by the uncertain perspec-
tives of the system itself. 
In  view of such factors,  it is not surprising that the diffi-
culties encountered everywhere with pluralist models (es-
pecially  from  the  mid-1970s  onwards)  have  been  com-
pounded in the Italian system, and remedies tried in other 
contexts have proved to be hard to implement. 
a)  Despite  all  this,  Italy  has  managed  to  uphold  a 
strongly consensual policy, which can be seen in the fun-
damental role played by collective bargaining as a proce-
dure for regulating labour relations. 
This is  a  typical  feature  of many  European  systems and 
will  undoubtedly have a profound influence on the pros-
pects  for  harmonization  within  the  Community.  In  fact, 
despite  serious  problems  in  recent  years  the  consensual 
participatory  and  bargaining  procedure  has  remained  a 
solid  point of reference  for  industrial  relations  in  many 
countries. 
The  methods  of  collective  bargaining,  starting  with 
sectorial  bargaining  at  national  and  regional  level,  have 
been  able  to  resist  moves  towards  decentralization  and 
fragmentation.  The margin for negotiation left for individ-
ual  labour agreements (and the individualization of labour 
relations) has been correspondingly limited. 
These trends,  opposing  though  they  are,  would  seem  to 
indicate  that  the  collective  and  voluntary  dimension  of 
industrial relations remains the crucial factor in the Euro-
pean social sphere. 
If this  is  the case,  social  partners will  play a key  role in 
building up this sphere. 
b)  A  list  follows  of  areas  where  the  trend  towards 
negotiated settlements has  developed  in  a particularly in-
novative way in Italy (in common with other countries): ITALY 
•  the development of combined forms of reduction and 
re-organization of working hours and times; 
•  management of active  labour policies,  including  the 
promotion of mobility and vocational training/re-trai-
ning; and the many  initiatives which aim to  support 
employment,  especially  within  underprivileged 
groups  and  areas.  This  is  probably  the  issue  which 
most  parties  agree  on,  even  if few  concrete  results 
have so far been achieved; 
•  the recent introduction of new technologies and,  more 
generally, of innovations into companies.  In  reality, 
the use of participatory methods is controversial and 
lacking  in  uniformity  in  several  countries,  with  a 
marked  preference  for  the  effects  of innovation  on 
labour relations rather than  innovative options them-
selves, which are still the exclusive province of man-
agement.  Consequently, participation in  this sense is 
limited  to  information.  Despite  this,  the  consensual 
procedure  enjoys  popularity,  especially  when  com-
pared with models prevalent overseas. 
c)  Another point to  stress is  that the different forms  of 
flexibility  as  regards  working  conditions  and  the  labour 
market are largely based on agreement and  social control, 
with  pure  and  simple  deregulatory  solutions  remaining 
unpopular, in line with a trend typical in Europe. 
The common objective of flexibility has meant adjustments 
and  reductions  in  the  core of labour  law  that  cannot  be 
waived.  There are still controversies between the partners 
over the  acceptable  limits  of flexibility  and  the  ways  of 
adapting protective machinery,  for  example  the  diversity 
of positions in Europe on the issue of fixed-term contracts. 
However,  the  choices  made  (not  only  in  Italy)  have 
eliminated  from  the  core  of protective  measures  under 
labour law those more obsolete parts and  those which are 
exposed  to  market  forces  and  innovation  (i.e.  types  of 
labour relationships,  mobility, etc.) but the core itself has 
not been abolished, nor is this a likely development. 
Given  this,  the  prospects  for  harmonization  at  European 
level  of labour relations would seem  to  be based  on  the 
retention of a single core of irrevocable law  - which  re-
mains a safety-net for the Community worker- while this 
minimum can be enhanced by  subsequent rules negotiated 
by  the  social partners or worked out by  participation and 
consultation procedures. 
d)  It is more difficult to identify specific ways in which 
the  consensual  procedure  might,  broadly  speaking,  de-
velop  in  the  future.  Particularly uncertain  is  the relation-
ship between bargaining, industrial disputes and participa-
tion. 
A common observation is  that the Italian system does not 
seem  to  possess  the  right or typical  conditions to  evolve 
towards  participatory  models,  which  would  necessitate  a 
united union movement, strong control by central organiz-
ations (unions and employers) over the grass-roots, a sta-
ble  government  committed  to  promoting  labour,  and  a 
public administration able to guarantee the achievement of 
objectives arising from political exchange. 
Such  peculiarities  have  not  stopped  the  system  (at  least 
since  1976)  from  repeated  attempts  at  participatory  man-
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agement of industrial  relations,  firstly  at  macro-economic 
level and subsequently at company and market level. 
These  attempts  have  succeeded  in  providing  the  system 
with some stability.  On  the basis of this success,  increas-
ingly wide sectors of the union (and political) world have 
opted for this line as the basis for modernization and Euro-
peanization of Italian industrial relations. 
At the macro-economic level  there appears to be no alter-
native to  the method of social concertation in  the eyes of 
the social actors and of the State, as confirmed by the tri-
partite agreement of July 23,  1993.  The very recent pen-
sion reform undertaken by the Dini government, to a great 
extent pre-negotiated with  union  organisations,  is  an  ex-
ample  of the  practical  application  of this  approach.  At 
company level, participatory practices still encounter much 
opposition and  have only been partially successful.  How-
ever,  they seem increasingly to meet with the approval of 
most  of  the  union  movement,  especially  the 
non-Communist  members,  who  are  looked  upon  favour-
ably  by  the  public  authorities  and  viewed  with  cautious 
interest by the major employers' organizations. 
The obstacles which hinder the development of participa-
tory procedures are still deeply rooted in  the way the sys-
tem is conceived and  in  the attitudes of some of the part-
ners. 
There are elements  which  leave changes  in  Italian indus-
trial relations rather exposed to  laissez-faire trends.  How-
ever,  although  there are openly  laissez-faire trends,  there 
are  also  opposing  ones,  deeply  rooted  in  the  history  of 
Italy  (and  other  European  countries):  the  interventionist 
tradition of public authorities,  supported (for a variety of 
reasons)  by  the  majority  of political  and  social  partners, 
including employers; the lack of solidarity and hegemonic 
inclinations of the latter; the continuing widespread power 
of the unions and their penetration of institutions; and the 
importance and positions of the political parties closest to 
the unions. 
It would be  simplistic to  conclude that the Italian system 
of industrial relations is tending only towards participatory 
models.  Instead of such a prospect there could be a stale-
mate situation, which has happened before.  Alternatively, 
there could be trends towards dualism,  i.e. differing pat-
terns  of industrial  relations  in  the  various  sectors of the 
system.  For example,  participatory  trends  in  certain sec-
tors of medium and large companies, or even medium and 
small  companies,  which  have  a  long  traditions  of union 
and  managerial  dialogue and  are supported by  a uniform 
political and civil framework,  types of individual relations 
with the marginalization of unions in  other sectors,  espe-
cially high-tech industries; and finally, a tendency towards 
industrial unrest which is widespread in  certain sectors of 
public services or in declining industrial areas. 
2. Points of convergence and social dialogue in Europe 
The  European  framework  could  significantly  influence 
trends in the Italian system towards greater participation. 
Similar points of convergence are already visible and have 
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depend on initiatives by private and public partners at both 
national and Community level. 
At the level  of European  social  dialogue,  the  role of the 
public  authorities  would  seem  to  be  essentially  promo-
tional  in  respect of any  active  co-operation  between  the 
partners,  rather  than  directly  regulatory  (although  this 
cannot be ruled out). 
Social dialogue could lead to proper agreement-based con-
ventional relations, as envisaged under Article 118b of the 
Treaty,  and  now highlighted in  the new  text approved at 
Maastricht.  Social  dialogue  (and  perhaps  bargaining  at 
European  level)  should  serve as  a  means  of reconciling 
divergent  points  of view,  encouraging  the  emergence  of 
common  or convergent  behaviour  between  the  partners, 
and drawing useful  conclusions for the  Community itself 
(whose initiative can now be considered as pre-empted by 
European bargaining). 
Experience  in  Italy  during  recent  years  indicates  that  a 
realistic  approach  to  European  harmonization  must  be 
gradual  and  flexible,  taking  into account the  peculiarities 
and  traditions of different national  practices but pursuing 
objectives of greater uniformity.  Consequently,  an  induc-
tive plan of action would seem to be the most appropriate 
way of achieving a series of limited objectives step by step 
rather than  via established legal  models and standardized 
solutions.  This  will  probably  also  influence  the  role  of 
Community  institutions,  which  may  play  the  part  of a 
jourth 
11 party in  industrial relations,  but its main. purpose 
would  be  to  guide  and  support national  partners,  rather 
than  (just)  the  legislators.  This kind  of progressive har-
monization could make use of a variety of mechanisms, in 
addition to traditional ones - i.e. agreements between the 
partners  with  the  participation  of national  governments, 
but also  jour-party agreements "at transnational and Euro-
pean level promoted by the Community. 
One final point should be made. The transition from basic 
guidelines - as defined by the Community - to their actual 
implementation  may  make  it necessary  for  the  partners, 
supported by public authorities, to select certain priorities 
for  the  difficult task of "Europeanizing 
11 labour relations. 
This would  mean  that  potential  areas  of application  and 
results could be tentatively defined by establishing which 
levels and issues are the easiest to achieve. 
Such a commitment would be most useful  in  areas where 
positive outcomes for the partners appear more likely, and 
where,  as  in  some countries,  there is already a history of 
cooperation  between  the  partners  which  is  supported  by 
the public authorities. LUXEMBOURG  129 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC ACTORS. BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND 
COLLECTIVE, IN A  FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT 
1. Description of partners and their 
institutional organisation 
1.1 The employer 
1.1.1 The concept of the employer 
The employer may be a natural person or a body corporate. 
From a contractual point of view, the employer is defined as 
the legal person who is party to a contract of employment. 
The  employer  may  be  a  natural  person  exercising  the 
employer's prerogatives himself. This type of employer is 
often described as a self-employed worker. 
In most cases, the employee works within an undertaking 
which belongs to a body corporate.  In practice, a natural 
person, namely the head of the undertaking or establishment, 
exercises the employer's prerogatives and responsibilities. 
Luxembourg law does not define the concepts of undertak-
ing, head of undertaking or head of establishment. Legisla-
tion makes a distinction between public-sector and private-
sector employers.  The concept of public-sector employer 
also covers the various ministries, administrations and State 
and local services. 
A breakdown of employers in the private sector shows that 
75% have fewer than 6 employees, 17.5% have between 6 
and 19 employees and 5%  between 20 and 49 employees. 
1.1.2 Structural organisation of employers 
Representative chambers 
The law requires an undertaking, whether a natural person 
or body corporate, to be associated with one of the represen-
tative chambers established by the Law of 4 April 1924, 
which created such bodies with an electoral basis, namely: 
•  The chamber of commerce for commercial and indus-
trial undertakings, banks and insurance companies, and 
undertakings in the hotel and catering business. 
•  The chamber of trades for the construction, food and 
clothing industries and other craft trades. 
•  The chamber of agriculture for farmers, winegrowers 
and market gardeners. 
Alongside  the  statutory  bodies  (representative chambers) 
established and operating on the basis of the Law of  1924, 
employers may establish employers' organisations. 
They have complete freedom  in  this respect,  as  the State 
neither  authorises,  prohibits  nor  lays  down  any  formal 
conditions for the creation of professional organisations. 
At present, the main employers' organisations are the: 
•  Federation des lndustriels luxembourgeois; 
•  Federation des Artisans; 
•  Confederation du Commerce luxembourgeois; 
•  Association des Banques et Banquiers; 
•  Federation Nationale des Hoteliers,  Restaurateurs et 
Cafetiers (Horesca). 
1.2 Workers 
1.2.1 The concept of worker 
As far as employed workers within the private sector are 
concerned, the law still makes a distinction between blue-
collar and white-collar workers. 
In general, and despite the fact that the distinction is becom-
ing  increasingly  vague,  labour  law  and  social  security 
legislation maintain different schemes for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. 
The  law  defines  a  blue-collar  worker  as  an  employee 
exercising a task of a primarily manual nature, whereas a 
white-collar worker is  a  person carrying out work of a 
primarily intellectual nature. However, to a large extent the 
law has already  brought about the unification if not the 
convergence of two statuses. 
Complete unification of status under labour law and social 
security legislation constitutes a popular theme for the trade 
union organisations. 
1.2.2 Structural organisation of employees 
Like employers, employed workers have to come under one 
of the chambers set up by the Law of  4 April 1924, which 
created representative chambers with an electoral basis. In 
the case of employees these are: 
•  the chamber of labour for employees with the status of 
blue collar worker; 
•  the chamber of white-collar employees for white-collar 
workers employed in the private sector. 
Civil servants working for the State or local authorities come 
under the chamber of civil servants and public employees. 
The  members  of representative  chambers  are elected  by 
postal ballot on the basis of proportional representation. 
In practice they are elected from lists put forward by the 
trade union organisations they represent. 
Alongside  the  statutory  bodies  (chamber  of labour  and 
chamber of  white-collar employees), private-sector workers 
are organised within freely constituted trade union organisa-
tions, namely the: 
•  Confederation syndicate independante - Luxembourg 
{OGB-L)  (Onojhengegen  Gewerkschaftsbond  Letze-
buerg); 
•  Confederation Luxembourgeoise des Syndicats Chre-
tiens (Letzebuerger Chreschtlechen Gewerkschaftsbond) 
{LCGB); 
•  Federation  des  Employes  Prives  - Federation  lnde-
pendante des Travailleurs (FEP-FIT); 
•  Federation Nationale des Cheminots, des Travailleurs 
du Transport, des Fonctionnaires et Employes de l'Etat 
du Luxembourg {FNCTTFEL); 
•  Federation Luxembourgeoise des Travailleurs du Livre; 
•  Federation  Chretienne  du  Personnel des  Transports 
{SYPROLUX); 
•  Association Luxembourgeoise des Employes de Banques 
et d'Assurances (ALEBA); 
•  Neutral Gewerkschaft Letzbuerg {NGL). LUXEMBOURG 
The OBG-L, the FNCITFEL and the Federation Luxembour-
geoise des Travailleurs du Livre are grouped together under 
the Confederation Generale du  Travail (CGT). 
The  Confederation  de  la  Fonction  Publique  {CGFP)  is 
composed of  47 sub-organisations representing the different 
categories of civil servants (graduates, junior and  middle 
executives)  or  the  different  sectors  of state  employees 
(teachers, armed forces and police). 
The CGFP is the government's privileged discussion partner 
in  the  negotiation  of periodic  agreements  reviewing  the 
salaries of State employees.  The collective agreement for 
blue-collar workers employed by the State is negotiated and 
signed with the OGB-L and the LCGB. 
The law1 makes it compulsory for an employer who regu-
larly employs 15 persons bound by a contract of employment 
to set up a workforce delegation. 
Delegates are elected by the company's workforce from lists 
of candidates put forward either by the most representative 
unions at national level or by a number of employees from 
within  the establishment  representing  at  least  5%  of the 
number of workers represented by the delegation, without 
however exceeding 100. 
Unions representing an  absolute majority of the members 
comprising the retiring delegation are also allowed to put 
forward lists of candidates. 
The Law of 6 May 1974 introduced joint works councils 
composed  of an  equal  number of representatives  of the 
employer and of the workforce. 
Joint works  councils  are compulsory  in  all  firms  in  the 
private sector with at least 150 employed workers. 
Workforce representatives are appointed by the workforce 
delegates,  by  secret  ballot,  on  the  basis  of proportional 
representation;  they  must  be  selected  from  the  workers 
employed in the undertaking. 
The employer's representatives are appointed by the head of 
the undertaking. 
1.3 Economic and Social Council 
Whereas the representative chambers are composed only of 
representatives of  the socio-professional category which it is 
their  legal  task  to  represent,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council (ESC) consists of 35 members representing, within 
one  body,  the  employers  and  employees  m  the  various 
sectors of the national economy, namely: 
•  iron and steel:  2 members 
•  small and medium-sized businesses:  2 members 
•  commerce:  2 members 
•  craft trades:  2 members 
•  banking:  1 member 
•  insurance:  1 member 
•  liberal professions:  1 member 
•  agriculture:  1 member 
•  viticulture:  1 member 
•  private-sector workers:  10 members 
1.  Law of 18 May 1979 reforming staff delegations, amended by the 
laws of 3 April 1980 and 3 November 1983. 
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•  civil  servants and white-collar employees in  the 
public sector:  3 members 
•  transport:  1 member 
The ESC also has seven members who are experts on eco-
nomic and social affairs and are completely independent of 
the professional and trade union organisations represented on 
the  Council;  four  of these  members are co-opted by the 
employers'  and  employees'  members of the  Council  and 
three are appointed by the government. 
2. Basis and guarantees for action 
2.1 Trade union freedom 
Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Constitution declares that the 
law "shall guarantee trade union  freedoms~ 
Equally,  Convention  No  87 on  union  freedom  and  the 
protection of  union rights, ratified by the Law of  5 February 
1958 (Mbnorial No 10 of27  February 1958, p.47) rules that 
"employees and employers, without any distinction whatso-
ever  being  made  between  them,  have the  right  to form 
organisations of  their choice without prior permission, as 
well as to join these organisations, on the sole condition that 
they obey the rules of  the organisations  '~ 
Since the general nature of the wording excludes any distinc-
tion based  on nationality,  foreigners  as well  as  nationals 
have the right to set up and join professional organisations. 
Clearly, this wording would make any limitation on the right 
to  belong to a union  for  reasons of race,  sex  or political 
conviction contrary to the Convention. 
In its definition of the status of trade unions, Convention No 
87 states that they have the right to draw up their articles of 
association  and  administrative rules  freely,  to  elect their 
representatives freely,  to organise their administration and 
activities freely,  and to draw up  their action programmes 
freely. 
The Convention prohibits the dissolution or suspension of a 
professional organisation by administrative procedures. 
It requires workers, employers and their respective organisa-
tions to keep within the law. 
2.2 Freedom of association 
The Law of  11  May 1936 guarantees freedom of association 
in all areas. Equally, it states that ')Jo one may be compelled 
to join an association ~ 
The Law of  11  May 1936 makes it an offence to refuse to 
employ a person for belonging to a union, as well as to make 
a contract of  employment conditional on not belonging to an 
association. 
It is also a punishable offence to make the implementation or 
continuation of a contract of employment conditional on not 
belonging to an association with the aim of undermining the 
freedom of association as laid down in law  . 
Finally, the Law makes it an offence to make a person fear 
losing his job in  order to  force  him not to  belong to  an 
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The Law does not, however, mention the subject of civil 
penalties applicable in the event of violation of the statutory 
rules governing the freedom to belong to an association and 
to carry out an activity within an association. 
3. Functions, roles, prerogatives and responsibilities 
in the private and public sectors 
3.1 Employers' and workers' organisations 
The law does not provide any definition of an employers' 
organisation. 
However, the Law of  12 June 1965 on collective agreements 
recognises as trade unions those occupational groups with an 
internal structure, and whose aim it is to defend occupational 
interests and represent their members, as well as to improve 
their conditions. It is the statutory task of the employers' and 
trade union organisations to negotiate and enter into collec-
tive agreements. 
From the employers' side, the collective agreement may be 
negotiated  and  signed  either  by  one  or several  specific 
employers, or by one or several employers' organisations. 
From the workers' side, the Law gives the most representa-
tive  unions  at  national  level  exclusive  rights  to  sign  a 
collective agreement. 
The Law thus excludes from collective bargaining sectoral 
unions, unions at undertaking level, and workforce represen-
tatives at undertaking or establishment level. 
Unions characterised by their large number of members, 
their activities and their independence are regarded as being 
representative at national level. 
The  periodical  tests  of representativeness  constituted  by 
elections in the social sphere (i.e. election of the chamber of 
labour, chamber of white-collar employees, or workforce 
delegations) enable the authority, influence and interest in a 
union beyond the confines of its members to be ascertained. 
At present, only the OGB-L, LCGB and FEP-FIT are considered 
to be representative at national level and therefore entitled to 
negotiate and enter into collective labour agreements. 
It should be noted that the Minister of  Labour is authorised 
to refuse to register a collective agreement entered into by a 
union which does not meet the criteria for national represen-
tativeness. Any such decision is subject to an appeal to the 
litigation committee of the Conseil d'Etat. 
Case-law is consistent in refusing to grant the status of '1egal 
person" to unions which are not constituted in one of the 
forms laid down in law, notably the Law of21 Apri/1928 on 
non-profit-making associations and public-benefit organisati-
ons. 
The Law does, however, grant to unions which are party to 
a collective agreement the right to take to court, on behalf of 
a  member, any case arising from the agreement,  without 
having to provide evidence of a special mandate. 
The Law makes the union's right to go to court conditional 
on  the party concerned being given prior notice and not 
raising any objection. 
Moreover, the Law allows the party concerned to intervene 
at any stage in proceedings begun by the union on the basis 
of a provision of the collective agreement. 
However, the Law does not grant unions the right to go to 
court  in  an  action  for  damages,  neither as  plaintiff nor 
defendant. 
3.2 Workforce representatives at company level 
Over and above the prerogatives granted by law to trade 
unions in the field of collective bargaining, the union is in 
close touch with company activities through workforce dele-
gates elected at undertaking or establishment level and work-
force representatives on the boards of larger limited com-
panies. 
The law acknowledges the right of nationally representative 
unions to put forward lists of candidates for workforce dele-
gations elections in undertakings. 
Thus the  law  attributes  special  prerogatives  to  delegates 
elected from lists put forward by such unions. 
Similarly, delegates elected from such lists have the unre-
stricted  right  to  post  union  messages  on  notice-boards 
reserved for this purpose. 
They have the right to  distribute union publications and 
handouts to the workers employed within the undertaking, 
on company premises. 
Trade union delegates have the right to collect union dues 
within the establishment. 
In  establishments  which  regularly  employ  150  or more 
workers, the law allows the workforce delegations to make 
use of advisers on speci  fie questions. 
These advisers may be members of the undertaking's work-
force  or outsiders.  The  delegation  chooses  the  advisers 
which it intends to use on the basis of proposals from one or 
all of the nationally representative unions represented within 
the delegation. 
In establishments with fewer than 150 workers, an absolute 
majority of members forming the delegation may decide to 
refer specific questions for joint examination by an employ-
ers'  organisation and the nationally representative unions 
represented within the delegation. 
In undertakings which employ more than 500 workers, the 
law compels the head of the undertaking to release a certain 
number of workforce delegates from all work. 
Where the number of workers represented by the delegation 
exceeds 1  ,500, the law authorises each nationally representa-
tive union to appoint one of these delegates directly. 
The law gives the workforce delegates the general task of 
safeguarding and defending the interests of the establish-
ment's  employees  in  terms  of working  conditions,  job 
security and social status. 
Although the law gives workforce delegates a limited role in 
collective bargaining, in practice the trade union organisa-
tions directly involve in negotiations those union delegates 
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Equally, when a dispute arising from collective bargaining 
is  brought  before  the  National  Conciliation  Office,  the 
special workers' representatives appointed by the unions are 
chosen from among the workforce delegates for the under-
takings or establishments involved in the case. 
In contrast to the representative chambers, which form the 
channel for union action at the level of legislative and sta-
tutory procedures and mechanisms, the workforce delegates 
constitute the channel for union action in support of claims 
at undertaking and establishment level. 
The joint works council, on the other hand, is the forum for 
cooperation between the undertaking's representatives and 
the workforce representatives at undertaking level. 
The works council is not involved in collective bargaining. 
The  law  gives  the  works  council  the  power  to  inform, 
advise, take joint decisions on certain specific matters, and 
monitor activities. 
3.3 Representative chambers 
The Law of  4 April 1924 setting up representative chambers 
with an electoral basis gives those chambers an advisory role 
as part of the procedure of adopting laws and implementing 
measures. 
In more general terms, the representative chambers have a 
statutory role with regard to safeguarding and defending the 
interests of the socio-professional category they represent. 
Finally, the representative chambers have specific duties as 
regards implementing and monitoring vocational training, 
especially apprenticeship training leading to the Certificat 
d'Aptitude Technique et Professionnelle (CATP).  The mem-
bers of  the representative chambers are elected from lists put 
forward by the employers' and trade union organisations. 
The representative chamber is the organisation which enables 
the employers' and trade union organisations to transpose 
into legal terms any claims they are making through their 
claims procedure. 
Prior opinions on bills tabled by the government or parlia-
ment have to be obtained from the representative chambers 
concerned. 
In addition, the Cour de cassation (Court of Appeal) ruled 
that regular consultation of the representative chambers is an 
important  formality  for  the  validity  of a  statutory  act 
introduced under the law (12 January 1961, Pasicrisie XVIII, 
p.257; 27 February 1964, Pasicrisie volume XIX,  p.297; 17 
November 1966, Pasicrisie volume XX, p.255). 
However,  the  requirement  to  consult  the  representative 
chambers does not affect the validity of a legislative act, 
since  the  representative  chambers  are  not  constitutional 
bodies. 
Representative  chambers  may  submit  draft  laws  to  the 
government,  which  the  latter  must  examine  and,  where 
appropriate, place before the legislative bodies. 
Where appropriate, the government may ask the Economic 
and Social Council to deliver a single coordinated opinion 
on questions of general interest on which the representative 
chambers have expressed fundamentally diverging opinions. 
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The representative chambers do not take any part in negoti-
ating and signing collective agreements, their role being at 
legislative procedure level, in connection with bills relating 
to matters of concern to them. 
3.4 Economic and Social Council 
•  General responsibilities/powers 
The Economic and Social Council is a governmental advi-
sory body whose task it is to study the economic, financial 
and  social  problems  affecting  either  several  sectors  of 
activity or the national economy as a whole. 
The ESC may make reasoned proposals to  the government 
based on its research. 
Matters are referred  to  the Council at the  request of the 
government or on its own initiative. 
•  Legislative or statutory measures of general  import 
(guideline opinion) 
The government  may  ask  for  the opinion of the  ESC  on 
legislative or statutory measures of general import which it 
is planning and which affect several occupational groups or 
the national economy as a whole. 
•  Diverging opinions of  the representative chambers 
The government may ask for the opinion of the ESC on all 
matters of general interest and all questions on which the 
representative chambers have expressed fundamentally diver-
ging opinions. The law requires the Committee to issue a 
single coordinated opinion in such cases. 
•  Annual opinion on the general state of  the nation 
The ESC is required by law to draw up an opinion during the 
first quarter of each year on the economic,  financial  and 
social position of the country. 
•  Esc links with the Tripartite Coordination Committee 
The government forwards to the ESC the opinions adopted by 
the Tripartite Coordination Committee. 
If  specifically asked to do so by the government, the ESC 
draws up its own opinion. 
4. Representativeness of the economic and social partners 
at the various levels (sectoral, regional, national) 
There is no regional aspect to the employers' representative 
structures. 
By contrast, the sectoral criterion is in evidence at the level 
of  the representative chambers and the employers' and trade 
union organisatioil.s. 
Although the internal structures of the large organisations 
reflect  their  representation  of employers  or workers  in 
different sectors of the economy, at national level they act as 
integrated structures representing the interests of all  their 
members. 
This is also true of the chambers representing employers and 
workers. 
Certain trade union organisations are characterised by the 
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With regard  to  collective bargaining,  only the nationally 
representative unions are legally entitled to sign collective 
labour agreements; unions established on a purely sectoral 
basis are excluded. 
Similarly, only nationally representative trade union organ-
isations  are  part  of the  institutionalised  framework  for 
tripartite dialogue with the government. 
The intersectoral representativeness of unions is gauged by 
means of the periodical tests constituted by ballots to elect 
workforce delegations, representative chambers and social 
security system bodies. 
At the moment, the unions regarded as being representative 
at national level are the: 
•  ConfederaJion Syndicate Independante (OGB-L)  (appro-
ximately 33,000 members); 
•  Confederation Luxembourgeoise des Syndicats  Chre-
tiens (LCGB)  (approximately 20,000 members); 
•  · FederaJion des Employes Prives -Federation Indepen-
dante des Travailleurs (FEP-FIT)  (approximately 11,000 
members). 
5. Functions of the bilateral or 
trilateral bodies at the various levels 
5.1 Tripartite Coordination Committee 
The Emergency Law of  24 December 1977 authorising the 
Government to take measures aimed at stimulating economic 
growth and maintaining full employment (Memorial A 1977, 
p.2702 and  Memorial A  1982, p.944) set up  a  Tripartite 
Coordination Committee. 
The Grand-Ducal Decree of  26 January 1978 (Memorial A 
No  9 of 7 March 1978, p.120) appoints as members of the 
Tripartite  Coordination  Committee  four  members  of the 
Government, namely the President of the Government (who 
chairs the committee),  the Minister of the National Econ-
omy, the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Finance, 
four employers' delegates (of whom two are appointed by 
the Chamber of  Commerce, one by the Chamber of  Trades 
and one by the Chamber of  Agriculture), and four delegates 
appointed by the most representative trade union organisa-
tions at national level, including one representative of State 
employees. 
The statutory task of the Tripartite Coordination Committee 
is  to  intervene  when  the  economic  and  social  position 
deteriorates to such an extent as to necessitate measures of 
general enforcement and national solidaritl. 
The government is obliged to convene the Tripartite Coordi-
naJion Committee without delay in the event of a worsening 
of  the economic and social situation translating in a signifi-
cant discrepancy in the inflation rate between Luxembourg 
and its principal trading partners or a deterioration in  the 
competitiveness of Luxembourg companies on the interna-
tional markets. 
2.  Law of 24 December 1984 amending: 
a)  Article 11  of the amended law of 22 June 1963 establishing 
the remuneration scale for State civil servants; 
b)  the Article of the amended law of24 December 1977 which 
authorises the govenunent to take measures aimed at stimulat-
ing  economic  growth  and  maintaining  full  employment 
(Memorial A No 114 of29 December 1984, p.2394). 
In  order to  assess  the  critical  threshold  in  a  worsening 
economic and social situation,  the government applies the 
economic indicators laid down in the Grand-Ducal Regula-
tion of  5 April1985
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These are as follows: 
•  the discrepancy between the national rate of inflation 
and the weighted average rates of Luxembourg's four 
principal trading partners (Belgium, Germany, France 
and the Netherlands) 
•  the actual rate of  exchange of the franc weighted by the 
export and import markets 
•  trends in exports and imports of goods 
•  the terms of trade calculated by reference to the unit 
values of exports and imports 
•  the  competitive  position  of  Luxembourg  industry 
expressed as the wage cost per unit produced 
•  industrial production prices 
•  activity indicators for the main economic sectors 
•  trends in unemployment and short-time working 
•  trends in the purchasing power of wages. 
If it is  the government's opinion that the trends in  these 
economic indicators indicate a significant worsening of the 
economic situation or a deterioration in companies' competi-
tiveness, it is obliged to propose to the Tripartite Coordina-
tion  Committee  the  legislative  and  statutory  measures  it 
considers necessary to redress the economic situation. 
These measures may, depending on the requirements of the 
particular situation, concern the procedures for implementing 
the sliding scale,  including a temporary limitation on the 
number and effects of the index brackets, and capping above 
a certain level  of income.  They may  involve a temporary 
freezing of price margins on products and services, including 
rents, and an increase in  the period of notice given before 
redundancies. 
The opinion of the  Tripartite  Coordination  Committee is 
based on an assessment of the economic and social situation 
and on the proposals made by the government with a view to 
bringing about recovery. 
The Committee adopts its opinions on the basis of a majority 
of the  members  of each  of the  groups  representing  the 
employers and nationally representative unions. 
The government delegation puts forward its view in line with 
the position agreed within the government council. 
If  the Committee, after being consulted by the government, 
fails to reach a majority on the proposals to be put forward, 
the government  may  call  in  a  mediator to  present to  the 
Committee  a  reasoned  proposal  aimed  at  restoring  the 
economic situation. The mediator must compile an objective 
file  on  all  the  economic  and  social  data  relating  to  the 
problem put before him and draw out the terms of a solution 
which will win the support of all the parties. 
He may carry out any study or analysis necessary to gather 
the information he needs to complete the task, in which he 
is bound by professional secrecy. 
3.  Grand-Ducal  Regulation  of  5  April  1985  implementing  the 
measures under Article 21 , paragraph 6 of the amended Law of  24 
December 1977 authorising the government to take measures aimed 
at stimulating economic growth and maintaining full employment 
(Memorial A No  28 of  3 June 1985, p.456). LUXEMBOURG 
After trying to reconcile the parties, the mediator puts before 
the  Tripartite  Coordination  Committee,  in  the  form  of a 
reasoned recommendation, proposals aimed at settling the 
contentious points. The government sets a deadline for this, 
which may be extended. 
The  mediator's  conclusions  and  recommendations  are 
submitted to the Tripartite Coordination Committee, which 
then expresses an opinion on them by the deadline set by the 
government. 
The Tripartite Coordination Committee adopts its opinions 
on the basis of a majority of the members of each of the 
groups representing the employers and nationally representa-
tive unions.  The government delegation puts forward  its 
view in line with the position agreed within the government 
council. 
Once the procedures for consulting the Tripartite Coordina-
tion Committee and, where applicable,  the mediation pro-
cedure  are  exhausted,  the  government  regains  its  full 
prerogatives to initiate legislation and may refer to parlia-
ment any  legislative measures aimed at restoring the eco-
nomic situation. 
The Tripartite Coordination Committee is also called upon 
to give an opinion on the validity of any request to  open 
negotiations aimed at concluding a collective agreement to 
reduce production costs in the interest of saving jobs. 
The Emergency Law of24 December 1977 gives undertak-
ings the option of entering into collective agreements with 
the  unions  to  reduce  production  costs  with  the  aim  of 
safeguarding jobs. Such agreements may come into effect 
before the expiry of the existing collective agreement. This 
option is restricted to undertakings affected by particularly 
severe structural or economic difficulties to such an extent 
that the situation, in economic terms, is one of emergency. 
The Law states that such agreements may not derogate, to 
the detriment of workers, from the minimum standards laid 
down  by  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  working 
conditions and the protection of employees. 
The undertakings which are permitted  to  enter into such 
agreements are those which can show they have implemented 
internal  measures  to  combat  unemployment  and  under-
employment and can prove they have already requested and 
been granted application of the arrangements for short-time 
working or extraordinary work in the common interest. 
The Tripartite  Coordination  Committee is  called upon  to 
assess and  deliver an  opinion on the justification for any 
request to start such negotiations. 
The Law makes the implementation of such an agreement 
conditional upon ratification by the Minister of Labour, who 
ensures that the procedures have been complied with. 
Under the terms of the Law of 28 March  1987 on early 
retirement, the Tripartite Coordination Committee is called 
upon to deliver an opinion prior to the introduction of the 
early-retirement adjustment model for companies employing 
at least 150 workers. 
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5.2 Tripartite conferences 
Apart from  the  institutionalised dialogue structure repre-
sented  by  the  Tripartite  Coordination  Committee,  the 
government and social partners meet periodically in a larger 
group known as the General Tripartite Conference. 
The agreements on the restructuring and modernisation of 
Luxembourg's iron and steel industry were reached by the 
Tripartite Conference on the Iron and Steel Industry. 
5.3 Other tripartite bodies 
The employers'  and  trade union  organisations are repre-
sented within other tripartite institutions, including the: 
•  Comite de conjoncture (Committee on the Economy), 
which is required by the law to give a prior opinion on 
the  eligibility  of the  various sectors  of the national 
economy for aid from the employment fund to maintain 
jobs through short-term working; 
•  Commission nationale de l'emploi (National Employ-
ment  Commission),  set  up  to  assist  the  Minister of 
Labour and advise the government on the drafting and 
implementation of employment policy; 
•  Comite  du  travail  feminin  (Committee  on  Female 
Employment); 
•  Conseil national de l 'immigration (National Immigra-
tion  Council),  the  task  of which  is  to  examine  all 
problems relating to immigrant workers; 
•  Comite permanent de surveillance des  effectifs de  la 
siderurgie (Standing Committee for the Monitoring of 
Steel Industry Workers), the task of which is to study 
the change in  the numbers employed in  the iron and 
steel  industry  and  to  coordinate  forward-looking 
measures with a view to redeploying surplus workers 
from that industry in other sectors of the economy. 
6. National administrations and govenunent institutions 
as socio-political actors and employers 
The  government  does  not  intervene  at  any  stage  in  the 
negotiation and conclusion of collective labour agreements. 
In the event of the National Conciliation Office being called 
upon,  the  Minister  of Labour,  who  is  president  of the 
Office,  delegates  his  powers  to  a  deputy-president.  This 
practice  illustrates  the  government's  refusal  to  become 
involved in collective bargaining in any way. 
The Emergency Law of  24 December 1977 permitting the 
government to take measures aimed at stimulating economic 
growth and maintaining full employment, as amended by the 
Law of 5  March  1980 (see  coordinated  text of 5  March 
1980, Memorial A No  26 of  21  April1980, p.440), states 
that the implementation of  any collective agreement reducing 
production  costs  in  the  interests  of safeguarding jobs is 
subject to prior ratification by the Minister of Labour. 
Moreover,  before  the  start of any  such  negotiations  the 
Tripartite Coordination Committee must express an opinion 
on whether negotiations are justified. 
In actual fact, neither the Tripartite Coordination Committee 
nor the Minister of Labour were called to intervene at any 
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The contractual  measures  designed  to  reduce production 
c.osts  in the interest of safeguarding jobs were all adopted 
without recourse to the mechanisms and procedures estab-
lished for this purpose by the Emergency Law of  1977. 
As an employer, the government enters into agreements with 
the unions on conditions of employment and pay applicable 
to  civil  servants,  white-collar employees  and  blue-collar 
workers employed by the State. 
With respect to civil servants and white-collar employees, 
the  government  negotiates  and  concludes,  with  the 
Confediration Generale de Fonction Publique {CGFP),  so-
called collective agreements establishing conditions of pay 
and employment for a period of several years. 
However, such agreements are not genuine collective labour 
agreements  within  the  meaning  of the  law on collective 
labour agreements covering employees in the private sector. 
They can be more accurately described as a manifestation of 
the political  commitment made to the union  representing 
public-service employees.  Through this commitment,  the 
government undertakes to put before the legislature a bill 
transposing into law the commitments made with respect to 
pay and working conditions. 
By  contrast,  the  government  concludes  with  the  unions 
representing  blue-collar  workers  employed  by  the  State 
collective agreements governed by the Law of  12 June 1965 
on collective agreements. 
CHAPTER II: INSTRUMENTS: THE SOURCES OF 
THE RULES  GOVERNING WORKING CONDITIONS 
1. Constitutional law and social prerogatives 
The Constitution expressly guarantees the right to work. 
Article 11, paragraph 4 states that "the law shall guarantee 
.  the right to work and secure for all citizens the exercise of 
this right~ 
Secondly, the Constitution states in paragraph 5 of  Article 
11 that  "the law shall organise social security, health protec-
tion and time off  for workers and shall guarantee union 
freedoms'~ 
Finally, Article 11 paragraph 6 requires the law to  "guaran-
tee the freedom of  trade and industry and the exercising of 
liberal professions and agricultural work; with the exception 
of  the restrictions to be established by the legislative  power'~ 
2. Legislation 
Apart from Articles 1779 and 1780 of the Civil Code, which 
concern  the  contract  of  employment,  the  fundamental 
principles  governing  conditions  of employment  are  laid 
down in  ordinary legislation.  There is  no labour code as 
such. 
The body of  laws governing conditions of  employment may 
be schematised as follows: 
•  Legal  framework for the contract of  employment: 
Law of  24 May 1989 on the contract of  employ-
ment; 
Law of7  June 1937, as subsequently amended (cf. 
coordinated text of 1 June 1981), making it a legal 
requirement to provide private-sector white-collar 
employees with a contract of employment; 
Law of  26 February 1993 on voluntary part-time 
work; 
Law of  19 May 1994 regulating temporary work 
arranged through an agency and the temporary 
loan of  labour. 
•  Legal  framework for the collective labour agreement 
Law of  12 June 1965 on collective labour agree-
ments. 
•  Minimum employment standards 
Duration of working time: 
*  Law of 11  August 1996 amending:  (1)  the 
Law  of 9  December  1970  reducing  and 
regulating  the  length  of working  time for 
workers in the public and private sectors of 
the economy; (2) the amended Law of  7 June 
1939 on the reform of  the Law of  31 October 
1919  requiring  private-sector  white-collar 
employees to be provided with a contract of 
employment; 
*  Articles  7 to 10 of the Law of 28 October 
1969 on the protection of  children and young 
workers. 
•  Work and time off  on Sundays 
Law of  1 August 1988 regarding weekly rest for 
white-collar and blue-collar workers. 
•  Work and time off  on statutory public holidays 
Law of  10 April1976 reforming the regulations on 
statutory public holidays.  · 
•  Paid leave 
Atnended law of  22 April1966 on the standardised 
regulation of  annual paid leave for employees in 
the private sector. 
•  Sport leave 
Law of26 March 1976 on physical education and 
sport. 
•  Study leave 
Law of  4 October 1973 instituting study leave. 
•  Cultural leave 
Law of  12 July 1994 instituting cultural leave. 
•  Politicalleave 
Grand-Ducal regulation of  6 December 1989 on 
political leave for mayors, aldermen and munici-
pal councillors, as amended by the Grand-Ducal 
regulation of  19 April1994. 
•  Leave for voluntary fire, rescue and other emergency 
service workers 
Law of  24 April 1994 instituting leave for volun-
tary fire,  rescue  and  other  emergency  service 
workers. 
•  Night work 
Law of  28 October 1969 concerning adolescents. 
Law of  3 July 1975 concerning women. 
•  Remuneration 
Minimum wage 
*  Amended Law of  12 March 1973 reforming 
the minimum wage. 
Sliding scale of  wages and salaries: 
*  Law of27  May 1975 giving general currency 
to the sliding scale of  wages and salaries. 
Attachment and assignment of remuneration: LUXEMBOURG 
*  Law of  11 November 1970 on the attachment 
and  assignment  of wages,  pensions  and 
annuities. 
Equal pay for men and women: 
*  Law of  8 December 1981 on equal treatment 
of  men and women with  regard to employ-
ment conditions and access to employment, 
training and promotion. 
•  Representative strudures for the workforce at undertak-
ing level 
Workforce delegates: 
*  Amended Law of  18 May 1979 on the reform 
of  workforce delegations. 
Joint works councils: 
*  Law of  6 May 1974 setting up joint councils 
in private-seaor undertakings and organising 
workforce representation in  limited compa-
nies. 
Workforce representation on the boards of limited 
companies: 
*  Law of6 May 1974 referred to above. 
•  Working conditions for special categories of  employees 
Disabled workers: 
*  Law of  12 November 1991 on disabled work-
ers. 
Women: 
*  Law of  3 July 1975 on maternity protection 
for working women. 
Children and adolescents: 
*  Law of  28 October 1969 on the protection of 
children and young workers, amended by the 
Law of  30 July 1972 (coordinated text of 10 
November 1981). 
3. Grand-Ducal regulations 
Under  the  terms of Article 36 of the  Constitution,  'the 
Grand Duke makes the necessary regulations for the exe-
cution of  laws ~ 
This power is part of the overall executive power exercised 
by the Grand Duke under Article 33 of the Constitution. 
A Grand-Ducal regulation is subordinate to the relevant law 
and may do nothing other than implement it. It may neither 
extend, restrict nor modify it. In other words, a regulation 
ranks lower than a law. 
The Constitution does not grant the courts the power to 
annul regulations which are contrary to the law. By stating 
that  'the  courts  and tribunals  shall  apply  decrees  and 
general and local regulations only in so far as they are 
consistent  with  the  law~ Article 95 of the  Constitution 
ensures an additional control on the legality of regulations. 
A  regulation which  is  rejected  as  illegal  remains on the 
statute books but has no force in law. 
Article 37 paragraph 4 of the Constitution assimilates the 
implementation of  international treaties with the implementa-
tion of laws, in terms of  both form and effects. 
The Constitution actually stipulates that the Grand Duke 
makes the necessary regulations for the implementation of 
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treaties, in the forms laid down by the measures for imple-
menting laws. 
The Constitution lists a series of provisions which reserve 
specific matters to legislation. 
On the whole these are particularly sensitive matters relating 
to  fundamental  liberties or of special  importance for  the 
functioning of the State. 
The matters which  the  Constitution  specifically excludes 
from being the subject of a formal law include the right to 
work (Article 11 paragraph 4), the organisation of the social 
security system, the organisation of  health protection and the 
arrangements for rest for workers, as well as the guarantee 
of union freedoms (Article 11 paragraph 5). 
In practice, the preserve of the law is interpreted in such a 
way that the constitutional requirements are met if the law 
confines itself to setting out the main principles,  leaving 
detailed implementation to the regulatory authority. 
The practice of  authorisations, which dates back to the First 
World War, has become standard practice for matters which 
the Constitution does not stipulate as being the preserve of 
legislation. 
Grand-Ducal regulations associated with enabling legislation 
are  subject  to  a  special  procedure.  The  opinion  of the 
Conseil  d'Etat  and  the  approval  of  the  Parliamentary 
Commission on Employment must be sought. This Commis-
sion is composed of representatives from the different parlia-
mentary groups, which have weighted voting rights propor-
tional to the size of the group they represent. In other words, 
an enabling regulations now constitutes a simplified legisla-
tive procedure. 
With regard to their effects, enabling regulations are assimi-
lated to ordinary regulations and classified as "decree laws~ 
They may derogate from existing laws. 
The most recent enabling legislation, the Law of  23 Decem-
ber 1987 empowering the Grand Duke to make regulations 
on certain matters (Memorial1987, p.2821), allows public 
administration  regulations to be adopted  in urgent cases, 
even if they derogate from existing legal provisions, with 
regard to measures of an economic and financial nature. 
4. The collective labour agreement 
The Law of  12 June 1965 lays down the legal framework for 
the collective labour agreement. 
It  defines  the  collective  labour  agreement  as  a  contract 
governing  employment  relations  and  general  working 
conditions. 
The role of  collective agreements has become crucial, as they 
cover 60% of the active working population. 
Sectoral collective agreements account for just over half the 
total number of employees covered by a collective agree-
ment. Company collective agreements account for the other 
half. 
Collective agreements are not confined to pay conditions for 
the workers covered. They deal with employment conditions 
as a whole, as well as the organisation of industrial relations 
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Whilst  the  content of a  collective  agreement,  generally 
speaking, is for the parties to decide, the Law does list a cer-
tain number of clauses which must be included. 
These include bonuses for arduous, dangerous or unhealthy 
work and procedures for enforcing the principle of equal pay 
for men and women. 
A  collective agreement must also provide for night work 
bonuses, which may not be less than 15%. 
Prior to the Law of  1975, which gave general currency to the 
sliding scale of wages and salaries, a collective agreement 
had to contain a sliding scale clause ensuring that the pay 
would be adapted to changes in the weighted cost-of-living 
index according to the methods applicable to public-sector 
pay rates. 
The Law of  12 June 1965 (Article 8 paragraph 2) states that 
"where the employer is bound by the clauses of  a collective 
agreement, the provisions of  such agreement will apply to 
labour relations and employment conditions in respect of  all 
members of  his workforce~~ 
It is therefore sufficient for the employer to be bound by a 
collective agreement for it to be applicable to all the under-
taking's employees, regardless of whether their contract is 
dated  before or after the  date  of implementation  of the 
agreement in the undertaking. 
A  collective  agreement  also  applies  to  those  employees 
within the undertaking who are not members of a trade union 
organisation which is party to the agreement. 
The undertaking may be a direct party to a collective agree-
ment at undertaking level, negotiated and signed by the head 
of the undertaking. 
It may equally find  itself subject to a  sectoral agreement 
because it belongs to an employers' organisation which is 
party to that agreement. 
Finally, the Law states that an agreement is equally binding 
on the undertakings which subscribe to it and those which 
ratify it. 
The Law of  12 June 1965 states that any collective agree-
ment may be declared to be of general application 
1lo all 
employers and workforce within the profession"  for which it 
was concluded. 
The  Law  allows  the  government  to  use  a  Grand-Ducal 
regulation to declare that a collective labour agreement is of 
general application. 
Extension  of a  collective  agreement  is  subject  to  two 
conditions: that it is based on a proposal agreed to by both 
the  permanent  members  and  the  special  members of the 
employers'  and  employees'  groups  in  the  National 
Conciliation Office, and that the appropriate representative 
chambers  have  been  consulted  regarding  the  proposed 
extension. 
A Grand-Ducal regulation declaring that a collective agree-
ment is of general application is published in the Memorial, 
together with the collective agreement which is the subject 
of the general declaration. The regulation takes effect eight 
clear days after it has been published in the Memorial, unless 
otherwise specified. 
The Law grants the government the right to revoke a Grand-
Ducal extension regulation. 
The concept  of an  agreement  at  undertaking  level  only 
recently became a source of labour law. 
The Emergency Law of  24 December 1977 allows special 
collective agreements to be entered into with the aim of 
reducing production costs in the interest of saving threatened 
jobs. 
The Law of  1 August 1988 on Sunday work and rest intro-
duces the concept of the special agreement at undertaking 
level  providing for continuous shift working in order to 
make production more efficient. 
In both these cases, the law restricts the legal power to make 
such agreement to unions which are representative at national 
level. 
In  practice,  special  collective agreements have the same 
effects as the collective labour agreement with which they 
are associated, where applicable. 
5. The role of the courts: 
court and constitutional case-law 
Labour courts may not constitute a source in the field of 
labour law, since Article 5 of the Civil Code forbids judges 
to  "give  verdicts by means of  general and regulatory mea-
sures on the cases placed before them ~~ 
In law, court decisions have no authority against the parties 
in dispute and do not create a legal standard. 
However, case-law, particularly from the Cour Superieure 
de  Justice  (courts  of appeal),  does  in  practice  make  a 
significant contribution to the formation of legal standards 
regarding employment. 
Case-law plays a vital  role in the implementation of laws 
governing working conditions. It is published in the Pasicri-
sie Luxembourgeoise. 
There is no constitutional case-law. 
On the one hand, in accordance with firmly established case-
law,  the courts do not check that laws are constitutional 
(Courde Cassation 14.8.1877, Pasicrisie volume I, p.370; 
Cour de Cassation 24.4.1879, Pasicrisie volume I, p.534; 
Conseil d'Etat 3.1.1883, Pasicrisie Volume II p.174; Cour 
de  Cassation  13.5.1954,  Pasicrisie  volume  XIV  p.99; 
Conseil d'Etat 4.8.1962, Pasicrisie volume XIX p.7). 
On the other hand, there is no constitutional court to ensure 
that laws are constitutional. 
At present, the question of whether to establish a constitu-
tional court is a topical subject in connection with the debate 
which has been opened at the request of the government, on 
a possible reform of the Constitution. 
6.  Custom 
Custom, which is recognised by the Civil Code (Articles 
1135, 1159 and 1160) with regard to the interpretation of 
contracts, plays a minor role in the implementation of labour 
laws. There is no labour law which refers to the custom and 
practice of the profession. LUXEMBOURG 
The concept of  constant practice in Wldertakings is taken into 
account by employment courts as a legal source in connec-
tion with bonuses or thirteenth month payments. 
7. International law and its regulatory 
effect at national level 
Labour law is influenced by measures adopted within the 
framework of international organisations such as the Council 
of Europe, the International Labour Organisation and the 
European Community. 
Case-law confirms the preeminence of international law over 
national law. 
It  tends to interpret national law in such a way as to achieve 
consistency with the requirements of international  agree-
ments (Cour de cassation,  13 June 1890, Pasicrisie volume 
II, p.621). 
Secondly,  case-law  makes  international  law  prevail  over 
national  law, even retrospectively, where it considers that 
the treaty has a more valid basis  than  that applied by  an 
internal  body.  (Cour (cassation  criminelle)  8 June  1950, 
Pasicrisie volume XV, p.41; Cour (appel correctionnel) 21 
July 1951, Pasicrisie volume XV, p.232; Conseil d'Etat, 28 
July 1951, Pasicrisie volume XV,  p.263; Cour (cassation 
criminelle) 14 July 1954, Pasicrisie volume XVI,  p.150). 
7  .1. Bilateral treaties 
Bilateral treaties signed with the Republic of Portugal and 
the  Socialist  Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia  define  the 
position of immigrants employed in Luxembourg. 
7.2 United Nations 
The standards adopted by the United Nations include the In-
ternational  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and Cultural 
Rights, which contains a certain number of clauses on labour 
law and was ratified by the Law of  3 June 1983 (Memorial 
A No 41 of9  June 1983, p. 956). 
This same Law also approved the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of  19 December 1966, as well as 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, signed on the same date. 
7.3 International Labour Organisation 
Luxembourg has ratified 55 ILO conventions (cf.  Annex). 
7.4 Council of  Europe 
The standards adopted by the Council of  Europe include the 
Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and 
ratified  by  Luxembourg  by  the Law of 29 August 1953 
(Memorial No 53 of29 August 1953, p.1099). 
The Law of  29 March 1958 authorised the government of 
Luxembourg to recognise as an obligatory right the right of 
individual appeal provided for in Article 25 of the Conven-
tion (Memorial No 20 of  10 April1958, p.441). 
The European Social Charter has not yet been the subject of 
a law of approval. A bill has however been under consider-
ation by parliament since 24 April 1977 (Parl.  Doc.  2084). 
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The European Convention on the Legal Status of  Migrant 
Workers, presented for signature to the member countries of 
the Council of  Europe on 24 November 1977, has not yet 
been ratified by Luxembourg. 
7.5 European Community 
The effect of Community law on labour law is particularly 
apparent in the field of equal treatment for men and women 
with regard to pay. 
The Grand-Ducal Regulation of  10July 1974, which is based 
on both Article 119 of the  Treaty of Rome and  ILO  Con-
vention No 100, compels all employers to provide equal pay 
for men and women for the same work or for work of equal 
value (Memorial A No 56 of22 July 1974, p.  1275). 
The application of Article 4 of  Directive No 7511 17/EEC of 
10 February 1975 to private-sector employees led to a major 
case with  regard  to  the  family  allowances  granted  under 
certain collective labour agreements.  A court ruling of 21 
April  1982  (SA  Bank M.M.  Warburg-Brinckmann,  Wirtz 
International v.  Francine Zanardi), subsequently confirmed 
by  a series of court rulings of 17 January  1984 and by a 
ruling of2 May 1985 (Banque Nationale de Paris v.  Stoffel, 
Pasiscrisie  1986, p.  273),  dealt with  the question of the 
applicability of Article 119 of the Treaty of  Rome, which 
applies directly to any form of direct and overt discrimina-
tion without Community or national measures being neces-
sary  to  ensure its  implementation.  Similarly,  the head of 
family allowance granted to State civil servants gave rise to 
a major case. 
In a decision of 10 July 1981  (Catherine Scheitler v.  Minis-
ter of  the Public Service), the Conseil d'Etat had ruled that 
Article 119 of the Treaty of  Rome had imperative force in 
that it was the duty of the national courts to ensure protec-
tion of the rights conferred by this provision by suspending 
the application of all provisions of national law which were 
contrary to the Treaty. 
A judgment by the Court of  Justice of  the European Commu-
nities of 9  June  1982  (Case  58181,  Commission  of the 
European  Communities  v.  Luxembourg)  had  stated  that 
Luxembourg had failed to fulfil its obligations by not taking 
the necessary measures within the timescale laid down in 
Directive  75/117/EEC  to  eliminate  discrepancies  in  the 
conditions for the granting of head of family allowances to 
persons in the public service. 
The Law of20 May 1983 was passed to correct the situation 
by  replacing  the  head  of family  allowance  by  a  family 
allowance and by conferring the right to this allowance on 
all civil servants who are married and not separated. 
Council  Directive  76/207/EEC  of 9  February  1976  was 
transposed into Luxembourg law by the Law of 8 December 
1981 on equal treatment for men and women with regard to 
employment conditions and access to employment, training 
and promotion. 
Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the 
approximation of Member States' legislation on collective 
redWldancies was transposed into national law by the Law of 
2 March 1982 on collective redundancies (Memorial A No 
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July 1993 introducing various measures to promote employ-
ment. 
Council Directive 77/87/EEC of 14 February  1977 on  the 
approximation of  Member States' legislation on maintaining 
workers'  rights in  the event of transfers of undertakings, 
establishments or parts of establishments was transposed by 
the Law of  18 March 1981 (Memorial A No 16 of  26 March 
1981, p.277). 
Finally, Council Directive 80/987  /EEC of 20 October 1980 
on the approximation of Member States' legislation on the 
protection of employees in  the event of the insolvency of 
their employer was  transposed  into  Luxembourg  law  by 
means of Article 19 of the amended Law of  24 December 
1977 authorising the government to take measures aimed at 
stimulating  economic  growth  and  maintaining  full  em-
ployment. 
8. Conflict of rules and hierarchy of sources 
Whatever their source, all legal standards are equally binding 
and may give rise to court proceedings. 
The hierarchy of sources may be schematised as follows: 
1.  The preeminence of international  law over  national 
law. 
2.  The preeminence of the  Constitution  over all  other 
national legal norms. In cases of dispute, the Constitu-
tion takes precedence over any other conflicting legal 
standards.  However,  in  accordance  with  established 
precedents, the courts refrain from checking that laws 
are constitutional, taking the view that the principle of 
the separation of powers must oppose the interference 
of the judiciary power in the legislative power. 
3.  The preeminence of  the law.  Although subordinate to 
the Constitution, laws prevails over every other source 
of national  legislation.  In  the  field  of employment 
conditions, laws lay down binding minimum thresholds 
from which neither an individual employment contract 
nor a collective agreement may derogate. Most laws on 
the regulation of employment conditions specifically 
state that any conflicting provisions are invalid.  The 
same is true with regard to length of working time, paid 
leave;  rest and work on Sundays, public holidays and 
maternity  protection.  The  same  also  applies  to  the 
contract of employment. With regard to the minimum 
wage, the Law of  12 March 1973 reforming the mini-
mum wage states that the minimum rates of pay  laid 
down by the law are binding on employers and may not 
be reduced by them, either by individual agreement or 
by collective labour agreement.  The Law of 27 May 
1975 giving general currency to  the sliding scale of 
wages and salaries makes it compulsory to  index-link 
pay to changes in the cost of living. 
4.  Grand-Ducal  regulations  are  subordinate  to  laws, 
whilst  constituting  a  means  of implementing  them. 
However, a Grand-Ducal regulation based on enabling 
legislation may derogate from existing laws in as far as 
the enabling legislation specifically provides for this. 
5.  Preeminence of  written law over custom. Custom may 
only have a subsidiary character, and customs may not 
be created or maintained against laws or implementing 
measures. 
6.  Preeminence of law from a public source over law from 
a professional source. A collective agreement may not 
derogate from the standards laid down by the law with 
respect to  conditions of employment and  pay.  Most 
labour laws specifically provide for the possibility of 
derogations by the social partners to the advantage of 
employees, through a collective agreement. 
7.  The  employment  relationship  in  the framework  of 
different sources of regulation.  The Law of 12 June 
1965 on collective agreements (Article 11, paragraph 
2) lays down the rule of automatic applicability of a 
collective  agreement,  declaring  null  and  void  any 
provision  of an  individual  contract  of employment 
which  is  contrary to  the provisions of the collective 
agreement. In other words, a contract which derogates 
from  the  collective  agreement  remains  valid  as  a 
contract, but any provisions which conflict with those 
of the collective agreement are invalid and are replaced 
by  those of the collective agreement.  The law does, 
however, qualify the automatic rule and the submission 
of an individual contract to the collective agreement by 
allowing  the  parties to  a contract of employment to 
make derogations from the collective agreement to the 
advantage of the employee.  In  other words, where a 
standard is laid down by the law or by the regulation 
implementing  the law,  an  individual contract of em-
ployment  may  not  derogate  from  it,  except  to  the 
advantage of the employee. Where a minimum standard 
is laid down by the law, a collective labour agreement 
may only derogate from it to the advantage of employ-
ees. It goes without saying that in such cases an individ-
ual contract of employment may only derogate to the 
advantage  of the  employee  as  compared  with  the 
minimum standard laid down by the collective labour 
agreement. 
CHAPTER Ill: ACTION IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMS, 
AND METHODS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS: 
MAIN POINTS OF CONFLICT 
Individual legal actions go before the labour court. 
Collective  disagreements  are  subject  to  extra-judiciary 
procedures. 
The statutory task of the Labour Inspectorate is to anticipate 
and iron out all  employment conflicts which do not come 
under the area of competence of the National Conciliation 
Office. 
Luxembourg law makes a distinction between individual and 
collective legal action, although it does not provide defini-
tions of these two concepts. 
It makes provision for the peaceful settlement of collective 
labour disputes. 
Thus, the Grand-Ducal Decree of  6 October 1945 gave the 
'1nterested parties " the right to bring before the National 
Conciliation Office any  "collective disagreement relating to 
working conditions in one or several undertakings •. LUXEMBOURG 
If  the initiative is not taken by the interested parties, the law 
authorises the National Conciliation Office to 
1'concern itself 
with any collective dispute brought to its attention •: 
Conflicts arising at the time of the conclusion, revision or 
renewal of  a collective agreement constitute collective cases, 
where the issue is not one of interpreting existing law but of 
creating a new rule. 
The Law of  12 June 1965 on collective agreements permits 
referral  to  the  National  Conciliation  Office  where  an 
employer  refuses  to  enter  negotiations  with  a  view  to 
concluding a collective agreement or if, during negotiations, 
the parties are unable to reach agreement on one or several 
fundamental points of  the envisaged collective agreement. In 
this case, the law permits the parties, after or even before the 
failure of attempts at conciliation, to refer the matter to one 
or several arbiters. 
Finally, the law describes as a collective conflict likely to 
lead to the conciliation or arbitration procedure before the 
National  Conciliation  Office  all  disputes  arising  from  a 
difference between the employer's and workers' representa-
tives on the joint works council on the subject of one of the 
measures falling under the council's jurisdiction (see Article 
16 paragraph 2 of the Law of  6 May 1974 instituting joint 
works councils in private-sector companies and organising 
employee representation in limited companies). 
The Law of  12 June 1965 gives trade union organisations 
which are party to a collective agreement the right to bring 
before the employment courts any  case arising  from  this 
agreement,  on  behalf of one of their  members,  without 
having to  produce a mandate from the person concerned, 
provided the latter has been notified and has not objected. 
Similarly, the law gives a trade union organisation bound by 
a collective agreement the right to intervene at any time in a 
legal  case  begun  on  the  basis  of this  agreement  by  an 
employee 
1'owing to the collective interest the resolution of 
the dispute may hold  for its members ': 
If legal action is taken by a trade union organisation, this 
does not necessarily cause the dispute to lose its individual 
character, since the presence of a collective interest is  not 
enough to give the case the collective nature required to start 
extra-judiciary  measures  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of 
collective labour disputes. 
Despite the possible collective interest to all workers covered 
by a collective agreement, the law bestows on labour courts 
special  jurisdiction  to  hear  specific  cases  involving  the 
interpretation  of the  provisions  of a  collective  labour 
agreement. 
1. The different types of strike and lock-out 
and their relative importance 
1.1 The right to strike 
The right to strike is not laid down explicitly either by the 
Constitution or in law. 
Its derived from a broad interpretation of the judicial origins 
of the principle of union freedom laid down in Article 11 
paragraph 5 of the Constitution (revision of21 May 1948), 
which stipulates that the law  ~hall guarantee trade union 
freedom
11
• 
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The Constituante of 1948 did not consider it necessary to 
include the right to strike among the rights laid down spe-
cifically by the Constitution, while considering this right as 
1'one of  the attributes, a corollary of  union freedoms ': 
Meanwhile, the Cour de Cassation, on 24 July 1952 (Pasi-
crisie  volume  XV  p.355),  ended  the  legal  controversy 
regarding the right to strike by ruling that tparticipation in 
a legitimate and lawful strike is an employee's right,  laid 
down implicitly in Article 11, paragraph 5 of  the Constitu-
tion': 
However, in an authoritative opinion on the right to strike, 
the  Procureur  General  de  l 'Etat,  after  finding  that  the 
Constitution  was  definitive only  in  terms  of trade union 
freedom, concluded that "it must nevertheless be recognised 
that it also confirms the right to take trade union action, 
since  without  that  right  trade  union freedom  would  be 
meaningless': 
The law does not define a strike. 
A  ruling of the  Cour de Cassation of 15  December 1959 
(Pasicrisie volume XVIII  p.  90) defines a strike as 
11a con-
certed stoppage of  work in support of  social claims ': 
In his conclusions preceding the 1959 ruling, the Procureur 
General expressed the view that to be justified in principle, 
a strike must pursue an economic aim, since political strikes 
have a  revolutionary  character,  and one does  not strike 
against the law ': 
In a declaration adopted on the occasion of the constitutional 
revision  of 1956,  parliament supported  this  approach  by 
declaring that 'the guarantee of  union freedoms contained in 
the Constitution of  Luxembourg includes the right to strike 
to protect the legitimate social demands of  workers': 
Although the right to strike is not contained explicitly in the 
Constitution,  the  law  nevertheless defines  the  conditions 
under which the right to strike may be exercised, as well as 
the  effects  of exercising  the  right to  strike on  industrial 
relations. 
On  the one hand,  the law makes  it an  offence to incite a 
work stoppage without having first referred the matter to the 
National Conciliation Office. 
On the other hand, the laws governing employment contracts 
of blue-collar and white-collar workers specifically state that 
1'if a worker refrains from providing his services because of 
a strike which is called under legitimate and lawful condi-
tions, this does not break the contract and does not consti-
tute a serious matter entitling the employer to dismiss him': 
Finally, the Law of  12 June 1965 on collective agreements 
imposes  on  a  union  party  to  a  collective agreement  the 
obligation to refrain from threatening or conducting a strike. 
The Law of  16 April 1979 governs the right to strike of State 
civil servants and employees of public establishments under 
direct State control. The legitimacy of strikes in the public 
service is conditional on the failure of a compulsory concili-
ation procedure before a conciliation commission. The Law, 
however, does not grant the right to strike to members of the 
government, special envoys and plenipotentiary ministers, 
legation advisers, other diplomatic agents if they occupy the 
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heads  of administration  and  their  deputies,  directors  of 
educational establishments and their deputies,  the staff of 
court and  prison  establishments,  members  of the  armed 
forces and forces of  law and order, medical and paramedical 
staff of the emergency services, security agents, and staff 
responsible for security in state departments. 
1.2 The right of lock-out 
The right of lock-out is mentioned in passing by the Law of 
12 June 1965 on  collective agreements,  imposing  on  an 
employer who is party to a collective agreement the obliga-
tion to refrain from threatening or implementing a lock-out. 
This ties in with a broad interpretation of the concept of 
"work stoppage  n as  used  in  the texts governing the prior 
conciliation  procedures,  by  including  the  right  of  the 
employer to apply a lock-out. 
Neither legislation nor case-law say anything on the subject 
of what determines whether a lock-out is legitimate, or on 
the legal effects of a lock-out on the employment contracts 
of strike  "outsiders~ 
2. Methods of resolving disputes: structure and appeal 
2.1 The National Conciliation Office 
The National Conciliation Office was set up by the Grand-
Ducal Decree of  6 October 1945 (Memorial of  15 October 
1945, p. 731) and is presided over by the Minister of Labour 
or his delegate. 
It is composed of  permanent members and special members. 
The permanent members are three employers' representatives 
appointed by the employers' organisations and three work-
ers' representatives appointed by the trade union organisa-
tions which are representative at national level. 
For  each  case,  special  members  are  appointed  by  the 
employers' organisations and the trade union organisations. 
The task  of the  National  Conciliation  Office  is  to  bring 
together the parties concerned to settle collective disputes. In 
particular, the law gives it the task of reconciling the parties 
concerned when collective agreements are to be concluded or 
renewed. 
In  practice,  the Office has the power to  intervene if the 
employer refuses to negotiate or in  the event of failure to 
agree on the basis of a collective agreement. 
Disputes brought before the National Conciliation Office are 
settled ·by agreement between the employers' and workers' 
groups. 
Settlements reached within the National Conciliation Office 
may be declared generally binding. 
If  the President of the Office considers that the means of 
conciliation have been exhausted, he draws up a statement of 
non-conciliation, indicating the contentious points. 
The conciliation process before the National Conciliation 
Office is obligatory. 
The law makes it an offence to incite a stoppage of work 
without the prior intervention of the National Conciliation 
Office. 
2.2 The arbitration council 
In the event of non-conciliation, the parties concerned may 
ask  the  government  to  refer  the  case  to  an  arbitration 
council. 
The arbitration council comprises a representative appointed 
by the government, a employer appointed by the employers' 
organisations, and an workers' representative appointed by 
the trade union organisations. 
Acceptance of the  arbitration  decision  by  the  parties  in 
dispute is equivalent to entering into a collective agreement. 
The arbitration decision may be the subject of a declaration 
to the effect that it is generally binding. 
The parties in dispute may refuse to accept the arbitration 
decision, which may be published if this is believed to be in 
the common interest or with the aim of resolving the dispute. 
2.3 Arbitration according to the civil code of procedure 
The Law of  12 June 1965 on collective agreements explicitly 
states that the parties in dispute may at any time ask one or 
several arbiters to resolve their dispute after or even prior to 
an attempt at conciliation. 
In  this event arbitration is carried out on the basis of the 
rules of the Code of  Civil Procedure (Articles 1033 et seq.). 
CHAPTER IV: THE NATIONAL SITUATION 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Basic characteristics of the national arrangements 
for the regulation of working conditions 
The law and its regulatory means of implementation form the 
main vehicle for normative action in the field of working 
conditions. 
The  legislature  lays  down  the  legal  framework  for  the 
individual  employment contract and  the collective agree-
ment. 
Working conditions are covered by minimum standards laid 
down by law. 
The  legislator  establishes  the  minimum  wage  to  which 
anyone  in  employment  is  entitled,  and  also  provides an 
assurance  that  wages  and  salaries  will  be  automatically 
index-linked to changes in the consumer price index, in the 
same way for all employees in the public and private sectors. 
The  law  organises  the  representation  of employees  at 
undertaking level and at board level in limited companies. 
However,  the  existence of legal  standards  governing  all 
aspects of labour law has not hampered the development of 
contractual law in the form of  the collective agreement, since 
standards of  contractual origin are supplementary to statutory 
standards. 
On the one hand,  the collective agreement constitutes the 
social  partners'  priority  wage  policy  tool,  since  the  law 
confines itself to stipulating the minimum wage and guaran-
teeing  purchasing  power  by  means  of the  sliding  scale 
mechanism. LUXEMBOURG 
On  the other hand,  the development of agreement-based 
standards has led to a certain number of fundamental changes 
in employment legislation,  notably in  the direction of the 
statutory reduction of  working hours. 
It cannot be denied that the collective agreement has become 
a powerful factor in good industrial relations and constitutes 
one of the decisive elements in the country's economic and 
social upturn. 
The institutionalised mechanism of dialogue through the Na-
tional Conciliation  Office has played a major role in the 
development of collective agreements by introducing bases 
for  consensus  between  the  social  partners  and  defusing 
potential labour disputes. Strike action has remained spor-
adic and of limited extent. 
The government is aware of the need to respect the auton-
omy of the social partners and therefore refuses to become 
involved in collective bargaining. 
However, the economic crisis led the government to put at 
the disposal of the social partners, through the Emergency 
Law of 1977,  the means of reducing production costs by 
collective agreement in the interest of saving jobs. The social 
partners made only marginal use of this possibility. 
Similarly, between 1981 and 1984 the government persuaded 
parliament to adopt a series of changes to the sliding scale 
mechanism for wages and salaries. Indexing has, however, 
been fully re-established since 1 January 1985. 
The government, nevertheless, is aware of the risks which a 
deterioration  in  the economic  and  social  situation would 
present  for  Luxembourg's  economy  and  has  therefore 
entrusted the  Tripartite  Coordination  Committee with the 
vital task of identifying the measures considered necessary, 
in the event of an manifest crisis, to bring about economic 
recovery. 
Although one of  the measures of national solidarity referred 
to by the law is the suspension of indexing, as well as the 
freezing of margins on products and services,  the general 
nature of the terms used by the law makes it possible, where 
appropriate, to consider other drastic measures appealing to 
national solidarity. 
It is  essential  to  note  that  the  mechanism  of tripartite 
dialogue  between  the  government,  employers  and  trade 
unions, followed if necessary by mediation, do not restrict 
the  government's freedom  of initiative and  action  in  the 
event of  failure to reach a final consensus on the measures to 
be taken. 
The unions consider the system to be appropriate in that, in 
their opinion, it provides the best guarantee for the harmoni-
ous development of industrial relations while offering the 
flexibility which is vital  for the adoption of the necessary 
measures to combat crisis situations. 
By  contrast, the employers consider the mechanism to  be 
inefficient, as it gives the government too much latitude and 
does not come into operation automatically. 
The development of normative action by legislative means is 
currently the subject of considerable controversy between 
employers' representatives and unions. 
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The employers are hostile to any new statutory measures 
relating  to  working  conditions  and  are  calling  for  the 
removal of the inflexibility which hampers the functioning 
of the employment market. 
The unions, on the other hand, continue to regard normative 
action as a vital element of  a policy of social progress, while 
believing that a policy based on collective agreements offers 
the social partners the essential freedom needed to be able to 
take account of the potential of the different branches of the 
national economy. 
The debate on the reform of  the laws on dismissal and on the 
regulation of temporary work as envisaged by the govern-
ment is a perfect example of the extent of the controversy. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
OF LABOUR LAW 
1.  Sourc~  of labour law 
§  1 The sources of labour law in the Netherlands are: 
a.  international provisions; 
b.  the relevant articles of the Constitution; 
c.  statutes (acts of Parliament); 
d.  royal  decrees,  general  regulations of the  administra-
tive authorities, etc; 
e.  collective agreements; 
f.  the individual contract of employment; 
g.  the employer's managerial authority; 
h.  company rules; 
i.  custom and practice (usage). 
Together with: case law 
2. Constitutional law 
§2  Constitutional law obviously determines the powers of 
the various public authorities.  According to  the Constitu-
tional structure, the heteronomous labour law of the Neth-
erlands derives essentially from national power (the King, 
the  government  and  the  parliament),  to  the  almost  total 
exclusion of subordinate authorities such as provinces and 
municipalities. 
§3  Between the 1920s and  1960s the various political forc-
es of the Netherlands often played with the idea of a cer-
tain democratic corporatism: the establishment of 'product 
boards' and  'industry boards' ( 'produktschappen' and  'be-
dri.ifschappen ')  which  could  be  given  regulatory  power. 
This system would be governed by  the Economic and So-
cial Council  (SER)  which  would  have  advisory,  supervi-
sory and legislative powers. 
This concept was dubbed the organization of industry un-
der  public  law.  Some  amendments  to  the  Constitution 
made it possible to elaborate this concept and the idea took 
concrete shape in  1950 in the Organisation of  Industry Act 
(OIA),  a framework statute. This act has never been greatly 
appreciated  in  practice.  Product  boards  and  industry 
boards have been established only  in  the agricultural and 
retail sectors.  And these boards have hardly ever received 
formal powers over social law. 
At the moment the government is reconsidering the future 
of this system. 
Only the Economic and Social Council (SER),  the supreme 
body of this organization of industry under public law, has 
achieved an important role, although largely of a consulta-
tive nature (see §§32-33). 
§4  The impact of fundamental  rights was  very  limited  in 
labour law in  the Netherlands up  to  the end of 1960s,  as 
the Dutch Constitution contained almost exclusively  'civil 
and political'  fundamental  rights.  Since  the  1960s,  the 
Netherlands has signed a growing number of international 
treaties  which  contain  fundamental  'social'  rights.  The 
Dutch Constitution was also updated in  1983 with a more 
extensive  listing of the  various  fundamental  rights  (Arti-
cles 1-23), including fundamental  'social' rights. 
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Although  these  rights  are chiefly  of a programmatic na-
ture,  this  trend  strengthened  the  impact  of fundamental 
rights  on  labour law  in  the  Netherlands.  This  is  particu-
larly true in the area of trade union freedom,  the freedom 
to  enter into collective bargaining, the right to strike, the 
quality of social case law and equality of treatment as re-
gards  race,  sex,  civil  status,  sexual  behaviour,  etc.  It 
would seem that this trend has yet to reach its culmination. 
§5  Constitutional law also plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the impact of international law on Dutch law. 
In  the  Netherlands,  international  treaties come into force 
nationally following  ratification,  which has  to  be author-
ized by Parliament. 
The Netherlands has a tradition of great loyalty as regards 
the  ratification  of international  treaties  containing  social 
regulations.  The  vast  majority  of the  conventions  of the 
International Labour Organization and the 'social' treaties 
of the  UN and  the  Council of Europe  have  consequently 
been ratified by the Netherlands. 
In  some cases the government simultaneously tables a bill 
in  which  the  terms  of national  law  are brought into  line 
with the international convention which is to be ratified. 
Even if national  legislation has not been amended, or has 
not  been  sufficiently  amended,  the  terms  of international 
treaties which  have  been  duly  ratified  have  priority over 
national  laws,  provided  that  their nature and  content are 
appropriate. 
Dutch law follows the philosophy of monism. 
The  Dutch  courts  have  therefore  recognized  the  direct 
application of Article 6  {4}  of the European Social Char-
ter (the  right to strike,  see §58)  and Article 26 of the  UN 
Treaty on Civil and Political Rights (the general regulation 
on  non-discrimination).  All  these  regulations  are  excep-
tions, however.  Most of the terms of international treaties 
are such that they do not lend themselves to direct applica-
tion  to  individual  legal  relationships.  This is  also  true of 
documents, such as resolutions, recommendations, etc. 
As regards the regulations enacted by  the European  Com-
munity,  Dutch  law  scrupulously  follows  the  outlines  set 
out by the Court of  Justice of the EC:  some social articles 
of the  Treaty of Rome,  such  as  Articles 48 and  119,  and 
Regulations  enacted  by  the  EC  (such  as  Regulation 
1612/68) are directly applicable in the national laws of the 
Netherlands.  Some  provisions  of EC  Directives  are  also 
directly applicable, provided that their nature and content 
are appropriate. 
Rulings  are  made  case  by  case and  the  most  spectacular 
case  in  recent  years  has  been  the affirmative response to 
the application of the EC Directives on the equal treatment 
of men and women and the rights of employees in the case 
of relocation of an enterprise. Various judgments of the EC 
Court of  Justice have had a major impact on Dutch labour 
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3. Statutes (Acts of Parliament) 
§6  In contrast to France, labour law is not codified in the 
Netherlands. This law has to be sought throughout Dutch 
legislation. 
Labour law, as set out in formal  Dutch legislation, is the 
result of cooperation  between  the  King,  the  government 
and the parliament. 
The desire to  amend or renew legislation comes in  most 
cases from the Dutch government or parliament (respond-
ing to by the aspirations of society). The desired changes 
are then  submitted by  the government to  the social  part-
ners for their opinion (via consultation requests to the SER 
or to  the Stichting van  de Arbeid [see  §§32-33]) and  fi-
nally  become bills  for  formal  statutes  which  have  to  be 
adopted by both Chambers  making  up  the Dutch parlia-
ment.  They  are  finally  signed  and  promulgated  by  the 
King. 
§7  Legislators  may  in  principle  legislate  on  any  matter 
provided that they respect the fundamental rights set out in 
the Constitution. Parliament has the task of verifying this 
conformity  since,  under  the  Constitution,  promulgated 
laws are inviolable.  Parliament may be guided on a bill's 
conformity with  the  Constitution  by  taking  advice  from 
the Council of State,  which  is  the supreme political  and 
legal  consultative body.  There is,  however,  no  Constitu-
tional Court to verify the conformity of a statute after its 
promulgation. 
For this reason Constitutional law has never played as pre-
dominant a role in labour law in the Netherlands as it does 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
However, the courts may test whether a statute is in accor-
dance with the provisions of international treaties, ratified 
by  the Netherlands as  far  as  these provisions  lend  them-
selves  to  direct  application.  This  possibility  has  led  in 
recent years to  the cancellation of some terms of statutes 
on social security by the courts because of their non-con-
formity with international regulations. 
§8  Dutch acts of parliament- and in particular statutes on 
labour law - usually contain only basic regulatory princi-
ples.  Enforcement  and  actual  application  take  place 
through  royal  orders,  Ministerial  Decrees,  etc.  In  some 
cases they take place through Ministerial Circulars, etc. 
Unlike in France, in the Netherlands there is no dispute as 
regards the distinction between the scope of a statute and 
the scope of a regulation. 
Parliament  no  longer  intervenes  formally  in  regulations 
issued by administrative authorities but is  kept informed 
and retains the possibility of imposing its will where nece-
ssary through a censure motion. 
The social  partners have no  formal  right of consultation 
during  the  formulation  of regulations  of administrative 
authorities.  They are always consulted  in  practice,  how-
ever, in the case of social measures. 
Regulations  of administrative  authorities  are  subject  to 
court vetting  from  the point of view of their conformity 
with  legislation  and  the  Constitution.  Those  which  are 
illegal may be cancelled under the common law of admin-
istrative contention. 
4. Collective agreements 
§9  The  most  important  instrument  governing  working 
conditions, after the law,  is the collective agreement.  We 
shall deal with this in detail below (see  §§37-47). 
In the Netherlands, industrial relations are largely ordered 
by the social  partners'  self-government.  Legislators have 
not therefore needed to intervene as much as for example 
in  France.  The requirements  which  the  law imposes on 
collective agreements are - as will be discussed below - so 
minimal  that  the  problem  of agreements  made  outside 
these requirements does not arise to such an extent as  in 
France. 
In the Nether  lands there are few wildcat strikes and conse-
quently  there  are  no  dispute-settlement  agreements  with 
delegations of striking employees.  This explains why the 
effectiveness of 'atypical' agreements is a matter which is 
hardly touched upon in Dutch case law and doctrine. 
The  only  phenomenon  in  this  field  in  the  Netherlands 
worth mentioning are the agreements with the works coun-
cil (see below). 
In very rare cases employment relationships may be regu-
lated by  'quasi  collective agreements'.  These are regula-
tions  drawn  up  by  'industry boards' (see  §3)  or by  the 
Minister for Social Affairs under the Wage Determination 
Act (WDA,  Articles. 5 and 6). They have the same manda-
tory  force  as  extended  collective  agreements  (see  §§51-
52). 
5. Agreements with works councils 
§ 10  It is  increasingly the case that the employer and the 
works council enter into agreements.  In  the Netherlands, 
these  agreements  have  achieved  a  formal  status  in  the 
Working Time Act. In a bill to amend the Workr Councils 
Act now pending  in  Parliament the  legal  status  of other 
types of agreements between employer and works councils 
will be clarified, although a general solution has not been 
found yet. 
6. Company rules 
§  11  Company  rules  predate the collective agreement but 
have gradually  lost their  importance with the growth of 
collective agreements as a source of regulations on work-
ing  conditions  allowing  greater  equality  between  em-
ployees and employers. 
Where they exists - the establishment of company rules is 
not  mandatory  under  Dutch  law  - they  contain  mainly 
prescriptions  relating  to  the  internal  organisation of the 
enterprise.  Even here, however, the law does not impose 
any prescription or limit on the content of company rules. 
In the past, company rules gave concrete shape to the em-
ployer's power unilaterally  to  issue  a  set of regulations 
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Since  1907  the  law (Articles  1637j-1637m  cc) has  made 
the  validity  of company  rules  subject  to  the  following 
conditions: 
(a)  that the employee has accepted the company rules in 
writing; 
(b)  that they have been published according to the stipu-
lated provisions (display and filing). 
These provisions are of little real  significance,  however, 
as employees would in practice find  it difficult to register 
their disagreement and  the  unilateral  setting  of company 
rules has continued. 
Their unilateral nature was suppressed in  1970 when  the 
law stipulated that company rules should be adopted by the 
works council (Article 27, WCA). 
Nevertheless, according to case law, company rules which 
are not published  according  to  statutory  regulations  and 
which are not submitted for approval by the works coun-
cil, may retain their compulsory nature under specific cir-
cumstances. 
The government has submitted a bill to Parliament to com-
pletely overhaul  the  existing  legal  situation  on  company 
rules. 
7. The managerial and disciplinary authority 
of the head of an enterprise 
§ 12 Under Dutch law the head of an enterprise is entitled 
to  lay  down  "provisions  relating  to  the  performance  of 
work" or 
11provisions intended to improve good order with-
in  the enterprise,  although  by using  this  option  he must 
remain within the limits laid down by the law, the collec-
tive agreement,  the contract of  employment and company 
rules "(Article 1639b, Civil Code). 
This  'managerial authority' gives the employer the possi-
bility of unilaterally laying down enterprise regulations. 
Employers  can  also  lay  down  regulations  unilaterally 
while making them appear to be bilateral; they draft rules 
which  are  accepted  by  employees  when  they  sign  their 
individual contract of employment. 
As  mentioned  above,  this  latter  situation  has  been 
approved by case law and the government intends to codi-
fy  it. 
8. The contract of employment 
§13 The contract of employment is very often reduced to a 
kind of 'entrance ticket', as rights and obligations are reg-
ulated by legal provisions set out in collective agreements 
and  company  rules.  This  means  that  employers and  em-
ployees have only to agree on the date of entry into service 
and the function which will be carried out. 
Many employers and employees wish, however, to set out 
more precise arrangements in the contract of employment, 
for instance: 
(a)  to  lay  down  rights  which  go  beyond  the  minimum 
provisions of the law or the collective agreement; 
(b)  to settle issues which waive certain provisions of the 
law or the  collective  agreement  authorizing  exemp-
tion by written contract; 
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(c)  to  settle  issues  for  which  laws  or collective  agree-
ments do not make provision; 
(d)  to settle individual issues, such as working hours, or 
the number of hours or days of work to be provided 
if these differ from usual working times in the enter-
prise. 
For any job which is not subject to a collective agreement 
there  are  undoubtedly  good  reasons  for  entering  into  a 
detailed contract of employment. 
This  often concerns higher management,  but also  certain 
occupational sectors and whole enterprises which have not 
entered  into collective agreements because of the lack of 
organization of employees. This situation concerns one out 
of four employees in the private sector. 
9. Custom and practice 
§  14  'Custom and practice' is the last source of the Dutch 
system of sources of labour law. 
Sometimes statutes or court decisions refer to custom and 
practice in the branch of industry or in the enterprise. The 
common  law  on  obligations  states  that  practice/usage 
should be taken into account for the interpretation of con-
tracts. For instance, the payment of a bonus, which is not 
based on a provision of the contract of employment,  the 
collective agreement, etc., may be invoked on the basis of 
practice/usage. 
In addition custom and practice plays an auxiliary role in 
the  law  in  relation  to  collective  agreements.  Employees 
who are not  subject  to  a  collective agreement under the 
law or as a result of their individual contract may invoke 
the rights contained  in  a  collective agreement when  they 
are able to  prove that the collective agreement is custom-
arily applied in their enterprise (see §50). 
This is the trickiest problem raised by regulations deriving 
from custom and practice: proving its existence. Employ-
ers may dispute the existence of custom and practise; they 
may also claim that employees did not immediately oppose 
the  modification  of a  practice and  that this  modification 
was therefore tacitly accepted by them. 
An appeal based on custom and practice will always fail if 
it conflicts with  the provisions of another source of law 
(legislation, collective agreement, company rules, contract 
of employment,  etc.),  even  if these  provisions  are  less 
favourable to employees than custom and practice. 
Custom and practice is  consequently somewhat neglected 
in Dutch labour law nowadays,  because it is  the weakest 
source of labour law. 
10. The role of the courts 
§15 Case law has played a modest part in the development 
of labour law  in  the  Netherlands.  The Netherlands does 
not have a Constitutional Court and - in contrast to most 
EC Member States - does not have labour courts. The es-
tablishment of social case law is largely a  matter for  the 
common law courts. 
This type of case law is unlikely to bring about a specific 
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the law. In the rare cases in which courts are asked to fill 
in the gaps in the law, for instance as regards the right to 
strike, there is  much reluctance to give general applicable 
rules. 
It can be seen, however, that case law of the last twenty to 
thirty years has been characterized by a predominant social 
attitude.  Courts tend  to  protect employees,  using general 
legal principles, against employers who are considered to 
be  more  powerful.  For  instance  in  the  law  relating  to 
proof,  the  law  relating  to  damage  caused  by  employees, 
etc. 
In  formal  terms,  the judges of courts of first  instance do 
not  have  to  abide  by  the  case  law  of  higher  courts, 
although in practice they do. Courts of first instance have, 
however,  been  responsible for  some  modifications of la-
bour law,  derogating  from  outdated  case  law of the  Su-
preme  Court  (Hoge  Raad):  for  instance  as  regards  the 
right  to  strike  (see  §58),  the  right  to  effective  employ-
ment, etc. 
11. The conflict of rules and the hierarchy of sources 
§16 In the Netherlands the law does not lay down a hier-
archy of sources of labour law as is the case in Belgium. 
The  priority  of sources  which  we  have  listed  above  is 
based in the first instance on general principles which ap-
ply under civil and public law. These principles provide us 
with the following order of priority: 
1.  international regulations; 
2.  legislation and case law; 
3.  collective agreements; 
4.  the  individual  contract of employment and  company 
rules; 
5.  usage. 
The hierarchical criterion is  less easy  to apply to  conflict 
between agreements with the works council,  the manage-
rial and disciplinary authority of the head of the enterprise 
and  company  rules,  individual  contracts  of employment 
and usage; the same applies to  the hierarchy of collective 
agreements  entered  into  at  more  than  one  level.  In  this 
area there are many uncertainties in Dutch labour law. 
§ 17  This hierarchy of sources  is  also  overturned  by  the 
'principle of the most favourable  law':  i.e.  the  idea  that 
the regulations  contained  in  a  lower  source  of law  may 
derogate from the regulations contained in a higher source 
if this is favourable to employees. The higher source is no 
more than a Jloor' for the lower regulations to built upon 
and  to  provide additional  advantages  for  employees  in  a 
particular branch of industry or enterprise.  But the higher 
source is a  Jloor' in the sense that lower sources are pro-
hibited to  go below it,  save for a few  exceptions as  dis-
cussed below. 
The principle of the  most  favourable  law  is  indisputable 
when a higher source of law uses terms such as  'at least'. 
But even if there is no such terms are used, the applicabil-
ity  of the  principle of the  most  favourable  law  may  be 
assumed most of the time. 
In  some cases,  however,  the  rules contained  in  a  higher 
source are construed in such a way that they are to be seen 
as  a  standard,  not  allowing  derogations  in  favour of the 
employees.  They are a  Jloor' and a  'ceiling' at the same 
time.  This  may  also  be  the  case  with  collective  agree-
ments, unlike in, say, for instance Germany, where collec-
tive agreements are always liable to derogations in melius. 
Finally, as indicated above,  there are also a few places in 
Dutch labour law in  which a higher source of law allows 
derogations in lower sources, even if these are derogations 
in peius, less favourable to the employees. Some of these 
provisions allow derogations in peius only by way of col-
lective agreements with the unions or agreements with the 
works council.  Others allow derogations in peius in every 
lower source,  provided  that  this  derogation  is agreed  in 
writing. 
CHAPTER II: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SECTION  1  : THE SOCIAL PARTNERS 
1. Trade unions 
§ 18  There  are  hundreds  of trade  unions  in  the  Nether-
lands.  Their membership varies from close on 300 000 in 
some cases to a few hundred in others. 
The most important trade unions are grouped together in 
four confederations: 
1.  the  Confederation  of Dutch  Trade  Unions  (FNV), 
traditionally the most powerful confederation, which 
was  set  up  in  1976  as  a  result of a  merger of the 
Social-Democrat confederation and the Catholic con-
federations  of trade  unions.  The  federations  which 
belong  to  the  FNV  have  approximately  1,100,000 
members; 
2.  the  National  Christian  Confederation  (CNV),  a 
confederation  which  was  and  is  still  largely 
Protestant-inspired and which did not take part in the 
merger in 197 6. The federations which belong to this 
confederation have approximately 300,000 members; 
3.  the  MHP,  a  confederation  of white  collar  unions 
founded  in  1972.  The trade unions belonging to this 
confederation have approximately 140,000 members; 
4.  the AVC, a recently formed confederation of formerly 
autonomous unions, which have some 100,000 members. 
§  19 In addition to these four confederations there are: 
a.  a  small  number  of independent  unions  for  specific 
'occupational categories'; 
b.  a number of radical left-wing unions belonging to the 
Independent  Confederation  of Trade  Unions  (OVB). 
They are active in some occupational sectors such as 
the  ports  sector,  which  is  very  important  in  the 
Netherlands. 
§20  The unions  affiliated  to  the  FNV  and  the  CNV  have 
clearly determined the organization of their members with-
in  their respective confederations according to the princi-
ples  of industry-wide  trade-unionism  (i.e.  a  federation 
covers all  employees  employed  in  a  particular economic 
sector, irrespective of their occupational category). 
§21  This means that there is very little competition to at-
tract  members  amongst  unions  belonging  to  the  same 
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unions which  are affiliated  to  different confederations or 
are not members of any confederation. 
There is  'a tacit agreement of  courtesy' between the FNV, 
the  CNV,  the  MHP  and  the  A  vc.  Their unions  normally 
refrain from  'poaching' members from the other or enter-
ing into public disputes; they consult one other in a timely 
way,  etc.  But  besides  that,  there  is  also  'rivalry' which 
may occasionally lead to conflicts. 
The constitution  of Dutch  trade  unions  can  certainly  be 
said to be democratic in principle. In theory, members are 
able  to  exert  every  influence on  the choice of managers 
and on decision-making. In practice, the situation is often 
very different because of members' apathy and  because it 
is  difficult  to  make  changes  to  the  unions'  complicated 
structure. 
§22  The Netherlands is one of the least unionized coun-
tries of the EC.  Some 25%  of Dutch employees belong to 
unions  affiliated  to  the  FNV,  the  CNV,  the  MHP  and  the 
A  vc. A further 2% are affiliated to the other unions. 
Rates of unionization vary very greatly within the working 
population. Some occupational sectors have a high rate of 
unionization (for instance, journalists) and  others have a 
low rate (for instance,  the  banking sector).  There is  still 
only a low level of unionization amongst employees in the 
new professions,  part-time employees,  the flexible labour 
force,  young employees, working women and foreign em-
ployees. 
Unions are looking for strategies to change this situation, 
although results are unlikely to  be achieved  immediately. 
A considerable increase in the rate of unionization should 
not therefore be expected. 
§23  Dutch unions have no official links with the political 
parties, although there is some affinity between the Social-
Democrat  party  (PvdA)  and  the  FNV  and  between  the 
Christian-Democrat party (CDA) and the CNV. 
2. Employers' organizations 
§24  There are  federations  of employers  in  most  occupa-
tional  sectors.  At  national  level,  almost  all  major enter-
prises and  all  the employers'  federations  are affiliated  to 
the  VNO-NCW,  a  recent  merger  of the  Confederation  of 
Dutch Enterprises  (VNO)  and  the Dutch Confederation of 
Christian Employers (NCW). 
Small  and  medium-sized  enterprises (except  those  in  the 
agricultural sector) are for  the  most part members of the 
MKB-Nederland,  a recent merger of the Dutch Royal Fed-
eration of  Entrepreneurs (KNOV) and the Dutch Federation 
of  Christian Entrepreneurs (NCOV). 
Farmers are federated  in  LTO-Nederland,  a recent merger 
of the Royal Committee on Dutch Agriculture (KNLC),  the 
Dutch  Catholic Federation of  Agriculturalists and Horti-
culturalists  (KNVTB)  and  the Dutch  Christian  Federation 
of  Agriculturalists and Horticulturalists (NCBTB). 
VNO-NCW,  MKB-Nederland  and  LTO-Nederland  cooperate 
within  the  central  Council  of Employers'  Organizations 
(RCO). 
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In  general,  employers'  organizations  are  structured  in  a 
democratic way  - managers are elected by  members  and 
must  report  to  them  on  a  regular  basis.  Some  members 
may,  however,  exert  more  influence  than  others  within 
certain employers' organizations. This is chiefly due to the 
size of the enterprise they represent. 
3. Trade-union law 
§25 Trade-union freedom is not explicitly mentioned as a 
fundamental  right in the Dutch Constitution.  Since 1872, 
however, it has not been disputed that the general freedom 
of association enshrined in the Constitution (Article 8) also 
extends to employers' and employees' organizations. 
In  recent years,  the  Netherlands has  signed a number of 
international documents recognizing trade-union freedom, 
whose regulations will  very  probably be directly binding 
in law. 
In the past there have been a number of situations in which 
extremist trade  unions  have  been  opposed  by  the public 
authorities.  At  present every union has complete freedom 
of action and  may  freely  establish its constitution.  No le-
gal  form  is  laid  down.  However,  an  organization  must 
have 'full legal capacity' in the sense set out in Book n of 
the  NBW  (Civil  Code)  in  order  to  be  able  to  enter  into 
collective agreements as a result of collective bargaining, 
to  propose lists of candidates for elections of works coun-
cils  or if it  wishes  to  participate  in  public-law  bodies. 
Book II of the  NBW  (Civil Code),  however, greatly facili-
tates  access  to  Jull  legal  capacity',  so  employers'  and 
employees' organizations in the Netherlands have no diffi-
culty  in  satisfying  this  requirement.  In  practice,  all  em-
ployers' organizations and all the major trade unions have 
acquired this full  legal capacity according to common civil 
law,  in contrast with other EC countries, where unions are 
for the most part 'outside the law' (Germany, Belgium) or 
governed  by  a  specific  trade-union  law  (France,  United 
Kingdom). 
§26  It is  accepted that employees cannot lose their rights 
or be dismissed from their duties because they belong to a 
trade  union.  This  has  not  however  engendered  case  law 
and  there  are no  legal  provisions  specifically  relating  to 
attacks on trade-union freedom. 
§27 In some countries, employees are obliged to belong to 
a  trade  union  (compulsory  membership  or  the  'closed 
shop'). In the Netherlands an obligation of this type is ex-
ceptional,  existing only  in the printing industry.  Legisla-
tion and case law authorize it within well-defined limits. 
§28  Several  collective  agreements  contain  provisions  al-
lowing employees to take part in trade-union activities and 
allowing the trade union to place officers within the enter-
prise,  to  organize meetings  at  workplaces,  etc.  Although 
there was  talk  of it several  years ago,  there has still not 
been any legislation on this matter. 
4. Representativeness 
§29  As  the  establishment of employers'  and  employees' 
organizations is free in the Netherlands and has effectively 
led  to  a  multitude of organisations,  the problem of their 
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It was  inevitable  that  certain  rights  should  be  reserved 
solely for those organizations considered to be representa-
tive. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  Economic  and  Social  Council 
{SER)  undertook  the  task  of laying down  criteria for  as-
sessing  representativeness,  a  task  it achieved  by  issuing 
directives.  The  initial  directives  adopted  in  1954  essen-
tially gave a  monopoly  to  the  organizations affiliated  to 
the precursors of the  FNV,  CNV  and  VNO.  These criteria 
proved unsatisfactory in  the  1970s when  the white collar 
unions  attracted  an  increasing  number  of members  and 
became organized in a much more effective way. 
During the 1970s, the white collar unions used social pres-
sure to acquire the places due to them in consultative, ad-
ministrative and management bodies. In 1977 the SER con-
sequently reviewed its 1954 criteria, providing them with 
greater objectivity. It is now possible to lodge an adminis-
trative appeal against decisions to admit or reject prospec-
tive  members  of consultative,  administrative or manage-
ment bodies.  This administrative appeal,  however,  is  not 
used very frequently in practice. 
For  representativeness  in  the  collective-bargaining  pro-
cess, see §42-45. 
SECTION 2: THE CONCERTATION SYSTEM 
1. Institutions 
§30  Employers'  and  employees'  organizations  meet  reg-
ularly and intensively either at sectoral level  or at enter-
prise level in order to conclude collective agreements and 
discuss all socio-economic matters relating to the sector or 
enterprise (placement,  vocational  training,  various social-
welfare arrangements, etc). 
In  addition  employees'  and  employers'  confederations 
meet at national level,  in  some cases on a bipartite basis, 
and  in  others  on  a  tripartite  basis  (with  government 
representatives). 
§31  Certainly,  legislative power and socio-economic pol-
icies in our Welfare States have become unthinkable with-
out dialogue between the social  partners:  people speak  in 
this respect of 'the economy of  concertation '. 
In the Netherlands this situation is shaped by delicate po-
litical relationships.  There are never single-party govern-
ments but always coalitions of the centre-left or the centre-
right which have constantly to take account of the opposi-
tion. It is for this reason that such importance is attached 
to  social  consensus.  Attempts  are always  made  to  avoid 
severe public confrontations both on the part of the gov-
ernment and on the part of the social partners. 
§32 In the Netherlands two forums for social concertation 
at national level have been set up: 
•  the  Stichting  van  de Arbeid (Labour Foundation),  a 
private-law body which was set up at the end of the 
Second  World  War by  representatives  of the  major 
employers'  and  employees'  confederations.  This 
Foundation is governed by a joint-management body 
(i.e.  on  an  equal  bipartite basis)  comprising  leading 
figures from: 
on the employees' side, the FNV, CNV,  MHP and 
AVC; 
on the employers' side, the VNO-NCW,  MKB-Ne-
derland and LTO-Nederland. 
•  the Sociaal Economische Raad (SER- the Economic 
and  Social  Council),  a  public-law body created and 
organized  by  the  Organisation  of Industry  Act of 
1950 (see §3). These confederations hold 2 X 11  seats; 
11  further  seats  are  reserved  for  independent  mem-
bers,  such  as  the  Chairman  of the  Nederlandsche 
Bank (Central Dutch Bank),  some university profes-
sors,  etc.  SER  committees also  contain  top  officials 
representing  Ministries  (Article  4,  OIA)  who  -
although formally only observers- play an influential 
role. 
The Stichting van de Arbeid and the Sociaal Economische 
Raad have  their head  offices  in  the same buildings (be-
longing  to  the  SER)  in  The Hague.  Most of the leading 
personalities serve on both bodies. 
There are only subtle differences between the two bodies. 
Within the Stichting van de Arbeid the social partners op-
erate on their own; they may confer together in camera. 
In  the SER,  however,  a  third  party has  to  be taken  into 
account:  the independent members and the ministerial offi-
cials.  The deliberations of the  SER,  or at least of its ple-
nary sessions, are public. 
The President of the SER is an independent person, while 
the Stichting van de Arbeid is jointly chaired by the presi-
dents of the VNO-NCW and the FNV. 
The SER is financed by levies from the professional world 
(Article 54, OIA), enabling it to have a considerable secre-
tariat.  The Stichting van de Arbeid has only limited fman-
cial resources and does not therefore have much in the way 
of offices. 
The SER  was set up by an  act of Parliament;  it  may,  for 
instance, be consulted on important measures of a social or 
economic nature which the government is proposing to im-
plement (Article 41, VIA). 
The Stichting  van de Arbeid was set up  privately by  the 
social partners. 
§33  Despite this, the main difference between the SER and 
the Stichting van de Arbeid is still difficult to define. This 
dual  system  is  explained  by  its  historical  context:  the 
Stichting van de Arbeid was set up in  1945, when the SER 
did not exist, and was recognized by the government as its 
main partner in the area of wage policy after the war (see 
§41). 
When the  SER was set up  in  1950 it did not displace the 
Stichting van de Arbeid from this role. It should be noted, 
however,  that wage policy since the middle of the 1960s 
has moved in  the direction of deregulation and the scope 
of action  of the  Stichting  van  de  Arbeid has  weakened 
since then. It continues, however, to operate because em-
ployers'  and  employees'  confederations  appreciate  this 
forum where they can meet on an intimate basis, out of the 
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The Stichting van de Arbeid is also used when it is necess-
ary to  work  out the outlines of a multi-industry  strategy 
concerning  policy  on  working  conditions  pursuant  to  a 
multi-industry agreement,  a protocol or any kind of docu-
ment.  This policy  is  then  implemented by  the  respective 
affiliates  in  the  various  occupational  sectors  and  enter-
prises concerned. 
The  most  famous  example  is  the  agreement  concluded 
within  the  Stichting  van  de  Arbeid  in  1982  relating  to 
shorter working hours, an  agreement which was obtained 
in  exchange  for  the  abolition  of automatic  wage  index-
ation. 
The Stichting van de Arbeid is also useful  when the gov-
ernment is attempting to consult the social partners at min-
isterial level rather than at civil-servant level. This consul-
tation takes the form of a meeting between a delegation of 
the  Cabinet and  the  management of the  Stichting  van  de 
Arbeid. 
It is evident from the above that the SER  has to  leave the 
initiative  to  the  Stichting  van  de  Arbeid  as  regards 
consultation about actual working conditions. 
The  SER  is  the  main  partner  when  the  other  aspects  of 
socio-economic policy have to be discussed. 
In addition the  SER  supervises the  functioning of the  sy-
stem of production boards and industrial boards laid down 
in the Organisation of  Industry Act of  1950 (see §3) and of 
the  system  of works  councils  laid  down  in  the  Works 
Councils Act. 
§34 This outline of bodies and situations in which employ-
ers' and  employees'  organizations  may  meet  is  far  from 
exhaustive. The social partners also meet in: 
•  administrative,  consultative  and  legal  bodies  in  the 
area of social security; 
•  joint industrial  committees  (see  §  75)  and  industrial 
boards (see §3); 
•  the National Manpower Services Board (Centraal Be-
stuur voor de Arbeidsvoorziening,  CBA)  and  the  28 
Regional  Manpower  Services  Boards  (Regionaal 
Bestuur voor de Arbeidsvoorziening, RBA). 
Even  in  left-wing  circles  - traditionally  opposed  to  the 
unions'  excessive  integration  in  the  State  machinery  -
there is now a desire for socio-economic policies based on 
social consensus. 
2. The role of the State 
§35 In the Netherlands the public authorities have been the 
main socio-political actor for a long  time,  especially and 
very clearly since 1945.  This development was shaped by 
the  theories  of Keynes  which  held  sway  for  several  de-
cades.  According to  these theories,  the public authorities 
should play a central role in  pursuing often contradictory 
economic objectives,  such  as  maintaining  the  balance of 
payments,  a sufficient level  of investment,  a stable price 
level,  full  employment,  the  reasonable  redistribution  of 
income, budgetary balance, etc. 
It is in this context that the public authorities exerted con-
siderable control, with the  'controlled' wage policy which 
was maintained from 1945 to  1958. The public authorities 
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at that time were made up of a centre-left coalition govern-
ment  comprising  Social-Democrats  and  Christian-Demo-
crats. The Social-Democrats left the government in  1958. 
Since  then  the  Netherlands  has  for  the  most  part  had 
centre-right governments comprising Christian-Democrats 
and  Liberals.  This  centre-right  coalition  has  gradually 
dismantled the controlled wage policy, but not as quickly 
as  the  unions (which are no  longer soulmates of the new 
political powers) would have liked. 
It is for this reason that the 1960s and 1970s were charac-
terized  by  considerable  concern  over  the  State's  role  in 
wage policy. All the institutions of controlled wage policy 
suffered  the  impact  of the  major  wage explosion  of the 
1960s. 
In  1970 new  legislation was enacted - the Determination 
of Wages  Act (DWA)  - which  in  principle gave the con-
tracting  parties of collective agreements responsibility for 
wage  policy  but  left  the  door  open  for  public-authority 
intervention in this area (Articles 8-11, DWA). 
Since  then  and  until  the  mid-1980s,  the  government has 
attempted every year to  reach an  agreement with employ-
ers' and employees' confederations as regards the outlines 
of wage adjustment,  within  the  broader context of socio-
economic policy.  Concertation should ideally lead to  'cen-
tral agreements', but they were only rarely achieved.  Af-
ter every failure of this tripartite concertation at the high-
est level, politicians and the media always demanded inter-
vention  by  the  public  authorities.  The public  authorities 
used  their  powers  to  intervene  effectively  on  several 
occasions between 1970 and 1982. 
At first, such  intervention often led to political and social 
conflicts (strikes).  Legal problems cropped up  later when 
the unions took this problem before the courts. The courts 
refused,  however,  to  prohibit  public-authority  interven-
tion.  The problem was  even  brought before the  Interna-
tional  Labour  Organization,  which,  after  a  few  years, 
became  more  critical  and,  through  an  expert  report  by 
Professor Windmuller, censured this repeated intervention 
in wage formation.  This opinion was issued in  1982, just 
when a new centre-right coalition government had come to 
power. This government, like all centre-right governments 
in  Western Europe,  intended to  give greater scope to  the 
play of free  market  forces.  It ruled out State intervention 
in  wage  determination  and,  from  an  economic  point  of 
view,  there  was  no  longer  any  need  for  this  since  the 
Nether  lands  had  a  record  unemployment  level  and  the 
unions  were  consequently  in  a  relatively  weak  position. 
Excessive  wage  increases  were  no  longer  to  be  feared. 
Dutch policy could then adopt the recommendations of the 
ILO's Windmuller Commission without any problem. 
Since 1982  there has  been  no  intervention in wage deter-
mination  in  the  private sector.  The  1970  the Act on  the 
Determination  of Wage-setting,  which  had  left  the  way 
open  for  intervention,  was  modified  in  this  respect  in 
1986. From then on the public authorities could intervene 
only  in  the  event  of extreme  urgency  caused  by  external 
factors (new Article 10, WDA). 
The government is  still,  however,  committed to  the prin-
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its, while the social partners carefully monitor the govern-
ment's socio-economic policy in  order to  determine their 
position on wage policy. 
The public authorities, which have always been constituted 
in  the  Netherlands  by  a  political  coalition  of various 
parties, scrupulously avoid taking the part of one or other 
of the social  partners (in contrast with the British case of 
the intimate relationship between the Labour Party and the 
TUC).  It is evident, however, that a centre-left government 
will have more sympathy with the unions, while a centre-
right  government  will  be  more  sensitive  to  employers' 
aspirations.  The  current  coalition  between  social-demo-
crats  and  liberals  keeps  an  equal  distance  to  both  social 
partners. 
The public  authorities  have  also  played  a  role  in  recent 
years in closely linking the statutory minimum wage,  the 
level of social-security benefits and the wages of civil ser-
vants to each other and to wage growth in  the private sec-
tor. The linking of the wages of civil servants to the pri-
vate sector was  abolished at the beginning of the  1980s. 
The linking of the statutory minimum wage and  the  level 
of social-security  benefits  to  wage  growth  in  the  private 
sector has been maintained in theory,  but was in  practice 
interrupted several  times  in  recent years.  At  the  moment 
this linkage is functioning again. 
While every government attempts to  pave the way for the 
harmonious  growth  of all  these  types  of income,  it  has 
almost become an obsessional concern in Dutch policy. 
This  concern  also  explains why  the  government  feels  so 
involved in the determination of wages in the private sec-
tor, although at present it intervenes in  the private sector 
by  persuasion and  indirect pressure rather than  by direct 
intervention. 
§36  The  public  authorities  have  continued  to  intervene 
directly in  the area of civil servants' wages,  since in  this 
area  they  are  the  employer.  This  involves  15%  of the 
working population. 
At first,  civil servants' working conditions and terms and 
conditions  of employment  were  set  formally  and  uni-
laterally by  the  government.  For a number of years  the 
trend  has  been  towards  a  situation  which  increasingly 
resembles  the collective-bargaining  system  in  the  private 
sector, but which leaves the final  word to the government. 
In  1988  this procedure was  formalized  in  the provisional 
protocol  between  the  government  and  the  unions 
representing civil servants. 
Until  the  beginning  of the  1990s  the  public  authorities 
have  kept control  over wage  increases  for  employees  of 
semi-public organisations (hospitals,  radio and  television, 
etc), about 10%  of the working population. When  this in 
turn was criticized by the ILO,  it was abolished in  1994. 
In  contrast  to  the  situation  in  other  countries  such  as 
France and Italy, the Netherlands does not have an income 
policy  conducted  explicitly  by  the  public  authorities 
through State enterprises,  since such enterprises are very 
rare in  the  Netherlands (and employ  less than  2%  of the 
total working population). 
CHAPTER Ill: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
SECTION  1: BACKGROUND 
1. The system of collective agreements 
§37 Since the Second World War, the Netherlands has had 
a  wide network of collective agreements and administra-
tive wage regulations covering approximately 70%  of the 
working population: 
•  approximately 200 sectoral collective agreements for 
approximately 2.6 million employees; 
•  approximately 600 company agreements for approxi-
mately  0.6  million  employees  in  the  private  sector 
and the semi-public sector; 
•  hundreds  of administrative wage  regulations  for ap-
proximately 0.8 million employees in the public sec-
tor. 
§38 The various collective agreements at sectoral or enter-
prise  level  are  concluded  independently  of one  another, 
although there are some links. 
In the first place,  this is because there are a large number 
of major unions concluding several collective agreements. 
This  is  the  case,  for  instance,  of the  lndustriebond  FNV 
(Federation  of  Industrial  Employees,  affiliated  to  the 
FNV),  which  is  party  to  the  agreements  in  the  iron  and 
steel  and  textile  sectors  and  the  Hoogovens  and  Philips 
enterprises, etc.  These unions tend to coordinate their ap-
proach to each bargaining process as far as possible. 
In  addition  most  unions  are  affiliated  to  the  three  main 
confederations (see  §18) and union policy tends to be co-
ordinated within these confederations as well. In this area, 
it should be noted that the influence of the confederations' 
offices, although limited at official level,  is relatively im-
portant  in  practice  and  is  more  important,  for  instance, 
than in the case of the TUC in Great Britain. 
Employers also coordinate their strategic positions during 
collective  bargaining  in  occupational  sectors  and  enter-
prises,  through  their  confederations  (VNO-NCW,  MKB-
Nederland  and  LTO-Nederland).  Round  tables  are  some-
times held  between  the  leading figures  of the employers' 
and  employees' confederations in order to reach  'common 
conclusions' in  the area of wage growth, working hours, 
employment, social security, etc. (see §35). 
The result is that although collective bargaining is official-
ly  decentralized  to  the  levels  of occupational  sector  or 
enterprise,  there has always been a tendency towards cen-
tralization. This tendency was very marked throughout the 
whole of the  period  1945-1958  but was  less pronounced 
between  1958 and  1982.  Since 1982 it has gained in  sig-
nificance, with the result that a mixed trend towards cen-
tralization  and  decentralization  has  been  one of the  fea-
tures  of the  current period.  A very  rapid  change in  this 
area cannot be expected. 
§39 We have noted therefore that the Netherlands has two 
types  of collective  agreement:  collective  agreements  at 
enterprise  level  and  collective  agreements  for  particular 
occupational  sectors.  It is  rare  for  an  enterprise  to  be 
bound by both a sectoral and a company agreement, which 
is often the case in France.  In most cases, enterprises are 
bound either by one or by the other. THE NETHERLANDS 
It should be noted, however, that bargaining at enterprise 
level is gaining ground. This trend, however, has more to 
do with works councils than with the unions.  Having ac-
quired full  independence in  1979, works councils are be-
ing increasingly taken seriously by the employers. From a 
strictly formal point of view, the employer and the works 
council do not 'bargain', but solely confer. The law also 
prohibits works councils from interfering in  fields  which 
are  already  exhaustively  regulated  by  collective  agree-
ments, bargaining between the union and the entrepreneur 
thus having priority over concertation between the entre-
preneur and the works council (see §87). 
In practice,  however,  it can be seen  that,  as  the unions 
have  only  limited  representation  within  enterprises, 
concertation between the entrepreneur and the works coun-
cil is of much greater significance than  is  bargaining be-
tween employers and the unions at enterprise level. 
Employers and some politicians would like to  strengthen 
dialogue between employers and works councils, possibly 
by  introducing  the works council  as  a  social  partner  in 
genuine collective bargaining at enterprise level.  This al-
ready takes place in some major enterprises which are not 
subject to collective agreements with the unions. 
The unions do not view this development favourably,  be-
cause it might be detrimental  to  their position,  which  is 
already weak. The furthest they wish to go is the delega-
tion  of some  executive  powers  as  regards  concertation 
between the entrepreneur and  the works council.  In  this 
area, new developments are to be expected. 
2. Fonnulating a collective agreement 
§40 Employers and unions normally meet every year for 
bargaining relating to the renewal of the collective agree-
ment,  since collective agreements are in  most cases  con-
cluded for one year, although there are from time to  time 
agreements concluded for several years. 
The Act on collective agreements (ACA) in practice places 
no  restriction  on the parties  as  fas  as  this  issue  is  con-
cerned (Articles 18 and 19, ACA). 
The starting  point of annual  concertation  is  the  existing 
agreement and the amendments which employers and em-
ployees wish to make to it. 
In the case of economic prosperity, the unions in particular 
propose a whole series of improvements and employers try 
to limit or to delay them for as far and as long as possible. 
If,  in  contrast,  the  economy  is  deteriorating,  employers 
attempt to take a backward step and the unions attempt to 
maintain 'acquired rights ' for as long as possible. 
In  the current context, a  mixed  form  seems to  be emerg-
ing.  Unions  are  pushing  forward  with  new  demands 
because of an improved economic situation but employers 
are  maintaining  their  demands,  for  instance  as  regards 
greater flexibility of wage structures and working hours. 
The demands  put  forward  by  the  social  partners  during 
collective  bargaining  are  established  in  advance  by  the 
various  organizations  following  consultations  with  their 
members.  Members'  influence  should  not,  however,  be 
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overestimated; it is the offices which play the crucial role. 
The-policy of the various unions, moreover, is also shaped 
by the influence of the confederation (see §38). 
Bargaining between employers and unions  is  not usually 
shaped  by  an  institutional  framework.  In some  occupa-
tional  sectors,  however,  it  is  institutionalized  within  a 
joint consultation  body.  In  only  very  few  occupational 
sectors are  meetings  conducted  by an  independent chair-
man. 
After the various bargaining sessions attended by the dele-
gations,  the  social  partners  fmally  reach  a  compromise. 
This  compromise  is  then  passed  on  to  their  members. 
Once their approval has been obtained, the new collective 
agreement may be formally concluded. 
If  the social partners do not reach consensus as regards the 
new collective agreement,  'war' may  be declared  in the 
form  of a  strike (see  §58).  A  strike does  not,  however, 
always take place.  It may  be (especially if employees do 
not feel  strong enough to undertake a strike and employers 
do not wish to  make matters worse) that the unions do not 
call a strike and there is simply a period with no collective 
agreement in  force.  The social  partners then resume bar-
gaining a year later. 
SECTION 2: THE LAW ON  COLLECTIVE 
LABOUR AGREEMENTS 
1. Definition-Fonn-Publicity 
§41  According to  the legal  definition,  a collective agree-
ment is an agreement concluded between, on the one hand, 
one or several  employers,  or one or several  employers' 
associations and,  on the other hand,  one or several  trade 
unions,  the main or exclusive aim of this agreement being 
to  regulate the working conditions which have to be taken 
into account in contracts of employment (Article 1, ACA). 
A  collective  agreement  must  necessarily  be  in  writing 
(Article 3, ACA). 
It must be submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs (Ar-
ticle  4,  WDA).  The  members  of signatory  parties  must 
obtain a copy of it (Article 4, ACA). 
2. Parties to collective agreements 
§42  In  the  Netherlands  any  association  of employers  or 
employees may enter into a collective agreement. 
No conditions relating to the size, independence or repre-
sentativeness of the parties to the collective agreement are 
laid down in law or case law. 
The only two legal conditions are: 
(a)  that the association has full  legal capacity (Article 1, 
ACA), 
(b)  that  the  association  is  authorized,  by  its  articles of 
association, to enter into collective agreements (Arti-
cle 2,  AG"'A). 
These  two  requirements  are  readily  satisfied  by  all 
organizations of employers and employees, even the small-
est  ones.  It  is  sufficient  to  draft  articles  of association 
which correspond to the minimum regulations imposed by 
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legal  capacity,  to  have these articles of association  certi-
fied  before a notary  and  then  to  enter the association on 
the register of associations. 
§43  From the employer's point of view,  the  legal  defini-
tion  also  allows  an  individual  employer,  or  an  ad  hoc 
group of employers, as well as a permanent association of 
employers, to be party to a collective agreement. 
This explains why  there are collective agreements at  the 
level  of occupational  sector as  well as  at the  level  of the 
enterprise itself (for instance Philips, Hoogovens). Collec-
tive agreements  at sectoral  level  are sometime concluded 
by a number of employers' associations (for instance in the 
building industry and the textile industry). 
§44 From the employees' point of view, unions, viewed in 
their  formal  sense,  are  entitled  to  enter  into  collective 
agreements, to the exclusion of all other employees' repre-
sentatives. 
In  the case of an  important agreement,  bargaining is  nor-
mally conducted by senior trade union leaders;  in the case 
of a less important agreement, bargaining is conducted by 
the union's district leaders. 
Only in  a few  major enterprises may  the union delegates 
from these enterprises also take part in the negotiations. 
But  it  is always  in  the  name  and  on  behalf of the  union 
that bargaining is conducted and agreements are signed. 
Under Dutch law works councils are formally not empow-
ered to enter into collective agreements (see  §39).  But this 
does  not prevent  them  in  some  enterprises  in  which  the 
unions  are  not  present  to  conclude  informal  collective 
agreements with the employer. 
§45  A collective agreement is  normally signed by all  the 
unions active in the economic sector or enterprise concern-
ed, or by none of them.  Up to now, cases in which collec-
tive bargaining has given rise to disagreement between the 
unions  concerned  are  not  so  frequent  as  for  instance  in 
France, If  they do occur neither the excluded union nor its 
members are bound by  this agreement and they  may  con-
tinue to  press for a more favourable collective agreement 
using methods of collective action.  As  in  recent years em-
ployees' militancy has  decreased unions also have sought 
the intervention of the courts in  such cases but the courts 
were not prepared to intervene. 
The overall picture,  however,  is,  that  'multi-unionism ' is 
not yet a problem in  the Netherlands as employers do  not 
systematically attempt, as they do in Great Britain, to deal 
with a single union  at  the  negotiating  table.  Such  a pre-
meditated  strategy  would  not  be tolerated  in  the Nether-
lands. 
3. A right to collective bargaining? 
§46  Between  1945  and  1970  employers'  and  employees' 
organizations  which  were  not  affiliated  to  the  'official' 
confederations of those days (the CNV and  the precursors 
of the  FNV)  were excluded from  the collective-bargaining 
process. 
During the  1960s,  some of these organizations took legal 
action to obtain support allowing them to take part in col-
lective  bargaining.  The  courts  rejected  them  on  the 
grounds of the principle of contractual freedom. 
During the  1970s,  the white collar unions  made a major 
break-through.  These  unions  were  fmally  recognized  as 
partners in  collective agreements,  more because of major 
political pressure than because of the size of their member-
ship. 
In 1979 the Economic and Social Council rejected the idea 
of legal  regulation of the  right of participation in collec-
tive bargaining and there is consequently no legislation on 
this issue. This SER opinion confirmed the traditional opi-
nion according to which recognition of the right to partici-
pate in collective bargaining can be obtained only by force 
of numbers. 
According  to  the  SER,  only clearly unreasonable cases in 
which access to collective bargaining is refused to an orga-
nization can be brought before the courts. 
Since then,  court decisions have tended to correct cases in 
which  organizations  have  been  excluded  for  inadequate 
reasons.  In other cases organizations have not managed to 
gain access to the negotiating table by judicial means. 
In  the  Netherlands  - in  contrast  with  the  situation  in 
France- the law does not make it compulsory for employ-
ers to negotiate or re-negotiate a collective agreement. The 
courts are not prepared to make employers subject to such 
an obligation (other than in exceptional cases). This means 
that the only way the unions can force employers to enter 
into collective bargaining is by striking. 
Although  cases  in  which  employers  deliberately  avoid 
negotiating with any unions (the American phenomenon of 
'no union') are rare, there are always some economic sec-
tors  and  enterprises  in  which  the  unions  cannot  impose 
collective  bargaining  because of their small  membership. 
It is  estimated  that  this  affects  20%  of employees  in  the 
private sector. 
4. Field of geographical, temporal 
and personal application 
§47 Legislators have given almost complete freedom to the 
social partners to organize the scope of application of col-
lective agreements - ratione territorialis, ratione personae 
and ratione temporis. 
In  the Netherlands, the geographical application of almost 
all industry agreements covers the whole country. The few 
exceptions  concern,  for  instance,  maritime  ports,  which 
are all subject to a separate collective agreement. 
As  regards the scope of application  ratione temporis, we 
have  already  noted  above  that  collective  agreements  are 
generally concluded in the Netherlands for a period of one 
or two years.  Collective agreements which contain special 
provisions  (early  retirement,  welfare  funds,  etc.)  are 
sometimes valid  for  longer periods.  The law lays down a 
maximum  period  of  five  years  and  specifies  certain 
arrangements as  regards the prolongation and termination 
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As  regards  the  field  of application  ratione personae,  the 
rule of the freedom of the social partners prevails. 
The collective agreement does not have to be restricted to 
employees bound by a contract of employment,  and  may 
also contain provisions concerning employees under enter-
prise contracts or contracts  for  the  provision  of services 
(Article 1[2],  ACA). This means that a number of atypical 
labour relationships may be included in the field of appli-
cation of a  collective agreement,  such  as  'on  call' con-
tracts,  apprenticeship  contracts,  temporary  contracts  and 
home-work contracts.  In practice, while the working con-
ditions  of temporary  employees  are  often  regulated  by 
collective agreements,  the conditions of employees bound 
by other 'atypical' contracts are less frequently so. 
Dutch collective agreements traditionally cover the work-
ing conditions of blue-collar employees. For several years, 
however,  a  number  of collective  agreements  have  also 
organized  the  working  conditions  of  white-collar  em-
ployees.  It is rare,  however,  for collective agreements  to 
lay  down  pay  scales  for  personnel  receiving  an  annual 
wage in excess of DM  150,000. 
Because  of the  fact  that  Dutch  unions  are  organized  in 
accordance with the principle of 'one occupational sector 
-one union' (at least as far as the unions of the same Con-
federation  are concerned),  the  boundaries of the  field  of 
application ratione personae does not raise many problems 
of rival agreements. 
Some conflicts may,  however,  arise:  for  instance,  do  the 
administrative  personnel  of a  shipping  company  come 
under the collective agreement for  maritime trade or the 
agreement for the ports sector or even the agreement relat-
ing to administrative personnel in general? 
5. Regulatory content 
§48  The provisions of collective agreements relate essen-
tially  to  wages,  pay  supplements,  working  hours,  holi-
days, overtime, etc. 
The collective agreement may  also contain regulations on 
employee  participation,  health  and  safety  rules,  supple-
mentary  social-security  benefits,  environmental  issues, 
investments,  etc.,  although  these  latter  issues  are  much 
less frequent in the Netherlands than elsewhere in the EC. 
Dutch law,  by giving the collective agreement  "the  main 
or exclusive  aim  of regulating  working  conditions  which 
must  be taken  into  account  in  contracts  of employment" 
(Article  1,  ACA)  restricted  the  scope of collective  agree-
ments. This is also borne out by case law:  the question as 
to  whether collective agreements  may  contain  provisions 
instituting  social  works  to  which  individual  employers 
must  make a financial  contribution  has  been  brought be-
fore  the  courts  on  a  number of occasions.  The Supreme 
Court of  Justice has confirmed this possibility on  several 
occasions. 
In the Netherlands there is no relevant borderline between 
the rules set out in collective agreements and those set out 
in law. The issues which may be dealt with in a collective 
agreement may also be dealt with in  law, which is in  fact 
what happens in  practice:  the  law often  lays down  mini-
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mum  regulations  which  are  then  improved  by  collective 
agreement.  This  is  the  case  in  particular  in  the  area  of 
rights to paid leave, to periods of notice, etc. 
In  most  cases  the  regulations  set out in  collective agree-
ments  also  have  a  minimum  nature,  which  means  that 
lower-ranking sources of law such  as  the individual con-
tract of employment may  depart therefrom in the employ-
ee's favour. 
In  some  cases,  however,  the  Dutch collective agreement 
has a maximum or standard nature and in this case deroga-
tions are not possible even if they are to  the workers' ad-
vantage. 
6. The mandatory force of regulatory provisions 
§49  In  this respect a distinction has  to be made between 
'ordinary'  collective  agreements  and  agreements  which 
have been rendered generally applicable, with erga omnes 
force,  by an extension order. 
Non-extended collective agreements are effective in  prin-
ciple only  in  cases  in  which employees are members of a 
signatory employees'  organization  and  the  employer is a 
member  of the  employers'  organization  which  has  con-
cluded the collective agreement for the occupational sector 
to  which it relates, or is himself a signatory to the collec-
tive agreement (Articles 9,  12 and 13, ACA). 
Clauses of individual contracts of employment which are 
in conflict with the provisions of the collective agreement 
are null  and  void;  they  are automatically replaced by  the 
corresponding provisions of the collective agreement (Arti-
cle 12, AL"'A). 
This subordination  to  the collective  agreement  continues 
after the termination or expiry of the agreement, until new 
provisions  are  laid  down,  either collectively  or individ-
ually. 
Parties to  collective bargaining may  also  give the  collec-
tive agreement retroactive force. 
§50  Employers bound by collective agreements are legally 
obliged to  apply them for their entire duration to  all con-
tracts  of employment  they  conclude  with  non-organized 
employees (unless the collective agreement provides other-
wise)  (Article  14,  ACA). If  employers do  not do so,  how-
ever,  non-organized  employees  cannot  claim  nullity  and 
the replacement of conflicting clauses by  reference to  the 
law on collective agreements. In this case, only the unions 
which  have  signed  the  collective  agreement  may  invoke 
this obligation in an action against an employer. 
These  non-organized  employees  may,  however,  suc-
cessfully  secure  application  of the  collective  agreement 
before  the  courts  if this  application  has  been  expressly 
agreed in  the individual contract of employment or if it is 
a result of the  implementation of general notions of civil 
law,  such as custom and practice. This also applies to em-
ployees  (whether  organized  or not)  working  for  an  em-
ployer who is not bound by the collective agreement. 
Nowadays, application of the collective agreement is very 
widespread, even in cases in which the law does not make 
it mandatory. 158  THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
7. Extension 
§51  During the years of the Great Depression prior to the 
Second  World  War,  Parliament  invested  the  executive 
authority (the Minister) with the power to extend the scope 
of an agreement to all employers in the occupational sector 
concerned, by means of an extension order: the Act on the 
extension of  the terms of  collective agreements (AECA). 
The Minister undertakes this extension only at the request 
of one or several of the employers' and employees' organ-
izations who have signed  the collective agreement  (Arti-
cle 4,  AECA) and wish to have it respected throughout the 
sector in  question;  he can  accept  this  request only  if he 
feels  that the agreement is already applied to a substantial 
majority of personnel employed in this occupational sector 
(Article 2, AECA). When assessing this majority,  the Min-
ister  takes  account  of the  percentage  of all  employees 
(whether organized or not) in the service of the employers 
bound by the collective agreement with respect to the total 
number of employees in this sector. This method of calcu-
lation  enables  the  collective  agreement  to  be  extended, 
even if the level of union organization is fairly low. At the 
same time this method of calculation makes it possible for 
a collective agreement to be extended even when it has not 
been signed by all the major unions. 
§52 In the Netherlands the mechanism of extension is  fre-
quently used.  When an agreement has been extended to a 
whole occupational sector all employers and employees in 
that sector are subject to the collective agreement by virtue 
of the law,  irrespective of whether or not they are union-
ized.  In  such  cases,  non-unionized  employees  may  take 
action to claim the rights contained in the collective agree-
ment (Article 3, AECA). 
The  extension  order cannot  have  retroactive  force  (Arti-
cle 2[3],  AECA) nor a forward effect. 
The Minister may  exclude certain enterprises and certain 
provisions of the collective agreement when  undertaking 
the extension (Article  2,  AECA).  The law  expressly  cites 
certain provisions which may not be extended (in particu-
lar, provisions likely to favour union members above other 
workers (Article 2[5], AECA). 
The  Minister  will  also  exclude  provisions  in  collective 
agreements from extension when they have a dubious legal 
character. 
The law sets out procedures for complaints and consulta-
tions (Article 4, AECA) but no judicial review is possible of 
the Minister's decision,  whether yes or no,  to  extend the 
terms of a collective agreement. 
The instrument of extending the binding force of collective 
agreements has come under sharp attack from economists 
in recent years as it is in fact creating  'wage cartels'. The 
government considered abolishing it,  but decided  later to 
maintain  the  instrument as  it  contributes  to  stable social 
relationships on the labour market. 
In recent times the Minister has started to use his power of 
extension to  exert pressure on the social  partners.  He is 
only  prepared  to  extend  the  binding  force  of collective 
agreements if the minimum wages contained in the collec-
tive agreement are not above the national  statutory  mini-
mum wage.  The aim here is  to  improve the possibilities 
for job seekers in the low paid sector. 
8. Contractual content 
§53  In  the  Netherlands,  collective agreements often con-
tain  various provisions which  relate only to the relation-
ship between the signatory parties, for instance: 
•  the date of the next meeting for new negotiations to 
conclude a collective agreement; 
•  finding  out  whether  an  evaluation  or  a  possible 
amendment of the current agreement may  be envisa-
ged; 
•  finding out what measures to take if a dispute arises 
between the signatory parties as regards application of 
the collective agreement (see §56); 
•  finding  out  to  what  extent  the  social  partners  will 
refrain from calling a strike throughout the period of 
validity of the collective agreement (see §54); 
•  finding  out  whether,  should  it  prove  impossible  to 
conclude a new agreement at the end of the period of 
validity  of the  agreement,  there  will  be  initial  re-
course to mediation or arbitration. 
A  characteristic  of this  contractual  part is  that  it can  be 
legally invoked only  by  the signatory parties.  Individual 
parties are not concerned;  moreover,  the contractual part 
cannot be extended by ministerial order (see §52). 
9. The no-strike obligation 
§54 In the Netherlands most collective agreements contain 
no-strike clauses,  in  accordance with which the signatory 
parties undertake to respect the provisions of the collective 
agreement throughout its duration and to refrain from any 
industrial action to change existing conditions. 
Even if these clauses were not explicitly stated, the signa-
tory parties would still be liable to apply this agreement in 
good faith by virtue of the general law of obligation. 
The no-strike obligation is  not only seen as a mandatory 
provision for the signatory parties of the collective agree-
ment. It also applies to employers and employees who are 
members of the signatory parties, with the result that they 
are  not  authorized  to  undertake  industrial  action  against 
one another during the period of validity of the collective 
agreement (Article 9,  AECA).  The signatory organizations 
must exert pressure on their members  to respect the col-
lective  agreement.  This  obligation,  however,  guarantees 
respect of the collective agreement only if that agreement 
makes express provision therefor (Article 8, AECA). 
In this context, unions cannot readily support a strike run-
ning counter to the provisions of the collective agreement. 
They would be penalized by the courts, which would order 
them,  by  summary  procedure,  to  disassociate themselves 
from the strike under pain of payment of fines (see §60). 
The no-strike obligation  may  be binding  on  unions  and 
their  members  only  if the  unions  are  signatories  to  the 
collective agreement. If  this is not the case, the union may 
start or continue strike action to obtain a more favourable 
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Most of the  no-strike obligations contained  in  collective 
agreements are of a relative nature, i.e. they concern only 
matters which are regulated by the agreement. 
It is  therefore possible to  organize,  during the period of 
validity of the agreement,  other types of strike,  such  as 
sympathy strikes. There is some doubt as to whether it is 
also possible to strike for reasons not covered by the col-
lective agreement, for instance for a supplementary bonus, 
a ruling relating to safety at work, etc. 
In principle, the no-strike obligation expires as the collec-
tive agreement expires or is terminated by agreement, al-
though in some cases it remains in force for a certain pe-
riod after this expiry  /termination. 
10. Interpretation and appeal 
§55  The employers and  employees who  are bound  by  a 
collective agreement  must  respect  it.  If  a party does  not 
respect it - intentionally, without premeditation or because 
of a  doubtful  interpretation - the other party to  the con-
tract of employment  may  refer the  matter  to  the district 
court (see §49). 
Moreover, signatory organizations of the collective agree-
ment are entitled, because of this status, to initiate action 
against a  member of another signatory organization who 
has not respected the collective agreement (Articles 9,  15 
and 16, ACA). 
Signatory  organizations  of the  collective  agreement  are 
also  entitled  to  intervene  in  any  legal  dispute  involving 
interpretation of the collective agreement (Article  114(2), 
Code  of Civil  Procedure),  but this  power is  infrequently 
used. 
In some branches of industry and in major enterprises, the 
collective agreement sets out specific bodies before which 
infractions  of the  collective  agreement  may  be  brought. 
This is not, however, a very current practice. 
In the Netherlands the observance of collective agreements 
is never subject to criminal sanctions. And only if they are 
extended  by  a  ministerial  order their may  compliance be 
monitored by  the public authorities if this  is  required by 
one of the signatory parties (although this is exceptional). 
§56  Disputes  relating  to  the  contractual  content  of the 
collective agreement too may  be brought before the com-
mon  law courts but only by  the  signatory  parties  to  the 
agreement.  However these  parties are normally  reluctant 
to bring their differences to the court. 
In some cases they put the matter before a joint arbitrary 
body but in  most cases  they  put the problem on  a  back 
burner until the next round of collective bargaining. 
Or they try to resolve it by way of a strike. But this would 
enable the common law judge to comment on the matter if 
he were asked for an injunction. 
11. European prospects 
§57 Up to now, the Dutch system of collective bargaining 
has not been affected to any great extent by European in-
dustrial relations, since the latter hardly exist. 
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It also seems unlikely that a reduction in the autonomy of 
the national social partners by European Regulations, Di-
rectives and collective agreements will come about in  the 
near future. 
The  current system  of collective  agreements  at  national 
level is not, therefore, threatened by the existence of Euro-
pean regulations; it is rather the lack of European regula-
tions which is a threat.  Economic life takes place increas-
ingly at multinational level.  Collective agreements limited 
to the national level no longer make it possible effectively 
to contain employers' authority and power. 
There are also  shortcomings  in  collective agreements  as 
regards the legal status of transborder workers. 
For these reasons it could be argued that the correct opera-
tion of the system for establishing working conditions on a 
joint basis needs European rules. 
Certainly, the European collective agreement is not a suit-
able  instrument  for  complete  harmonization  of working 
conditions at European level.  It may however prove valu-
able in the fight against 'social dumping'. It may lay down 
a  minimum  level  for  working  conditions  and  fill  in  the 
gaps  and  shortcomings  regarding  working  conditions  at 
European level. These functions cannot usefully be carried 
out by national laws and collective agreements. 
In this respect the first phenomena of European collective 
bargaining must be welcomed: 
•  the rising number of collective agreements establish-
ing European Works councils (see  §102) 
•  the  Framework  Agreement  on  Parental  Leave,  con-
cluded in  December 1995 by the European organisa-
tions of employers and trade unions. 
CHAPTER IV: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
SECTION  1: THE STRIKE 
1. Development of the right to strike and strike action 
§58 The ban on  'coalitions' was lifted in  the Netherlands 
in  1872.  From that  time on,  criminal  proceedings could 
not be taken against people for organizing or taking part in 
strikes. 
Yet,  civil-law risks were not removed to  the same extent: 
strikers  could  be  dismissed  immediately  because  of 
'breach  of contract'  and  even  made  to  pay  damages  to 
employers. 
Between 1918 and 1940 the doctrine of the abuse of rights 
and the summary procedure entered Dutch civil law. This 
offered  the  possibility  of  initiating  civil  proceedings 
against unions inciting strike action.  However, these pos-
sibilities were hardly used before 1940. 
After 1945,  the Netherlands had a controlled wage policy 
(see  §35)  and  strikes  were  very  quickly  seen  as  strikes 
against the authorities which could not be legal by defini-
tion.  Unions affiliated to  the major confederations which 
were  associated  with  this  wage  policy  felt  that  strikes 
would  undermine  their  position;  the  only  strikes  which 
were organized  were wildcat strikes or strikes organized 
by non-recognized  Communist unions and were declared 
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After 1958  when  the  Social-Democrats had  left the  gov-
ernment, the trade unions distanced themselves further and 
further from the state controlled wage policy. In this social 
context,  industrial disputes have become increasingly  nu-
merous. 
This situation led employers to request the courts to place 
restrictions on the freedom to strike. In 1960, the Supreme 
Court gave its famous PANHONLmco ruling. It considered 
that strikes should in principle be considered as a  'breach 
of  contract' by employees against their employers and that 
unions which incited employees to  take such  action were 
committing a tort. 
The Supreme  Court  left  only  a  small  opening  for  legal 
strikes, i.e. when  "the circumstances[  ...  } are such that, in 
the prevailing legal opinion, it is not possible reasonably 
to  request  employees  to  continue to  carry on  with  their 
work~ 
This  Supreme  Court  ruling  was  widely  criticized  - the 
space  which  it left  for  strikes  was  considered  to  be  too 
small. The government requested the opinion of the Econ-
omic and Social Council and in  1969 introduced a bill to 
regulate the right to strike. This bill provoked further crit-
icism  and  was  finally  withdrawn  in  1980.  In  the  mean-
time, in 1972, the Amsterdam Court of  Appeal had already 
changed  the  framework  used  up  to  then  in  case  law  by 
ruling  that  a  strike  is  legal  in  principle  unless  auxiliary 
circumstances  make  it  illegal.  This  decision  laid  the 
foundations for a renewal of case law on strikes during the 
period to 1986. 
Following ratification of the European Social Charter by 
the Netherlands in  1980, this Charter backed up the new 
tendency of Dutch case law. In a major order of 1986, the 
Supreme  Court  finally  stated  that  the  provisions  of the 
European Social  Charter,  which  recognized  the  right  to 
strike,  were  directly  applicable  in  the  Netherlands  and 
that,  for these reasons,  the right to  strike should be con-
sidered to be legal. 
§59  Although there was talk at the beginning of the 1970s 
of an  industrial-relations  crisis  - the  traditional  Dutch 
model  of industrial  harmony had  given way  to  a conflic-
tual  model  - the  number of working  days  lost  over  the 
years  because  of strikes  has  been  one  of the  lowest  in 
Western Europe, with the result that it might be said that 
Dutch industrial relations are always fairly  'hamwnious '. 
There are no  major or long-term disputes.  The industrial 
disputes which arise nowadays are generally of short dura-
tion.  They  serve  to  indicate  the  precise  position  of the 
various power relations in  a socio-economic and  political 
context which is continually changing.  None of the social 
partners is out to destroy the other. When the various par-
ties  have established  the  lie of the  land  as  regards  these 
power relations- which can be fairly readily deduced -a 
compromise  is  reached  and  life continues  until  there  are 
further doubts about the true nature of power relations. 
The most important strikes are caused by the renewal  of 
collective agreements in the private sector. 
Before  1983,  some  strikes  were  called  because  of the 
government's intention to intervene in wages in the private 
sector. 
There  are  very  few  State  enterprises  in  the  Netherlands 
and public servants' salaries and wages were automatically 
linked to wage growth in the private sector until the end of 
the  1970s,  so  there  was  no  reason  to  organize  separate 
strikes in the two sectors. 
This link with wages in  the private sector has been aban-
doned over the past ten  years and  there have been  some 
strikes in the public sector in the Netherlands on the occa-
sion  of the  annual  review  of working  conditions  in  the 
public sector. 
Most  of  the  various  types  of  industrial  action  have 
occurred in the Netherlands: strike in all its forms (general 
strike, selective strike, strike for recognition, slow-downs, 
sit-ins, sympathy strikes, etc), but the most common form 
is  a  strike paralysing  a whole sector or enterprise orga-
nized by the major unions in order to achieve an improve-
ment  in working conditions.  It is  sometime accompanied 
by  picketing,  but this  is  much  less common and  less vio-
lent than in Great Britain, for instance. Wildcat strikes are 
rare. 
During  the  last  twenty  to  thirty  years  employers  have 
never had to  resort to  lock-outs but have stated that they 
would  use  this  method  in  the  future  if it were to  prove 
necessary. 
2. Judicial methods 
§60  Dutch  society  as  a whole  generally  feels  ill  at ease 
when  an  industrial  dispute  arises,  and  attempts  are  then 
made  to  make  it as  short as  possible.  It is  often the case 
that, when a strike breaks out, employers initiate summary 
proceedings with the presiding judge of the Regional Tri-
bunal. 
In  their request,  they ask the judge to prohibit the unions 
from supporting the strike, under penalty of a fine. 
The courts have no  problems in  accepting such  requests. 
The Dutch unions have civil personality (see §24) and can 
therefore be brought before the courts. 
The  presiding judge of the  Regional  Tribunal  rejects  or 
accepts the request, or accepts it conditionally. 
In  practice,  a  (conditional)  acceptance  means  that unions 
must withdraw their support for the strike. The social part-
ners then meet around the negotiating table in order to fmd 
a compromise. 
If  they loze the unions always withdraw their support from 
strikes;  they  are  therefore  never  forced  to  pay  a  fine. 
There  are  only  few  examples  in  which  employers  have 
claimed damages from the unions. It is the end of the stri-
ke which is sought and not damage to the opposing party. 
In  some  cases,  the  unions  lodge  an  appeal  against  the 
judgement prohibiting the strike,  but this procedure leads 
to  a  Court  of Appeal judgement,  which  takes  several 
months; by that time, the strike is long over and the appeal 
judgement is  of no significance,  other than for the devel-
opment of case  law.  Appeals  to  the  Supreme  Court take 
place only very rarely. 
If, in contrast, the court authorizes the action, this is also 
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compromise as  quickly as  possible. If it  is  impossible to 
reach a compromise and the strike continues, there is con-
siderable political and media concern, with the result that 
steps are soon taken to settle the dispute. 
In the case of an organized strike, there are few opportun-
ities for employers to take summary action against individ-
ual employees, but this situation is possible in  the case of 
wildcat strikes. 
In the past, employees ran the risk of having an  'order to 
resume  work' enforced  against  them,  under penalty  of a 
fine  or a lodging of security,  but these actions have been  J  abolished by law since 1979 (Article J639a,  Civil Code). 
~  3. Definition/concept of the legal strike 
· :  .. 1 §61  Neither Dutch legislation nor Dutch case law contains 
~  /:  a definition of 'strike'.  The top Dutch expert on the right 
·  to  strike,  Professor M.G.  Rood  of Leiden,  has  given  the 
following  definition of a strike:  'The  collective stoppage 
: of work by employees as  a means of  exerting pressure so 
1 that  they  can  resume  work as  soon  as  the objective pur-
1 sued has been  achieved~ 
The Supreme Court ruled in  1986 ruled that the principle 
of the legality of strikes refers essentially to a strike which 
1  is: 
: (a)  general  (i.e.  which  concerns all  the  personnel  of an 
enterprise or occupational sector); 
(b)  directed against the strikers' employer or against his 
representative organization (i.e. which is not directed 
against a third party). 
Strikes  which  do  not  meet  these  conditions  must  be 
assessed more rigorously as to their legality. 
According  to  this  Supreme  Court  ruling of 1986,  strikes 
are illegal when: 
a.  major procedural rules have been disregarded; 
This includes cases in which: 
•  a  strike is organized  when  there has  been  little 
negotiation; 
•  the necessary  care  has  not  been  taken  to  avoid 
pointless damage and injury; 
•  the strike conflicts with the no-strike obligations 
set out in the collective agreement. 
b.  after  evaluating  all  the  specific  conditions  and 
circumstances of the strike,  as  well  as  their internal 
links and interdependence,  it must be conclud_ed  that 
the  unions  should  not  reasonably  have  taken  such 
extreme action. 
~ This mainly includes cases in which the damage caused by 
~ the strike is excessive in relation to what is at stake. 
4. Disputes of right and disputes of interest 
§62  International  literature  makes  a  distinction  between 
'disputes of  right' and 'disputes of  interest'. 
In the Netherlands most strikes are due to genuine disputes 
of interest.  Strikes  out of disputes  of right are  not  very 
common in the Netherlands as 
•  the  rights  of Dutch  employees  have  been  strongly 
enshrined in law, 
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•  the  courts may  deal  in  full  with  labour-law disputes 
without being subject to any restrictions, 
•  the existence of the summary procedure and of legal 
assistance  have  greatly  facilitated  employees'  access 
to this  'legal channel', 
•  unions may also take action in the courts in the event 
of disputes  relating  to  interpretation  of a  collective 
agreement. 
Consequently  unions  and  employees  prefer  the  judicial 
way for the resolution of disputes of right. 
As strikes out of disputes of right are not very common in 
the Netherlands, it is not quite evident whether such strik-
es are by definition illegal. In the small body of case laws 
on  strikes out of disputes of rights  the courts have only 
seldom taken such a dogmatic stand. 
5. Strikes in essential public services 
§63  There are  no  legal  provisions  in  the  Netherlands  in 
this area.  In  1980, it was decided to make the social part-
ners responsible for regulating this issue,  through a strike 
code, but this idea was never put into practice. 
The courts assess the legality of a strike by taking account 
of the fact that certain occupational sectors require a mini-
mum  service or safety  measures  in  the event of strikes, 
and that employees in some essential services cannot strike 
without alternative arrangements being made. 
In some cases the courts have agreed to hear cases against 
unions brought by customers' organisations where a strike 
threatened  public  interests  (for  example  a  bus  drivers' 
strike). 
6. Effects of strikes 
§64 If  strikes are legal,  this legality has consequences for 
the  legal  position of the  unions  organizing them  and  for 
individual striking employees: 
•  The unions are not committing a tort and are not res-
ponsible for the damage caused by the strike. 
•  Striking employees  are not committing a  'breach  of 
contract' and their employers cannot legitimately take 
disciplinary action, such as dismissal, demotion, etc., 
against striking employees. The courts could overturn 
these sanctions and  order the employer to  re-employ 
the  employee in  his  former position and  to  reinstate 
his rights. 
•  No  action  for  compensation  can  be  taken  against 
strikers. 
Employers  are  not,  however,  liable  to  pay  employees' 
wages.  Striking employees  are not entitled  to  unemploy-
ment benefit, but the unions provide them with strike pay 
from their strike funds. 
Most strikes end  fairly quickly in  the Netherlands and  in 
some  cases  employers  pay  wages  for  the  days  on  which 
employees have been on strike. 
A  court  ruling  that  a  strike  is  illegal  will  request  the 
unions which have come out on strike to end the strike as 
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Failure to observe this order attracts a fine to force unions 
to withdraw their support for the strike (verbally and in 
writing, and especially in financial terms: the strike fund). 
If  the union fails to withdraw its support, the fine may be 
enforced and the union may  in principle be made,  by the 
employer or by third parties, to pay damages. 
In  the  Netherlands,  unions  normally,  however,  abide 
closely by legal decisions. For this reason it is uncertain to 
what extent unions may be held responsible for damages 
caused  after  they  should  have  withdrawn  their  support, 
because the strike has been ruled illegal. There is no case 
law on this matter. 
If the  strike has been organized by the unions,  and  em-
ployees have acted on the court ruling and resumed work, 
employers  may  not take disciplinary  action  only  on the 
ground that the strike has been declared illegal.  From the 
moment the court has ruled that the strike is illegal, how-
ever, employers may take disciplinary action against indi-
vidual strikers who continue to strike as long as the disci-
plinary action is not disproportional. 
It is not certain whether third parties may take action for 
compensation of damages against employees.  There is  no 
case law on this matter. 
SECTION 2: MISCELLANEOUS 
1. Other types of industrial action 
§65 In the case of a go-slow or work-to-rule, for example, 
employers  do  not  have  to  pay  all  employees  their  full 
wages.  It  is not certain, however, exactly how much em-
ployers must pay or to whom payment must be made.  In 
order  to  avoid  labourious  disputes,  most  employers  are 
forced in practice to pay all employees' wages in full. It is 
exactly this last point which may  provide the courts with 
grounds for ruling that these actions are illegal. 
§66 A picket may in principle entail action by the police. 
In practice, the police prefer not to interfere in  an  indus-
trial dispute as long as it does not result in serious crimes, 
which is very rare in the Netherlands. 
Employers may, however, request a summary court judge-
ment  ruling  that  the  picket  is  illegal  and  subject  to  the 
penalty  of a  fine.  In  most  cases,  the  courts  consider 
pickets to be illegal and unions and employees accept this 
ruling. 
Sit-ins may also entail criminal proceedings in the case of 
serious crime but,  here too,  the police prefer to  take no 
action. 
Employers  again  have the  opportunity,  especially  in  the 
case of industrial action  supported by  the unions,  to  ask 
for a civil summary judgement ruling that the sit-in is ille-
gal and ordering the unions to withdraw their support for 
the illegal action. 
This situation has arisen, but, for instance,  in the case of 
the closure of the production unit of Ford Amsterdam, the 
court  made  this  order subject  to  a  prohibition  on  Ford 
management preventing them from closing this unit imme-
diately (see §93). 
2. The lock-out 
§67 Lock-out is in some cases taken to mean the dismissal 
of all  striking  employees.  Reference  should  be made  to 
§64 in this regard. 
In  other cases,  however,  lock-out  is  taken  to  mean  the 
laying-off of non-striking employees because of a  strike. 
The  legal  situation  in  this  case  in  the  Netherlands  is 
described below. 
The employer cannot easily present this laying-off as a dis-
missal, as under Dutch law it is not normally possible to 
dismiss  employees  without  the  authorization  of a  civil 
servant, which may costs weeks to obtain. 
The employer may consider presenting the lay-offs as an 
interruption of the payment of wages,  but then the diffi-
culty  arises  that  the  Dutch  law on the obligation to pay 
wages (article  163&1  Civil  Code)  is not very clear.  Are 
employers liable to continue to pay wages to non-striking 
workers who cannot work as a consequence of a strike? 
Supreme Court case law has ruled that the response to this 
question depends on the nature of the industrial dispute. 
In the case of a strike organized to obtain improved work-
ing conditions for  the majority of employees,  employers 
are not liable to pay the wages of those who wish to work 
but are prevented from doing so because of the strike. 
In the case,  however, of a wildcat protest action of short 
duration,  in  which  only  a  few  employees  take  part, 
employers are liable to pay the wages of the other employ-
ees. 
If  there is no right to payment of wages, non-striking em-
ployees may apply for unemployment benefit. 
None of these questions has been dealt with in depth be-
cause  the  lock-out  has  not been used  in  the  Netherlands 
since  1945  and employers prefer to continue to  pay non-
strikers (as long as they are genuinely non-strikers). 
3. Dispute-settlement mechanisms 
§68 Although- as we have seen- social conflicts are sur-
rounded by a  fairly  impressive arsenal of legal weapons, 
Dutch statute law does not make provision for institutiona-
lized  bodies  for  conciliation,  mediation or arbitration in 
industrial  disputes.  Old  legal  provisions  containing 
dispute-settlement  mechanisms  have  been  abolished  or 
have gone unheeded since 1945. 
A  bill  introduced  in  1969 containing new regulations on 
dispute-settlement mechanisms was never enacted and was 
withdrawn in  1986. Meanwhile, the idea of self-regulation 
of strike action by representatives of employers' and em-
ployees' confederations in the Stichting van de Arbeid has 
proved attractive to some people but has never been put 
into practice. 
Collective  agreements  in  some  cases  contain  provisions 
relating to the procedures to be followed  in the event of 
industrial  dispute,  but  these  provisions  are  very  rarely 
used. 
Industrial disputes of longer duration are sometimes medi-
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level personality. The SER  keeps an updated list of people 
offering to undertake this task. 
Statutory mediation is offered in the field of workers' par-
ticipation in the enterprise (see  §  75)  as well as in the pu-
blic  service,  for  which  a  consultation  and  arbitration 
commission was  set  up  in  1985  and  operates  under  the 
chairmanship of a former Minister for Social Affairs (Dr 
Albeda). 
4. Strike in the public service 
§69 Public servants were prohibited from striking in  1903 
and subject to criminal proceedings. This prohibition was 
abolished  in  1979  but  the  government  did  not  wish  to 
grant an  unlimited  right to  strike to  public  servants  and 
consequently announced a bill to regulate public servants' 
right to strike.  This idea was never put into practice and 
there is no law on this matter. 
Public  servants'  unions organizing a strike could still  be 
brought before  the  courts  and  could  have  a  prohibition 
accompanied  by  a  fine  imposed  upon  them.  Public  ser-
vants  themselves  could  be  disciplined:  demotion,  dis-
missal, etc. 
In some cases, however, the courts have already ruled that 
a strike by public servants is legal; in other cases,  for in-
stance in the case of police personnel, on one occasion a 
strike  action  was  prohibited,  another  time  it  was  con-
doned. 
CHAPTER V: EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
IN THE ENTERPRISE 
SECTION  1: INTRODUCTION 
§70 .The Dutch system of employee representation is based 
on two key elements: unions and works councils. 
Representation by unions is  the  longest-standing  form  of 
representation.  During the  first  half of this  century,  the 
unions managed to establish themselves as  social partners 
in collective bargaining. Employers accepted the unions as 
fully fledged partners in the negotiation of working condi-
tions. 
After the Second World War, the unions also managed to 
take their place in various consultative and decision-mak-
ing bodies. Unions have had a considerable influence over 
national socio-economic management. 
There is,  however,  little presence of the Dutch trade un-
ions on the shop floor.  There is no legislation like in  Bel-
gium and  France to  give  the  unions  access  to  the  shop 
floor. 
Workers'  representation  inside  the  enterprise  is  almost 
entirely a matter for the works councils. 
At  the  outset,  the  unions  had  an  attitude of distrust  to-
wards the precursors of the current works councils, which 
were set up at the end of the last century by employers. 
Unions rejected these councils as  'instruments of  manage-
ment' to block the emergence of independent trade union-
Ism. 
163 
After the First World War,  under German influence,  the 
Socialist  unions  started  to  favour  works  councils.  The 
main trend at that time was, however, to establish partici-
pation at the  level  of the occupational sector.  Since then 
and up  to  now,  the attitude of the unions towards works 
councils has been hesitant, although they have shown in-
creasing  interest.  A division of tasks has  in  fact  become 
established, in which the works council is chiefly respon-
sible for matters inside the enterprise, and working condi-
tions  are  largely  left  to  the  unions.  Some  factors  have 
made the acceptance of works councils easier for unions: 
in particular, the fact that unions may themselves present a 
list of candidates (see §§81-82) and the fact that legislators 
have deliberately  denied works councils  any  power over 
matters  which  are  exhaustively  regulated  by  collective 
agreement (see §87). 
§  71  The first  statute relating  to  works councils was  the 
Works  Councils Act (WCA) of 1950.  Yet this was a weak 
piece of legislation which was not very helpful in further-
ing the development of works councils. 
A  growing trend  towards democracy  led  in  1970 to  four 
Acts which were to  extend employee participation.  These 
included: 
•  an Act on the annual accounts of the company; 
•  an  Act on  the management structure of major enter-
prises; 
•  an Act on the right of investigation (see §92); and 
•  a new Works Councils Act of 1970 (see §74). 
In  the  new  Works  Councils  Act of 1970 the powers and 
tasks  of works councils and  the  legal  protection of their 
members were increased and penalties were established to 
cover cases of non-observance. 
The ever-increasing trend towards democracy led in  1979 
to  a  major  amendment  of the  Act,  through  which  the 
works  council  became  a  real  employees'  committee (the 
employer being  no  longer its  chairman)  and  the powers, 
possibilities of appeal and legal protection of works coun-
cils were again extended. 
This  Act  was  supplemented  in  1982  by  regulations  on 
employee participation  in  small  and  medium-sized  enter-
prises. 
In  1990  the  Works  Councils  Act was  again  amended  to 
simplify the  procedures of judicial review and to  harmo-
nise  them with those of the Health and Safety Act.  Quite 
recently, in  1996, the government tabled a new bill with a 
series  of new  amendments  to  facilitate  the  operation  of 
works councils. 
§72  The trade  union  movement  benefitted  less  from  the 
drive to expand industrial democracy in the Netherlands. 
Union delegates on the work floor are only recognized in a 
number of collective agreements. Legal regulations on this 
issue  have  never  passed  the  preparatory  stage  and  were 
withdrawn in  1991. 
The only statutory rights secured for the trade unions were 
those included in  the Act on the notification of collective 
dismissals and in the Act on company inquiries (see  §98). 
In addition the trade unions were to play a role in the rules 
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§73  Initially the public service was left outside the system 
of works councils.  For civil  servants  of the  State  since 
1982 departmental committees have been set up to serve as 
participation centres organized in accordance with the var-
ious regulations covering public servants. 
In  1994 however this system was replaced by a system of 
works councils according to the Works Councils Act. 
In  education  (both  public and private)  specific participa-
tion regulations apply in order to include the participation 
of parents,  pupils and  students.  Because of the  constitu-
tional  guaranteed freedom of education,  these  regulations 
are to  some extent less strict than  those in  the economic 
sector. 
The  regulations  on  participation  in  force  at  universities 
are, in contrast and for historic reasons (student protests in 
the  1960s),  more  comprehensive  than  those  in  the  eco-
nomic sector but a harmonisation move is envisaged by the 
present government. 
SECTION 2: WORKS COUNCILS 
1. Concepts/definitions 
§74 The most important statute on workers' participation 
is  the Works  Councils Act (WCA)  of 1971  as  subsequently 
amended. This Act regulates the composition, election and 
powers of works councils in detail and also sets out possi-
bilities for settling any disputes which may arise. 
§75 The Works  Councils Act also  regulates the composi-
tion,  appointment and  powers  of 'joint  industry commit-
tees'.  These committees are set up  by  the Economic and 
Social  Council  for  each  occupational  sector.  They  are 
composed of an  equal  number of representatives  of em-
ployers and  unions belonging to  this occupational  sector. 
These  industry  committees  have  mediation  and  advisory 
powers as regards disputes arising between works councils 
and heads of enterprises in the occupational sector in ques-
tion (Articles 37-46, WCA). 
§76  Company owners are obliged to set up a works coun-
cil as  soon as  they  employ at least  35  people under con-
tracts of employment. If  they have fewer then 100 employ-
ees,  only  employees  employed  for  more  than  a  third  of 
normal working hours are taken  into account.  Employees 
who are not employed under contracts of employment may 
be involved in the  functioning of the works council. 
In the bill currently before Parliament some modifications 
of the latter provisions are proposed. 
In enterprises which do not employ enough employees to 
establish a works council but which have at least  10 em-
ployees, employers must organize a staff meeting at least 
twice a year.  Employers must ask the opinion of staff be-
fore  taking certain decisions,  for instance in  cases of dis-
missals or major changes affecting at least a quarter of the 
personnel (Article 35b, WCA). 
According to the bill currently before Parliament a sort of 
a works council  may  be established in  these small  enter-
prises  too,  notably  to  negotiate  with  the  employer  on 
working hours and health and safety matters. 
In  the  case  of  medium-sized  enterprises  (35-100 
employees),  the standard  rules for  the works councils are 
modified somewhat (Article 35a, WCA). 
The end  result  is  that  the  works  councils  system  in  the 
Netherlands  is  progressively  more  burdensome  for  em-
ployers according to whether he has: 
•  10 or more employees; 
•  35 or more employees; 
•  100 or more employees. 
§77 An enterprise is  uany body organized and operating as 
an independent entity in which work takes place pursuant 
to contracts of  employment"  (Article 1, WCA). 
So  the term  'enterprise' does not refer solely to  commer-
cial  enterprises.  It should be noted that the way  in which 
'enterprise'  is  defined  means  that  even  organizations 
which  are  not  conventionally  considered  to  be  'enter-
prises' must organize a works council, for instance hospi-
tals,  welfare  organisations  and  even  religious  groupings 
like the Salvation Army. 
As  we have seen  already  the public service is  also under 
the Works  Councils Act and  therefore covered by the no-
tion of 'enterprise' which in the ambit of the Works Coun-
cils Act has completely lost any commercial connotation. 
Furthermore the concept of 'enterprise' as  defmed above 
reflects the current situation in  society.  It may  be,  but is 
not necessarily,  identical  with  the legal  concept of 'com-
pany' which  is  used  in  company  law.  It should be noted 
that  'company' is  always taken  formally  to  mean  the em-
ployer/legal person. 
However,  the  French  notions of 'enterprise' and  'estab-
lishment' are very often confused in the Netherlands. The 
latter are distinguished only if the establishment is not an 
independent entity within the company.  This includes for 
instance a ship, a service station, a building site, etc. The 
latter are defined in Dutch law as  'part of  the enterprise'. 
Some legal provisions take up this notion. 
§  7  8 All  this means  that enterprises which have two sepa-
rate sites operating externally in  an  independent way,  for 
instance as regards their output of products, intake of per-
sonnel, etc.  must establish a works council at each of these 
sites as soon as  they  employ the required number of em-
ployees.  Consequently  all  major  enterprises  which  have 
several  factories  in  the country have several works coun-
cils. 
Yet,  derogations from  this model are possible if they are 
advantageous  the  smooth  functioning  of the  Act  in  the 
enterprises (Articles 3-5 WCA). 
§79  When  an  employer  has  several  enterprises  and  has 
consequently set up several works councils, it may be felt 
necessary to  establish a works council  that covers the in-
terests of all  the employees.  Employers may,  for this pur-
pose, set up a central works council as an umbrella organi-
sation covering the various councils for each enterprise. 
In some cases,  a financial  group of enterprises may be so 
complicated that it is  felt  necessary to set up a further in-
termediate  level  between  the  upper  level  of the  central 
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works councils:  this is called the  'divisional works coun-
cil' and  serves as  a  sub-umbrella covering only a part of 
but not all of the local works councils. 
If  the majority of the works councils concerned so  wish, 
the establishment of a central works council or a divisional 
works council is compulsory.  These councils look solely 
at  matters  which  are  of common  interest  to  all  or the 
majority of enterprises  for  which  they  have  been  set up 
(Articles 33-35, WCA). 
A complicated network of participatory bodies has conse-
quently emerged in major financial  groups,  large depart-
ment stores, etc. Sometimes this has led to disputes about 
powers and  a  case has  been  reported  in  which  a  works 
council has taken action against the central works council! 
§80 The works council may itself further develop its struc-
ture  (Article  15,  WCA).  It  may  establish  subcommittees 
dealing with the interests of certain groups of employees. 
If a  particular site is  not large enough  for  the establish-
ment of an independent works council, the works council 
may establish a subcommittee for this site which is respon-
sible for consultation with the local manager. 
The works council may also establish standing committees 
for  specific  issues,  for  instance,  a  standing  committee 
monitoring the safety, health and welfare of employees in 
a  factory.  Ad hoc committees may  also be set up to  pre-
pare certain dossiers. 
Standing  committees  must  include  a  majority  of works-
council  members;  subcommittees  may  also  include  em-
ployees belonging to the body in question, alongside mem-
bers of the works council.  Ad  hoc committees include at 
least one member of the works council. 
Powers may  be transferred to subcommittees and standing 
committees. 
2. The electoral system 
§81  The works council is elected by all  employees in the 
enterprise by free elections, with the exception, however, 
of the manager of the enterprise. The works council is thus 
representative of all personnel in the enterprise. 
Unions are not authorized to make appointments, but they 
may  present  lists  containing  their  own  candidates  (Arti-
cle  9,  WCA).  In  practice  very  often  a  great  deal  of the 
members of works councils are union  members.  They sit 
alongside  'independent' members elected  from  independ-
ent lists.  The result  is  that unions  exert some  influence 
over works councils  but do  not  control  them  totally.  It 
may  be  that  a  works  council  takes  a  position  differing 
from the union position on a given problem. 
§82  All  employees who have been  employed  for  at  least 
six months in the enterprise may vote. In order to be eligi-
ble for election,  employees must have been  in  the enter-
prise for at least one year (Article 6,  WCA). 
A member may be excluded from the works council only 
by  the  industry  commission  and  at  the  request  of the 
owner or of the works council and for the sole reason that 
the member is a serious hindrance to  the performance of 
the works council's activities. 
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The operation of the works council  is  further determined 
by its own rules of procedure (Articles 8 and 14,  WCA). 
Under the  law,  employees cannot suffer prejudice as  re-
gards their position in  the enterprise because of candida-
ture or membership of the works council or its committees 
(Article  21,  WCA).  Members,  former  members  and  can-
didate-members of the works council cannot be dismissed 
without prior judicial consent. 
3. General powers 
§83  The works council  has,  in  the  first  place,  a  certain 
number of general  powers in  the interest of an effective 
operation. 
Firstly,  works councils have a  right to  information from 
the employer.  The law describes in  detail what is under-
stood by this right to information (Article 31,  WCA). 
In  general,  employers must without delay  provide all the 
information  which  the works council  and  its  subcommit-
tees  may  reasonably require for the performance of their 
tasks.  Employers  must  pass  on,  on  their own  initiative, 
certain basic data relating to the enterprise,  such as  fore-
casts and reports on the enterprise's activities and results, 
data relating to staffing social policy, etc. (Article 31 a and 
31b, WCA). 
§84  Provision  is  made  for  the  employer and  the works 
council to  meet whenever one of them so requests, but at 
least six times per year (Article 23, 23a and 23b, WCA).  At 
least twice a year, the meeting reports on the general con-
duct of the enterprise's affairs, in the presence of a repre-
sentative  of  the  supervisory  board,  if  this  exists 
(Article 24,  WCA). 
Works councils also possess: 
•  the right to invite experts (Articles 16 and 22,  WCA); 
•  the  right  to  use  certain  facilities  belonging  to  the 
enterprise, such as a meeting place (Article 17, WCA); 
•  the right to take part in joint discussions and to con-
sult personnel (Article 18(1),  WCA); 
•  the  right  to  education  and  training  (Article  18(2), 
WCA). 
All  this takes place in due proportion and with continued 
payment of wages.  In the event of a dispute, the matter is 
resolved by the district court. 
The operating costs of the works council and its commit-
tees  are borne by  the employer.  Employers  must be in-
formed in advance of the cost of experts which it has been 
decided to consult. The costs of this consultation are borne 
by  the employer only if he so consents. If  this is not the 
case, the matter must be brought before the district court. 
If necessary,  the works council  may  request  legal  assis-
tance paid for by the State. 
Some  of  the  rights  mentioned  above  are  modified  in 
respect of small and medium-sized enterprises (Article 35a 
and 35b, WCA). 
In  the  bill  currently  before Parliament it is  proposed  to 
give works councils a genuine power of initiative - if the 
employer turns down an initiative of the works council the 
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In addition some improvements of the facilities for works 
councils are proposed. 
4. Economic powers 
§85  Employers  must  request  the  opmton  of the  works 
council  on  a  large  number  of decisions  of an  economic 
nature, such as transfer of the enterprise, merger, closure, 
major re-organizations,  the recruitment of temporary em-
ployees, etc.  (Article 25 WCA).  In the bill currently before 
Parliament it is proposed to add to this list:  the introduc-
tion  of technological  innovations  and  environmental  in-
vestments. 
The works council  must  be  consulted  sufficiently  in  ad-
vance for due account to be taken of its opinion. The deci-
sion must be reasoned  in  the same way  as  the  final  deci-
sion, if this is not in accordance with the opinion of the 
works council. 
In  this  latter  case,  employers  must  defer  application  of 
their decision. 
In  the  case of small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  these 
rules are somewhat modified (Article 35a and 35b, WCA). 
§86 The works council then has a period of one month to 
appeal against this decision before the Chamber of  Enter-
prises of the Amsterdam Court of  Justice (Article 26 WCA). 
The investigation by the Chamber of  Enterprises is only of 
a  cursory  nature.  It will  only  accept  that  the  appeal  is 
founded if it considers that the employer could not reason-
ably have taken this decision if he had correctly evaluated 
all the interests involved. 
Practice shows that the Chamber of  Enterprises avoids any 
intervention as regards economic choices made by employ-
ers. It does not want to intervene with the laws of the mar-
ketplace. The investigation by the Chamber of  Enterprises 
of decisions taken by employers consequently concentrates 
on  procedural  aspects,  for  instance,  finding  out whether 
the  employer  has  consulted  sufficiently  with  the  works 
council.  Several  works  councils  have  consequently  won 
their cases  because of procedural  mistakes.  An employer 
was  thus  prohibited  from  closing  part  of an  enterprise 
when he had previously given his agreement to  its contin-
ued existence. A decision will also be overturned if it does 
not give sufficient explanation  for  its  deviation  from  the 
opinion of the works council. Chamber of  Enterprises case 
law therefore helps to  formulate principles for correct en-
terprise management:  its case law encourages management 
to work correctly with works councils, thereby giving the 
maximum opportunity for employee participation through 
the works council. 
If  the Chamber of  Enterprises considers the disputed deci-
sion of management incorrect, employers may  be ordered 
to  withdraw  their decision  in  full  or in  part,  to  remove 
certain  effects  or not  to  take  certain  implementing  mea-
sures.  If necessary  the  Chamber of Enterprises may  take 
interim measures in  respect of the decision which has  led 
to the dispute. 
An appeal against verdicts of the  Chamber of  Enterprises 
may be lodged with the Supreme Court. 
S.Socialpowers 
§87  In  social  matters,  employers  may  not take decisions 
without the agreement of the works council, which conse-
quently has a right of veto (which may, however, be over-
turned,  as  will  be  discussed  below).  This  right  of veto 
covers matters relating to  personnel  management,  such as 
arrangements  in  relation  to  recruitment  policy,  leave  or 
promotion,  arrangements  relating  to  working  hours  or 
leave, pay systems or systems of  job evaluation, as well as 
company rules (Article 27[1], WCA). 
In the bill now before Parliament it is proposed to remove 
•  company  rules'  from  this  list,  but  to  add  to  this  list: 
arrangements in relation to privacy and discipline. 
But  there is  a very  important limitation to  these powers: 
the  employer does  not  need  to  seek  the works  council's 
agreement  in  these  matters  if  the  matter  is  already 
exhaustively dealt with in a collective agreement or a regu-
lation by a public body applicable to the enterprise. 
This  rule  enshrines  the  priority  of collective  bargaining 
with  the  trade  unions  over  negotiations  with  the  works 
councils. 
In  practice it often happens,  that the collective agreement 
with the trade unions has not settled a matter exhaustively 
but only  rudimentarily.  In  those cases the employer must 
seek the works council's agreement on its concrete imple-
mentation. 
§88 If the  employer does  not obtain  the works  council's 
agreement on these issues, he may put the case before the 
industry committee  for  mediation  and  may  then  demand 
such  agreement  from  the  district  court,  with  a  possible 
appeal to  the Regional Tribunal with further appeal to the 
Supreme Court (Article 27[4],  WCA). 
§89 The works council also has the task of promoting the 
observance of all  relevant provisions governing terms and 
conditions of employment,  employees'  health and  safety, 
consultation  relating  to  work,  decentralization,  the  dis-
tribution  of tasks  within  the  enterprise and  the  employ-
ment  of handicapped  workers.  It must  ensure  that  no 
discriminatory  measures  are taken  and,  in  particular,  en-
courage  equal  treatment  of men  and  women  (Article  28, 
WCA). 
If  employers establish an institution benefitting employees, 
for  instance a pension fund,  the works council  is entitled 
to  appoint  at  least  half  the  administrators  (Article  29, 
WCA). 
6. Other powers 
§90 The works council has a right to consultation when a 
director of the enterprise is  appointed.  It does  not,  how-
ever,  have recourse against the appointment of a director 
(Article 30, WCA). 
In  major enterprises the works council  can  influence the 
composition of the Supervisory Board (see §§ 98-99). 
The powers of the works council  may  be extended in  an 
agreement between the works council and the employer or 
by a collective agreement.  The SER may also, in the event 
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organizations involved,  order an  extension of the powers 
of works councils belonging to  a certain economic sector 
(Article 32 and 32a, WCA).  Little use is made, however, of 
this latter possibility. 
Works councils have additional powers under the Health 
and Safety Act (HSA).  They have the right of consultation 
and negotiation relating to all matters affecting employees' 
health, safety and welfare (Articles 14 and 15, HSA).  They 
may  accompany  officials  from  the  Labour  Inspectorate 
during their visits to the enterprise and may speak to them 
confidentially (Article 32,  HSA).  In the event of a dispute 
with the employer, they may appeal to the Labour Inspec-
torate to enforce the law. They may also, in certain cases, 
lodge an appeal with the Minister as  regards the decision 
of the regional director of the Labour Inspectorate (Arti-
cles 36 and 40, HSA). 
7. Legal sanctions 
§91  The works council  may  ensure observance of all  the 
obligations  which  the  law  on  works  councils  places  on 
employers  by  lodging  a  request  with  the  district  court. 
Prior to this request the industry committee must be asked 
to  undertake  mediation.  Appeals  may  be  brought  before 
the  Regional  Tribunal  and  appeals  may  be  taken  to  the 
Supreme Court (Article 36, WCA). 
SECTION 3: UNION PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
1. Involvement in the right of company inquiries 
§92  In  1971  Dutch Company  Law was  amended  to  give 
the judiciary the power of investigation into the policy and 
daily management of an enterprise. Such an inquiry can be 
ordered  by  the  Chamber of Enterprises  of the  Court  of 
Justice of Amsterdam  (Articles.  346-347,  Book II,  Civil 
Code).  Applications for  such  inquiries to  be held can  be 
made, by the trade unions or by the shareholders or by the 
public prosecutor of the Amsterdam Court of  Justice. 
The applicant must have informed the company's manage-
ment and supervisory board in advance of the grounds for 
this inquiry.  Unions must also allow the works council, if 
there is one, to give its opinion (Article 349, Book II, Civil 
Code). 
A request is accepted by the Chamber of  Enterprises only 
if there are reasons to doubt the correct management of the 
enterprise.  In  this  case,  the  Chamber  of Enterprises 
appoints one or several people to  conduct an  inquiry into 
the policy and management of the enterprise. Investigators 
have access to the books and files of the legal person, and 
the  directors  and  members  of the  supervisory  board  are 
required  to  provide  any  necessary  information  (Arti-
cles 345 and 351, Book II, Civil Code). 
If  the inquiry reveals incorrect management, the Chamber 
of Enterprises  may  take  any  necessary  measure,  such  as 
the suspension or cancellation of decisions,  suspension or 
dismissal  of directors  or  members  of the  supervisory 
board, temporary appointments of directors or members of 
the  supervisory  board,  temporary  derogation  from  the 
articles  of association  and  even  dissolution  of the  legal 
person (Articles.  355-358, Book II, Civil Code). 
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Appeals  against  Chamber of Enterprises  rulings  may  be 
taken  before  the  Supreme  Court  (Article  359,  Book  II, 
Civil Code). 
§93  In practice, unions use this right of inquiry very rare-
ly. 
A first  reason  for  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  the procedure 
takes  a  considerable  amount  of time.  In the  case of the 
closure of the production unit of Ford Netherlands at Am-
sterdam in  1981,  the ruling - which rejected the unions' 
application  - was  given  only  after closure of the  enter-
prise. 
However, there is a remedy for this problem: unions may, 
at the same time as the request for the organization of an 
inquiry is made,  lodge an application for summary procee-
dings against the enterprise in order to obtain a temporary 
ban certain managerial decisions. 
This was the outcome of the BATCO I affair in  1980 when 
the  management  was  prohibited  from  implementing  its 
decision to close its Dutch plant for one year. By that time 
the  Chamber  of Enterprises  had  been  able  to  establish 
'mismanagement' on  the side of BATCO and  the manage-
ment decided to keep the production unit in Amsterdam in 
operation. 
Secondly,  a request  is  a difficult  matter because the cri-
teria  adopted  by  the  Chamber of Enterprises  as  regards 
incorrect  management  supposes  management  contrary  to 
the fundamental  requirements which may be imposed on a 
responsible owner.  This condition is a stringent require-
ment. It may,  however,  be shaded so that it differentiates 
between social management and economic management.  It 
was  therefore considered in  the  BA  TCO 1 affair that there 
had  not  been  incorrect  economic  management,  but  that 
there  had  been  incorrect  social  management,  as  certain 
procedural rules had  been breached and negotiations with 
the  unions  had  left  much  to  be  desired.  In  practice,  it 
seems  that  it  is  easier  to  prove incorrect social  manage-
ment than incorrect economic management. 
Finally, a request is a risky undertaking since an applicant 
whose application has been rejected may be ordered to pay 
damages if the request was not reasonably founded (Article 
350, Book II, Civil Code). 
2. The Merger Code 
§94 A second consultation and information measure relates 
to mergers. This regulation is not set out in an act of Par-
liament but in a document of 1970 issued by the Economic 
and Social Council which sets out the rules of conduct to 
be followed in  the case of merger.  It has two chapters, of 
which the first relates to the protection of shareholders and 
the second to  the interests of employees.  It does not con-
tain any  formal  rules but merely  indicates the procedures 
to be followed in the case of merger. 
The  Economic  and  Social  Council  order  (commonly 
known as  'The Merger Code'), amended in  1975, applies 
to any acquisition of a financial holding, whether direct or 
indirect,  in  the  activities  of an  enterprise  or part of an 
enterprise.  It  consequently  relates  both  to  mergers  by 
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etc.  The Merger  Code  is  also  applicable  when  a  merger 
takes  place on  the  basis  of a  takeover  bid.  Its  scope  of 
application is limited, however,  to mergers concerning an 
enterprise with at least  100 employees.  The order relates 
solely  to  the economic sector, although its scope may  be 
extended  by  collective  agreement  (Article  15,  Merger 
Code), which was done for instance in the hospital sector. 
As soon as merger negotiations reach a stage at which the 
conclusion of an agreement seems likely, employers must 
immediately notify the unions and the Merger Commission 
of the Economic and Social Council.  The unions must be 
informed of the reasons and effects of the merger and must 
be allowed, during consultation, to give their opinion on 
the merger from the point of view of employees' interests. 
This consultation is  about the social  consequences of the 
merger for the workers concerned and the measures taken 
to cope with them.  Unions must observe the confidential-
ity of these negotiations (Article 18, Merger Code). 
Because the  'Merger Code' is not an act of Parliament, the 
courts cannot enforce its observance. There is, however, a 
Merger  Commission  which  supervises  the  observance of 
the Code. 
This Commission comprises representatives of employees, 
employers and the Association of  Brokers, as well as inde-
pendent members.  In certain cases,  the Commission  may 
grant exemption from observance of the guidelines (Arti-
cles 23-30 and 32,  Merger  Code).  As  a sanction against 
failure  to  observe  the code,  it  may  issue a public  repri-
mand  or give  a  public  notification  (Article  32,  Merger 
Code).  Moreover,  in  the  case  of takeover  bids  on  the 
Stock Exchange,  the Association of Brokers may  also  re-
fuse to collaborate if the Code is not respected. 
§95  The Merger Code does not operate well in the case of 
a genuine takeover battle. Under the pressure of time, vital 
decisions may  be taken as to  the future of the enterprise, 
such as a merger with a third party or the establishment of 
a legal protection framework, which do not always make it 
possible to organize the compulsory information and con-
sultation within due time. 
3. Collective Dismissals 
§96  Finally Dutch unions have a statutory right of infor-
mation and consultation in  the case of collective dismiss-
als.  This  is  laid  down  in  the  Notification  of Collective 
Dismissals  Act,  which  implements  the  EC  Directive  on 
collective dismissals. 
If an  employer  makes  20  or more  employees  redundant 
within three months,  he is obliged to  notify the trade un-
ions.  Implementing  the  collective  dismissal  is  forbidden 
during a  'waiting period' of one month. The trade unions 
can  use  this  period  to  negotiate a  'social plan' with  the 
employer. 
SECTION 4: PARTICIPATION 
IN  COMPANY BODIES 
1. The management structure of major enterprises 
§97  In  1971  Dutch Company Law was amended to allow 
employees to have some influence over the composition of 
the  top  level  of management  of major  enterprises.  This 
regulation is a compromise between  the opinions of em-
ployers and employees as regards the question of whether 
the works council should be authorized directly to appoint 
some of the members of the supervisory board,  as  is the 
case in Germany. 
'Major'  enterprises  are  considered  to  be  public  limited 
companies or partnerships, cooperatives and  mutual-guar-
antee companies: 
a)  whose paid-up capital,  including reserves,  is at least 
NLG 25 million; 
b)  which have organized a works council; 
c)  which have at least 100 employees in the Netherlands 
(Article 262 of  Book II Civil Code) 
When the company fulfils these conditions, it must estab-
lish  a  supervisory  board.  This  board  has  the  following 
legal powers: 
a)  the appointment of management; 
b)  the closure of annual accounts; 
c)  the approval of major management decisions (Articles 
272-274 of  Book II Civil Code). 
The Dutch solution for the composition of the supervisory 
board  then  is  very  original.  The  supervisory  board  ap-
points it own members.  It must, however, inform the gen-
eral  meeting  of shareholders  and  the  works  council  in 
good time.  These latter two instances,  in the same way as 
management,  may  then  make  recommendations  for  the 
appointment of a member of the supervisory board. Before 
making a final appointment, the supervisory board notifies 
the general meeting of shareholders and the works council 
of the persons it intends to appoint. The supervisory board 
may  appoint such  persons,  unless the general  meeting of 
shareholders  or the  works  council  disputes  this  appoint-
ment. This dispute may be founded, in a limited way, on: 
a)  the  likelihood  that  the candidate will  be not suitable 
to  carry  out  the  functions  of  a  member  of  the 
supervisory board; 
b)  the  fact  that  the  supervisory board will  not be duly 
constituted if the intended appointment actually takes 
place; 
c)  the fact that there have been procedural errors. 
The appointment  may,  however,  take place if,  at the  re-
quest  of the  supervisory  board,  the  Chamber of Enter-
prises  of the  Amsterdam  Court  of Justice  declares  the 
grounds to be unfounded.  Appeal to the Supreme Court is 
not possible in this type of cases (Article 268 of Book II of 
the Dutch Civil Code). 
§98  Works councils have made very little use of this ap-
peal procedure over their 25 years of existence; the reason 
is,  as  the  case  law of the  Chamber of Enterprises  made 
clear,  that objections to  proposed appointments based  on 
subjective  feelings  of  mistrust  towards  the  proposed 
candidate  are  not  accepted;  objections  founded  on  the 
abovementioned grounds must be justified in  an  objective 
way. 
Clearly, this will not happen where the Supervisory Board 
is wise enough to propose suitable persons. 
So  the system has certainly contributed to improving the 
quality  of the  Supervisory  Boards.  But  it  has  not  at all THE NETHERLANDS 
contributed to  the feeling among works councils that they 
can  really  influence  the  composition  of the  Supervisory 
Board. 
The same feelings are prevalent on the shareholder side so 
the general impression is that the Dutch system has helped 
to amalgamate the powers of management and the Supervi-
sory Board, which is virtually uncontrollable. 
The trade unions would still prefer a system in  which a 
certain  number of members of the supervisory board are 
appointed directly by the works council,  but the govern-
ment has no intentions at present to change the system. 
2. The provisions in national law in respect 
of rights of participation, consultation and infonnation 
in multinational groups 
§99 Dutch company and labour law has made a number of 
exceptions to  accommodate the rules of industrial democ-
racy in multinational enterprises. 
In  the Act on  the management structure of major enter-
prises (see §§98-99) the participation model was structured 
'upwards': it is enough for the parent company to respect 
the model for its subsidiaries to be exempted. 
This parent company, however, does not necessarily repre-
sent the highest management level  of the group.  In  cases 
of multinational companies it is  in  most cases  merely the 
highest level of the group's Dutch establishments.  Above 
it,  there  is  generally  an  international  holding  company 
which - even if it is established in the Netherlands,  nor-
mally falls outside the scope of the aforementioned model 
of participation, as it has less than 100 employees. 
It is  for  this  reason  that  Dutch  multinational  companies 
such as Philips and AKZO Nobel have been able to keep the 
registered  offices  of  their  holding  companies  in  the 
Netherlands  without  their  holding  company  having  to 
comply with the Dutch rules on the Supervisory Boards. 
In  so  far  as  the  Dutch  rules  on  Supervisory  Boards  are 
applicable  to  multinational  companies,  those  companies, 
which have most of their employees employed outside the 
Netherlands, are further served by another exception. 
They may  give their Supervisory Boards a much  'lighter' 
status in the sense that it only has the power to control the 
major decisions of the management,  but not the power to 
appoint management and to approve the annual accounts. 
§100 The Works  Councils Act at first sight does not con-
tain  exceptions to accommodate multinational companies. 
Multinational enterprises are subject to this Act and there-
fore have to  establish works councils and  even a central 
works council  for  their subsidiaries in  the Netherlands if 
they meet the criteria of the Act. 
However  the  Dutch  Works  Council  Act  cannot  require 
multinationals to establish works councils for their enter-
prises outside the Netherlands. Neither can it require mul-
tinational companies to establish a central  works council 
which is representative for all the enterprises of the multi-
national, in the Netherlands as well as in other countries. 
So until now there has been no obligation on the manage-
ment of multinational enterprises to set up a genuine 'cen-
169 
tral' works council covering all the enterprises of a multi-
national. 
This picture will be changed in the near future to a certain 
extent  now  that  multinational  enterprises  are obliged  by 
virtue of an EU Directive to set up European Works Coun-
cils. 
In  the Netherlands there is currently a bill  before parlia-
ment to  implement this Directive and already  two Dutch 
multinationals  (lNG and  DAF)  have set up a  Euro Works 
Council. 
§ 101  The Merger Code is applicable to any foreign enter-
prise which is directly involved in a merger with a Dutch 
enterprise,  whatever its  nationality  or place of establish-
ment. 
The result is that, in the case of a merger, the foreign part-
ner,  in  the same way as the Dutch partner, is required to 
participate in  the process of information and consultation 
as  vis-a-vis the Dutch unions.  It is taken  for granted that 
the Dutch  partner will  inform his  foreign  partner of his 
specific obligations. If  this is not the case, rigorous action 
is  not taken against the foreign  partner in  respect of any 
infraction of the Merger  Code  (bearing in  mind that the 
code sets out only symbolic sanctions!). 
The Code nevertheless makes a very important exception 
for mergers  l{which  do  not come within Dutch legal juris-
diction" (Article  15[3j[cj,  Merger  Code).  This exception 
relates to  mergers between two or several groups of for-
eign companies whose actual management takes place out-
side  Dutch  territory,  although  they  include  Dutch 
establishments employing more than 100 employees. 
A full  merger between the Pechiney group and the Ameri-
can  National Can  group would not,  therefore,  fall  within 
the  scope  of application  of the  Merger  Code,  although 
both these groups have major subsidiaries in  the Nether-
lands. 
This exception is interpreted, however,  in a very restrict-
ive  way.  Mergers  involving  solely  or  principally  the 
Dutch subsidiaries of a foreign group would, therefore, be 
subject to the Merger Code, which means that a merger of 
Pechiney  Holland  and  American  National  Can  Holland 
would be governed by the Merger Code. 
The notion of 'solely or principally' is interpreted on the 
basis of the number of employees involved. 
A Dutch enterprise or a Dutch financial group wishing to 
take over a  foreign  enterprise would have to  respect the 
Merger Code,  since it could be expected that this takeover 
would have major consequences for Dutch personnel:  for 
instance,  because of the  size of the foreign  enterprise or 
the harmonization of activities or markets. 
§  102  It should  be  remembered  that  works  councils  too 
must be informed and consulted in the event of a merger, 
pursuant  to  the  Works  Councils  Act  (see  §85).  As  the 
scope of application of Works Councils Act is limited sole-
ly  to enterprises established in  the Netherlands,  this obli-
gation  does  not  relate  to  foreign  partners  in  a  merger. 
Only  the  local  management of subsidiaries established  in 
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mation  and  consultation.  Moreover,  local  management  is 
not obliged to request the opinion of the works council  if 
the partner in the merger is located abroad and there is no 
reason to think that the merger will have a serious impact 
on enterprises in  the Netherlands (Article 27[1],  last sen-
tence,  WCA). AUSTRIA  171 
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CHAPTER 1:  MAIN ACTORS 
Austria  has  both  voluntary  and  statutory  representative 
bodies at industry level.  Characteristic of the structure of 
Austrian labour relations is the centralised nature of such 
associations and their integration within the system of social 
partnership,  in which they  are active in various areas of 
economic  and  social  policy.  At  company  level,  worker 
interests are represented by the works council. 
1. Voluntary representative bodies 
1.1 AU§trian Trade Union Federation (Osterreichische 
Gewerkschaftsbund - OGB) 
The Austrian  Trade  Union  Federation  {OGB)  represents 
almost 60% of  all employees, and 98% of  workers organised 
in trade unions; with its 14 member trade unions, it thus in 
practice monopolises the representation of the workforce. 
This concentration of power does not have any  statutory 
basis, but has historical reasons. With a view to overcoming 
political conflicts and concentrating on the common interest 
in  the  reconstruction  of Austria,  the  OGB  was  founded 
immediately after the end of the Second World War as a 
universal and non-party-political trade union organisation, 
replacing the ideologically oriented trade unions of the inter-
war years.  Despite its claim to be above politics, however, 
the OGB  is not apolitical; within the OGB,  policy is decided 
by political  groupings,  with  the  social-democratic  group 
representing the  majority  in  13  of the  14  member trade 
unions. It should be noted, however, that individual trade 
union membership is  not conditional upon belonging to a 
political group. 
Legally,  the  OGB  is  a  society  under  the  Societies  Act. 
Organised by industrial sector, the 14 member trade unions 
are not separate legal persons, but are statutory organs of the 
OGB,  which  supervises  their  composition  and  activity. 
Although individual workers join a specific trade union, they 
are, legally speaking, members of the OGB as the umbrella 
organisation. In practice, however, the trade unions play a 
major role, as can be seen from the dominant part they play 
in collective agreements at sector level. 
The OGB  comprises the following trade unions (in order of 
size):  private employees' trade union, metal/mining/energy 
trade union,  public service union, wood and construction 
workers'  union,  municipal  employees'  union,  railway 
workers' union,  post and telecommunications employees' 
union, chemical workers' union, agriculture and food union, 
hotel, catering and personal services union, commerce and 
transport union, textiles, clothing and leather union, printing 
and paper industry union, and the union for the arts, media 
and liberal professions. 
Most of the trade unions in  the OGB  are organised along 
sectoral  lines,  i.e.  all  employees  in  an  economic  sector, 
regardless of  occupation, belong to the same trade union. An 
exception is the private employees' union, which represents 
salaried  employees  in  all  sectors except for  the arts,  the 
media  and  the  liberal  professions.  The  organisational 
differences  between  the  manual  and  white-collar  unions 
occasionally lead to tensions.  A restructuring of the trade 
unions is currently being planned, the aim being to have just 
three large umbrella associations grouping together related 
member organisations. 
Under its statutes, the OGB  is called upon to carry out the 
following tasks:  representation of the social and economic 
interests of workers, promotion of trade-union activities to 
improve working conditions, participation in legislation in 
the  field  of social  and  economic  policy,  conclusion  of 
collective agreements, representation of  workers in disputes, 
nomination of representatives to organisations, exercising 
influence  on  the  social  insurance  system,  making  legal 
protection available to members free of charge and promo-
tion of the education and training of workers. The broad 
nature of these  tasks  illustrates  that  the 6GB's  activities 
within the framework of social partnership go beyond the 
immediate trade-union sphere. 
In  1994, the OGB  had  1 599 135 members, representing a 
drop of 1% compared with 1993. This continued a long-term 
trend; back in the 80s, the level of trade-union organisation 
in Austria fell from over 65% to around 58%. 
1.2 The employers 
On  the employer side,  no  single organisation has  such  a 
dominant position comparable with the OGB's.  The main 
body is the Association of  Austrian Industrialists, a volun-
tary  organisation;  there  are  only  a  few  other  voluntary 
employer  associations,  for  example  in  the  banking  and 
insurance sector.  To avoid jurisdictional  conflicts,  these 
associations have concluded working arrangements with the 
statutory bodies representing employer interests. Collective 
agreements are normally entered into by the statutory bodies 
representing employers. 
2. Statutory representation 
Alongside the voluntary representative bodies, the interests 
of  employers and workers are represented by statutory, self-
governing bodies (chambers).  The main chambers are the 
Chambers of Labour (Arbeiterkammern) and the Chambers 
of Industry  (Wirtschaftskammern).  In  practice,  statutory 
representation by the Chambers plays a major role, since 
nearly all sectors of the economy are represented by such 
statutory bodies and,  in addition, all persons employed in 
these sectors are automatically members. 
2.1 The Chambers of Labour (Arbeiterkammem) 
In principle, the Chambers of  Labour cover all workers apart 
from  senior employees  ( 
11 persons permanently entitled to 
exert a  detemlining  influence on the management of the 
enterprise j.  Each  Federal  Land  has  its  own  chamber 
(Landeskmnmer); the Federal Chamber of  Labour is respon-
sible for matters affecting more than one Land. In practice, 
the Chambers of  Labour and the OGB are largely run by the 
same people; while this ensures coordination between the 
two organisations, it does occasionally give rise to criticism. 
In addition to providing information and advice to workers 
(including legal  protection in  matters of labour law),  the 
Chambers  of Labour  are  integrated  within  the  political 
decision-making process in a variety of ways (e.g. consulta-
tion on  legislation  and  participation in  social  partnership 
bodies). AUSTRIA 
The  Chambers  of Labour  are  self-governing;  the  main 
organs are the plenary assembly, the executive committee, 
the  president  and  various  specialised  committees.  The 
plenary assembly is directly elected by the members every 
five years. The chambers are financed by a chamber levy, a 
percentage of gross earnings deducted at source from each 
Chamber member. 
2.2 Chambers of Industry (Wirtschaftskammern) 
Both  natural  and  legal  persons  may  be  members  of the 
Chambers of  Industry; membership comes automatically with 
an  authorisation  to  trade  as  a  business.  Every  Chamber 
member has a vote, thus ensuring that small and  medium-
sized businesses are strongly represented. 
As on the worker side, the employer side is also represented 
by nine Land chambers and a Federal chamber.  They are 
each organised into six sections, representing the interests of 
different sectors (craft trades, industry, commerce, banking 
and insurance, transport and tourism) and in turn comprising 
specialist groups. 
The main tasks of the Chambers of  Industry are to advise 
their members and give opinions on draft legislation.  Of 
particular importance  in  practice  is  also  their  ability  to 
conclude  collective  agreements.  The  central  collective 
agreements for each sector in Austria are concluded between 
the specialist groups of the Chamber of  Industry and the OGB 
trade unions.  Finally, the Federal Chamber of  Industry is 
legally authorised to undertake various economic administra-
tion tasks (e.g. in the field of foreign trade). 
3. Social partnership 
A characteristic feature of Austria is the system of social 
partnership,  in  which  the  representative  bodies  of the 
employers and workers are integrated. The basis for social 
partnership is the pursuit of  the long-term common goals and 
interests of both employers and workers (economic growth, 
international competitiveness, social consensus). Characteris-
tic  of this  social  partnership  is  an  extensive  negotiation 
process, going well beyond traditional industrial relations 
questions (wages policy, working conditions). The employer 
and worker organisations participate in  the formulation of 
general economic and social policy and are often the driving 
force in such matters. They are represented on a variety of 
different bodies, ranging from social insurance boards to the 
central  bank.  They  do  not  act  purely  as  organisations 
fighting on behalf of their clientele, but are called upon to 
act  in  the  "common  good~ The centralised  structure  of 
labour relations facilitates  the negotiation of stable agree-
ments, but also serves to curb selfish group interests. There 
is general agreement that the readiness to cooperate and the 
tendency  towards  stability  characteristic  of  the  social 
partnership system has contributed in recent decades to the 
extremely positive economic development of Austria, also 
when  compared at international  level.  A macro-economic 
policy pursued by the social partners is of great importance 
particularly for a small country with a high level of foreign 
trade.  In  recent  years,  however,  the  social  partnership 
structures have increasingly been criticised as too rigid and 
insufficiently innovative. 
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The  'Joint  Commission for Wage  and Price  Questions~ 
established in  1957, is the central social partnership body. 
Cooperation on the Joint Commission is completely volun-
tary  and has  no  statutory basis (gentlemen's agreement). 
Under the chairmanship of the Federal Chancellor, with the 
relevant  government  Ministers  attending,  the  four  'flig n 
representative bodies- OGB, Federal Chamber of  Labour, 
Federal Chamber of Industry  and  the  Conference of the 
presidents of  the Land Chambers of  Industry - meet together 
on the Joint Commission. It in tum has various subcommit-
tees  (wages  subcommittee,  prices  subcommittee).  The 
"Advisory Council for Economic and Social Questions n is 
responsible for preparatory work (studies, reports, etc.). 
In formal terms, the Joint Commission also plays a role in 
collective bargaining: the member organisations of the repre-
sentative bodies ask it for permission to enter into negotia-
tions  and  submit  to  it  for  approval  the  agreements  they 
conclude. In  fact,  however, this is merely a formal proce-
dure intended more for the purpose of general legitimation; 
the Commission does not intervene in collective bargaining. 
4. Worker representation in companies: 
the Works Council 
At company level, the works council represents the interests 
of  employees. Unlike at industry level, the representation of 
workers in  companies is governed by detailed legislation. 
The works council is legally completely independent of the 
trade unions.  In  Austria,  there  is  no  provision  for  trade 
union representation within companies, e.g. by shop stew-
ards.  In  practice,  however.,  there are close personal links 
between works councils and trade unions; the vast majority 
of works council members are also active trade unionists. 
Where at least four works council representatives are to be 
elected, trade union officials are also entitled to stand for 
election.  At least 3/4 of works council members must be 
employed by the company in question, however. 
As in Gennany, the works council in Austria consists solely 
of worker representatives and  is the negotiating partner of 
the  company  management.  If the  workers  so  request,  a 
Works Council must be set up in any company permanently 
employing more than four workers entitled to vote. Where 
necessary,  separate works councils have to  be set up  for 
workers  and  salaried  employees.  If the  establishment 
employs more than four young persons, a youth representa-
tion council has to be set up; where there are more than four 
disabled workers, a spokesperson for disabled persons has to 
be elected.  A works council can be established only at the 
initiative of the workers; however, the exercise of a number 
of rights is dependent on the existence of a works council. 
The size of the works council  depends on  the number of 
employees  in  the  company  (one  representative  for  5-9 
workers, two for 10-19 workers, three for 20-50 workers, 
four for 51-100 workers, etc.). 
If  a company comprises several establishments that form an 
economic  unit  and  are  administered  centrally,  a  central 
works council  must be set up.  In groups of companies, a 
group representation can be set up if there are works coun-
cils in more than one enterprise. 174  THE REGULATIONS OF WORKING CONDmONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
The works council has supervisory, information and consul-
tation rights in various areas.  In addition,  it has joint and 
non-joint  decision-making  powers.  Its  main  non-joint 
decision-making power is its right to sit on the supervisory 
board. In the case of  joint decision-making, the owner of the 
company and the works council are both equal partners. In 
legal terms, the aim is for this restriction on the owner's sole 
right of decision  to  be balanced  by  the works  council's 
interest in the "common good"  of the company. 
The main decision-making power in economic terms is the 
right of the works council to designate 1/3 of the members 
of the supervisory boards of  joint stock companies, limited 
companies and others mentioned in the relevant legislation. 
The  worker  representatives  on  the  supervisory  board 
essentially have the same rights and duties as the shareholder 
representatives. 
CHAPTER II: REGULATION OF 
WORKING CONDITIONS 
1. Constitutional law 
Questions  of labour  legislation  are  touched  upon  only 
peripherally by  Austrian constitutional  law.  Of particular 
relevance here is the division of competences between the 
Federal  Government  and  the  Lander,  with  legislative 
competence in nearly all labour legislation matters being in 
the hands of the Federal Government. In addition, the right 
of association is constitutionally guaranteed. 
The Austrian Constitution does not provide for any funda-
mental  social  rights  in  the narrow  sense.  The European 
Social Charter, which has not been ratified as constitutional 
law, is subject to an implementation condition, i.e. national 
legislation is required to implement it. 
2. Ordinary legislation 
In Austria, labour legislation matters are usually governed 
by ordinary legislation. In the law governing employment 
contracts, most legislation imposes obligations on one party 
only, i.e.  they may  be modified by collective agreement, 
company agreement or individual contract in favour of the 
employees, but not to their disadvantage (advantage princi-
ple).  In  the  law  governing  company  constitutions,  the 
legislation is normally binding on both parties, i.e. cannot be 
modified in either direction (regulatory principle). 
At the level of ordinary legislation,  there is considerable 
fragmentation  of legal  sources in  Austria,  because  - for 
historical reasons -the employment conditions of individual 
groups  of workers  have  each  been  regulated  separately. 
Examples are the Business regulations of  1859, the Journal-
ists Act of 1920, the Salaried Employees Act of  1921, the 
Actors Act of  1922, the Estate Employees Act of  1923 and the 
Contracted Employees Act of  1948. In addition, there is a 
range of special legislation for subsidiary areas of labour 
law, e.g. the Protection of  Mothers Act of  1957, the Em-
ployee Liability Act of  1965, the Working Time Act of  1969, 
the  Continued  Payment  of Wages  Act of 1974  and  the 
Employee Protection Act of  1994. 
In  1967, the Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs 
set up a Commission to prepare the codification of labour 
law. An i111JX>rtant outcome of this work was the adoption of 
the Labour Constitution Act of  1974, which regulated a large 
part of  collective labour law. Where individual labour law is 
concerned, however, no codification has yet been possible; 
indeed,  special  legislation continues to be adopted.  How-
ever, the endeavours to arrive at a codification continue. 
3. Collective agreements 
In Austria, 98% of  all workers outside the public service are 
covered by collective agreements. Collective agreements can 
apply  to  either  the  country  as  a  whole or to  individual 
Lander;  most  workers are covered by Federal  collective 
agreements. The normal case is for collective agreements to 
be confined to occupational groups and sectors. The main 
division on the worker side is the split between workers and 
salaried  employees:  in  many  sectors  there  are  separate 
collective agreements for these groups. 
Collective agreements comprise a part governing liability 
and a regulative part. The part governing liability is essen-
tially a civil-law contract binding only on the two parties. 
The regulative part of a collective agreement may  be re-
garded  as  equivalent  to  legislation.  The  provisions  of 
collective agreements are also governed by the advantage 
principle, i.e. in cases of doubt they are unilaterally binding 
and  can  be  modified  only  by  provisions  in  a  company 
agreement or contract of employment that are more favour-
able to the employee.  Collective agreements chiefly regulate 
rights and duties arising from the employment relationship. 
In  practice,  most  collective agreements  offer only  slight 
improvements over the law in some central areas of regula-
tion (protection of working time, redundancies, protection 
against dismissal and periods of notice for salaried employ-
ees),  due  to  the  considerable  involvement  of the  social 
partners in the formulation of legislation. 
In  practice,  most  collective  agreements  in  Austria  are 
concluded between the statutory representatives (chambers of 
industry) on the employers' side and the voluntary represen-
tative bodies (OGB  trade unions) on the workers' side.  In 
Austria, collective agreements do not apply solely to workers 
who are members of the worker organisation party to the 
collective  agreement  but  to  all  workers  employed  in  an 
establishment or enterprise whose owner is a member of the 
employer association party to the agreement. This phenome-
non is referred to as the 
1'outsider 
11 effect. 
For employment relationships in sectors not covered by a 
collective  agreement,  the  Federal  Conciliation  Office 
(Bundeseinigungsrat) may, in certain circumstances, declare 
an outside collective agreement to be applicable (made into 
a statute).  Where there is no employer association able to 
conclude a collective agreement, a minimum wage may be 
set by the Federal Conciliation  Office at the request of a 
worker association able to conclude a collective agreement. 
In practice, minimum wages are set in domestic service and 
caretaking. 
4. Company agreements 
Where authorised by law or collective agreement, company 
agreements may be concluded within individual establish-
ments. A company agreement is a written agreement between 
the owner of  the establishment and the works council subject 
to the restrictions placed on it by the authorisation. AUSTRIA 
Legislation provides for several  types of company agree-
ment.  A  'hecessary company agreement" covers measures 
that can be taken by the employer only on the basis of a 
company agreement reached voluntarily. A  "substitutable" or 
"enforceable  company  agreement • relates  to  matters  the 
regulation of which by company agreement can be enforced 
by one of the parties.  This means that if no agreement is 
reached, the party concerned can call upon the Arbitration 
Office (Schlichtungsstelle).  However if it is then still not 
possible to reach an agreement, the Arbitration Office has to 
arrive at a  decision,  which  takes  the place of the  failed 
company agreement. This decision has the effect of a valid 
company agreement. Finally, the 
11voluntary company agree-
ment" covers  matters that  may  be regulated  by company 
agreement only if the parties voluntarily agree. 
Like collective agreements, company agreements are directly 
binding in law. Their relationship to collective agreements 
is again governed by the advantage principle: in areas that 
fall under both a company agreement and a valid collective 
agreement, the company agreement only has legal effect if it 
contains more favourable provisions for the workforce. 
In  practice,  company  agreements  are  concluded  with  a 
variety of provisions going beyond the statutory require-
ments. These are known as 'free company agreements ~ They 
do not have the legal status of a normal company agreement. 
In the view of the Supreme Court, however, the content of 
such an agreement may be considered to supplement individ-
ual employment contracts and hence have legal effect. This 
interpretation  of a  free  company  agreement  as  a  model 
contract is frequently criticised by experts. 
S. Individual contracts of employment 
In order of legal priority, individual contracts of employ-
ment  come  after  binding  law,  collective  agreement  and 
company agreement. The contract of employment concluded 
between the employer and the individual worker provides· the 
basis for  the employment  relationship and  hence for  the 
application of collective agreements and  company agree-
ments. In this respect, it is of some importance. However, 
as a  means of regulating working conditions,  it plays no 
more than a subsidiary role because of the wide scope of the 
law, collective agreements and company agreements. 
Individual contracts of employment are important for senior 
employees,  since they do not come under the law on the 
constitution of enterprises, which provides protection in the 
even! of  dismissal, relocation, etc. They are also of particu-
lar  Importance  for  those  in  practice  rare  employment 
relationships not covered by a collective agreement. 
CHAPTER Ill: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
1. Institutions 
1.1 The Labour Courts 
The Labour and Social Courts Ad of  1985 brought together 
the  previously  separate  competences  of  labour  courts, 
arbitration  tribunals  and  conciliation  offices  in  labour 
disputes.  The regular courts, acting as  labour courts, are 
now competent in such matters. They include legal disputes 
between  employers  and  employees  in  connection  with 
employment relationships or the contracting of such relation-
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s~ips, between employers or workers and worker organisa-
tions, between workers in  connection with the work they 
perform together, concerning pension claims, claims against 
the construction-workers, holiday and redundancy insurance 
schemes  and  against  the  pharmacists'  salary  fund  and 
concerning rights under company statutes. 
~u~t~an labour  courts  are integrated  within  the  regular 
JUdictal  system.  Fifteen Land courts  act  as  "labour  and 
social courts"ofthe first instance; Vienna has its own labour 
and social court. The courts of second instance are the four 
higher regional courts, while the court of third instance is 
the Supreme Court 'fn matters of  labour and social law~ 
Decisions in  labour law  are in  principle taken  by court 
."senates" comprising  professional judges and  expert  lay 
JUdges.  In  the  first  instance,  the  senate  comprises  one 
professional judge and two lay judges, one representing the 
employers and one the workforce, where possible from the 
same  occupational  groups  as  the  parties  involved.  The 
senates of the Higher Regional Court and the regular senates 
of the Supreme Court comprise three professional and two 
lay  judges;  the  reinforced  senate  of the  Supreme  Court 
comprises seven professional judges and four lay judges. 
The expert lay judges are elected to their (honorary) posts by 
the statutory bodies representing the employers and workers 
for a term of five years. They are independent in the exercise 
of their duties and share the judicial powers of the court in 
full. 
The new  legislation  governing  labour  and  social  courts 
introduced  a  collective  right  to  initiate  proceedings  at 
company and industry level. In matters of labour law, for 
example (but not in legal disputes under company statutes), 
the employer and the worker organisations able to enter into 
collective agreements at company level (works council) may 
take legal action, and have actions brought against them, to 
determine the existence or non-existence of rights or legal 
relationships affecting at least three workers in the establish-
ment or enterprise. The judgment applies only the parties to 
the  action  and  is  not  binding  on any  subsequent  action 
involving the employer and workforce.  In practice,  such 
judgments are usually complied with by both the employer 
and the worker side. 
At industry level, employer and worker bodies capable of 
entering into collective agreements may, in their sphere of 
activity,  may  bring  an  action  before the  Supreme  Court 
against other bodies able to enter into collective agreements 
to determine the existence or non-existence of rights or legal 
relationships.  The case brought by the plaintiff need not 
mention  named  persons,  but must relate to at least three 
workers or employers. Here too, the judgment applies only 
to the action in question, but in practical terms the interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court assumes great importance. The 
Constitutional Court is soon to decide on the constitutional-
ity of this special judgment procedure. 
In the labour courts, proceedings in the first instance are 
uncomplicated and are designed to reach a rapid conclusion. 
For example, the parties need not be represented in the first 
instance.  Where the parties present their own cases  the  .  .  ' 
JUdge  has  a  particular  duty  to  provide  instructions  and 
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or employee of a statutory representative body or voluntary 
professional organisation capable of  entering into a collective 
agreement;  this  often  happens  in  practice.  In  addition, 
workers  can  be  represented  by  the  works  council  and 
employers by their employees, representatives or members 
of  a management body. 
1.2 Arbitration Office (Schlichtungsstelle) 
Under Austrian law, a distinction is made between obliga-
tory and voluntary arbitration,  with voluntary arbitration 
predominating. In Austria, provision is made for compulsory 
arbitration only at company level in connection with enforce-
able  or  substitutable  company  agreements.  Compulsory 
arbitration proceedings are handled in Austria by an arbitra-
tion body set up on an ad hoc basis. 
At the request of the two parties to the dispute,  such an 
arbitration body will be set up at the seat of the court of first 
instance concerned with matters of labour law and comprises 
a chairman and four assessors. The chairman is appointed by 
the President of the Court from those professional judges 
concerned with matters of labour law at the joint request of 
the two parties to the dispute. The latter each designate two 
assessors, one from the panel of assessors drawn up by the 
Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs and one from 
the company in question.  The decision of the arbitration 
body has the status of a company agreement. 
Voluntary arbitration in connection with the conclusion or 
modification of  collective agreements is the responsibility of 
the Federal Conciliation Office. 
1.3 Federal Conciliation Office (Bundeseinigungsstelle) 
The Federal Conciliation Office is a collegial body under the 
Federal Ministry of  Labour and Social Affairs. It comprises 
the chairman,  who  is  appointed  for  an  indefinite  term, 
subject to revocation, by the Federal Ministry of  Labour and 
Social  Affairs  after  consulting  the  Federal  Chatnber  of 
Industry and the Federal Chatnber of  Labour, and members 
appointed by  the employers and  workers.  The latter are 
appointed for five years upon the proposal of the statutory 
representative bodies. 
The Federal  Conciliation  Office acts  essentially  in  three 
areas: 
1)  On request it establishes statutes and determines mini-
mum wage rates and apprenticeship compensation. 
2)  It can act on a voluntary basis to arbitrate in disputes 
between parties to collective agreements. 
3)  It is  responsible  for  granting  and  withdrawing  the 
capacity to conclude collective agreements and inter-
prets collective agreements following requests by courts 
or administrative authorities. 
2. Industrial action 
In Austria,  industrial action is very rare.  In practice,  the 
nearest thing to industrial action is works assemblies lasting 
up to two hours, which are allowed to be held under the 
Employment Constitution Act. The reasons for the very low 
frequency of  strikes compared with the other OECD countries 
lie  in  the  negotiating  mechanisms  of social  partnership, 
which  over the  long  term clearly  represent for  the trade 
unions a more efficient form of asserting their interests than 
industrial action. 
It should be noted that, from a legal standpoint, industrial 
action is regulated neither by the constitution nor ordinary 
legislation. It is 'tolerated "by the legal system and is subject 
to general law.  No systematic distinction is made between 
strikes and lock-outs. 
In  Austria,  the prevailing legal view is that a distinction 
needs  to be made between  the collective and  individual 
aspects of the law where a strike is concerned. Even where 
a strike is legal as a collective action, the individual worker 
is in recurrent breach of his contract of employment through 
participating in the strike and hence provides grounds for 
dismissal. This "separation theory • is strongly criticised by 
some experts. The Supreme Court has hitherto not issued any 
ruling on this issue. 
It  could be argued that the rudimentary character of Austrian 
law governing industrial action is due to the centralised and 
negotiation-oriented structure of labour relations: on the one 
hand, a fully fledged strike law is not seen as necessary in a 
system of social partnership, since strikes are not regarded 
as an option. On the other, the relative unattractiveness of 
industrial action contributes to the inclination of the negoti-
ating parties to cooperate. Last but not least, the law makes 
''wildcat
11strikes difficult and hence facilitates the acceptance 
of centrally negotiated agreements. 
CHAPTER IV: INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND 
The entry  into force of the European Economic Area on 
1 January  1994 and  Austria's accession to  the European 
Communities on 1 January 1995 have resulted in a qualita-
tive leap in the international integration of Austrian labour 
law. Despite the generally high level of labour standards in 
Austria, the lot of workers has improved in various areas 
covered by Community law. Changes to Austria labour law 
were necessary particularly in the areas of equal opportuni-
ties, worker protection, ownership transfers, mass redundan-
cies and written certificates of employment. For example, 
the  regulations  governing  technical  worker protection in 
Austria have had to be completely rewritten. In the case of 
ownership transfers, the obligation to transfer contracts of 
employment has led to an improvement in the position of 
workers, compared with the agreement between buyer, seller 
and workers previously required in Austria for the transfer 
of employment. Where equal opportunities are concerned, 
the ability to  take into account indirect discrimination in 
particular  represents  an  innovation.  The  obligation  to 
provide a written certificate of employment had already been 
implemented in 1993 in line with Directive 911533. 
Beyond Community level, the ILO  Conventions are of par-
ticular importance. Austria is a member of the ILO and, in 
this capacity, has ratified a number of international treaties. PORTUGAL  177 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE ACTORS 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
This study will focus on actors in the industrial relations 
system in the context of their collective organisations.  A 
specific hierarchical and functional order will be adopted. 
First, the State.  Next, the system of trade unions and em-
ployers'  organisations,  with  their primary organisations, 
associations,  federations  and  confederations.  In-company 
workforce organisation through unions and works councils 
will be briefly examined, since it plays a part, albeit infor-
mal and subsidiary, in the regulation of  working conditions. 
Finally, we shall study the structures which underpin the · 
social dialogue nationwide: the Pennanent Council for So-
cial Consultation  and the fledgling  Economic and Social 
Council. 
SECTION 2: THE STATE 
1. Functions and structures 
The State plays a very important role in the regulation of 
working conditions in Portugal. It intervenes at legislative, 
administrative and jurisdictional levels. 
In the legislative sphere, the State: 
(a)  establishes the constitutional basis for workers' rights 
(fundamental rights) 
(b)  establishes the constitutional basis for trade union free-
dom and collective autonomy; 
(c)  gives shape to and guarantees the legal effectiveness of 
the collective regulation of working conditions (either 
in the agreement-based sub-system or in the statutory 
sub-system); 
(d)  prescribes minimum requirements for protection in the 
workplace; 
(e)  establishes the general nature of the employment con-
tract. 
In the administrative sphere, the State makes a direct contri-
bution to the collective regulation of working conditions (to 
supplement collective agreements and to underpin collective 
bargaining). It is also responsible, through the Employment 
Administration, for monitoring, helping to resolve collective 
disputes, and for a range of administrative duties. 
Finally, in the jurisdictional sphere, the State enforces the 
law. 
The legislative function is the province of the Assembly of 
the Republic (Acts) and the Government (Decree-laws). The 
administrative function properly falls to the Government, 
more  particularly  to  the  Ministry  of Employment.  The 
jurisdictional function is carried out by the Courts. 
Chapter II will examine how each of these bodies discharges 
its duties. 
We now tum to the agencies and departments whose duties 
are relevant to this study, in order to see how they are organ-
ised. 
2. The Assembly of the Republic 
The Assembly of the Republic  (AR) is  the representative 
assembly of all Portuguese people. It is made up of at least 
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230 and at most 235 deputies. These are elected by electoral 
constituencies set up by law (which may also create a na-
tional electoral constituency). In principle, all voting citizens 
are eligible. The deputies represent the country as a whole, 
rather than just their own constituencies. 
Only the political parties, acting on their own or in coalition, 
can stand for election to the AR. However, citizens who are 
not registered members of these parties may be included on 
their respective lists. 
The deputies, who are elected by proportional representation 
using the method of  highest average (the De Hondt system), 
enjoy special status for the duration of their mandate. The 
rights, prerogatives, immunities, duties and incompatibilities 
attendant on their position are specified in detail. 
In principle, the legislative period is four years. It can only 
be interrupted by dissolving the AR. The President of the 
Republic has sole power to dissolve the AR. 
A legislative session lasts one year. It generally runs from 15 
October to  15 June. 
Ministers are entitled to attend and speak at plenary sessions 
of the AR. They may be assisted or replaced by Secretaries 
of  State. Meetings are held at which members of the Govern-
ment answer deputies' questions and requests. 
The AR regulations make provision for committees on which 
members of the political parties are proportionally repre-
sented. The third committee (the Committee on Employment, 
Social Security and the Family)  is particularly relevant to 
this study. The committees play a key role in debates on new 
bills since, once these are passed in principle, the AR may 
ask the committees to fill in and vote on the details. 
3. The Govenunent and the Employment Administration 
3.1 The Government 
The Government conducts the country's general policy. It is 
the highest body of public administration, consisting of the 
Prime Minister,  Ministers and Secretaries of State.  Their 
number and  their respective duties are laid down by the 
respective enabling laws. 
The Prime Minister is  appointed by the President of the 
Republic following consultations with the parties represented 
in the AR.  His choice must reflect the outcome of the elec-
tions. The remaining members of the Government are pro-
posed by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President 
of the Republic. 
The Prime Minister is accountable to the President of the 
Republic and, as part of the Government's overall political 
accountability, to the Assembly of the Republic. 
The Government drafts a programme of work and submits it 
to the AR  for approval. The programme outlines the main 
political options and the measures to be taken or proposed in 
the different spheres of Government activity. The members 
of the Government are bound by the programme and by the 
decisions of the Council of Ministers. 
The Government may ask the AR for a vote of confidence on 
a  general policy statement or on any given subject of na-
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of  its members, may adopt a motion of censure on the Gov-
ernment's handling of its programme or on other subjects of 
national interest. If  a  motion of censure is  passed by an 
absolute majority of titular deputies, the Government must 
resign. 
New ministries introduced by the Enabling Law subsequent 
to the current Government (Decree-law No  329187 of 23 
September) include the Ministry of  Employment and Social 
Security, formerly known as the Ministry of  Labour. The old 
name still  features  in the Enabling Law (Decree-law  No 
47178 of  21  March).  According to this law, the Ministry's 
responsibilities  include  'framing  employment  policy  and 
coordinating the means of  implementing it.  To  this end, it 
will ensure that workers' organisations are effectively in-
volved and will promote the harmonious development of 
labour relations, with a view to improving workers' living 
conditions.  It pays heed to social and economic reality in the 
country~ 
The Minister of Labour is assisted by three Secretaries of 
State: the Secretary of State to the Minister, the Secretary of 
State for Employment, and the Secretary of State for Social 
Security. 
3.2 The Ministry of Employment and Social Security 
With regard to employment, in addition to policy-making 
and  support machinery,  the  Ministry  includes  a  General 
Labour Inspectorate and Directorates-General for Labour, 
Collective Labour Relations, and Health and Safety at Work. 
There follows a brief description of the various departments, 
outlining their powers in the social and economic arena. 
3.2.1 The Directorate-General for Labour 
This Directorate-General has duties and powers in the field 
of labour relations and working conditions and is divided 
into two directorates and four divisions. 
Besides  formulating  policies and drafting  legislation,  the 
Directorate-General is responsible for: 
•  registering and publishing collective agreements, arbi-
tration rulings and accession agreements; 
•  taking part in preparatory research in the field of statu-
tory labour regulation; 
•  promoting  the  establishment of joint committees  as 
stipulated by collective agreements; 
•  drafting opinions and providing technical support for 
any public or private-sector bodies which ask for it; 
•  registering and publishing the rules of trade union and 
employers' organisations; 
•  promoting the publication of the means of identifying 
the members of employers' and trade union organisa-
tion managements; 
•  preparing sociological studies on the social aspects of 
labour and on the conduct of its actors; 
•  analysing the trends in collective labour relations, trade 
union activities and disputes; 
•  monitoring wage settlements resulting from collective 
bargaining; 
•  helping to prepare negotiations on the national mini-
mum wage; 
•  drafting  preparatory  studies  on  the  ratification  of 
International Labour Organisation conventions ; 
•  providing technical back-up for permanent links with 
the International Labour Organisation and other inter-
national bodies. 
3.2.2 The Directorate-General for 
Collective Labour Relations 
The  Directorate-General  for  Collective Labour Relations 
(DGRCT)  plays an active part in the resolution of labour 
disputes, chiefly through the intermediary of its conciliation 
services. The DGRCT is a regionalised service, with delega-
tions in different parts of the country. The Directorate-Gen-
eral for Health and Safety at Work, which is active in this 
field, also bas a regionalised structure. 
The DGRCT's duties include: 
•  monitoring the progress of collective bargaining, when 
asked to do so; 
•  preventing  labour disputes  and  proposing  means of 
resolving them. 
The DGRCT's main task is to provide conciliation in disputes 
arising from the conclusion of collective agreements. 
3.2.3 The General Labour Inspectorate (IGT) 
The General Labour Inspectorate (IGT), whose legal status is 
defined by Decree-law No  327/83 of  8 July 1983,  enjoys 
administrative autonomy, although it is part of the Ministry 
of  Employment. Its staff has the authority to deal with issues 
independently. It can act both through its central departments 
and through its regional services, which cover the whole of 
the country and all  areas of activity, public corporations, 
privately-owned enterprises and the cooperatives. The re-
gional services include the regional coordination centres of 
the North,  the Centre,  Lisbon and the South, as well  as 
delegations and sub-delegations. 
The IGT is responsible for: 
•  enforcing the provisions of statutory labour law, using 
the instruments of collective regulation and individual 
employment  contracts,  including  health,  safety  and 
medical care at work. 
•  approving and enforcing corporate in-house regulations; 
•  granting  the  authorisations  provided  for  by  labour 
legislation; 
•  assessing the employment position of foreigners; 
•  alerting the relevant ministries to any gaps caused by 
the absence or shortcomings of legal provisions which 
it is required to enforce; 
•  informing and offering technical  advice to workers, 
employers' bodies and their respective organisations on 
how to interpret and implement the relevant statutory 
provisions. 
As an offshoot of these duties, the IGT offers training and 
guidance to promote observance of statutory provisions. IGT 
delegations  operate  special  units  to  supply  information, 
answer queries and handle requests for intervention. 
The inspectorate also has coercive powers. It is expected to 
report any infringements of the provisions it is required to 
monitor. It can also impose fines. 
The various IGT services cooperate closely with the Direc-
torate-General for Health and Safety and with the Institute of POR1VGAL 
Employment and Vocational Training.  At the request of the 
courts, they may also investigate the circumstances in which 
an industrial accident occurred or an occupational disease 
was contracted. 
Anyone denying a properly identified IGT officer access to 
premises he is visiting as part of his duties is liable to legal 
penalties,  as  is  anyone impeding  the officer's activities. 
Similarly,  legal  penalties await anyone who  makes  false 
statements, refuses to make oral or written statements with-
out just cause, or refuses to supply such information as is 
judged relevant. 
IGT  officers  are entitled,  in  discharging  their duties  and 
whenever they deem it necessary, to bring along technicians 
from  the Ministry of Employment and Social Security or 
technicians and representatives from the trade unions and 
employers' organisations concerned. 
4. Courts and tribunals 
The Constitution  defines  tribunals  as  "public  institutions 
empowered to administer justice on behalf of  the people~ 
Tribunals are independent and subject only to the law. 
There are several kinds of  tribunal: the Constitutional Court, 
the Supreme Court of  Justice, the lawcourts of first instance 
and second instance (or courts of appeal), the Court of  Audi-
tors, and the military tribunals. 
The organisation and powers of the lawcourts - which are 
relevant to this study - are set out in the Lawcourts Enabling 
Ad (Law 38187 of23 December). The courts of first instance 
have general or specialised competence,  according to  the 
nature of the cases brought before them. The labour tribunals 
are an example of such a  court with specialised powers. 
They handle civil-law cases relating to the cancellation and 
interpretation of collective agreements, cases between trade 
unions and the employees they  represent, cases involving 
strike action, etc. 
Appeals against the decisions of the courts of first instance 
can be made in various ways. The courts of second instance 
(courts of appeal), as well as the Supreme Court of  Justice, 
may sit in plenary session or refer cases to specialised sec-
tions as  required.  The social  sections are responsible for 
judging appeals in cases subject to the civil competence of 
labour tribunals. 
SECTION 3: TRADE UNION FREEDOM AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF TRADE UNIONS 
AND EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATIONS 
1. The right to join a union 
1.1 What is trade union freedom? 
The 1975 Ad of the Military Revolutionary Council estab-
lishes a sort of trade union monopoly. Its champions advo-
cated a collective right to engage in trade union activity, as 
opposed to an individual right.  The collective right was a 
matter of a class rather than of individuals: class rights as 
opposed to individual rights
1
• 
1.  The concept of  collective freedom was defended at the Constituent 
Assembly by the members of the Communist Party, who criticised 
the ideal of  individual freedom to form unions as laid down by ILO 
Convention No 87. They objected that it had been conceived with 
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Yet the oveiWhelming majority of the Constituent Assembly 
came out in favour of individuals' rights to join a union. The 
Portuguese Constitution now defines trade union rights as 
the workers' right to organise themselves in accordance with 
the provisions of ILO  Convention No 87 and the interpreta-
tion offered by the Committee on Union Rights. It constitutes 
specific expression of the general freedom of association, a 
basic human right. 
1.2 The content of union rights 
In a broad sense, union rights include the following main 
features: 
•  positive  individual  freedom  (freedom  to  form  trade 
unions and to join trade unions already in existence); 
•  negative individual union rights; 
•  the right of trade unions to form associations; 
•  the freedom of  trade unions to decide their own internal 
organisation; 
•  the autonomy of trade unions; 
•  the right to collective bargaining; 
•  the right to organise within the company; 
•  the right of participation; 
•  the right to strike. 
1.2.1 Positive individual freedom 
1. 2.1.1 Individual right of  trade union association 
The individual (positive) right of trade union association is 
reflected by the freedom to form trade unions or to join an 
existing union as an individual. The Portuguese Constitution 
grants these two rights (Article 56 §2). 
The public authorities may not impede or hamper the exer-
cise of these rights. 
A trade union may acquire legal personality simply by regis-
tering  its  rules  with  the Ministry of Employment  (Trade 
Union Act, Article 10).  Once registered, the Ministry will 
order the rules to be published in the Bulletin of  Labour and 
Employment {BTE). 
Only the courts and tribunals are competent to judge unlaw-
ful practice in setting up a union (TUA, Article 10 §4). 
Workers are free to decide the scope of action of a trade 
union they set up, and neither the State nor existing trade 
unions have any right to hinder or restrict their action in any 
way. 
In practice, the right to form trade unions permits the exis-
tence of  competing trade unions and is therefore a guarantee 
of union pluralism. 
the Cold War in mind and dismissed the idea of  individual freedom 
to join a union as essentially bourgeois (the debates at the Constitu-
ent Assembly are summed up by MARIO PINTO in Das concepfoes 
da  liberdade sindicat as concepfoes sobre 0  homem e a  sociedade 
(Freedom to join unions: a function of ideas about Man and Soci-
ety), published in: Direito e Justifa, No 1, 1980). All other parties, 
including the Socialist Party, defended a version of  union freedom 
in line with the ideas expressed ILO  Convention No  87, which is 
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1. 2.1. 2 The principle of  non-discrimination 
Article 56,  §2  of the Constitution guarantees workers the 
right to union freedom without any discrimination whatso-
ever. 
Nevertheless,  union  freedom  is  confined  to  workers  (  cf. 
Article 2a). This legal restriction demands careful interpreta-
tion, or difficulties might arise in respect of the legitimacy 
of home-workers' trade unions or the registration of unem-
ployed workers (TUA Article 16 §3) or of workers looking 
for their first job. 
1. 2.1. 3 The Civil Service 
Civil servants are a special case, in that the constitutional 
provisions applicable to workers in general do not automati-
cally extend to them. Yet civil servants' individual freedom 
of trade union association (positive and negative) is written 
into  Portuguese law.  Article 50 of the  Trade  Union  Act, 
which preceded the Constitution, stipulated that the exercise 
of  union freedom by civil servants should be enshrined in a 
specific law. In the event, no such law was ever adopted, but 
general union rights are applied to civil servants' unions. 
Several civil  service trade unions are registered with  the 
Ministry of  Employment. 
Besides the Trade Union Act, the ratification by Portugal of 
ILO Conventions Nos 87  and 151 constitutes a legal basis for 
civil service union rights. 
Laws  establishing special  provisions for civil  servants as 
regards their right to  engage in  collective bargaining,  to 
strike and to form works councils have been enacted. These 
will be examined elsewhere. 
Some civil  service categories  in  Portugal  have  no  union 
rights. Provision for this derogation is made in Article 270 
of the Constitution, which stipulates that the law may restrict 
the rights of expression, assembly, demonstration, associa-
tion and collective petition and limit the passive electoral 
rights of regular military personnel and military agents in 
active service, in strict accordance with the demands of their 
functions. 
Similarly,  ILO  Conventions Nos 87 and  151, the Interna-
tional  Agreement  on  Civil  and Political  Rights  and  the 
International Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, all of which have been transposed into Portuguese 
domestic law, provide for restrictions for the armed forces 
and police. Accordingly, Portuguese law denies the right to 
form trade unions to military personnel and members of the 
police force. 
1. 2.1. 4 The right to define the union's scope of  action 
The (individual) right of trade union association implies that 
workers are free to decide the geographical and occupational 
scope of  a future union and the 
11Category "it is to represent. 
In other words, they are free to decide the geographical and 
occupational  boundaries which will feature in  the union's 
rules. 
This means  that no attempt has been  made to define any 
''categories "in advance, since this would a priori restrict the 
union's representational scope. This is in direct opposition 
to  the  situation created  by the single union  system,  now 
obsolete. 
1.2.1.5 The (positive) right to join a trade union 
Article 56 §2b of the Constitution expressly recognises the 
positive right to join a union. This may be interpreted as the 
guarantee of the trade union freedom in both senses; a posi-
tive right and a negative right. 
Article 16 of  the TUA grants workers the right to join a union 
representing their category and area of activity. This right 
was especially relevant in the days before the Constitution, 
when  the  principle of union  monopoly was  still  in  force 
(Article 11 of the TUA, now repealed) and trade unions did 
not have specific leanings.  Nowadays this right should be 
interpreted in the context of a new and different legal frame-
work in which the right to join is not as far-reaching, since 
it is qualified by the trade unions' own right to accept or 
reject  new  members  in  accordance  with  their  respective 
rules.  Effectively then,  Article  16  of the TUA has  to  all 
intents and purposes been repealed, since the legal system of 
single  unions  is  no  longer  constitutional;  all  provisions 
deriving  from  this  article  have  likewise  been  abrogated. 
Since the aforementioned Article 16 §1  referred to the sole 
union for each respective category, it was inconsistent with 
the principle of union freedom. 
The Trade Union Act restricts the right to join a union in that 
no worker may be a member of more than one union, and in 
addition that union must be consistent with his or her occu-
pation or sector activity. A worker may join different trade 
unions  only  if they  correspond  to  different  occupations 
which the worker effectively exercises (TUA Article 16 §2). 
1.2.2 Negative union rights (non-membership) 
Negative union rights (the right not to join a union) and the 
attendant right not to pay union dues, are enshrined in Arti-
cle 55 §2b of the Constitution. This article gives workers the 
freedom of membership in the form of their right not to be 
compelled to pay dues to a union to which they do not be-
long. Article 16 §4 of the Union Act expressly stipulates the 
worker's right to  leave a union of which he is a member. 
The law does, however, require the worker to do so in writ-
ing and to pay three months' contributions. 
In other words, 
11Union security"  clauses are prohibited under 
Portuguese law.  Neither the law nor collective agreements 
are allowed to force a worker to join or not to join a union. 
Likewise,  they  may  not require workers to pay dues to a 
union of which they are not members. 
Article 37 for the TUA states that any agreement is forbidden 
and considered null and void which aims at: 
a)  making the recruitment of a worker contingent on his 
belonging or not belonging to a trade union or on his 
leaving the union to which he already belongs; 
b)  dismissing, transferring or in any other way prejudicing 
the interests of a worker on the grounds of his belong-
ing or not belonging to a union or because of his union 
activities. 
In actual fact,  such clauses and indeed such a tradition are 
unknown in  Portugal.  However, the corporatist system in 
force prior to 25 April  197 4 could require workers to pay PORTUGAL 
contributions to the union responsible for their job category, 
even if they were not members. 
1.2.3 The trade unions' right of association 
The Constitution also grants the trade unions themselves the 
right of  association. They may form associations, federations 
or confederations. Article 55 §2a of the Constitution  ex-
pressly spells out the right to constitute trade union associa-
tions at all levels. 
Trade unions at all levels have the right to establish links 
with  or  become  affiliated  to  international  trade-union 
organisations (Constitution, Article 55 §5). Pre-1975 legisla-
tion forbade both trade unions (Article 7,  §3 of the TUA) and 
the employers' organisations to enter into international affili-
ations. 
1.2.4 Freedom of internal organisation 
In line with ILO Convention No 87 (Article 2 of which refers 
to the individual right to establish trade unions, and Article 
3 to the right of organisations to draw up their own rules), 
Portuguese constitutional law expressly stipulates (in addi-
tion to the right to set up trade unions) the trade unions' 
right to  organise themselves and  to  formulate  their own 
internal rules (Constitution, Article 55 §2 c). 
Article 14 of the TUA lists the items which must feature in 
the rules: 
a)  the name and address of the organisation, its head of-
fice,  its geographical coverage, its area of activity, its 
objectives and its duration (where this is not indefinite); 
b)  the terms on which membership is acquired and for-
feited, and the rights and duties attaching to it; 
c)  the disciplinary system; 
d)  details of financial administration, budget and accounts; 
e)  the establishment and operational details of sections, 
delegations  or  other  forms  of  decentralised 
organisation; 
f)  the procedure for rule changes; 
g)  disbanding, dissolution and liquidation and the subse-
quent destination of the respective assets. 
In addition to the principles laid down by the law in this 
matter, the system by which trade unions can acquire legal 
personality clearly rules out any  form of interference,  in 
particular on the part of  the administrative authorities, in the 
drafting of rules, a right strictly reserved for the workers 
themselves (TUA, Article 13). Provision is merely made for 
the verification of  an organisation's legality, a matter for the 
courts. 
1.2.5 The right to self-management 
The right to management autonomy springs from the legal 
principles in force. Article 55 §4 of the Constitution stipu-
lates  that  trade  unions  shall  operate  independently  of 
employers,  the State,  churches,  political  parties or other 
political organisations. 
The law also provides for the publication,  in an  official 
gazette, of the names of elected members of union adminis-
trative bodies, but forbids any form of control or impedi-
ment of  the right to elect leaders. Article 13 of the TUA states 
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that union leaders must be elected freely and democratically 
from among the trade union members. 
The Constitution stipulates that legal provision must be made 
to  provide an  adequate guarantee of the independence of 
trade unions (Article 55 §4).  Legal protection in this sphere 
is  still  imperfect,  save for the rules which protect union 
leaders from discriminatory and anti-union behaviour on the 
part of employers. 
1.2.  6 The right to collective bargaining 
The Constitution expressly stipulates that it is up to the trade 
unions to exercise the right to collective bargaining. This 
right is enshrined in Article 56 §3 of the Constitution, which 
requires legislation to be brought in to establish the legiti-
macy of  collective labour agreements and to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the regulations in  force  (Article 56 §4).  The 
contractual autonomy of trade unions is another important 
aspect of union freedom. 
1.2.  7 The right to union activity within the enterprise 
Article 55 §2d) of the Constitution guarantees workers the 
right to engage in union activities within the enterprise. This 
right was originally established by Article 25 of the TUA, 
which decreed that workers and trade unions are entitled to 
engage in union activities within the enterprise, particularly 
through shop stewards, union committees and inter-union 
committees. 
In addition to the right to engage in union activities, Article 
54 of the Constitution also grants industrial workers the right 
to organise works councils (see below). 
1.2.8 The right to participate 
In accordance with Articles 56 and 54 of the Constitution, 
trade unions and works councils are entitled to participate in 
certain activities, such as drafting labour legislation, moni-
toring the implementation of economic and social plans, and 
managing social security institutions, etc. (see below). 
1.2.9 The right to strike 
In line with the principles defended by the ILO  Committee on 
the Freedom of  Association, the right to strike is part and 
parcel of union freedom in the broadest sense. Portuguese 
law guarantees workers' right to strike. 
Atticle 57 §1  of the Constitution clearly states that the right 
to strike is guaranteed. Article 57 §2 adds that it is up to the 
workers to decide the range of interests which may be de-
fended  by  strike action,  since the law cannot restrict this 
range (see below).  The right to strike is embodied in the 
Strike Act. Lock-outs are forbidden by Article 57 §3 of the 
Constitution. 
1.3 The principles regulating union freedom 
The statutory arrangements which regulate union freedom 
are based on a set of principles which underpin the exercise 
of union  freedom.  These  are  essentially  threefold:  the 
speciality principle; the principle of organisation and demo-
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1.3.1 The speciality principle 
To comply with the speciality principle, trade unions must, 
at all  levels of their organisation and activity,  tailor their 
conduct to the aims they have set out to achieve. This is a 
general legal principle which applies to all organisations, 
without exception, and which restricts their own legal capac-
ity (Article 160 of the Civil Code). 
Application of this principle requires the scope of action or 
the purpose of each specific type of association to be identi-
fied. Where the trade unions are concerned, the Constitution 
expressly recognises union freedom for workers, in order to 
defend their rights and interests (Article 55 and 56). But the 
TUA goes into greater detail as to what constitutes workers' 
interests.  Article 2b  defines trade unions as a  permanent 
association of workers set up to defend and promote their 
social and occupational interests. The defence of these inter-
ests is therefore the objective of trade unions. 
Of course, there is still a margin of legal uncertainty as to 
the precise nature of the interests which trade unions are 
legally and technically empowered to defend. Union practice 
tends to a very broad interpretation of these interests, partic-
ularly where the right to strike is concerned. Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that workers are not entirely free to decide 
what the purpose of their union should be. 
1.3.2 The principles of democratic 
organisation and management 
The rule laid down by Article 55 §3 of the Constitution is 
crucial. It states that trade unions must be governed by the 
principles of democratic organisation and management, on 
the basis of  a regular, secret leadership ballot. No authorisa-
tion or confirmation is necessary. Unions are based on the 
active participation of  workers at all levels of their activity. 
Clearly, then, the Constitution alludes to two separate princi-
ples: democratic organisation and democratic management. 
Both must be rooted in a free electoral system and the prac-
tice of  active worker participation in union life. The Consti-
tution clearly intends organisation and  government to  be 
viewed as two distinct aspects.  Yet both rest on the twin 
pillars of free elections and participation. 
In  line with these principles (and bearing in  mind that of 
union independence), trade unions are not entirely free to 
choose the organisational and operational rules by which 
they are to operate. They must comply with the principles 
laid down by law. 
Similarly, in regulating the drafting of union rules and disci-
plining union activity,  the  law  must in  tum  re~pect and 
promote respect for the principles in question. The law is the 
guarantor of the principle of democratic organisation and 
government, which explains the requirement that administra-
tive bodies must be elected by regular, secret ballot (Arti-
cle 55 §3 of the Constitution i. 
2.  See also: Article 13 of the TUA (free and democratic election of 
union  management);  Article 17 of the  TUA (rules  on  elections, 
duration of  management mandates, general assemblies and dismissal 
of management); and Article 29 of the TUA (rules for the election, 
by secret and direct ballot, of shop stewards). 
1.3.3 The right to dissent 
The constitutional provision which obliges union rules to 
recognise the right to dissent, or "splinter rights", (Article 55 
§2e) of  the Constitution) is very significant. Unions remain 
free,  however to decide for themselves what form the right 
to dissent shall take in their rules.  In practice, this means 
that the right to dissent is elastic, yet the core principle is 
sacrosanct: members have the right to express themselves in 
an organised manner within the union organisation
3
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1.3.4 The principle of union independence 
It is generally accepted that trade unions should be indepen-
dent. Partly this is because experience tells us this is right, 
and partly because of the key role played by trade unions, 
their social  impact and  their regular contacts with  other 
social, ideological and partisan forces. 
The Constitution make provision for this in Article 55 §4, 
which confirms the independence of trade unions from em-
ployers, the State, churches, parties and other political asso-
ciations. The law must establish adequate safeguards for this 
principle, which fonns the backbone of working class unity. 
Prior to the Constitution, Article 6 of the TUA of 1975 estab-
lished the following system, which is still in force:  employ-
ers, employers' organisations and other forms on non-union 
organisation may not promote the establishment of, or in any 
way support or finance trade unions, nor may they intervene 
in any shape or form in their organisation and management. 
Trade unions associations are independent of the State, polit-
ical parties and religious institutions, which may not inter-
fere with union organisation and management. All forms of 
reciprocal financing are prohibited. An administrative func-
tion in a trade union is incompatible with a leading function 
in a political party or religious institution. 
The system does not provide sufficient guarantees to prevent 
infringements, which in practice often go unpunished. For 
instance, some union leaders are also members of parliament 
or of their political party leadership. 
Under Portuguese constitutional law, the lack of such rules 
as imposed by Article 55 §4 of the Constitution, is unconsti-
tutional by default (Article 283 of the Constitution). 
2. Employers' freedom of association 
Employers' organisations are governed by the Employers' 
Associations Act, the EAA, (DL 215-c/75), published jointly 
with DL 215-A and 215-B. The former gave the Intersindical 
a legal monopoly to represent all Portuguese workers; the 
latter established the 
1'single union "legal framework. 
Unlike its provisions on trade unions, the Constitution omits 
any reference to employers' right of association. Although 
3.  This is an unusual feature of union freedom in legal terms, not least 
because a substantial part of the trade union movement has always 
opposed the right to dissent or splintering. So why did the Portu-
guese Constitution opt for  such a formula?  The fact  is that the 
Portuguese experience of union monopoly has essentially been a 
negative one. The monopoly was legally instituted in 1975 and left 
a clearly authoritarian imprint on Portuguese unions. This negative 
experience also explains why the union umbrella group, UOT, set up 
in  1979, decided to  introduce a fair  measure of freedom  in the 
matter of dissent in its own organisation. PORTUGAL 
constitutional clauses can be applied to this right by analogy 
(drawing on the principle of non-discrimination and interna-
tional  instruments such  as  the  Universal  Declaration  on 
Human Rights and ILO Convention No 87), the fact remains 
that the Portuguese Constitution specifically aimed at guar-
anteeing workers' rights.  This constitutional difference is 
clearly illustrated by the fact that lock-outs are prohibited, 
while the right to strike is unequivocally guaranteed. 
The EAA recognises the employers' right to form employers' 
organisations and provides for a procedure enabling them to 
acquire legal  personality similar to that applicable to the 
trade unions. Yet there are significant differences and pecu-
liarities. For example, the EAA requires employers' organisa-
tions  to  hold  management  elections  during  their general 
assembly, which must be held at least once a year
4
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Article 10 §2 of the EAA states that any employer may join 
an association which represents his respective category, in 
his own area of  activity, provided it meets statutory require-
ments. His admission may not be contingent on a discretion-
ary decision on the part of the organisation. The thinking 
underlying this formulation is the same as that which under-
pins the system of union monopoly embodied in the Trade 
Union Act. 
Another noteworthy provision is the obligation on employ-
ers' organisations to inform the Ministry of  Employment, by 
31  January of each year, of the number of members they 
represent and the number of workers they employ within the 
area of  activity covered (Article 12 §2 of the EAA). Since this 
information has no legal purpose and since no such clause 
exists for the trade unions, theses provisions are of doubtful 
legality in terms of freedom of association and non-discrimi-
nation. As it is, these rules are not enforced. 
The EAA forbade employers' organisations to join foreign or 
international organisations unless specifically authorised to 
do so by the Ministry of  Employment (Article 4). This clause 
has effectively been abrogated by the Constitution. Never-
theless, the fact remains that there is a difference between the 
law applicable to employers' associations and that applicable 
to trade unions (see above). It is inadmissible that the gov-
ernment should still enjoy discretionary powers in this re-
spect. 
The general law on associations applies to employers' or-
ganisations in the absence of specific rules. This is laid down 
in Article 14 of the EAA in accordance with its general prin-
ciples. 
There is a difference between employers' associations and 
associations of companies.  The latter focus  on economic 
interests and involve the pursuit of economic and productive 
activities. They do not represent the entrepreneurs in matters 
relating to labour relations, for which only employers' asso-
ciations are competent. Employers' associations are associa-
tions of  entrepreneurs who usually employ people (Article 1 
§2a of  the EAA). Associations of companies set up in accor-
dance with the general law on the right of association may, 
however, acquire the status of an  employers'  association 
(Article 16 of the EAA). 
4.  Whether this requirement is legally enforceable is doubtful.  It  is 
almost impossible to implement, particularly where the number of 
members is very large. 
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3. DtSCription and repr~entativeness of the social actors 
3.1 Trade union structur~ 
3.1.1 The legal model 
As in other aspects, the Trade Union Act (TUA) is clearly an 
extension of  previous corporative legislation where the defi-
nition of criteria for trade union structures are concerned. 
Article 2 of  the 1975 Act defines a trade union - in the strict 
sense - as a permanent organisation of workers established 
with a  view to defending and promoting their social and 
occupational interests.  It goes on to define federation of 
trade unions and union of  trade unions as associations of 
unions grouped by area of activity or region.  Finally, the 
Act defines a confederation as a national association of trade 
unions
5
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The 1975 Act established a statutory model for trade union 
structure based on the classifications we have already seen
6
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This should be interpreted in the context of the Constitution 
and the ILO Conventions on union freedom. It is safe to say, 
therefore, that Portugal currently enjoys union freedom in 
respect of the organisations' choice of representational sco-
pe?. 
3.1.2 The right to dissent 
As outlined above, the Constitution requires the unions to 
respect the right to dissent within their organisational struc-
ture. This constitutional obligation can only be understood 
in the light of the great political and union debates taking 
place at the time (1974-75), debates which found an echo in 
the Constituent Assembly. Proponents of the right to dissent 
argued that this would ensure freedom of expression in union 
terms within a system still wedded to the single union princi-
ple. The different political trends then opposing the single 
union system (chiefly the socialists and the social-democrats) 
voted in favour of the right to dissent. When the Constitu-
tion was first amended in 1982, the right to dissent within 
the union was strengthened. This development corresponds 
to the convergent views held by the UGT (this group of un-
ions has been a staunch defender of the right to dissent from 
its inception). 
Since  it  was  founded,  the  UGT  has combined  two  major 
trends in union thinking, reflecting the positions defended by 
the two main  political  parties:  the socialist trend and the 
social-democratic trend.  The  '~nitary" tendency,  i.e.  the 
communist  position,  is  also  represented  within  the  UGT 
through the large union (for example in the banking sector) 
which emerged from the old system and joined the uar. 
The Christian Democrats represent a third, but very small 
5.  This was the same in the old corporative system. Yet there is an 
important  difference:  the  third  level,  i.e.confederations,  corre-
sponded to the corporations in the old system. These were mixed 
corporative organisations covering both the trade unions and the 
employers' associations.  A complete analysis of the union structure 
in  the corporative system  can be found  in  MARIO  PINTO,  Union 
Structures in Portugal, GIS  1973. 
6.  Especially since there was a special procedure to cover the plans for 
replacing existing occupation-based unions by  unions  for  a par-
ticular area of activity (Article 12, now repealed). 
7.  Yet the TUA model defining the union position was to a large extent 
inherited from the system previously in force. 
8.  The Communists did not withdraw because these unions occupy a 
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trend. The Wlions affiliated to the UGT are heavily influenced 
by the relationships between the different union trends. They 
participate individually in union elections, though they often 
present coalition lists. 
By contrast, the right to dissent within the CGTP-IN  is  of 
minor practical importance. This is either because there is no 
room for it owing to the way the right of expression is or-
ganised, or because the Communist tendency prevails and 
restricts the scope for expressing minority views. It is un-
usual for the CGTP-IN to have different factions competing in 
union elections.  The only time when there are any visible 
signs of  divergence and bargaining with minority trends is at 
union congresses. 
3.2 The question of representativeness 
Portuguese law makes no provision nor lays down any rules 
concerning the problem of trade union representativeness. 
The prevailing system of effective union pluralism deter-
mines the potential and, in most cases, the effectiveness of 
pluralism in terms of collective agreements. Each of these 
collective agreements applies to  workers affiliated  to  the 
respective representative trade unions - in terms of the legal 
system governing the effectiveness of agreements. We shall 
find  further on that this aspect is  regulated in  a practical 
fashion.  The only criterion applied by the law is that of the 
"union representing the largest number of  workers '',  to settle 
competing  claims  between  collective.  labour  agreements 
(Article 14 of the Law on collective labour regulation)
9
• 
3.3 The two models of union structure 
Because of the influence exerted by the TUA in the post-1975 
period and because of the passive attitude of the union or-
ganisations of the time, Portuguese unions today are exten-
sions ofpre-1974 structures. One major difference however 
is the adoption by the UGT of a national union model based 
on area of activity for the new unions it has created. This 
model draws on Austrian and West German examples. 
In  brief,  Portugal  has  two  organisational  models  for  its 
unions.  One  is  built  round  district-level  primary  unions 
(based  on professions or area of activity) which together 
form national federations for each area of activity. It is these 
sectoral federations which, in practice, negotiate collective 
agreements for each sector. The same primary unions also 
form regional organisations. Finally, the national confedera-
tion brings them all together and represents them at national 
level. This is the prevalent model as adopted by the CGTP-IN. 
The second model consists mainly of the large national in-
dustrial Wlions. Because of  their scope of action, they neither 
form sectoral federations nor regional organisations. This is 
the UGT  model. Within this central union organisation are 
some of the  unions  inherited  from  the  previous  system, 
including large regional or national unions in  the services 
sector of the  economy  (banks and  insurance companies). 
These obviously are not quite the sort of small unions which 
need to form federations and they therefore fit in with the 
UGT set-up. Nevertheless, office-workers' and service work-
ers' unions, also part of the UGT  organisation, were for a 
long time organised at district level within large regional 
9.  See further on. 
federations,  but even these are now tending to evolve into 
national groupings. 
Thus, the CGTP-IN  has a large number of primary unions, 
which in tum form federations and regional organisations. 
The UGT for its part has no sectoral federations or regional 
organisations. It does have just two regional office-workers' 
federations, which also play a very important role in collec-
tive bargaining. 
3.4 The large confederations 
Since the end of 1978, Portugal has had two general trade 
union confederations: the General Confederation of  Portu-
guese Workers  - National Inter-Union  (CGTP-IN)  and the 
General Workers' Union {UGT). 
3.4.1 The General Confederation of  Portuguese 
Workers -National Inter-Union (CGTP-IN) 
The CGTP-IN saw the light of  day in the immediate aftermath 
of the revolution of 25 April 1974
10
•  It was established de 
jure under the terms of a decree-law of the Military Revolu-
tionary Council in March 1975 {DL 215-A/75). 
The CGTP-IN is essentially Communist-inspired. At interna-
tional level, it maintains special links with the WFTU, but it 
is not affiliated to a confederation. 
3.4.2 The General Workers' Union  (UGT) 
The UGT was founded in late 1978 following agreement on 
a fifty-fifty coalition between the two union trends (socialist 
and social-democratic). It is reformist in nature. 
Internationally, the UGT is affiliated to the ICFTU (Interna-
tional Confederation of  Free Trade Unions) and ETUC (the 
European Trade Union Confederation). 
3.4.3 Representativeness of the large confederations 
The representativeness of  the two trade-union confederations 
cannot be determined because of the lack of reliable public 
data
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ever, be made. 
At the time of its first congress in  1975,  some 150 trade 
unions representing approximately 1,500,000 workers were 
members of the CGTP-IN.  A recent study
12 credits the CGTP-
IN  with  143  affiliated  unions  representing  approximately 
1,160,000 workers. 
I 0.  The CGTP-IN dates its de facto foundation to  1970, when the first 
inter-union meetings took place between the managements of  corpo-
rative  unions  of different calling but all  largely  opposed to the 
political regime then in power. 
II.  The Ministry for  Employment and  Social  Security published in 
1990 a study on trade union membership in Portugal - MARIA DE 
CONCEI<.:.\ CFRDEIRA and ERITE PADILHA, A sindicalizap:Jo e alguns 
componamentos sindicais, Lisbon, MESS,  1990- which quotes the 
following average rates of trade union membership:  1969: 59%; 
1974/1978: 52.4%; 1979/1984: 58.8%; and  1985/1986: between 
50.5% and 52.6% (op. cit. pages 23-24). Nevertheless, this study 
does not give a breakdown by trade union confederation of the trade 
union membership figures, expressly stating that it was not possible 
to draw conclusions about the representativeness of  the confedera-
tions (page 14). 
12.  JosE BARRETO,  Estudo sobre os sindicatos apos 1974, unpublished, 
Lisbon. PORTUGAL 
The first  UGT  congress in early 1979 was attended by 33 
trade unions representing some 600,000 workers. The study 
referred to in the previous paragraph states that the UGT now 
represents 53 trade unions, with approximately 1,100,000 
workers. 
However, another publication by the Ministry of  Employment 
and Social Security
13 gives different figures, relating to April 
1987. CGTP-IN:  122 duly affiliated primary trade unions and 
71  associates;  UGT:  52 trade unions. There were also  116 
independent trade unions
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It should be noted that the number of trade unions does not 
reflect the number of affiliated workers, and only approxi-
mate figures are available. The number of workers who are 
members of trade union must in fact be considerably lower 
than the figures quoted above. Assuming a membership rate 
of around 50%
15
,  a hypothesis which neither confederation 
disputes and which is a very high rate in comparison with 
the other Member States of the Community, and also taking 
into account the size of the active population in Portugal, 
some  1,450,000 workers  would  be  members  of unions. 
Assuming they are more or less equally representative, each 
of the two confederations would have some 650,000 affili-
ated workers, with 150,000 shared among the independent 
trade unions.  It should, however, be emphasised that this 
estimate is merely an attempt to correct the figures occasion-
ally published and that,  as  mentioned earlier,  no  reliable 
figures exist. 
3.5 Employers' organisations 
The 1974 revolution heralded the rise of new-style employ-
ers' organisations.  Three employers'  confederations have 
emerged, probably under the influence of the old corporatist 
divisions: 
•  the Portuguese Farmers' Confederation (CAP) 
•  the Confederation of  Portuguese Industry (CIP) 
•  the Portuguese Trade Confederation (CCP) 
The CAP represents 76 regional  farmers'  associations,  16 
specialised associations and 12 cooperatives. The primary 
associations are organised into four federations, which large-
ly correspond with the country's main farming regions. 
The CAP  is  a  member of a  number of international  or-
ganisations: the Committee of  Agricultural Organisations in 
the EEC (COPA); the European Confederation of  Agriculture 
(ECA); the International Federation of  Agricultural Produc-
ers (IFAP) and the Economic and Social Committee. 
The CIP represents 79 associations (sectoral and regional). 
The primary associations may  have sections and can also 
form sectoral federations.  In some cases there are parallel 
technical associations. 
This confederation's international links include membership 
of the International Organisation of  Employers (IOE) and the 
Union of  Industrial and Employers' Confederation of  Europe 
13.  MARIA DA CX>NCEI<:AO CERDEIRA and EDITE PADILHA, As estruturas 
sindilXlis porlugaesas - uma analise evolutiva de 1933 a Abril 1987, 
Lisbon, MESS, 1988. 
14.  The CGTP-IN (Relatorio de actividades ao V Congresso da  CGTP-IN, 
1986), set the number of independent unions at roughly 160, 73 of 
these being associated with the CGTP-IN. 
15.  Figure given in the study quoted in note 11. 
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(UNICE).  Like the other Portuguese employers' confedera-
tions, the CIP is a member of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. 
The CCP represents 137 associations. There are some federa-
tions which mediate between the primary associations and 
the confederation. 
SECTION 4: WORKERS' ORGANISATION 
WITHIN THE ENTERPRISE 
In the Portuguese system, the organisation of workers within 
the enterprise is characterised by a dual structure. On the one 
hand, the organisation is an extension of the unions; on the 
other hand, it is an institutional aspect of the workers' com-
munity within the enterprise regardless of their union affilia-
tion. The extension of union organisation and union activity 
within the enterprise is guaranteed by the Constitution and 
regulated by the TUA. This covers all workers belonging to 
a union. The law lays down rules establishing the legitimacy 
of the workers' general meetings with the union organisation 
within the enterprise. 
The autonomous institutional organisation of workers within 
the enterprise is also provided for by the Constitution and 
subject  to  Act 46/79,  known  as  the  Works  Council  Act 
(WCA).  This parallel form of workers' organisation within 
the enterprise has its own specific tasks, as opposed to the 
trade union organisation,  which  is  solely  responsible for 
collective bargaining. These tasks combine participation and 
monitoring. 
1. Union organisation within the enterprise 
Article 55 §2d of the Constitution guarantees workers the 
right to exercise union activities within the enterprise. This 
clause confers constitutional  legitimacy  to  the  rights  en-
shrined in Chapter III of the 1975 Trade Union Act, which 
deals with the exercise of union activity within the enter-
prise. This system is still in force. 
Article 25 of the TUA gives workers and unions the right to 
carry out union activities within the enterprise, especially 
through shop stewards, union committees and inter-union 
committees.  The shop stewards are union representatives 
within a given company. All the workers who have joined 
the same union within a company make up the union branch 
in that company (Article 2 h) of the TUA. 
Each union has the right to appoint one or more shop stew-
ards in each company.  According to Article 29 §1  of the 
TUA, shop stewards must be elected and discharged by direct 
secret ballot of the union members (the union branch in the 
company). The law also makes provision for the respective 
unions' rules to regulate the whole process. If  there is more 
than one shop steward representing the same union, a com-
pany union committee - a term used in the law - may be set 
up. This is an organisation of shop stewards belonging to the 
same  union  within  a  single company  or production  unit 
(Article 2i and Article 29 §2 of the TUA). In companies with 
several union branches (representing more than one union), 
the respective shop stewards can set up a company inter-
union  committee.  Sitting on this committee will be shop 
stewards representing different unions within the same com-
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The law does not set limits to the number of shop stewards. 
It merely restricts the number of workers entitled to daytime 
release arrangements with  a  view to  carrying  out union 
duties (and to various protective privileges),  the number 
varying according to company size
16
• 
2. Works councils 
Works councils are separate from in-house trade union or-
ganisations (which are based on union freedom). They con-
stitute the institutionalised legal  right to representation of 
workers within each company. This workers' representative 
structure was established by the 1976 Constitution, but in 
fact embodies a very important feature seen in Portugal since 
1974. The fundamental features of the works councils are 
laid down in the Constitution. 
Article 54 of the chapter devoted to workers' rights, free-
doms and guarantees stipulates that: 
(i)  Workers have the right to  set up works councils to 
defend their interests and take part in the democratic 
process within the company. 
(ii)  Plenary meetings of workers will discuss the formula-
tion and approval of rules and elect members of the 
works councils by direct secret ballot. 
(iii)  Coordination committees may be set up to improve the 
efficiency of economic restructuring and to guarantee 
respect of  workers' rights. 
(iv)  The members of  works councils are entitled to the same 
legal protection as shop stewards. 
(v)  Works councils have the right: 
(a)  to receive the information they need to carry out 
their duties; 
(b)  to monitor company management; 
(c)  to have a say in any reorganisation of production 
units; 
(d)  to take part in formulating labour legislation and 
social and economic planning concerning their par-
ticular sector; 
(e)  to manage or participate in the management of the 
company's social work; 
(f)  to promote the election of  workers' representatives 
in State-run enterprises as defined by the law. 
These basic constitutional provisions are supplemented by 
the Works Councils Act (WCA). 
The law provides for only one works council per company 
(single representation). This is representative of all workers. 
Nevertheless, sub-committees may be elected within differ-
ent establishments. The law also provides for the setting-up 
16.  The maximum number of shop stewards entitled to daytime release 
for purposes of union activity has been established as follows: 
•  a company employing fewer that 50 unionised workers: 1; 
•  a company employing between 50-90 unionised workers: 2; 
•  a company employing between 100-199 unionised workers: 
3; 
•  a company employing between 200-499 unionised workers: 
6; 
•  a company employing more than 500 unionised workers: the 
number of shop stewards is calculated on the basis of a for-
mula:  6 +(n-500/200),  where n  represents  the  number  of 
workers rounded up to the next higher unit where necessary. 
Once the shop stewards have been elected, the union management 
will communicate their names to the employers, by receipted regis-
tered letter. The names will be posted in the premises set aside for 
union information (Article 36 of the TUA). 
of  coordination committees for more efficient intervention in 
the process of economic restructuring and the exercising of 
other rights. 
SECTION 5: SOCIAL DIALOGUE STRUCTURES 
AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
1. The Pennanent Council for Social Consultation 
The problem of  social consultation became an issue in Portu-
gal much later than in other European countries, owing to 
the country's trials and tribulations since the 1974 revolu-
tion. It was not until 1983 that the "central-bloc government 
11 
- a coalition of Socialists and Social Democrats- took the 
road of social consultation, a move endorsed by the UGT. 
The CGTP-IN, on the other hand, was resolutely against, and 
the employers' confederations were divided. The CIP took a 
wait-and-see attitude, while the CCP was in favour. 
This led to a Decree-Law dated March 1984 (DL 74/84), by 
which the government set up  the Permanent Council for 
Social Consultation (CPCS). This is a tripartite body (govern-
ment, unions and employers) with advisory powers. Its brief 
is to promote dialogue and consultation and to ensure partici-
pation of workers' and employers' organisations in social 
and economic policy-making.  The law stipulates that the 
government must seek the Council's advice on all bills fall-
ing within its area of competence and inform it of its re-
sponse to its opinions, proposals and recommendations. 
However,  the two agreements on wage policy, signed in 
1987 and 1988 respectively, had a significance well beyond 
the scope of the various opinions on proposed legislation, for 
example - which were often not unanimous. In practice, the 
scope of agreements is  equivalent to that of inter-profes-
sional  collective  agreements  negotiated  nationally.  They 
provide a framework for collective bargaining at sectoral and 
company level.  However, while the 1987 experiment cer-
tainly bore fruit,  the same cannot be said of the 1988 agree-
ment.  Although  this  agreement did continue to  influence 
collective bargaining proceedings, confirming its regulatory 
powers, it prevented real wage increases as inflation turned 
out to be higher than expected. 
Meanwhile the CGTP-IN, which had initially opposed social 
consultation and refused to take part in it, decided in Octo-
ber 1987 to take its seat on the CPCS. Portuguese experience 
of social consultation is still relatively new. Its future will 
obviously depend on several factors.  Nevertheless, all the 
social partners have of late indicated they would like to see 
more social dialogue within the Council. Now it is the gov-
ernment which seems less keen. 
The latest constitutional revision has resulted in the estab-
lishment of an Economic and Social Council, which threa-
tens the very existence of the Permanent Council for Social 
Consultation.  A  debate  is  now raging as to whether the 
creation of this new body justifies the abolition of the CPCS. 
All the social partners represented in the CPCS are opposed 
to  this.  Other employers'  organisations,  however,  are in 
favour of doing away with it and transferring its powers to 
the new organisation. POR1VGAL 
2. Other participation functions and bodies 
The regulation of working conditions is further influenced 
by a set of bodies responsible for monitoring workers' and 
employers' participation. The following is a brief description 
of some of these. 
2.1 The Economic and Social Council 
As we have seen, the latest revision of the Portuguese Con-
stitution saw the inception of an Economic and Social Coun-
cil. The ESC is an advisory body with consultative powers in 
the field of economic and social policy (Article 95 of the 
Constitution). Legislation is now needed to define the Coun-
cil's powers and composition. This will designate the repre-
sentatives of the government, workers' economic activities, 
autonomous regions and local authorities who will partici-
pate in the Council (Article 95 of the Constitution). 
2.2 The Committee for Equality in Employment (CITE) 
Decree-law 392/72 of  20 September set up a tripartite com-
mittee reporting to the Ministry of  Employment and Social 
Security, responsible for the promotion of equal opportuni-
ties for men and women at work. It focuses in particular on 
equal pay, equal access to employment, career opportunities, 
etc. 
2.3 The National Council for Health and Safety at Work 
This Council was set up by Resolution 204182
11 of the Coun-
cil of  Ministers on 16 November pursuant to ILO  Convention 
No  155. It is a tripartite body headed by the Minister of 
Employment and Social Security.  Its vice-chairman is the 
director-general of health and safety. Other members of the 
Council include representatives from other ministries and the 
regional governments, and delegates from the most represen-
tative employers' and workers' organisations. 
The Council's duties include: 
•  helping to formulate and implement national policies on 
health and safety for all workers and on the working 
environment; 
•  issuing opinions at national level on relevant topics and 
programmes; 
•  assessing the results of measures taken and proposing 
adjustments to them on the basis of social and economic 
change in the country. 
2.4 The Institute of  Port Workers (ITP) 
The Institute of Port Workers  is a public institution with 
administrative and financial  autonomy.  It is  a structurally 
decentralised body reporting to the Ministry for Maritime 
Affairs. It has a management board and a supervisory com-
mittee, each consisting of  a representative from the Maritime 
Ministry, the National Federation of  Port Workers' Unions 
and the port operators' associations. 
The ITP's duties include: 
•  studying and proposing general and policy guidelines 
for port workers at national level with a view to achiev-
ing, as far as possible, standard treatment of the prob-
lems arising in all the nation's ports; 
17.  Amended by Resolution 50/86 of  26 June. 
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•  furthering the implementation of general standards for 
port work in all ports, by gradually improving their use 
throughout the country; 
•  assessing manpower requirements for each port accord-
ing to traffic levels, and drafting proposals for fixing or 
adjusting manning levels as necessary; 
•  promoting schemes for rational work distribution, par-
ticularly for shift workers; 
•  establishing procedural rules for all employers in the 
different ports, creating the prerequisites for progres-
sive standardisation in respect of the recruitment and 
allocation of labour; 
•  promoting the payment of guaranteed wages to port 
workers; 
•  ensuring the availability of vocational training schemes 
in collaboration with trade unions and port operators; 
•  establishing general terms of recruitment for all port 
workers; 
•  providing arbitration on any technical and labour dis-
putes brought before it; 
•  generally doing all in its power to see that disciplinary 
standards and  rules on the health and safety of port 
workers are respected. 
2.5 The Institute of  Employment 
and Vocational Training (IEFP) 
The IEFP  is a public institution with administrative and fi-
nancial autonomy, reporting to the Ministry of  Employment 
and Social Security. Its rules were approved by Decree-law 
247/85 of  12 July 1985. It operates on a tripartite basis with 
a regional structure. 
The IEFP's management board is made up of eight represen-
tatives of the public authorities, four representatives of trade 
union organisations and four representatives of employers' 
confederations
18
•  The first of these groups consists of mem-
bers of the  executive  committee and  delegates  from  the 
Ministries of the Interior, Finance, and Planning and Edu-
cation. 
Generally ~~g,  the IEFP helps to draft, define and assess 
employment and vocational training policies and, once ap-
proved by government, to carry them out. More specifically, 
it: 
•  makes sure any employment problems are recognised; 
•  promotes the organisation of the job market with a view 
to  achieving full  employment respecting job-seekers' 
freedom to choose according to their preferences and 
qualifications; 
•  promotes  vocational  information,  guidance,  training 
and rehabilitation, and helps to find suitable openings 
particularly for school-leavers and other disadvantaged 
social groups.  Another of its tasks  is to analyse job 
openings and the geographical and professional mobil-
ity of labour; 
•  helps to improve productivity within the enterprise by 
organising training courses; 
•  backs any initiative liable to create new jobs; 
•  helps to coordinate cooperation schemes developed by 
national  and  international  organisations  and  organ-
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isations in other countries in the field of employment 
and vocational training and rehabilitation
19
• 
2.6 The National Institute for the Organisation 
of  Workers' Leisure 7ime (INA  TEL) 
INA TEL is a public institution with administrative and fman-
cial autonomy managed on a bipartite basis. It was set up by 
Decree-law 519-12179 of  29 December 1979 and reports to 
the Ministry of  Employment and Social SecuritjlD. 
The general management board of INA TEL has 20 members, 
ten representing the trade unions and ten the different minis-
tries and other departments concerned
21
•  INA TEL was set up 
to enable both active and retired workers to satisfy those 
interests concerned with their well-being and so contribute 
to a more rational organisation of their leisure time in order 
to improve their quality of life.  Specifically,  INA TEL pro-
motes schemes in the cultural, sports, games, economic and 
social spheres in accordance with its objectives
22
• 
2.  7 The Institute of  Financial Management 
of  Social Security (IGFSS) 
The IGFSS  is a public institution with financial and admin-
istrative autonomy, set up by Decree-Law 17177 of  12 J  anu-
ary 1977. Its organisational and operational rules and its area 
of competence are laid down in Decree-Law 124177.  The 
IGFSS  is directly answerable to  the Secretary of State for 
Social Security. Its management board is made up of repre-
sentatives of  the government, pensioners' associations, trade 
unions, employers' associations and State-run enterprises. 
It was set up to help define financial policy relating to Social 
Security and to carry out studies and implement schemes 
aimed at ensuring balanced  financial  management of the 
Social Security system. It also collects monthly dues in order 
to be able to cover costs, drafts and implements financial 
plans, administers the funds in its charge, collaborates with 
other Social Security institutions, etc. (Articles 2 and 3 of 
DL 124/77). 
CHAPTER II: INSTRUMENTS FOR THE REGULATION 
OF WORKING CONDITIONS 
1. The sources of regulation 
In  Portugal,  the  sources  of labour  regulations  are  the 
Constitution, European Community employment legislation, 
international labour law, laws and government regulations, 
collective  agreements,  accession  agreements,  arbitration 
rulings, joint committee deliberations, ministerial decrees on 
labour regulation or extensions,  company in-house rules, 
accepted custom and practice, and "assentos "(rulings of the 
Supreme Court, which have normative value). These sources 
will be discussed separately in the following sections. 
2. Constitutional law 
The Constitution of  the Republic of  Portugal features various 
stipulations with a direct bearing on labour law. In this sense 
19.  Article 4, idem. 
20.  Article I  ofDL519-12179. 
21.  Article 28, idem. 
22.  Articles 3 and 4, idem. 
it  constitutes a  source of labour law,  in fact  the highest 
source in hierarchical terms. 
The constitutional stipulations with direct bearing on labour 
law are contained within Part 1 of the Constitution:  "Funda-
mental Rights and Duties ':  Title II on "Rights, freedoms and 
guaratuees ':  and particularly Chapter m thereof,  'Workers' 
rights, freedoms and guarantees~ However, Chapter I on 
"Personal rights, freedoms and guarantees" also features at 
least one stipulation of interest to the subject of this study, 
namely Article 47, which enshrines the right of all people to 
choose their profession or job with freedom,  save where 
there are legal restrictions dictated by the common interest 
or restrictions associated with the person's own ability. This 
article also spells out the right of all citizens to open and 
equal access to public service posts, subject to a competitive 
examination. 
Besides the Title II chapters mentioned, Title m on  "Eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights and duties", Chapter I on 
"Economic rights and duties': also deals with matters cov-
ered by labour legislation. 
2.1 Workers' rights, freedoms and guarantees 
Articles 53, 54, 55, 56 and 57  are devoted to the fundamen-
tal rights granted to all workers. 
Article 53 guarantees job security to all workers and bans 
unfair dismissals and dismissals on political or ideological 
grounds. 
Article 54 affirms the right to set up works councils within 
the enterprise and lays down the rights of these councils. 
Article 54 also defines the way in which the works councils 
should be elected and guarantees its members the same legal 
protection as that afforded to shop stewards. The rights of 
works councils are: 
(a)  to receive the information they need to carry out their 
duties; 
(b)  to monitor company management; 
(c)  to have a say in any reorganisation of production units; 
(d)  to take part in formulating labour legislation and social 
and economic planning concerning their particular sec-
tor; 
(e)  to manage or participate in the management of the com-
pany's social work; 
(t)  to promote the election of workers' representatives in 
State-run enterprises as defined by the law. 
Article 55 is given over to union rights, granted to all work-
ers without discrimination, and implying: 
(a)  the right to set up trade unions at all levels; 
(b)  the right to organise these trade unions and to decide 
their internal organisation; 
(c)  the right to engage in union activities within the enter-
pnse; 
(d)  the right to dissent, according to the procedures estab-
lished by the rules of the trade unions. 
Article 55 obliges trade unions to observe the principles of 
democratic organisation and management. It affirms the their 
independence  and  grants  them  the  right  to  international 
affiliation.  Finally,  it  states  that  the  law must give duly 
elected workers' representatives adequate protection against PORTUGAL 
manipulation, constraints or limitations of any kind in the 
lawful discharge of their duties
23
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Article 56 recognises the trade unions' role to defend and to 
further the defence of the workers they represent, and sets 
out their rights. According to this article, trade unions have 
the right to: 
(a)  participate in the drafting of labour legislation; 
(b)  take part in managing social security institutions and 
other organisations set up to defend workers' interests; 
(c)  help to monitor the implementation of measures under 
economic and social plans; 
(d)  be represented on social consultation bodies. 
Collective bargaining forms part of the trade unions' brief. 
Finally, Article 57 stipulates that: 
(i)  'the right to strike is guaranteed~ 
(ii)  'ft is up to the workers to define the scope of  interests 
to be defended by strike action; the law cannot restrict 
this scope~ 
(iii)  '1ock-outs are prohibited~ 
2.2 Basic social rights 
Article 58 of  the Constitution lays down the right to work as 
a  fundamental social right for all. It states that "all people 
have the right to work, and that the duty to work is insepara-
ble/rom the right to work, save for those hampered by age, 
sickness or invalidity~ The right to work means that the 
State has certain obligations.  By  means of economic and 
social planning, it must guarantee: 
(a)  the implementation of policies to achieve full employ-
ment; 
(b)  equal opportunities in the choice of profession or job 
and no discrimination regarding access to a function, 
job or profession on grounds of sex; 
(c)  cultural, technical and vocational training for workers. 
The Constitution  goes on to  list workers'  rights and  the 
State's obligations (Article 59), stipulating that all workers, 
regardless of age, sex, race, citizenship, region of origin, 
religion and political or ideological leanings, are entitled to: 
(a)  remuneration commensurate with quantity, nature and 
quality of work; the principle of equal pay for equal 
work must be respected, so as to guarantee a dignified 
existence; 
(b)  the organisation of  work in socially acceptable working 
conditions,  conducive  to  developing  one's full  pro-
fessional potential; 
(c)  work in healthy and safe surroundings; 
(d)  rest and leisure,  a  limit to  the working day,  weekly 
rest, and regular paid holidays; 
(e)  material assistance in the event of redundancy. 
It is up to the State to guarantee the working conditions, 
remuneration and rest to which the workers are entitled, by: 
(a)  fixing  and  updating  the  national  minimum  wage; 
account should be taken, among other things, of work-
23.  Article 56 of the  Constitution states that  "union  associations are 
governed by the principles of  democratic organisation and manage-
ment based on the regular election of  its managing bodies by secret 
ballot, without submitting to any authority or homologation,· these 
associations are independent of  the employers, the State, churches, 
parties and other politiool associations, and the law must guarantee 
this independence[  ...  ].,· they are entitled to forge links with or join 
international trade union organisations". 
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ers' needs, the rise in the cost of living, the level of 
development of productive forces,  the imperatives of 
economic and financial  stability, and the build-up of 
assets for development; 
(b)  setting limits to working time at national level; 
(c)  ensuring special protection at work for pregnant women 
and women who have recently given birth, for minors, 
the disabled and those engaged in particularly strenuous 
activities or particularly unhealthy, toxic or dangerous 
work; 
(d)  systematic development of a network of rest and holi-
day centres together with the social organisations; 
(e)  protecting the working conditions and guaranteeing the 
social rights of immigrant workers. 
Last but not least, there is the constitutional right to social 
security (Article 63). The State is thus responsible for organ-
ising, coordinating and financing a unified and decentralised 
social security system. The trade unions, other organisations 
representing workers and associations acting for other bene-
ficiaries are all expected to participate. The ultimate object 
of  social security is to protect citizens against the risks asso-
ciated with sickness,  old age,  invalidity, widowhood and 
orphanhood; protection is also provided against unemploy-
ment and,  generally,  against the loss or reduction of the 
means of subsistence or the ability to work. 
2.3 The external impact of constitutional 
rights, freedoms and guarantees 
According to Article 17 of the Constitution, the system of 
rights, freedoms and guarantees applies to the terms of  Title 
ID as well as to basic rights of a similar nature. As we have 
seen, Title II, Chapter II spells out workers' rights, guaran-
tees and freedoms.  Hence the said system, as specified in 
Article 18, applies to it. According to this article, the consti-
tutional postulates of Article 17 are directly applicable and 
binding on public and private bodies alike. It is safe to say, 
therefore, that these rules have immediate impact and require 
no  intermediary,  development or other legislative spurs. 
They apply even where no specific laws exist and the State 
and private individuals alike must abide by them. This means 
that any laws which inhibit these constitutional prescriptions 
must be invalid, since they take the place of the law and are 
enforced in defiance of the law
24
•  Furthermore, Article 18 
establishes that the law cannot restrict rights, freedoms and 
guarantees save in cases expressly spelt out in the Constitu-
tion. These restrictions shall be limited in such a way as to 
safeguard other constitutionally guaranteed rights and inter-
ests25.  Moreover, laws restricting rights, liberties and guar-
antees must be of a general and abstract nature. They may 
neither be retroactive nor inhibit the extent or scope of the 
essence of constitutional prescriptions. 
All this means that the rights, freedoms and guarantees of 
workers as set out in the Constitution have tremendous sig-
nificance as far as the sources of labour regulation are con-
cerned. 
24.  Cf GOMES  CONAOTILHO  and  VITAL  MOREIRA,  Constituion of the 
Portuguese Republic - annotated. 
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3. Community rules 
According to Article 8  §3  of the Constitution,  provisions 
issued by the competent international organisations of which 
Portugal is a member have immediate and direct effect on 
domestic legislation, provided this is expressly stipulated in 
the respective constitutive treaties. 
This article was introduced when the Portuguese Constitu-
tion was revised in  1982 in order to enable the country to 
join the European Community, thus guaranteeing the consti-
tutionality of one of the legal repercussions of accession: 
direct and immediate submission to provisions issuing from 
the competent European Community bodies. In line with the 
EC Treaty, provisions laid down by those bodies thus became 
a source of labour regulation in Portugal as from the date of 
accession. 
4. International law 
Article 8 §1 states that the rules and principles of general or 
common international law are an integral part of Portuguese 
law. Article 8 §2 adds that the rules laid down by interna-
tional agreements and formally ratified or approved  shall 
take effect nationally as soon as they have been officially 
published and to the extent that they commit the Portuguese 
State at international level. 
Hence Article 8 §1  establishes "automatic integration" ma-
chinery for the rules and principles of general or common 
international law. The rules of general international law are 
customary rules which are general in their scope. The princi-
ples of general international law are the basic principles to 
which most States adhere and which, by that very fact,  have 
become enshrined in international legal thinking, such as, for 
example, the principle of good faith, abuse of rights, etc
26
• 
Article 8 §2, also establishes an automatic, but conditional, 
integration system; incorporation into national legislation is 
made subject to agreements having been formally approved 
or ratified and properly published. For example, some of the 
pacts and agreements ratified by Portugal with a particular 
bearing on the subject in question include: 
•  The Universal Declaration of  Human Rights
27
; 
•  The  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights7B; 
•  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Right~; 
•  The European Convention on Human Right?>. 
Given their much wider scope, we shall not attempt to dis-
cuss  the  Conventions  of  the  International  Labour 
Organisation ratified by Portugal. 
5. Ordinary laws 
Ordinary laws are a solemn act on the part of those bodies 
wielding legislative power and the power to lay down gen-
eral and abstract legal rules i.e. the laws emanating from the 
26.  GOMES CONOTILHO and VITAL MOREIRA, op cit. 
27.  According to Article 16, §2 of the Constitution,  "the constitutional 
and legal prescription in respect of  basic rights must be interpreted 
and incorporated in compliance with the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights~ 
28.  Approved for ratification by Act 29179 of  12 June. 
29.  Approved for ratification by Act 45178 of  11 June. 
30.  Approved for ratification by Act 65178 of  13 June. 
Assembly of the Republic and the Decree-Laws issued by the 
government, as well as the legislative orders of the regional 
assemblies. In terms of labour legislation, two aspects come 
to the fore:  one is the Assembly of the Republic's preroga-
tive to  legislate in certain areas; the other is the process of 
lawmaking itself, seen from the point of view of the work-
ers' right to participate. 
5.1 Laws in the strict sense 
Under the terms of  Article 164 of the Constitution, the As-
sembly of the Republic is responsible for formulating laws 
on all  matters, save where the Constitution decrees other-
wise. Article 168 §Jb stipulates that it is the prerogative of 
the Assembly to legislate on, inter alia, matters concerning 
rights,  freedoms and guarantees.  As  indicated above,  the 
rights, freedoms and guarantees of workers are covered by 
Title II, Chapter III on rights, freedoms and guarantees. 
The subjects listed in Articles 53-58 of the Constitution come 
within the legislative powers of the Assembly and may not 
be regulated by the government without the prior con8ent of 
the Assembly. Such legislative authorisation must specify the 
object, meaning, scope and duration of the authorisation and 
may not be used more than twice, unless it is put into effect 
in a piecemeal fashion
31
• 
5.2 Decree-laws 
According to Article 201 of  the Constitution, the government 
is responsible, as part of its legislative duties, for: 
•  fonnulating decree-laws on all matters not reserved for 
the Assembly of the Republic; 
•  formulating decree-laws on matters falling within the 
prerogative of the  Assembly of the Republic,  where 
prior consent has been obtained; 
•  formulating  decree-laws  on  the  development  of the 
general principles or guidelines for the legal systems 
contained within the laws that pertain to them. 
Laws and decree-laws have equal status, save that decree-
laws  already  promulgated  on  the  basis  of  legislative 
authorisation and those dealing with the general bases for 
legal systems are subordinate to the relevant laws
32
• 
Laws and Decree-Laws, as well as regional orders on labour 
legislation
33 at the formulation stage (this will be discussed 
further on), must be submitted to the workers' organisations 
for consultation purposes, as mentioned in the first chapter 
of this reporf4. This means that the draft bills and proposals 
must be published  in  the Journal of the Assembly of the 
Republic, the Bulletin of  Labour and Employment and the 
Official Journal of  the Region, depending on whether the 
31 .  Article 168 §§2 and 3 of the Constitution. 
32.  Article 115 of the Gonstitution. 
33.  According to  the said Article 2 of Act 16179 Labour Legislation 
means any legislation aimed at regulating individual and collective 
labour relations as well as workers' rights as such and the rights of 
their organisations, i.e. a) individual labour contracts; b) collective 
labour relations;  c)  works councils,  the respective coordinating 
committees and their rights; d) trade unions and union rights; e) the 
right to strike; f)  national minimum wage and working hours; g) 
vocational training; h) accidents at work and occupational diseases; 
also the process involved in ratification of the conventions of the 
lntemationa/ Labour Organisation. 
34.  Article 3 of Act 16/79. PORTUGAL 
legislation in question emanates from the Assembly of the 
Republic, the Government or the Regional Assemblies35. 
The legislator must take account of the views put forward by 
the workers' organisations36. 
5.3 The regulatory powers of governmene
7 
According to Article 202 of the Constitution, the Govern-
ment is responsible for administrative functions, drafting the 
necessary  regulations to  enable it to  enforce the  law and 
taking all necessary steps to promote economic and social 
development in a way calculated to meet collective needs. 
The regulations concerned are those which Article 115 of the 
Constitution  stipulates  are  part of normative  legislation. 
Such regulations logically depend on the prior existence of 
relevant laws requiring normative enforcement at administra-
tive level. As such they are derived legal acts which can in 
no way modify, suspend, derogate from or repeal a Ia~. 
Independent regulations are another aspect of the govern-
ment's regulatory powers - i.e.  regulations for which the 
Enabling Act will merely lay down who is subjectively and 
objectively empowered to formulate them39. The Constitution 
demands that these regulations take the form of an adminis-
trative decree.  This is to prevent the government and  the 
administration from turning to such regulations rather than 
the appropriate legislative instrument in an attempt to cir-
cumvent the specific requirements and controls devised for 
the purposes of lawmaking
40
• 
Equally, as indicated above, the government can take general 
measures  to  promote  economic  and  social  development. 
These aspects are particularly significant to our study, since 
they  embrace both  extension and  regulatory  decisions  in 
respect of labour law. These points will be discussed later. 
5.4 The legislative and regulatory powers 
of the autonomous regions 
According to Article 115 of the Constitution, legislative acts 
include Laws, Decree-Laws and regional legislative orders. 
Paragraph 3 of  the said Article stipulates that regional legis-
lative orders deal with matters which are of specific interest 
to the respective regions and are not the prerogative of the 
Assembly of the Republic, since the government cannot act 
against the general laws of the Republic41. 
This means that the legislative power of the autonomous 
regions42  is subject to two parameters. On the one hand, it 
only applies to matters which are of specific interest to the 
region concerned and are not already the preserve of the 
35.  Article 4 of  Act 16/79. 
36.  Article 7,  idem. 
37.  This should really be dealt with separately; strictly speaking it is 
not part of  the Govenunents's legislative powers. However, we are 
including it here for the sake of  clarity. 
38.  GOMES CANOTILHO and VITAL MOREIRA,  op. cit. 
39.  Article 115 §§ 6 and 7 of the Constitution. 
40.  GOMES CANOTILHO and VITAL MOREIRA,  op. cit. 
41.  Article 115 §4 stipulates that laws and decree-laws sufficiently well-
founded to warrant their unqualified extension to the entire national 
territory are general Jaws of the Republic. 
42.  Article 227 of the Constitution  of the  Portuguese Republic has 
created two Autonomous Regions which correspond to the archipel-
agoes of the Azores and Madeira; their powers are laid down in 
Article 229. 
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Assembly of the Republic or the government; on the other 
hand, it may not run counter to the general laws of theRe-
public. Hierarchically then, regional legislative orders oc-
cupy a lower rung on the ladder of rules43. 
The regional assembly and the regional govemment
44 are the 
government bodies at regional level. The regional assembly 
has sole power to legislate (within the limits imposed by the 
Constitution and the general laws of  the Republic) on matters 
of  ~pecific interest to the Regions and not falling within the 
prerogative of other institutions45. It is also responsible for 
making regulations on the general laws issued by the institu-
tions which do not assume sole responsibility for regulation; 
it also exercises legislative initiative on new bills and pro-
posals for changes to the Assembly of the Republic. These 
are just the powers which have a bearing on this study
46
• 
The regional governments have no legislative power; they 
merely have regulatory power in matters of regionallegis-
lation47. 
6. Collective agreements 
As we have seen, the Constitution recognises trade unions' 
right to collective bargaining, a right guaranteed by law. The 
law will lay down rules on the legitimacy of collective la-
bour agreements and see that they are properly implemented. 
The legitimacy of  collective labour agreements and the effec-
tive implementation of  rules is regulated by Decree-law 519-
c1 /79 of  20 December 1979 on the Collective Regulation of 
Labour). 
According to this text, collective agreements may not restrict 
the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed basic rights, run 
cmmter to imperative legal rules or feature provisions which 
would give the workers less favourable terms and conditions 
than those stipulated in law. 
6.1 The content of collective agreements 
Article 7 of the aforementioned Decree-Law stipulates that 
collective agreements may  regulate relations between con-
tracting parties, particularly as regards the means of super-
vising r~pect of  the terms of the agreement and the machin-
ery for resolving disputes arising from its implementation 
and revision (contractual part of the agreement); they may 
also regulate the reciprocal rights and obligations of workers 
and employers bound by individual labour contracts in so far 
as they fall  within the scope of the agreement (regulatory 
part of the agreement). 
6.2 Scope of collective agreements 
6.2.1 Personal scope 
Collective labour agreements are binding on the employers' 
organisations which subscribe to  them and on employers 
affiliated to signatory employers' associations, as well as on 
the workers they employ, whether they are members of the 
contracting trade-union associations or of associations repre-
43.  GOMES CANOTILHO  and VITAL MOREIRA op. cit. 
44.  Article 233 of the Constitution. 
45.  Article 229 a) of the Constitution. 
46.  Article 234 of the Constitution. 
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sen  ted by contracting trade-union associations
48
•  Equally, 
collective agreements are assumed to cover those workers 
and employers already affiliated to the signatory associations 
at the start of the negotiating process as well as those who 
join up during the lifetime of agreements
49
• This means that 
the scope of  a collective agreement is determined by the fact 
of  membership, during a given period, of  any of the associa-
tions which sign the agreement either directly or indirectly. 
Hence, in Portugal today, contrary to the days of corpora-
tism, collective agreements do not have an erga omnes ef-
fect.  A way therefore had to be found to widen their scope 
to include, in some cases, employers and workers. This was 
done by a ministerial extension decree. 
6.2.2 Duration of agreements 
Up  until  the  latest  reform of Decree-Law 519-c1/79 by 
DL 87/89 of 23  March  1989,  collective agreements were 
valid for two years minimum, save for wage scales which 
had a six-monthly revision clause built in. Currently, con-
tracting parties are free to set the duration of the agreement 
themselves, with one proviso: collective agreements may not 
be revoked less than six months after being submitted for 
registration. In practice, this works out as a one year mini-
mum term. 
6.2.3 Geographical or territorial scope 
The geographical or territorial scope of collective agreements 
is either established by the relevant trade unions and employ-
ers' associations or else arises naturally if the geographical 
scope of the two sides is the same. As a result, a collective 
agreement may cover several territories, i.e. as many as are 
represented by both the signatory trade unions and employ-
ers' associations. 
6.2.4 Levels of negotiation and expression of dissent 
Collective bargaining in  Portugal  is  largely conducted at 
sectoral level.  In fact,  some two thirds of all negotiations 
take place at this level.  Broadly speaking,  company-level 
collective agreements are restricted to public-sector enter-
prises, the largest companies in Portugal. 
Although  centralised  guidelines  involving  the  State  and 
certain employers' associations and trade unions have been 
known to influence collective agreements negotiated during 
the period concerned, this is to recent a development to be 
able to draw conclusions concerning the centralised or decen-
tralised nature of collective bargaining in Portugal. 
7. Accession agreements 
Article 28 of  Decree-law 519-c1  179 rules that trade unions 
on the one hand and the employers' associations on an indi-
vidual basis on the other hand may join collective agree-
ments already in force. This widens or extends the scope of 
collective agreements. This extension is based on an arrange-
ment between the parties empowered to negotiate collective 
agreements.  All the same, the law does impose a rather odd 
restriction:  the accession agreement may  not involve any 
changes to the content of the collective agreement, even if it 
were to apply solely to the new contracting parties (Article 
48.  Article 7 of Decree-law 519-cl/79. 
49.  Article 8, idem. 
28  §3  of the Decree-law).  Without this  restriction,  such 
accession agreements would simply tum into a new bargain-
ing round and defeat the entire purpose of the exercise i.e. 
speed: Furthermore, the parties can always conclude a new 
collective agreement more or less in line with an existing 
one. It may be concluded, therefore, that accession agree-
ments are bona fide collective labour agreements. Despite 
the slight difference in  the way they are concluded,  they 
cannot, generally speaking, be regarded as inferior to labour 
agreements as sources of rights. This restriction to the bar-
gaining process warrants a special study. 
8. Arbitration 
Arbitration is one of several methods of achieving peaceful 
settlement of collective labour disputes covered by Decree-
Law 519-c1 /79. The outcome of arbitration- the arbitration 
ruling- has the same effect as a collective labour agreement, 
since the parties will have agreed to abide by it (Article 34). 
Arbitrdtion rulings may not diminish the rights or guarantees 
stipulated by earlier collective agreements. 
9. The decisions of the joint committees 
Article 41 of  Decree-Law 519-c1/79 stipulates that collective 
agreements must provide for the establishment of  committees 
made up of an equal number of representatives of the various 
signatories with authority to interpret (and apply) collective 
agreements. Their decisions are taken unanimously and are 
regarded as having full interpretative or executive force; they 
are formally addressed to the Ministry of  Employment and 
published  in  the  same  manner as  collective agreements. 
These decisions are binding on the agreement as a whole, 
even where it includes an extension arrangement. 
10. Generic government regulations 
The Portuguese system of labour law is made up of different 
kinds of administrative regulations. For our purposes, we 
need to distinguish between those also applicable to other 
branches of the law and those which are specific to labour 
law, including for example extension orders ("Portarias de 
extensao 
11
- PE) and labour regulation orders ( "Portarias de 
Regulamentarao de Trabalho 
11
- PRT). 
The following generic regulations are liable to constitute a 
source of labour law: 
(a)  regulatory decrees or ordinary decrees  - this  is  the 
official formula for an administrative ruling, approved 
by the government and promulgated by the President of 
the Republic; 
(b)  regional regulatory decrees - this is the official formula 
for  an  administrative  ruling  passed  by  the  regional 
assembly or approved by the regional government of an 
autonomous region (it is signed by the relevant Minister 
of the Republic); 
(c)  resolutions of  the Council of  Ministers - these are deci-
sions taken by this body and not subject to promulga-
tion  by the President of the Republic.  They may in-
volve  the  resolution  of concrete  cases,  set  out  a 
programme, or take the form of generic rules of a regu-
latory nature. They should not be seen as legislation, 
since they are not mentioned in the Constitution; they 
fall within the powers of the government in its capacity PORTUGAL 
as an administrative or executive body of the State); 
(d)  Orders ( "portarias j  - the official formula for an ad-
ministrative  regulation  approved  by  one or several 
Ministers acting under the powers conferred by the law. 
There are two types of  order in labour law: extension orders 
{PE) and labour regulation orders (PRT).  Both engender legal 
rules which apply to labour relations between certain catego-
ries of  employers and workers, defined in terms of sphere of 
activity or professional category and a given geographical 
zone. 
Extension orders seek to enlarge the scope of application of 
a collective labour agreement or arbitration ruling. The law 
makes specific provision for two cases: 
(a)  the case of companies and workers who exercise their 
activity in the same area as the agreement but who are 
not  covered  because  they  are  not  members  of the 
employers' associations or trade unions which signed 
the said agreement; 
(b)  the case of companies and workers belonging to the 
same economic and occupational sector as that covered 
by the agreement, but who exercise their activity in a 
geographical zone not covered by the agreement and 
where the employers'  associations  and  trade unions 
which can represent them do not exist. 
The extension order has two aims. The first of these is to 
ensure equal treatment for all workers and employers belong-
ing to the same category and falling within the original scope 
of the agreement.  This is  in order to achieve single legal 
status for all, either at company level or at sectoral level 
(type of economic activity), and to fill so-called "vacuums" 
(buttressed by a policy of support for voluntary bargaining), 
by drawing parallels between the categories covered and 
social and economic conditions. Although the content of an 
extension order is established in advance by a  collective 
agreement or an arbitration  ruling,  the  law authorises  a 
partial extension, but of course this does not mean that the 
provisions of the extended agreement are in any way chan-
ged. 
A labour regulation order (PRT) is a ministerial act compris-
ing an interconnecting set of rules to regulate employment 
conditions and remunerations. It applies to a given economic 
sector or professional category (Article 36 et seq of Decree-
Law 519-c1/79).  The use of this formula depends on the 
existence of  a basic legal requirement: namely that no exten-
sion  agreement can  be concluded  because  the necessary 
conditions are not fulfilled.  A  number of further require-
ments must be met: 
(a)  the non-existence of  trade unions or employers' associa-
tions; 
(b)  a repeated refusal by parties to negotiate; 
(c)  the manifest use of delaying tactics impeding collective 
bargaining. 
A  PRT is therefore used as an auxiliary tool, when all else 
fails. 
11. Jurisprudence: the 'lissentos"of the Supreme Court 
In the Portuguese legal system, court decisions are a source 
of law only in exceptional cases. These are cases in which 
the Supreme Court of  Justice establishes case law which will 
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have general compulsory force. It does so by means of so-
called "assentos '~ Article 763 of the Code of  Civil Procedure 
states that if, within the framework of the same legislation, 
the Supreme Court of  Justice hands down two rulings based 
on contrary reading of the same fundamental legal issue, the 
parties may appeal against the most recent judgement. The 
Supreme Court of  Justice must resolve the dispute and hand 
down a ruling which will have general and compulsory force 
of law:  the  "assento ~ This regime applies to labour law 
(Article  74 of the Code of  Labour Procedure).  Obviously 
then, there may be "assentos "dealing with labour law. Nev-
ertheless, this special source of law may take on a different 
form where labour legislation is concerned. According to 
Article 180 of the Code of  Labour Procedure, judgements 
passed by the Supreme Court of  Justice in cases concerning 
the cancellation or interpretation of individual clauses of 
collective labour agreements have the same value as "assen-
tos ".  ''Assentos" must be published in the Official Journal 
and in the Bulletin of  Employment and Labour. 
12. Custom and practice 
In  line with Article 12  §2 of Decree-Law 519-c1179,  the 
customs peculiar to the worker's trade and to the company 
shall be taken into account, provided they do not run counter 
to  the rules set out above (i.e. labour laws and collective 
agreements) or violate the principles of good faith, unless 
other provisions are added in writing. 
Thus the customs in force in the different trades and in the 
companies themselves are a mediate source of law. They are 
normative and supplementary in scope, since they may not 
be ignored unless all parties agree in writing and, of course, 
provided no other source of law applies. It is therefore im-
portant to identify these customs, a task which the Portu-
guese legal  profession  more or less  ignores,  as  they are 
rarely brought into the solution of concrete cases. 
13. In-house regulations 
Article 39 of the Act deals with the employer's powers to 
decide the terms of service, within the limits laid down by 
the contract of employment and the rules to which it is sub-
ject. The same article stipulates that these rights must be 
exercised  within  the  framework  of in-house  regulations 
formulated by the employer, which should include rules on 
the organisation of  work and discipline. The workers should 
be informed of these in-house rules once they are set, in line 
with Article 23 of  Act 46/79, which stipulates that the works 
councils must be informed of such matters. Moreover, in-
house regulations must be officially submitted for approval 
by the Ministry of  Labour. Approval is due within no more 
than 30 days of receipt. If  no approval is forthcoming within 
this period, the regulations shall be regarded as having been 
tacitly approved. 
The employer must then see to the proper distribution of in-
house regulations within the company. Once this is done, all 
workers are bound by the rules, until they are changed or 
revoked. 
However, some of these in-house regulations may include 
provisions other than those involving the employers' right to 
organise and direct the work. They may deal with contrac-
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unilaterally. The law allows in-house regulations to feature 
accession agreements (Article 7 of the Act), but in that case 
the workers must agree to the contractual provisions. Their 
consent may be tacit or express. Nevertheless, Article 7 §2 
confirms that the worker is deemed as having agreed if he or 
his representative fails to speak out against the regulation in 
writing, within 30 days from the date on which the contract 
entered into force or the regulations were published, if the 
publication date was later than the entry into force of the 
contract. 
In conclusion, in-house regulations may be said to constitute 
sources of law when they express the employer's unilateral 
right to organise and discipline work, but not when they 
express the contractual autonomy of the contracting parties, 
even though they take the form of an accession agreement. 
In  this  respect,  in-house  regulations  are equivalent  to  a 
model contract. 
14. The hierarchy of sources 
The sources of labour regulation, in hierarchical order, are 
as follows: 
(a)  the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic; 
(b)  derived Community Law and International Law; 
(c)  ordinary legislation: Acts and Decree-Laws, plus the 
legislative orders issued by the regional assemblies; 
(d)  the "assentos 
11 of  the Supreme Court of  Justice; 
(e)  general regulations issued by the government; 
(f)  collective agreements, accession agreements, negotia-
tions within joint committees and arbitration rulings; 
(g)  extension orders and labour regulation orders; 
(h)  the customs and traditions of trades, professions and 
enterprises; 
(i)  in-house regulations of enterprises. 
Portuguese legal doctrine raises a number of problems on 
several counts.  Two in particular should be briefly men-
tioned. The first concerns the relationship between interna-
tional labour rules binding on the Portuguese State, and the 
State's own laws. Most authors regard international law as 
superior to ordinary law. The second problem concerns the 
relationship between collective labour agreements on the one 
hand and extension orders and labour regulation orders on 
the other hand.  Several authors insist on  the primacy of 
collective agreements, even though the law (Civil Code and 
WCA,  Article 12)  gives  priority to  extension  and  labour 
regulation orders over collective agreements. Others argue 
the opposite case. But in debating the question of hierarchy 
it is as well to bear in mind the supplementary nature of 
administrative regulations in terms of collective autonomy. 
15. The 'favor laboratoris 
11 principle 
The Portuguese legal doctrine makes frequent reference to 
the principle of  most favourable treatment of the worker (the 
Javor laboratoris
11principle) in conduction with the problem 
of  the hierarchy of sources of labour regulation. There is no 
room here to put the case in all its aspects, arguments and 
views. In a nutshell, the problem is this: Article 13 §1  of the 
WCA stipulates that higher sources of  law always take prece-
dence over lower sources of law,  save where the  latter, 
without infringing the former, establish rules giving more 
favourable treatment to the worker. Quite a number of au-
thors take this to constitute the principle of most favourable 
treatment of the worker,  a  principle which  can  then be 
brought to bear on the theory of interpretation in labour law 
and  in  other areas.  Article 6 of Decree-Law 519-c1/79, 
while confirming these provisions, is taken by these authors 
to express the same principle: the instruments of collective 
labour regulation (i.e. orders, collective agreements, acces-
sion agreements and arbitration rulings) may not feature any 
provisions which would give less favourable treatment to the 
workers than that established by the law. This thesis is some-
times further bolstered by referring to Article 14 of  Decree-
Law 519-c1 /79,  which says that the rules established by 
whichever of the means referred to in Article 2 (which lists 
the various instruments of collective labour regulation indi-
cated above) may not be ignored by individual labour con-
tracts, unless they offer more favourable terms for the work-
ers. 
What seems certain  is  that Article 13  §1  emphasises the 
general principle according to which the rules established by 
a source higher up the hierarchical ladder take precedence 
over the rules established by one lower down. It expressly 
stipulates that this principle always applies, but then goes on 
to introduce one exception,  which occurs when the rules 
established by the higher source do not prevent the rules of 
a lower source providing for more favourable treatment of 
the workers.  This simply  implies that  some of the rules 
applicable to employment conditions are merely designed to 
offer minimum protection to the worker. In no way can it be 
construed as the expression of a principle actually altering 
the general rules on hierarchy. On the contrary, by specifi-
cally confirming the primacy of rules established by higher 
sources (by use of the word  '~lways j, the law has sought to 
quash the notion that the criteria of hierarchy employed in 
labour law can be different from those in general use. 
All the same, it is necessary to recognise the particular as-
pect of semi-imperative rules offering minimum protection 
for workers. Such rules are imperative only in so far as they 
do not allow lower normative sources to institute rules which 
are less advantageous to workers . One conclusion we may 
safely draw from the aforementioned Article 13 §1  is that it 
assumes the principle according to which labour law is pro-
tective law and that the protection offered is guaranteed by 
the hierarchy of normative sources. Rules emanating from 
lower down the ladder may not run counter to rules from 
higher up save where the latter are not imperative and pro-
vided the former are more advantageous to workers. In other 
words,  hierarchically  ~uperior
11 rules establish  minimum 
protection on which 'inferior 
11 rules may then build, unless 
the former are absolutely imperative. These lower rules are 
likely to be more effective, either because they are narrower 
in scope,  or simply because they are more in touch with 
reality and with the will of the parties concerned to protect 
workers not in  relation to increasingly specific economic, 
industrial and social circumstances rather than an abstract set 
of  generic rules. What we have here is the principle of work-
er protection rooted in the idea of development and improve-
ment  from  the most general  (and hierarchically superior) 
level  down to the most specialised and concrete (and,  in 
legal  terms,  hierarchically  inferior) level.  This system is 
probably more appropriate and more effective from the point PORTUGAL 
of  view of  protecting the worker, because it strikes a better 
balance between the interests involved. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND 
METHODS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. Industrial action 
1.1 Industrial action
50 
If  we analyse industrial action in Portugal, a clear overall 
picture emerges of how disputes arise and are resolved. 
Broadly speaking, for the purposes of such an analysis, we 
need to break down industrial action into two groups: that 
within a single company, and that involving several compa-
nies. 
In the majority of cases, industrial action within a company 
tends to be strictly occupational. This is no longer true of 
industrial action involving more than one company, when 
other t objectives may be involved. 
In general, industrial action involving more than one com-
pany is called by the confederations and trade union associa-
tions. It is usually in the shape of  days of action and includes 
mass meetings, demonstrations, picketing of certain public 
institutions,  such  as  the  Assembly  of the  Republic,  the 
government,  and the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security. Such actions are usually linked to late payment of 
wages
51
, redundancies, government legislation, privatisation 
of specific companies or simply to express solidarity with 
other people's economic claims. 
1.2 The chief causes of conflict52 
Looking at industrial  action within a  single company  in 
1978, we find that 37.8% of disputes related to the payment 
of wages, 21.9% job security, 9% wage claims and 3.2% 
increases in other financial  benefits.  Other claims did not 
reach significant percentages. 
Industrial action concerning the payment of wages involved, 
in descending order of importance, the textile industry, the 
metalworking sector and building. 
Industrial action for job security affected, in the same order, 
metalworking, textiles and the timber industry. 
Wage claims and disputes for other financial benefits mostly 
concerned the  metalworking sector,  food,  beverages and 
tobacco, and the catering industry. 
Industrial action within a single company largely focused on 
the districts of Oporto, Lisbon, Setubal and Braga. 
Industrial action at multi-company level shows that 21.6% 
of  all claims concerned job security, 19. 8 % wage increases 
and 16.2% the payment of wages. Other claims were insig-
nificant in percentage terms. 
50.  This text was drafted on the basis of documents published by the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Securit- Department of La-
bour: Relatorios e Analises - Conjlitos Colectoivos de Trabalho -
Reports and Analyses - Collective labour disputes. 
51.  This kind of action occurs less frequently now that such situations 
are becoming rarer. 
52.  The percentages quoted are provisional and purely indicative. 
197 
The areas most affected by multi-company industrial action 
were Lisbon, Oporto and Setubal. 
Clearly then, industrial action in Portugal is largely defen-
sive, and more so at single company level  than at multi-
company level. 
2. Strikes and lock-outs 
2.1 The system; strikes and lock-outs 
As indicated above, the legal provisions on strikes and lock-
out in Portugal are rooted in the Constitution. Under Article 
50 of the Constitution: 
(i)  The right to strike is guaranteed. 
(ii)  It is up to the workers to define the scope of interests 
they intend to defend by strike action. The law may not 
restrict that right. 
(iii)  Lock-outs are prohibited. 
This leaves us with two fundamental points. To begin with, 
lock-outs are prohibited. Hence there is no way that collec-
tive labour relations can be organised on the basis of equality 
between the social partners in terms of the coercive machin-
ery at their disposal. 
On the other hand,  the right to strike is guaranteed in the 
most generous of terms, quite ruling out the possibility of in 
any way restricting (by resorting to ordinary law) the range 
of interests liable to be defended by strike action. 
Act 65177 of  26 August, known as the Strike Act, develops 
the constitutional bases of  the strike provisions, but does not 
specify the reasons or foundations for strike action or the 
forms which it may take.  It merely regulates the procedural 
aspects relating to the decision to strike, notification of strike 
action, safeguarding the freedom to work, maintaining essen-
tial services, and the effects of strike action. 
In Portugal, strikes may take forms other than the classic 
concept of ''collective and concerted withholding of  labour, 
in which a group of  workers seeks to bring pressure to bear 
in order to achieve a specific benefit or common objective~ 
Under  these  other  forms,  either  labour  is  not withheld 
(working to  rule),  it is only partially withheld (overtime 
bans, no ticket sales for public transport) or else the action 
involves only part of the workforce (staggered or selective 
strikes). 
Current doctrine is seeking to classify the different types of 
strike action on the basis of legally relevant common charac-
teristics53.  We  may  distinguish  offensive and  defensive54 
strikes, lawful and unlawful55 strikes, single-company strikes 
or sectoral strikes, regional and national strikes, socio-pro-
fessional  strikes,  solidarity  strikes,  political  strikes,  etc. 
However,  the concept of an unlawful strike has not been 
precisely defined, though the most prevalent doctrine is that 
political strikes are unlawful, as are strikes in which there is 
no  withholding of labour.  Many legal  experts have their 
53.  For a classification of strike action, cf MARIO  PINTO,  Greve, in: 
Encic/opedia Polis; BERNARDO XAVIER, Direito de Greve; MONTEI-
RO  FERNANDES, Direito de greve. 
54.  Defensive strikes are strikes aimed at forcing companies to abide by 
certain statutory or agreement-based obligations; offensive strikes 
are strikes called to press new claims. 
55.  According to whether the strike respects or is in breach or regula-
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doubts about the selective strike, both on the grounds of its 
lawfulness as such and because of its repercussions in law. 
There is not yet an adequate body of  case law, and the evi-
dence is contradictory. 
2.2 Some facts and figures on strikes 
The Statistical Office of the Portuguese Ministry of  Employ-
ment and Social Security publishes a quarterly bulletin giv-
ing the number of strikes, the number of  workers involved 
and the number of working days lost by sector, company, 
group of  companies, district, type of claim, results achieved 
and strike duration. 
Turning to the latest data published in the second quarter of 
1988, we find there were 30 strikes involving 46,479 work-
ers and the loss of 39,903 working days in total. The largest 
number of strikes was  in  the  processing  industries  (18), 
followed by transport and communications (5). The largest 
number of  workers concerned was in banking, insurance and 
real estate, in which there was only one strike but this in-
volved no fewer than 22,638 workers. Next in line were the 
processing  industries  (17 ,298  workers).  The  number  of 
working days  lost was  highest  in  the  latter  two  sectors: 
19,755 in banking, insurance and real estate and 12,700 in 
the processing industries. 
Of the 30 registered strikes, 25 were single-company strikes 
and  other  five  were  multi-company  strikes.  The  former 
involved 14,576 workers with a total loss of 14,787 working 
days. The highest number of workers affected and working 
days lost in the multi-company strikes were in the banking, 
insurance and real estate sector. 
In the processing industries, the number of striking workers 
was roughly the same in single-company strikes and multi-
company strikes, although the number of working days lost 
was lower in the latter category. 
The districts with the highest number of striking workers and 
working days lost were Lisbon (18,433 workers and 17,502 
working  days  lost),  Setubal  (13,226  workers  and  3,564 
working days lost). 
Looking at what triggered the strikes, we find that 42.9% 
concerned wage claims, 28.6% conditions of employment, 
7. 9% working time, 7. 9% workers' organisations' freedom 
to  operate and  disciplinary  action,  and  6.3%  health  and 
safety or social issues. 
Turning to  results,  77. 8%  of strikes did  not  achieve  the 
desired objective, 12.7% were partially successful and only 
9.5% were fully vindicated. 
Finally, in terms of duration, we find that in the case of both 
single-company strikes and multi-company strikes, the vast 
majority of  strikes, workers concerned and working days lost 
fell  within a range of 1-5  days.  Shorter or longer strikes 
were statistically insignificant. 
3. The machinery for resolving collective disputes 
In Portugal, as  in other countries, we also need to  distin-
guish between collective disputes based on legal grounds and 
those based on economic grounds or conflicts of interest. 
A  practical  criterion  for  operating this distinction  is  the 
difference in the type of decision required for each of these 
categories. 
Since it involves a difference of opinion on existing law, 
disputes based on legal grounds are resolved by interpreting, 
stating and applying the law. In practical terms, this means 
applying existing law, a typically judicial task. 
A conflict of interest implies a dispute not based on existing 
law, but relates to the rules that need to be formulated for 
the just and equitable resolution of conflicting interests. This 
means either bargaining between the parties themselves (of 
their own free will, with the aid or mediation of third par-
ties), or an external decision (e.g. compulsory arbitration or 
an administrative ruling). 
3.1 Collective disputes on economic grounds 
3.1.1 Conciliation, mediation and arbitration 
Decree-law 519-cl  179 stipulates that collective labour dis-
putes arising from the application or revision of a collective 
agreement (i.e. di5.-putes based on economic grounds) may be 
resolved by conciliation, mediation, or arbitration (Article 30 
et seq). 
These peaceful  means  of resolving collective disputes  on 
economic grounds are optional, i.e. they require prior agree-
ment by the parties concerned (except in the case of compul-
sory arbitration applicable to public-sector enterprises). 
The law also stipulates that the parties concerned may estab-
lish rules whereby they will resort to conciliation, mediation 
and arbitration.  However, the law provides for additional 
arrangements which apply when the parties do not disagree. 
3.1.2 Non-compulsory legal machinery 
The law states that conciliation may be initiated at any time, 
by consent of  all parties concerned, or by one of them (if the 
other part fails to respond to a proposal to conclude or revise 
an agreement or, in other cases, by giving one week's notice 
in writing to the other party). 
Conciliation is provided by the conciliation services of the 
Ministry  of Employment  and Social  Security,  assisted  if 
necessary  by  the  relevant services of another ministry di-
rectly concerned in the resolution of the dispute. 
Conciliation is  the most common non-compulsory form of 
settling disputes. 
Parties may  at  any time decide to  submit their collective 
disputes to mediation. 
In line with the supplementary character of mediation as a 
legal instrument, the mediator is chosen by both parties and 
must present a proposal (by registered mail) within 20 days 
of his appointment. The proposal will be considered rejected 
if the parties concerned fail  to notify acceptance in writing, 
within ten days of receiving it. During this period, the medi-
ator will contact all  the parties, one after the other, as he 
judges necessary and feasible, with a view to obtaining their 
agreement. The mediator is sworn to secrecy regarding any 
information he may receive in the process and which is not 
known to the other party. PORTUGAL 
Although the law makes provision for mediation as descr-
ibed, there has so far not been a single case in Portugal. 
Parties may, at any time, agree to resort to arbitration, on 
terms defined by themselves or, if they fail  to do so,  as 
stipulated by the law (supplementary arrangement). In accor-
dance with this procedure, arbitration is in the hands of three 
arbiters. The parties appoint one each, who then appoint the 
third. The arbiters are independent and may solicit the help 
of  experts. The arbitration ruling is made by majority vote. 
Arbitration rulings are as binding as the collective agree-
ments themselves, with one important restriction: they may 
not diminish the rights or guarantees laid down by previous 
collective agreements; they may not operate a derogation 'fn 
peius~ 
The social partners in Portugal have resorted to arbitration 
only on very rare occasions. In fact, not a single arbitration 
ruling has been published in Portugal since 1984. 
3.1.3 Compulsory arbitration 
The Minister of Employment or other minister concerned 
may order disputes arising from the implementation or revi-
sion of a  collective agreement applicable  to  State-owned 
enterprises or companies operating with public capital to be 
resolved by compulsory arbitration (Article 35 of  Decree-law 
519-c1  179). 
The law also authorises the Minister to decide by decree in 
the event of  disagreement between contending parties on the 
choice of the third arbiter in the arbitration process. Yet the 
law is silent on the most likely eventuality, which is that one 
of  the parties (most probably the trade union) fails to appoint 
its own arbiter.  How arbitration is  to  take place in  such 
circumstances is an open question, unless ways can be found 
to secure an appointment (no easy matter). No compulsory 
arbitration orders have been issued in Portugal since 1985. 
3.1.4 Labour regulation orders 
Significantly,  the Decree-Law 519-c1  179  includes labour 
regulation orders in its chapter on collective labour disputes. 
This clearly implies that this instrument of collective labour 
regulation  constitutes  a  means  of peaceful  resolution  of 
collective labour disputes on economic grounds which cannot 
or probably will not be resolved through collective bargain-
ing between the parties. We have already discussed the way 
in which such labour regulation orders are issued and how 
the law makes this government option fit in with the collec-
tive autonomy of  the social partners. No further comment is 
required. Although very popular in the past, this method of 
solving disputes has not been used since 1986. 
3.2 Collective disputes on legal grounds 
Like any other legal conflict, collective disputes on legal 
grounds can be resolved by the courts, which are empowered 
to interpret and apply the clauses of collective agreements, 
regardless of whether they are compulsory or normative. 
All the same, the law also stipulates that the joint committees 
set up under collective agreements are themselves competent 
to interpret and incorporate the respective agreements and 
settle any doubts and disputes arising from them. This ar-
rangement is part of Article 41  of Decree-Law 519-c1 /79. 
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Only unanimous decisions, duly filed and published (within 
the terms of the collective agreement), have authority equal 
to  that of the agreements,  being  regarded as  regulations 
handed down by the agreements themselves. 
Authors differ on whether these joint committees are entitled 
to apply the agreements (i.e. negotiate solutions to any short-
comings) as well as interpret them. It would seem that the 
answer should be in the affirmative, especially as the law, in 
the final passages of  Article 41  §5 makes express mention of 
the assumption of application. This clause states that deci-
sions taken unanimously are automatically applicable to the 
employers and workers subject to the extension orders of 
agreements to be interpreted or applied. 
A look at the bulletins published by the Ministry of  Employ-
ment and Social Security, which contain the decisions taken 
by the joint committees, not only tells us that such decisions 
are frequent, but also that they apply and interpret the provi-
sions of the collective agreements from which they arose. 
CHAPTER IV: THE PORTUGUESE MODEL FOR 
THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDITIONS-
A SYNTHESIS 
SECTION  1 : THE SYSTEM -
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. The model in general. Consensus, criticism, trends 
The Portuguese system for the regulation of working condi-
tions is comparable in general terms to that operated by other 
European pluralist democracies. In other words, it dovetails 
with the global model in the Community countries. 
Portugal operates a system of union freedom, in which the 
right  to  collective bargaining and  the right to  strike are 
enshrined in  law and respected.  Besides, the system is ex-
pressly rooted in the Constitution. It is further guaranteed by 
ILO Conventions 11, 87, 135 and 151, all of which apply in 
the Portuguese legal order. 
Generally speaking, the union system and the regulation of 
working conditions are operated on the basis of consensus. 
Neither the trade unions nor employers are hostile towards 
the system, but all the same, individual aspects of the system 
sometimes come in for criticism. 
One such aspect is the fact that the Constitution couches the 
right to strike in terms which, in the employers' view, im-
pede proper legislative and jurisdictional control over the 
right to strike. This they argue, is compounded by the lock-
out ban, which effectively puts paid to any notion of "equal 
weapons ".in labour relations. 
The workers on the other hand complain that certain laws 
unduly restrict their right to collective bargaining in certain 
areas (more details on this later). 
Globally speaking then, the constitutional model governing 
the system of regulation of  working conditions, including the 
labour relations machinery,  is clearly biased in favour of the 
worker ifavor laboratoris  principle).  However,  ordinary 
legislation, both pre- and post-Constitution, has had to block 
some of the practical  repercussions of this system which 
would most likely have arisen had the model been allowed 
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favour the worker, but which is kept in check by the recol-
lection of  the difficulties which arose from balance of power 
problems during the 1974-75 revolutionary period and the 
economic crisis. The situation may become less acute as the 
economic situation improves, if industrial relations follow 
suit, particularly in terms of social dialogue. Some progress 
is already evident, both at practical level and in the legislati-
ve sense (the recent Decree-Law 87/89, for example, intro-
duces more flexibility into the legal arrangements for collec-
tive bargaining). 
2. Some of the principal features of the Portuguese 
system for regulating working conditions 
Some aspects of the Portuguese system for regulating work-
ing conditions should be highlighted and compared with the 
systems operating in other countries. 
A salient feature of the Portuguese system is its strong reli-
ance on the Constitution as a basis for regulating working 
conditions. The Constitution proclaims fundamental work-
ers' rights, guarantees union freedom and grants workers' 
organisations the right to participate in the drafting of legis-
lation. 
Secondly, the entire system of labour law (which includes 
labour relations and collective bargaining) is permeated by 
the concept of "legality"- clearly designed to protect the 
worker.  This emphasis on the force of law is one of the 
traditions handed down by the previous political regime, and 
one which is sometimes used to restrict and control collec-
tive union autonomy. 
The constitutional guarantee of the right to strike (reinforced 
by a lock-out ban), expressed in unequivocal terms, is an-
other characteristic worthy of note. 
The government's powers to extend collective agreements 
( 'jJortarias de regulamentarao de trabalho j  should also be 
mentioned. It is worth noting that the government's regula-
tory powers in this field, which go back a long way in Portu-
guese law, now tend to be measured against the principle of 
the right to collective bargaining and therefore tend to be 
used sparingly. The result is a system for the regulation of 
working conditions split into two halves:  one is based on 
agreement and entirely autonomous, the other depends on 
government regulation. Priority is always given to the for-
mer, however. Since we have already described the regula-
tory sub-system on working conditions (Sources of labour 
law - if  Chapter II) and since the sub-system based on union 
autonomy in collective bargaining enjoys priority, a descrip-
tion of the latter is called for. We shall situate that descrip-
tion within the overall framework of the law and administra-
tive regulation, with a view to achieving a synthesis of the 
legal  and  institutional  model  underlying  the  Portuguese 
system for the regulation of working conditions. 
SECTION 2: A  DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
1. The legal status and legitimacy of collective bargaining 
It will be remembered that the constitutional regulation not 
only forms  the foundation  for the regulation of working 
conditions (specifically, the fundamental rights of workers) 
but also establishes the legitimacy of  union freedom in gen-
era156 and collective autonomy in particular. Article 56 §3 of 
the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic expressly states 
that the trade unions have the right to exercise their collec-
tive bargaining powers as guaranteed by the law. Article 56 
§4 goes on to say that the law defmes the rules on who is 
empowered to conclude collective labour agreements and the 
scope of the provisions they contain. 
As far as the applicability of collective agreements is con-
cerned, they are regarded as forming an integral part of the 
system of labour law  sources.  Hierarchically,  they  rank 
lower than the law, but they have normative effect on the 
individual labour relations in question. This normative appli-
cability is enshrined in the Civil Code and upheld by the 
Labour Contacts Act. In addition, it is especially governed 
and guaranteed by the Law on Collective Labour Regulation, 
which sets out the civil penalties that apply. This Act also 
establishes the rules on the legitimacy of the conclusion of 
collective agreements. 
The legal discipline inherent in the different instruments of 
collective labour regulation
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,  and particularly evident in the 
above mentioned law , makes it clear that collective labour 
agreements in terms of  legitimacy take precedence over other 
forms  of collective  labour regulation.  The government's 
powers, when expressed by means of ministerial orders to 
regulate working conditions ("port  arias de regulamentarao 
do trabalho j  are manifestly  intended  to counter the (de 
facto) impossibility of concluding collective agreements. 
2. The collective bargaining process 
The thorough and detailed attention to the bargaining process 
is probably the most outstanding feature of the legal  and 
institutional model for collective bargaining in Portugal. 
Besides making sure that negotiations do not start until the 
agreement under review has almost run out, the law also, 
where appropriate (and this is an aspect with a bearing on the 
limits of collective autonomy,  a  point we shall  return to 
later), organises the negotiations proper, by fixing a precise 
timetable and deadlines for the bargaining process and by 
defining and overseeing certain operations with remarkable 
attention to detail.  For example, Chapter V of Decree-law 
519-cl  /79  (significantly  entitled  "Bargaining  process j 
stipulates that representatives must declare their identity and 
inform each other by whom and for what they are mandated 
at the outset of the talks.  It obliges the parties to establish, 
in writing, a timetable and the rules for the negotiations and 
to send a copy of the protocol to the Minister of  Employment 
and the minister responsible for the sector concerned. 
Very broadly then, the negotiating process (this is the term 
used by the law) breaks down as follows.  The first,  com-
pulsory, step is the tabling of a formal, written negotiating 
proposal  and  counter-proposal,  setting  out the economic 
arguments in the case.  Failing this, the documents will be 
declared null and void or prompt a refusal to negotiate. 
56.  We have already studied the constitutional regime governing these 
basic rights and union freedom. 
57.  1be concept of 'fnstnunents of  collective labour regulation~ cover-
ing  collective  agreements  and  arbitration  rulings  or ministerial 
orders, is one laid down by the law itself. PORTUGAL 
The next step  is what is known as the direct bargaining 
stage, which the law requires to start within a fortnight of 
receipt of the reply to the proposal, unless another deadline 
is fixed beforehand. This is where the law goes into detail 
regarding some of  the aspects involved in the opening proce-
dures and the bargaining process itself (for example, that the 
issue of remunerations should be dealt with before all oth-
ers).  Other provisions are  more substantial,  such as  the 
express prescription of  the principle of good faith in bargain-
ing, the principle of democratic consultation of the workers 
and employers represented by the participants in the talks, 
and the principle of  reciprocal information by the negotiating 
parties. 
If  called for,  the next stage will  involve the search for a 
peaceful solution to collective disputes, if such is the out-
come suggested by the direct negotiations. In this case the 
law prescribes conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and 
lays down supplementary rules to this effect. In collective 
disputes arising from the conclusion or revision of a collecti-
ve agreement applicable to State-owned or State-run enter-
prises, arbitration may be made compulsory by order from 
the Minister of Employment and any other minister con-
cerned. 
The final stage is for the collective agreement to be regis-
tered and officially published, whereupon they enter into 
force in accordance with the law. 
3. Limits to collective autonomy 
The law sets limits in the realm of collective bargaining in 
labour relations which go back to the corporatist regime in 
force  prior to  the political  changes in  1974.  The current 
system applies these limitations both  in  a  positive and a 
negative fashion. 
On the positive side, the law confirms that collective agree-
ments may govern relations between the contracting parties 
(e.g. monitoring of implementation of the agreement,  the 
means for peaceful resolution of disputes arising from its 
implementation or its revision, and the reciprocal rights and 
duties of  workers and employers who are party to individual 
contracts). 
In the negative sense, tlie law expressly excludes from the 
framework  of collective  autonomy  the  regulation  of the 
economic activities of enterprises (notably tax and pricing 
arrangements). This may appear excessive, but it is useful 
and  instructive to  know that these rules are occasionally 
transgressed. 
With clear educational intent, the law expressly forbids the 
instruments of  collective regulation to: 
•  restrict the exercise of basic rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution; 
•  impede the operation of imperative legal rules; 
•  include any provision implying less favourable treat-
ment of the workers than that laid down by law. 
However, in addition to these restrictive prescriptions, the 
law also imposes others whose bias is rather different. These 
take their inspiration not so much from a structural model 
but instead reflect the need for moderation in terms of the 
speed and scope of improvements to existing working condi-
tions.  One such is the ban (in principle) on entering into 
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negotiations to review existing collective agreements until 
very near the end of their statutory (minimum) lifetime. The 
law  also  forbids  contracting parties to  implement agreed 
clauses retroactively, except within well-defined limits. 
In addition to these bans (which apply to the regularity with 
which contractual arrangements are revised), there are others 
which  oppose  the  application  of certain  prerogatives  or 
improvements to systems defmed by law. For example, the 
parties may  not fix  or regulate,  by collective agreement, 
advantages over and above those granted by the public social 
security scheme. This rule is often flouted in practice, which 
only highlights its absurdity. It is also expressly forbidden 
to enter into contractual arrangements which exceed the legal 
thresholds in respect of annual holidays, public holidays, 
absence from work and working time, not to speak of cour-
se, of the restrictions arising from imperative legal rules in 
certain areas such as redundancy
58
• 
By setting itself up in opposition to the trends outlined abo-
ve, the law makes it difficult to derogate from a collective 
agreement. A new agreement must contain a clause stating 
that the new scheme will be globally more favourable than 
that in force under the old agreement from which a deroga-
tion is sought. However, this is also a restriction of collec-
tive autonomy, although less wide in scope. In fact, while 
arguing the merits of certainty, this approach actually sug-
gests a lack of trust in trade unions. 
Collective bargaining in  State-owned enterprises is  faced 
with even more restrictions. The government, as guardian, 
must approve the agreement before it can enter into force. 
Similarly, in the event of a dispute, the Minister of Employ-
ment and the minister concerned may impose arbitration. 
4. A structural outline of the legal and institutional model 
Following  is  a description of the various elements which 
illustrate the way in which the legal and institutional model 
for collective labour regulation in Portugal is structured. 
First of all, only recognised trade unions may legitimately 
take part in collective bargaining (as well as the companies 
and employers' associations, likewise duly recognised). This 
narrow concept of  what constitutes a negotiating party is yet 
again the fruit of tradition, the legacy of a period when no 
other form of labour organisation existed. It is very much 
based on the strategic separation between trade unions and 
works  councils  in  the period  immediately after 25  April 
197  4. The operational division between the two forms of 
workers' organisation is explicitly confirmed in the constitu-
tional regime and by extension, in ordinary law. The respon-
sibility for management monitoring now lies with the works 
councils, whereas collective bargaining is the province of the 
58.  Decree-law 121/78,  recently repealed,  was an  especially telling 
example of the way in which such bans were arranged. It forbade 
parties to: 
•  establish wage discrimination on grounds of sex; 
•  fix  minimum  wages  by  contract  for  unskilled  workers 
amounting to more than 60% of the minimum wage in force; 
•  revise upwards, either as  a percentage or in absolute terms, 
any additional benefits already in force and with a financial 
content, save for productivity bonuses paid out on merit. 
The  first  of these  is  clearly  superfluous,  since  there  are rules, 
particularly constitutional  rules,  on the subject.  The others are 
survivals of a policy of wage controls now replaced by informal 
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trade unions. This fimctional, fonnal and radical division has 
frequently  been controverted at company  level  through  a 
variety of means, ranging from joint negotiation by union 
and committee representatives, through direct bargaining by 
the works councils either in lieu of the trade unions or by 
adopting  a  divergent contractual  position  arising  from  a 
crisis, to the exercising at company level of a contractual 
option negotiated on top of sectoral union agreements.  An 
infonnal system grafted to the official system is thus created. 
It is  worth noting that the whole question of the  role of 
works councils in collective bargaining is one of the keys to 
understanding the relative lack of importance of collective 
bargaining at company level (except in State-owned compa-
nies). 
The fact that trade unions and employers' organisations need 
to be legally recognised in order to be allowed to take part 
in collective bargaining is typical of the legal framework of 
the  Portuguese  model.  This  rule  has  on  occasion  been 
breached, more because of inadequate controls than because 
of any deliberate, strategic opposition move on the part of 
the unions, as has been known to happen in other countries. 
One of the strong-points of the Portuguese model is that the 
law clearly comes down in favour of collective agreements 
taking precedence over heteronomous instruments of collec-
tive regulation, particularly those of government origin. As 
we have pointed out,  the law only justifies the issuing of 
ministerial orders for the collective regulation of labour to 
make up for the absence of  collective agreements. This com-
pensatory mechanism also plays a supporting role in collec-
tive bargaining in  the event of the employers refusing  to 
negotiate. In that case it is possible to bypass the obstacle 
and inflict a penalty (this function was extremely important 
in  corporatist  times,  when  statutory  arbitration  was 
unknown). 
One of the most interesting aspects of the legal and institu-
tional model in hand is what we might call the pluralism of 
bargaining. A practice still much in vogue is that of negotia-
ting several collective agreements at one time, reflecting the 
pluralism  of the  trade  unions.  These  agreements  apply, 
parallel  to  each  other,  to  the  same  category  of workers. 
Decree-Law 519-cl  179 has not bothered to determine who 
should negotiate or which is the most representative union; 
this  would of course  tend  to  rule  out parallelism  in  the 
bargaining process and could indeed give the edge to minis-
terial orders extending agreements. 
In our opinion, and in view of the specificity of the Portu-
guese system, this omission has its roots in the past.  The 
single union concept was only really abandoned in practice 
some ten years ago. However, attempts to change this legal 
solution are fraught with difficulty, running into problems 
with  the  country's legislative policy and  indeed  with  the 
sensitivities  of the  trade  unions  themselves.  Unions  and 
employers have found ways to solve the problem, but they 
lack  consistency.  Practical  criteria have  been  adopted  to 
govern the issuing of ministerial extension orders. 
The legal model expresses a clear preference for company-
level agreements rather than sectoral agreements and leaves 
absolutely no room for linking agreements at different lev-
els. The law upholds the principle of primacy of  specific in-
house agreements over general sectoral agreements. 
This choice takes on added importance in the light of the 
legal preference for the criterion most favourable to workers 
in  the event of manifest positive conflict between agree-
ments,  where the speciality principle cannot win the deci-
sion. 
The model envisaged by the law clearly rules out the possi-
bility of linked bargaining.  At the same time, the law as-
sumes the principle of globality (not plurality!) for the pur-
poses of resolving positive conflicts between agreements. 
That is to say, it works out solutions which ensure that one 
agreement will always globally and completely take prece-
dence over the other. This is further borne out by the legal 
preference for vertical agreements. 
The law makes provision for vertical collective labour agree-
ments (or agreements by activity sector) and confirms their 
primacy over horizontal (occupation-linked) collective agree-
ments. Of  course, this only applies in the event of a conflict 
of  application, i.e. if a new collective agreement sets out to 
regulate in their entirety the labour relations of all (  occupa-
tional) categories of workers (or at any rate of the majority 
of workers)  in  a given  sector of activity,  and if a union 
acting  for  a  given  occupational  category  has  previously 
concluded  a  horizontal  agreement  (for the  occupation  in 
question), the vertical (sectoral) agreement will take prece-
dence over the earlier horizontal agreement, even if the latter 
has not yet run its course. 
Furthermore,  the  legal  provision  underlying  this  option 
applies it to all instruments of collective labour regulation. 
On the whole then, it is safe to say that this option works 
well, despite a few  problems which we need  not go into 
here. 
This is true in respect of both agreements at undertaking and 
establishment level and sectoral agreements. 
5. The legal model and social dialogue 
It is  hardly surprising that a legal  model  of such  minute 
detail makes no flexible provision for the recent phenomenon 
of  tripartite agreements (government, employers' confedera-
tions and  trade  union  confederations  - UGT),  commonly 
known  as  social consultation  agreements.  All  the  same, 
these agreements (dated 1986 and 1987, on incomes policy 
for  1987  and  1988  respectively)  clearly  reflect  a  mutual 
compromise between employers and unions on the method of 
adjusting pay in the context of collective bargaining. 
Of course, tripartite agreements of this type are not standard 
collective labour agreements, but rather atypical collective 
agreements; their legal impact is undeniable. 
One very special aspect of the situation is the fact that these 
social consultation agreements are by way of being national 
blueprints: they will form part of the bargaining machinery 
which will later influence sectoral and corporate agreements. 
What we have here is  an  articulated collective bargaining 
technique not foreseen by the legal model. 
These social agreements were the first ones in Portuguese 
bargaining history to be concluded directly by the confedera-
tions. POR1VGAL 
Another point to bear in  mind is that contrary to current 
practice and indeed to the assumptions made by the law, 
social consultation agreements are addressed directly to the 
social partners (and the government) and contain no rules 
which would be directly and immediately applicable to indi-
vidual labour relations. 
6. Final comideratiom: a legal and institutional model as 
an instrument of recognition, promotion and control 
Taking  the  Portuguese  legal  and  institutional  model  for 
collective  labour bargaining as a  whole,  it emerges as  a 
synthesis between the past and what is now a compromise 
between the strengths and weaknesses of the situation in 
Portugal. 
Our interpretation, which we are offering for debate, is the 
following. The Portuguese model has adjusted to (and at the 
same  time  is  placed  in  sharp  relief by)  the  traditional 
interventionist stance of the State. This is reflected by the 
sub-system of collective autonomy for the unions and, to a 
lesser extent, by the autonomous way in which normative 
rules are fashioned.  Here we are faced with the lack of a 
liberal tradition in Portugal and the heritage of State control 
over private autonomy. 
Moreover, the Portuguese model reflects and highlights the 
shortcomings of the industrial relations system itself, in line 
with lagging economic,  social  and cultural development. 
Still, substantial progress has been made in this respect of 
late, largely owing to new concepts in social dialogue (social 
consultation), not only at national level, but also at company 
level, as in the case of the Lis  nave Agreement.  These new 
practices are proof of a high degree of material and formal 
rationalisation capacity. All the same, it is interesting to note 
that even this trend is anchored in law, through the establish-
ment of  the Standing Council on Social Consultation, which 
has been the forum for negotiations on the national tripartite 
agreements. 
To conclude, it can be said that Portuguese law has a hand 
in collective bargaining in a number of respects. 
To begin with, the law obviously plays a  role in legally 
justifying the collective regulation of labour relations by 
recognising the collective autonomy of the unions and by 
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recognising collective agreements as sources of law with 
normative legal impact on individual labour relations. 
Secondly, it is responsible for promoting collective bargain-
ing, particularly favouring the trade unions with a view to 
securing  the  highest  possible  advantage  for  workers. 
Regulation of the bargaining process and provision of the 
machinery for the resolution of  collective disputes, including 
the role of the government's own normative interventions, 
are just some of  the aspects which clearly highlight the legis-
lative will to sustain and promote collective bargaining. 
Last but not least, there is the matter of control. The law sets 
substantive and formal limits on the collective bargaining 
autonomy of both unions and employers. 
7. The verdict: from rigidity to flexibility - a policy must 
Although the legal and institutional formality of the system 
governing the collective regulation of labour relations in 
Portugal  has undoubtedly had  its advantages,  its  lack of 
flexibility is beginning to be felt as a serious impediment to 
collective bargaining and is clearly at odds with the new 
spirit which is finding a dynamic outlet in informal negotia-
tions. 
The lack of flexibility is evident not only in the content of 
negotiations or in the limits imposed on the social partners 
as to what they may discuss and what they may agree if their 
deliberations are to have normative effect, but also above all 
in  the very  structure of the collective bargaining system 
which puts too narrow a limitation on who is allowed to 
negotiate and draws the line rather too closely as  to the 
solutions it will countenance on issues such as derogation 
from previous agreements, the link between different types 
of collective agreement, etc. 
Of  course, this does not mean we should make a clean break 
with a model to which the social partners have grown accus-
tomed or that we are seeking to weaken the legal framework 
in favour of excessive liberalisation. An excessively radical 
reform could stop current progress in its tracks and trigger 
a crisis with an uncertain outcome. A reasonable method of 
reform would be to sound out the social partners' own sub-
jective experience with the system and compare it with the 
objective labour relations trends which have been emerging 
in practice. That is why an in-depth analysis of such practice 
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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
The real breakthrough in terms of Finland's industrialisation 
is  generally  considered  to  have  taken  place  in  the  final 
decade of  the last century. Collective labour market relations 
began to take shape in Finland during the period 1896-1909, 
the period during which the trades unions were gathering 
momentum and such new phenomena as strikes and collec-
tive bargaining were becoming common. The first regional 
trade union was established in 1907 and the corresponding 
employers' organisation was set up in the same year. 
The labour market in Finland has been marked by disconti-
nui~ and violent upheavals. From the civil war of 1918 up 
untd the peace agreement concluding the Second World War 
in  1944 collective agreements  were non-existent,  having 
ceased because of resistance, mainly, from the employers. 
The situation changed after 1944, the year in which collec-
tive  bargaining  negotiations  were  re-established.  Wage 
policies in the post-war period were determined mainly by 
the government.  A  move  to  liberalise the wage controls 
prompted a general strike in 1955, in the wake of which the 
trade union  organisation  split  to  become  two  competing 
organisations. 
In 1969 they were reunited and during the 1970s there was 
rapid development of what could be called a Nordic model 
for  industrial  relations  with  stable  relations  between  the 
social partners and a high level of organisation on the part of 
employers and employees alike. 
Since the end of the 1960s a state incomes policy has been 
the principal  feature of Finnish procedures for regulating 
wages and other working conditions in Finland. 
The effect of the incomes policy has been to allow a system 
of  negotiation to be agreed between the national-level social 
partners and the government, whereby fixed frameworks are 
set for wages, taxation and social policy during the period in 
question.  After 1968 it was only in a very few cases that 
there was a failure to achieve a national-level agreement for 
wage rounds.  In  legal  terms  these  national-level  income 
policy agreements are not collective agreements but they 
presuppose that each trade or federation concludes a separate 
collective agreement within the constraints imposed nation-
ally. 
The income policy presupposed, and encouraged, the setting-
up of a neocorporatist political regime. The national labour 
market organisations have been  invited  to  attend  a  large 
number  of  various  government  bodies'  meetings.  The 
incomes  policy  has  also  encouraged  the  labour  market 
organisations to centralise their structure. The national level 
organisations have assumed the largest share of power and 
importance  and  they  have  assumed  the  highest  level  of 
responsibility  in  the  federation  and  can  exercise  power 
directly within the federation at national level. Within the 
negotiating system a certain amount of decentralisation has 
been  becoming  increasingly  evident,  agreements  contain 
fewer detailed rules than in the past and offer greater scope 
for local-level agreements. 
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CHAPTER I:THE ACTORS 
1. The labour market organisations 
~embershi~ levels in  the Finnish labour market organisa-
tions are htgh  both  for  employers'  organisations and  for 
those representing employees. A figure of 85-90% is regu-
larly quoted for employees' organisations. If  pensioners and 
other special  groups are discounted,  however,  the figure 
drops to a significantly lower 72% or thereabouts. 
The largest trade union, the SAK  (Central Organisation of 
Finni~h Trade u_nions) has 1. 1 million members, primarily 
orgarused along mdustrial federation lines. The trade union 
movement in  Finland caters for public and private-sector 
salaried employees.  The second largest trade union is the 
ST~K (The Finnish Confederation of  Salaried Employees), 
whtch  has  about  630,000  members.  The  membership 
incl~des health  care  personnel  (apart  from  doctors)  and 
clen~al and  technical  staff within the industry,  including 
pubhc-sector employees.  The organisation  comprises  six 
negotiating teams. The membership of the Confederation of 
Unions for Academic Professionals in Finland - AKAV A -
has a membership of 320,000 academics. 
At national level there are four major organisations repre-
senting employers' interests. 
The most important organisation representing employers is 
the TT (Confederation of  Finnish Industry and Employers). 
TT  has  over 7,000 member  companies  employing  some 
500,000 people. The services sector has its own national-
level organisation representing employers' interests, the PT 
- (Employers' Confederation of  Service Industries). Member 
finns cover commerce, hotels, catering, banking, insurance 
and other fields within the private services sector. 
Within the public sector there are two national-level  ne-
gotiating partners,  one to  represent government,  in other 
words the national administration as an employer (VTML, 
Department of Public Personnel Management),  the other 
having been set up to  manage the responsibilities of local 
authorities as  employers (KT,  The Commission for Local 
Authority Employers). 
The national organisation representing the interests of wage 
earners has long been active in a broad international context 
of cooperation. SAK,  STTK and AKA v  A are members of the 
NFS  (The Nordic Trade  Union  Council),  ETUC  (The Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation),  ICGTU (The International 
Confederation  of Free  Trade  Unions)  and  the  OECD's 
advisory body, the TUAC. 
The employers' organisations also participate in extensive 
international cooperation programmes. TT is a member of 
UNICE (the Union of  Industries in the European Community) 
the JOE,  (the International Organisation of  Employers) and 
the OECD's BIAC. 
The labour market organisations play a key role in labour 
law in Finland. Apart from entering and negotiating collec-
tive  agreements  they  are  represented  in  many  national 
committees and negotiating delegations and they are regu-
larly consulted with  regard  to  the drafting of new labour 
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1.1 Trade union representatives 
Freedom of association has been guaranteed by the Finnish 
constitution for as long as the country has been independent. 
The obligation to respect the freedom of association is also 
anchored in the Contract of  Employment Act.  In addition, 
there is a provision in the act which stipulates that if at least 
ten workers are employed at a workplace the employer must 
allow them and their trade unions to use, outside of working 
hours,  and  free of charge,  any suitable rooms which the 
employer has available for meetings relating to trade union 
matters. It is a condition is that such activity should not 
disrupt work within the company. 
By implementing special rules relating to the position of the 
trade  union  representative  an  attempt  has  been  made  to 
prevent  discrimination  against  workers  who  are  active 
members of trade unions. In the agreement on trade union 
representatives concluded by the national-level organisations 
there  are  special  provisions  to  protect  the  trade  union 
representative against dismissal owing to a shortage of work 
or  for  other  reasons  of an  economic  nature.  The  basic 
premise has been that the trade union representative would 
be the last to be dismissed under such circumstances. 
The Contract of  Employment Act contains a corresponding 
rule. By law a trade union representative can be dismissed 
only if  a majority of  the workers he represents gives its con-
sent or when his work is finished and no other work can be 
procured which corresponds to  his professional qualifica-
tions. 
The Contract of  Employment Act contains a number of rules 
which indirectly protect trade union activities. The main rule 
is considered to  be that relating  to  any  industrial  action 
which is taken by a trade union but which does not represent 
a  breach of an agreement by an individual.  An employee 
who is a member of a trade union is also entitled by law to 
adopt a neutral position in such circumstances and is  not 
obliged to perform the tasks normally performed by those on 
strike. In practice, trade union representatives have enjoyed 
an influential position at workplaces in Finland, primarily 
industrial workplaces. 
2. Workers and employers as individuals 
Labour law in Finland allows a large measure of scope for 
one-to-one agreements. The provisions of binding, legally 
enforceable rules or collective agreements cannot, however, 
be waived in one-to-agreements. Individual employers can 
also enter collective agreements with a trade union. 
The labour market system in  Finland comprises both the 
public and private sectors. They are, however, regulated in 
different ways. At the level of private law the conditions of 
employment of public-sector employees are regulated sepa-
rately.  Public-sector  employees  are  also  covered  by  a 
collective agreement for the civil service, which is essen-
tially based on the Collective Agreements Act. The system 
is, however, more centralised and in a number of ways the 
regulation is different. The right to contract is restricted and 
the right to take strike action is much more limited than in 
the case of private-sector employees. 
3. Public authorities 
The  ILO-backed  tripartite  principle  is  considered  very 
important in Finland. The power of the state is represented 
primarily by  the Ministry of Labour,  which is  the most 
important actor in terms of labour law. The Ministry acts 
partly as legislative body but at the same time it supervises 
and implements provisions relating to job placement and the 
monitoring of worker protection or the working environ-
ment. In addition, the Ministry also runs a research depart-
ment for labour policy. 
The  government  acts  as  an  employer  through  a  special 
department  attached  to  the  Treasury,  the  Government 
Employment Agency. 
The  government  also  has  a  number  of arbitration  and 
mediating bodies, the purpose of which is to help prevent 
conflict on the labour market. The labour court, the national 
conciliation officer and the labour council are examples of 
such bodies. In certain circumstances special authorities have 
been  set up  to  monitor compliance with legislation.  The 
equal opportunities ombudsman thus has a special duty to 
monitor compliance with the Equal Opportunities Act. 
4. Employees' scope for exerting influence 
As a  group employees have an  important role to play in 
bringing influence to bear within individual companies. This 
influence can be exerted both within the context of collective 
agreements  as  well  as  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the 
Cooperation Act, the Management Representation Act and 
the  Working  Environment  Regulation.  In the three latter 
cases the trade unions can play a central role but there are 
also alternative ways in which influence can be brought to 
bear by those who are not members of trade unions. 
4.1 The Cooperation Act 
The Cooperation Act,  which came into force in  1978,  is 
applicable in all companies employing a staff of  at least 30 
(manual and clerical). The act does not apply to non-profit-
making  associations.  The  Cooperation  in  Civil  Service 
Departments  mul  Establishments  Act  (1988)  essentially 
extends the act's application to staff employed in national 
administration. 
The aim of  the act is to extend cooperation within companies 
and to broaden the scope of employees to influence the way 
in which matters are dealt with which relate to their work 
and  to  their workplace.  The objective  is  to  develop  the 
effectiveness of the company improve working conditions. 
The act was supplemented in 1990 by a provision concerning 
cooperation within firms structured as groups of companies. 
This provision is to applied to Finnish groups of  companies 
whose staff in Finland normally total at least 500. In 1996 
the act was extended to include a number of rules aimed at 
complying with the requirements of EC Directive 94/45/EC 
on  the  establishment of a  European  works  council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-
scale groups of  Uluiertakings for the purposes of  informing 
and consulting employees. 
The  cooperation  procedure  is  based  primarily  on  local 
negotiating structures as established by collective agreement. FINLAND 
Employers'  representatives  are  selected  from  within  the 
undertaking  in  the  light of the nature of the  issue  to  be 
discussed on a case-by-case basis. If  the case of an individual 
worker is  to  be  considered  the cooperation  procedure is 
initially restricted to the employer and the person concerned. 
Both parties to the employment contract can request that the 
matter should be considered at talks between the employer 
and  the staff representative,  by  which  is  meant  the trade 
union representative who, on the basis of collective agree-
ment provisions,  is  elected  for  various  staff groups  and 
occupational safety officers who represent workers exclu-
sively in matters relating to worker protection. In addition, 
workers who are not members of trade unions are entitled to 
choose  their  own  representative  if they  account  for  the 
majority of the staff group in question. Furthermore, it is 
possible, within individual undertakings, to decide whether 
a delegation should be appointed for one year at a time to 
consider aspects of cooperation. 
The  cooperation  procedure  implies  an  obligation  on  the 
employer to inform the staff concerning important matters 
and to enter negotiations. 
The obligation to provide information includes a duty  to 
present  regular reports  on  the  economic  situation  of the 
company,  including  wage statistics etc.  In  addition,  any 
requisite information must be provided separate  I  y each time 
a cooperation procedure is launched. 
The obligation to negotiate is given whenever matters to be 
considered fall  within the scope of the cooperation proce-
dure. In the Cooperation Ad there is a comprehensive list of 
examples such as circumstances which affect the position of 
the staff or substantial changes to tasks, working methods or 
work layout, transfer from one task to another, large-scale 
purchase of machines and equipment which would affect the 
staff, substantial changes to premises at the workplace and 
new products or service activities including closure of firms 
or parts thereof or the removal  to  another  location  or a 
substantial  expansion  or  scaling  down  of the  firm.  A 
cooperation procedure may also be launched in the event of 
notice being served, redundancy or reassignment to part-time 
working due to economic or production-related causes or in 
the event of the transfer of the undertaking or its merger 
together with any decisions relating to training and reassign-
ment associated therewith. The cooperation procedure also 
covers other company matters - staffing and training policy, 
rationalisation  moves,  the  distribution  of working  hours 
throughout the day and the company's policy with regard to 
the recruiting and use of  outside workers. Also included are 
in-house  information,  working  regulations,  cooperation 
training,  employment-related  accommodation  and  other 
matters affecting social activities as stipulated in the coopera-
tion procedure. 
The cooperation procedure is not limited simply to negotia-
tions, in other words the exerting of influence by employees. 
In a number of special fields workers have cooperation rights 
on a number of issues including even scope for unilaterally 
deciding matters. For example, the working regulations can 
only be applied if such a move has been agreed in accor-
dance with  the  cooperation procedure.  This  might cover 
general rules of  a various nature relating to practical routines 
and procedures at the workplace. The contents of coopera-
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tion training and its scope could also be agreed together with 
questions relating to social activities. In the latter examples 
the staff representatives are entitled to  make  decisions if 
agreement cannot be reached in the context of the coopera-
tion procedure. 
The employers' obligation to negotiate is subject to a time 
limit in  certain circumstances.  Such is  the case when the 
measure to be negotiated can clearly lead to a situation where 
the worker is given notice, made redundant or reassigned to 
part-time work.  The length of the compulsory period for 
conducting negotiations- which can be shortened only if the 
negotiations are successfully concluded- can vary to reflect 
the  number  of employees  who  are  affected  by  notice, 
redundancy  or part-time  working.  The  Cooperation Ad 
contains  a  provision  on  the  cooperation  procedure with 
practical  information concerning the taking on of outside 
personnel. 
The cooperation negotiations should consider the reasons for 
the planned measures, their effects and any alternatives so 
that the staff representatives are given a genuine opportunity 
to influence the decision. The aim of the negotiating proce-
dure is to achieve a consensus but once the obligation to 
negotiate has been discharged  the employer is entitled to 
decide the matter as he sees fit. 
By an agreement on cooperation the national employers' and 
employees'  organisations  can  waive  the  other  binding 
provisions of the act. Such an agreement has the effect in law 
of a collective agreement. 
4.2 Management representation 
The Staff  Representation on Company Management Boards 
Act  came  into  force  in  1990.  Finland  introduced  such 
management representation for staff relatively late compared 
with other Nordic countries. 
The Act is applicable to Finnish undertakings employing at 
least 150 people in Finland. 
It presupposes that  representation on  management boards 
shall be based primarily on agreement reached at company 
level.  In the event of agreement not being reached the act 
remains fully  applicable.  However,  the parties are not at 
liberty to waive certain of the act's basic rules. 
Staff representation shall be provided whenever at least two 
categories of personnel, who together represent the majority 
of the staff, so require. 
The act contains detailed provisions concerning the election 
of staff representatives,  their eligibility  and  their rights, 
obligations and responsibilities. The provisions include that 
the  staff representatives  shall  be employed  by  the  firm. 
There is also a provision that the employer shall determine 
the bodies to which the representatives are to be appointed 
but in the first instance they are appointed by the staff acting 
alone. Representatives shall number at least one and no more 
than  four.  When  certain  issues  referred to  in  the act are 
being considered staff representatives may not be present. 
Such issues are the election or removal of the firm's manage-
ment,  the  conditions of contract of the management,  the 
conditions of employment for the staff or action to be taken 
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Experience with this act has mainly been good. 
CHAPTER II: SOURCES OF REGULATION 
1. General infonnation on the sources of labour law 
Alongside legislation  the  two  most  important sources of 
labour law in Finland are collective agreements, which in 
practice regulate working conditions on the Finnish labour 
market in accordance with an agreed method, and employ-
ment contracts,  which  are  concluded  between  individual 
employers and employees.  The effect in  law of collective 
agreements  is  regulated  in  the  Collective Agreements Act 
(1946) and the effect in law of contracts of employment are 
laid down in the Contract of  Employment Act (1971). 
The  hierarchy  of sources  for  labour  law  in  Finland  is 
complex because the conditions applicable to  a particular 
employment relationship can be governed by a number of 
other various  legal  sources and  in  a number of different 
ways.  It therefore  seems  appropriate to  list  the  order of 
priorities applied in the event of a conflict of regulations. 
The main legal institutions listed below will be reviewed in 
more detail at a later stage. 
•  Absolute rules of law; 
•  Provisions  within  a  collective  agreement  which  are 
universally applicable under the terms of the Contracts 
of  Employment Act; 
•  Provisions within a collective agreement which are to 
be applied under the tenns of the Collective Agreements 
Act; 
•  The absolute rules from which derogation is possible by 
collective agreement; 
•  The conditions of the contract of  employment; 
•  The employment regulations referred to in Section 6 of 
the Cooperation Act; 
•  Provisions of the  collective  agreement  from  which 
derogation is possible in contracts of employment; 
•  Statutory provisions of a non-mandatory nature; 
•  The provisions of common law (and the above-men-
tioned established practice, which often has the same 
status as the conditions of a contract of employment); 
and 
•  Instructions issued by an employer. 
The above list is not exhaustive.  For example, within the 
first category  (absolute rules of law)  a  distinction would 
need to be made between rules of a constitutional or basic-
law nature,  rules which  form  part of EC  law and  conse-
quently  have  precedence over national  law  and  ordinary 
national absolute rules of  law. In general terms it can be said 
that in Finland labour law regulations are comprehensive and 
detailed.  People's working lives are thus governed by  the 
law to a very large extent. 
In  any  assessment  of those  instances  where  conflict  of 
regulations might arise it is worthwhile remembering that the 
aim of  labour law provisions traditionally has been to protect 
the weaker party, in other words the employee.  This aim 
also  underlies  the  recognition  afforded  to  the  advantage 
principle. This implies that whenever it occurs that within 
the highly complex labour law hierarchy of regulations there 
are conditions which regulate one and the same issue,  the 
regulation to be applied is the one which is most advanta-
geous  to  the  worker.  This  advantage  principle  is  now 
accepted legal practice in Finland. 
2. The employment contract - emplo~ent  relationships 
The Employment Contracts Act defmes an employment con-
tract as  an  agreement by which one party, the employee, 
enters a commitment vis-a-vis the other party, the employer, 
to  perform work  for  wages  or some other consideration 
under  the  guidance  and  supervision  of the  latter.  This 
definition is of  importance not only for the application of the 
Contracts of  Employment Act but also because in accordance 
with the basic principle of Finnish labour law it determines 
a  standard scope of application for labour law regulation 
overall. This is possible because the criteria specified in the 
Employment Contracts Act form  the basic premise of the 
employment relationship. The difference between an employ-
ment contract relationship and an employment relationship 
is that the fonner takes effect when the employment contract 
is entered, whereas an employment relationship takes effect 
at  the  time  at  which  the  employee  de  facto  commences 
working  under  the  terms  of his  contract.  Whereas  the 
employment contract only includes those conditions agreed 
between the employer and the employee, there are a number 
of different  types  of regulations which  are applicable to 
employment relationships (law, collective agreement etc.). 
The concept of the employment relationship is also used as 
a basis for the definition of employee and employer. 
The  concept  of employee  is  comprehensively  defined  in 
Finnish  law.  Homeworking  and  working  with  machines 
owned by the employed person can be included within the 
said definition with direct reference to the law. Furthermore, 
the requirement  that work shall  be carried out under the 
management  and  supervision  of the  employer  has  been 
interpreted liberally. It has been considered sufficient for the 
employer  to  be  entitled  to  supervise  work  without  him 
actually having to do so. 
Under  the  provisions  of the  Employment  Contracts  Act 
employees are required to carry out the agreed work care-
fully  and  in  accordance with  the  instructions and orders 
which the employer is authorised to issue. In addition, the 
Employment Contracts Act contains a series of provisions 
regarding other obligations that the employee is required to 
fulfil.  The  employee  is  required  to  observe  the  safety 
regulations  and  may  not  disclose  business  or  industrial 
secrets with which he has been entrusted or has otherwise 
gained knowledge of.  He must also not accept any bribes. 
The worker may not conclude any employment contract with 
a competing employer nor otherwise engage in any compet-
ing activity which might be detrimental to his employer. The 
law has special provisions regarding the scope for employers 
to curtail a worker's right to carry out competing activities 
after the termination of the employment relationship. 
The employer's major obligation is to pay wages or some 
other  remuneration  for  work  performed.  There  are  no 
provisions in the Employment Contracts Act or in any other 
law  regarding  the  amount  of wages.  The  Employment 
Contracts Act contains only general rules on various types of 
wage,  the reasons for setting a wage,  the time,  place and 
nature  of the  payment  and  further  information  on  the 
employee's entitlement  to  a  wage  for  the  period  during FINLAND 
which  he  was  unable  to  perform  his  work  for  reasons 
attributable to the employer, because of insurmountable or 
comparable obstacles or because of the employee's illness. 
The  size of the wage  is  determined  in  the  employment 
contract or, as is most frequently the case,  in accordance 
with  provisions  either  in  the  normally  binding  or  the 
generally applicable collective agreement (see below). 
It may be agreed that remuneration is paid either in cash or 
as payment in kind or as a combination of the two. If  not 
otherwise agreed remuneration is paid in national currency. 
The basis for calculating the amount of the wage can be 
freely agreed. In practice the amount of the wage is deter-
mined by the time spent on the work (hourly, weekly or 
monthly wage}, by the quantity of work performed or on the 
basis of  results achieved (production bonus) or as a combina-
tion of these two wage-setting schemes. 
Wages are to be paid at the agreed time. When a working 
relationship ends wages normally fall due on the last work-
ing day. If  the payment of uncontested wage claims is de-
layed the worker is entitled, pursuant to a separate provision, 
to wages during the waiting period. 
3. Employment contracts and the general 
effects of collective agreements 
In view of  employers' general minimum obligations the uni-
versal  applicability  of collective  agreements  takes  on  a 
central importance. As a minimum requirement the employer 
must by law include in his terms of employment the provi-
sions of the national  collective agreement  which  can  be 
considered standard within the branch of industry concerned. 
Although the provisions have many points in common with 
the collective agreement which is binding in accordance with 
the provisions of  the Collective Agreements Act, (more about 
which later), the universal applicability aspect should not be 
seen as part of the "actual "collective agreement system. In 
the Employment Contracts Act the collective agreement is 
merely a  means whereby minimum conditions can be set, 
including for employment relationships where the employer 
is  not  a  member  of an  employers'  association  and  the 
employer and  employee could  therefore bilaterally agree 
wages and  other terms quite  freely  in  the  absence of a 
universal applicability rule. 
The obligation to comply with the provisions of the univer-
sally applicable collective agreement affects only the em-
ployer. Universally applicable collective agreements entail 
no obligations for workers but give them merely a right to 
require that the employer should apply the provisions of the 
universally applicable collective agreement which are more 
advantageous for the employees than provisions in  other 
regulatory sources (for example an employment contract or 
the law) which relate to the same issue.  The obligation to 
maintain industrial peace does not form part of the univer-
sally applicable collective agreement; any disputes arising 
are disputes relating to the employment contract, for which 
the general courts are the bodies responsible. The general 
court can seek the opinion of the labour court, for example 
for the interpretation of a universally applicable collective 
agreement. 
The universal applicability rule in the Employment Contracts 
Act has often been described as a law on a minimum wage. 
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The legal effects of the above are not however restricted to 
pay scales and the employer may apply all the provisions 
(standards) contained in the universally applicable collective 
agreement which are applicable to the "employment contract" 
and also those provisions which are applied to the 
11employ-
ment relationship besides ~ In the case of the provisions first 
named above the Employment Contracts Act was given an 
automatic and binding effect for employment relationships: 
a condition in the employment contract which is less advan-
tageous for the worker than corresponding provisions in the 
universally  applicable  collective  agreement  is  rendered 
invalid and  instead of the conditions of the employment 
contract being applied it is those of the collective agreement 
which are applied. 
If  there is no universally applicable collective agreement for 
the sector in question (and the employer is under no circum-
stances obliged to comply with a normally binding collective 
agreement) the scope for reaching an agreement is very wide 
for both parties to the employment contract. This scope is 
most tightly controlled by the absolute provisions of labour 
law and the general rules of contractual law. The Employ-
ment Contracts Ad contains no express provision specifying 
how the conditions of an employment relationship are to be 
established in those cases when no agreement at all has been 
reached on such matters as wages or in circumstances when 
an  agreed  (wage-related)  condition  should  be considered 
invalid.  In  such  cases  and  whenever  wages  are  under 
consideration the best principle is to do whatever is consid-
ered customary and reasonable in the trade concerned. 
4. Regulation by law 
In Finland there is a Holidays Act which establishes entitle-
ment to an annual holiday, and working hours legislation, 
protection at work legislation etc., all of which contain a 
series of statutory obligations for employers and rights for 
employees. 
An employee's entitlement to maternity, paternity or parental 
leave plus nursing-care leave are based on various statutory 
provisions in the Employment Contracts Act. According to 
this  act  a  worker  is  entitled  to  maternity,  paternity  or 
parental leave for the same period as the Sickness Insurance 
Act entitles that person to receive maternity, paternity or 
parental allowance. Maternity allowance is paid to a child's 
mother over a period of 105 days. Entitlement to maternity 
allowance normally commences 30 working days prior to the 
expected birth of the child and accordingly ends 75 days 
after the birth.  An employee who is pregnant and who at 
work  is  exposed  to  chemicals,  radiation  or  who  risks 
contracting  contagious  diseases  in  such  a  way  that  the 
development of the foetus  or the continued pregnancy is 
endangered is  entitled to special  maternity allowance (or 
corresponding leave) in principle from the commencement of 
the pregnancy. A precondition for special maternity allow-
ance is moreover that the worker could not be relocated to 
other duties  for  the period up to  the commencement of 
maternity leave. Special maternity allowance is not paid at 
all if the risk can be obviated. 
The termination of employment relationships is also regu-
lated in detail by legislation which sets out specific provi-
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sions concerning  redundancy,  the  serving of notice  and 
rescission. 
Redundancy. The rights and obligations which relate to em-
ployment relationships can be suspended temporarily under 
the rules on redundancy. When a worker is made redundant 
for economic reasons or owing to production-related circum-
stances an employer who falls within the scope of application 
of the Cooperation Act may apply the procedural rules set 
out therein. 
In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of the  Employment 
Contracts Act an employer may, providing the conditions 
under which he can serve notice or revoke an employment 
contract apply, unilaterally make redundant a worker in such 
a  way  that  the  employment  and  payment  of wages  are 
stopped for a certain period or until further notice (entirely) 
while the employment relationship is otherwise maintained. 
This also applies if  the worker's work is temporarily reduced 
and the employer cannot reasonably order him to perform 
other work or undergo training reflecting the employer's 
needs. In such cases a worker may be made redundant for a 
period up to a maximum of 90 days. Redundancy can also 
take the form of a shortening of standard working hours per 
day or per week, for example a six-hour working day or a 
four-day working week. 
In practice it is usually a question of redundancy when the 
economic or production-related criteria for serving of notice 
are satisfied, in other words when the workload has dropped 
in a significant and permanent way or if the workload has 
dropped temporarily. 
An employer's unilateral right to make workers redundant 
can be extended by collective agreement. 
Notice of termination.  An employment contract which  is 
concluded for a certain time ends when that period of time 
expires, when the agreed task has been completed or if the 
reason for the limited-period employment contract ceases to 
exist.  Normally  it  is  not  possible  for  a  limited-period 
employment contract  to  end by  the serving of notice of 
termination; it can be brought to an end before the agreed 
time only by rescission for the reasons shown below.  An 
employment contract which is open-ended can be terminated 
by observing the period of notice which has been served or 
without so doing if so agreed or if specially provided for in 
the Employment Contracts Act. The period of notice can be 
agreed up to a maximum of six months. There may also be 
an agreement to the effect that the employers'  period of 
notice should be longer than that of the employee and the 
Employment Contracts Act contains an appropriate provi-
sion. 
The Employment Contracts Act contains provisions covering 
the reasons for serving notice of termination. These specify 
the reasons for serving notice of termination which relate to 
the personality of the employee or that person's behaviour, 
in  other words personal grounds and also the reasons for 
serving notice of termination which relate to a reduction in 
workload  for  economic  reasons  or to  production-related 
causes or other comparable reasons, in other words collective 
grounds.  This  classification  of the  grrounds  for  serving 
notice, which in practice are seldom so clearly defined, is of 
decisive  importance  with  regard  to  the  procedure  to  he 
applied prior to the serving of notice and, above all, with 
regard to the determining of  the compensation to be awarded 
in connection with an unfair serving of  notice. 
Any assessment of the gravity of the employee's negligence 
or misdemeanour should in each case consider the nature of 
the work, the employee's position in the company's struc-
ture, any specific features of the working environment, the 
circumstances of the event and any consequences from the 
point of  view of  the employer or the employee's colleagues. 
If  the employees misconduct is not particularly serious it is 
generally assumed that the employer shall give. the employee 
a clear warning with regard to the misdemeanour and that the 
employee is thus given an opportunity to correct his ways. 
The Employment (;_ontracts Act contains special provisions 
regarding the collective serving of notice. The Act contains 
a  general reference to the conditions determining an em-
ployer's right to issue notices of termination and examples 
of situations in which an employer would be considered to 
have no reason for issuing notices of termination. With this 
list of examples the aim was to describe situations in which 
collective  grounds  would  not  constitute  a  sufficiently 
important reason and partly to prevent personal grounds for 
serving notice being circumvented or personal grounds in 
reality being concealed behind economic reasons or causes 
relating to production. 
A  substantial  and  long-term  reduction  in  workload  is 
generally sufficient reason to serve notice. This is not the 
case if the employee can reasonably be reassigned to new 
duties  consonant  with  this  skills  and  capabilities.  The 
employer's obligation to offer work extends to any available 
work at all if the employee, by virtue of his training, general 
capabilities and  experience,  can carry out the work after 
having received training or reasonable practice. The basic 
premise is that the work being offered to an employee must 
be as similar as possible in terms of requirements, responsi-
bilities, etc. It is for the employer to establish which type of 
work the employee can carry out. 
The Employment  Contracts Act also contains a  provision 
obliging the employer to reinstate a worker who has been 
made  redundant  during  the  nine  months  following  the 
redundancy  if the  employer  in  question  again  seeks  to 
increase the strength of his workforce. 
In reality an employee is not protected against redundancy 
given that the employment relationship ends when the period 
of notice expires.  Contesting the grounds for a  notice or 
bringing a  case before the court for a  decision  does not 
change the situation. An employment relationship on which 
notice has illegally been served cannot be reinstated in any 
circumstances by legal means without the consent of both 
parties. Compensation is normally awarded in the event of 
notice being served illegally. The aim with these compensa-
tion rules was to ensure that the employer is at least obliged 
to  think carefully if he intends to continue or suspend a 
working relationship on which notice has been served for no 
particularly important reason. 
An employer who has served notice of termination on an 
employment contract without objective reason is liable pay 
compensation to the employee of an amount corresponding 
to at least 3 and at most 24 months' wages. The compensa-FINLAND 
tion specified in the Employment Contracts Act is not the 
same as damages. Compensation is a sanction with special 
features.  Although  the employee need  not have  suffered 
material damage when he was served notice on other than 
objective grounds, the minimum compensation at least has to 
be paid. 
Rescission. In accordance with the Employment Contracts 
A a an employment contract can be rescinded with immediate 
effect for a certain period or until further notice "if important 
reasons so diaate~ The reason for rescission must always be 
more  serious  than  that  for  giving  notice  although  the 
somewhat inconsistent wording of  the Employment Contracts 
Act could suggest otherwise. 
Before an employer can rescind an employment contract he 
must give the employee an opportunity to learn the reasons 
for the rescission. Conversely, the employee must give the 
employer an opportunity to be consulted if the employee is 
intending to rescind the employment contract for the reasons 
indicated. 
5. Collective agreements 
Paradoxically, the regulation by law of collective agreements 
was introduced in 1924, a time when collective agreements 
were concluded only under exceptional circumstances. The 
legislation was based largely on a German parliamentary bill 
which was never enacted in Germany. The bill was the work 
of  Hugo Sinzheimer, a well-known German expert on labour 
law. The Collective Agreements Act in force in Finland since 
1946  is in fact still essentially based on Sinzheimer's bill 
even if a number of aspects have been modernised. 
The  breakthrough  for  the  modem  collective  agreement 
system in Finland occurred in  1945-46, a time when,  for 
their part, the employers were reconsidering their aversion 
to collective agreements. The situation in Finland at the time 
was that the war had been lost and the Communist Party had 
been  newly  legalised.  Within  a  short  time  trade  unions 
spread rapidly. The Finnish system of collective agreements 
was characterised from the start by a large measure of central 
administration,  the  system  was  developed  'top  down" 
through  national-level  labour  market  agreements  and 
regulations  issued  by  the  national-level  organisation. 
Moreover,  after  the  war the  economy  was  largely  state 
controlled, as were wages. Labour market policy was also 
affected by the fact that throughout industry a vicious power 
struggle was taking place between the Social Democrats and 
the Communists. 
5.1 The structure of the collective agreement system 
Since the end of the 1960s Finland has been operating an 
agreement hierarchy at four different levels. Within this hie-
rarchy the collective agreement is located essentially on the 
second level. 
At national trade union level the agreements concluded are 
income policy  agreements  and  general  agreements.  The 
agreements relating to incomes policy constitute comprehen-
sive economic agreements.  However, agreements are also 
secured on wages, agricultural incomes, taxation policy and 
on issues which relate to economic policy. In an agreement 
of  this type other interested organisations, including foreign 
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countries (governments) and the Finnish national bank, can 
also contribute to the work of  the employees' and employers' 
associations. An income policy agreement is most frequently 
drafted in writing but in legal respects it is primarily more 
of a gentlemen's agreement. 
Comprehensive agreements on income policy are now no 
longer formalised  as  an agreement and it is sufficient to 
produce a national-level labour market agreement, which is 
of course based  to  a  greater or lesser extent on clearly 
documented expectations with regard to national economic 
policy for the duration of the agreement. 
A common feature of national-level labour market agree-
ments  and  incomes  policy  agreements  is  that  they  form 
frameworks  or guidelines  for  collective agreements  con-
cluded by unions. However, they have no direct effect in law 
with regard to the relationship of the parties to the collective 
agreement.  Besides outline agreements relating to income 
policy  matters which cover wage trends etc.  the national-
level organisations also conclude outline agreements of a 
different  type,  which  are  known  as  general  agreements. 
These often settle matters which need to be agreed for longer 
periods of time.  In the past such agreements have covered 
employees' protection against termination of employment, 
the position of the trade union representative, the taking on 
of outside staff, rationalisation and cooperation within the 
undertaking. Such general agreements have in practice been 
included as parts of  collective agreements concluded by trade 
unions in various industries. 
The  most  important  level  for  concluding  labour market 
agreements is union level. In practice the relevant collective 
agreements, primarily at this level, form an integral part of 
the Collective Agreeme1Us Act. The agreement is comprehen-
sive and detailed.  They are very important as a  means of 
regulating the terms under which work is actually carried out 
at the workplace within the various branches of industry. 
Such agreements most frequently regulate aspects of wages, 
negotiating procedures, the position of trade union represen-
tatives,  the payment of trade union membership fees  etc. 
Collective agreement practice in Finland is characterised by 
the fact that a series of legal rules are also incorporated in 
collective agreements. The effect of this is that they can be 
monitored and  legal  proceedings instituted in  the manner 
prescribed for conditions governing collective agreements. 
At local level it is quite possible to conclude valid collective 
agreements.  In  practice  such  agreements  are  concluded 
mainly at a number of large undertakings, several of which 
(Finnair,  Yle etc.) are not members of employers' organisa-
tions.  For the  remainder  local  agreements are concluded 
primarily on the basis of delegation provisions included in 
union agreements.  Both the degree of interest in, and the 
need for,  local  solutions appear to have risen over recent 
years. 
The fourth level for the regulation of the conditions govern-
ing employment relationships is the personal level. Since a 
collective agreement merely defines a minimum it is always 
possible to agree more advantageous terms within the context 
of a personal one-to-one employment contract. 212  THE REGULATION OF THE WORKING CONDmONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
5.2 The collective agreement under Finnish law 
Collective agreements  must  be  concluded  in  writing.  A 
collective agreement may be concluded between employers 
or employers' associations as one party and trade unions as 
the other. 
A collective agreement is a standard contract with conditions 
to be applied in the "employment contract or otherwise in an 
employment relationship~ This implies by definition that the 
collective agreement must regulate individual employment 
relationships if it is to have the legal effects provided by 
law. 
The Collective Agreements Act gives the parties exceptional 
authority to establish rights and obligations in  respect of 
persons who are not themselves parties to the contract. This 
authority, known as the power of  regulation,  is  therefore 
interpreted relatively strictly. 
This power of regulation comprises primarily a scope for 
reguiating individual conditions in employment relationships 
(individual standards). In practice the power of regulation 
can to some extent be extended to apply to other matters. In 
classic German style this extension of power has come to be 
applied to solidarity standards (standards relating to social 
arrangements of the workplace or trade union representa-
tives, etc.) but also a number of other matters which can, de 
facto, restrict the employers' rights to manage and distribute 
the work. There is actually a certain discrepancy between the 
theory and  practice of collective agreement legislation  in 
Finland in that, for example, the doctrine of the solidarity 
norm survives in  a form which does not appear to  be of 
particular relevance to collective agreements as practised. 
The  collective  agreement  also  includes  rules  which  are 
conditions designed to produce effect in law exclusively for 
the parties  to  the agreement.  Conditions of this  type are 
conventionally known as compulsory conditions in contrast 
to  the statutory provisions which  can  be included  in  the 
agreement on the basis of the power of regulation. 
The  Collective  Agreements  Act  requires  the  individual 
standards  in  the  collective  agreement  are  automatically 
binding on the employment relationship. This implies that 
any provision in the employment contract which is inconsis-
tent  with  a  provision  in  the  collective agreement  to  the 
disadvantage of the employee is  invalid.  Instead  it is  the 
provision  of the  Collective  Agreement  which  is  to  be 
applied. 
Two  different approaches  were adopted  in  an  attempt  to 
ensure that the nonnative provisions of collective agreements 
were complied with at workplaces. In the first approach an 
employer who is bound by a collective agreement and who 
knowingly infringes a nonnative provision in that agreement 
or had  every  reason to  see that he was  infringing such  a 
provision is liable to a fine not exceeding FIM 130,000. An 
employee who is bound by a collective agreement can under 
the same circumstances be liable to a fine not exceeding FIM 
1,300 if individual standards are not respected.  The latter 
fine  is  in  practice of little  importance since  most  of the 
conditions of the collective agreement entail obligations to 
be met by employers. In the other case it is the associations 
which are bound under the terms of the collective agreement 
to monitor their members' compliance with the provisions of 
the collective agreement. If this obligation to  monitor is 
neglected an  association renders itself liable to a fine not 
exceeding FIM 130,000. 
The Collective Agreements Act contains an index of those 
persons  who  are  bound  by  collective agreements.  These 
persons are sometimes themselves parties to the contract, in 
other words employers or associations who have concluded 
the agreement, as well as those who with the consent of the 
parties to the agreement have in writing become parties to 
the said agreement. The other group comprises those persons 
who  are merely  bound  by  the agreement  (without being 
parties  to  it).  These  persons  are  registered  subsidiary 
associations affiliated to the associations which are parties to 
the agreement plus employers and employees who, under the 
terms of the agreement, are or have been members of an 
organisation which is bound by the agreement. 
The foregoing implies that to leave an organisation during 
the period of validity of an .agreement does not have the 
effect of freeing an employer or employee from the obliga-
tions imposed by the agreement for as long as it remains in 
force.  By way of contrast, an organisation bound solely by 
a collective agreement can be released from its obligation 
under the agreement  if it  is  no  longer a  member of the 
organisation which is party to the agreement. 
An  employer who  is  bound by a collective agreement is 
obliged  to  comply  with  the  conditions  of the  collective 
agreement in  respect of those workers who are themselves 
not bound by the collective agreement. The obligation laid 
down in the Collective Agreements Act is thus optional. On 
the basis of  a provision in the Employment Contracts Act the 
employer is obliged - irrespective of any obligation under 
the tenns of the collective agreement based on the Collective 
Agreements Act - to ensure that as regards the employment 
contract  or employment  relationship  and  as  a  minimum 
condition the wages and other terms determined for the type 
of work in question are observed in a collective agreement 
of  a type generally used for the sector of industry concerned. 
The legal effects of the collective agreement cover the period 
of time for which the agreement was concluded. In addition 
it has been accepted that the terms of  a collective agreement 
continue to  apply  for  some  time  afterwards  in  line with 
theory and practice. This implies that the conditions of the 
collective agreement are to be applied even when no agree-
ment exists,  as  in  the case of individual conditions in an 
employment relationship provided it has not been agreed 
otherwise. 
6.  Court jurisprudence 
Court jurisprudence is  an  important  source of law  even 
though legislation and  agreements are the most important 
control mechanisms for labour law in Finland. In general 
terms  the  Finnish  system  is  based  on  the  principle  that 
individual legal disputes are decided by the general courts 
whereas disputes which  relate to  the interpretation of the 
provisions  of collective  agreements  or are  the  result  of 
breaches of  collective agreements are decided by the Labour 
Court. This implies that the Supreme Court is the last Court 
of Appeal  in  disputes  relating  to  the  application  of the 
Employment Con.tracts Act while the Supreme Administrative 
Court  decides  disputes  involving  public-sector  salaried FINLAND 
employees  in  matters  relating  to  the  application  of the 
universal  collective  agreements  it  is  the  Supreme  Court 
which is the appropriate forum but the latter can request the 
opinion of  the Labour Court whenever it is a question of the 
correct meaning of the collective agreement itself. 
7. International sources 
The regulation of labour law in Finland has always been 
profoundly influenced by international models. In the 1920s 
the International Labour OrganisaJion (ILO) was the only fo-
rum in which the Finnish employers and employees associa-
tions cooperated were de  facto involved. Many ILO conven-
tions  have  also  influenced  the  drafting  of legislation  in 
Finland in a major way. Nordic cooperation has also been 
important, albeit in a largely informal way . 
The influence of international sources is most evident in le-
gislation. In keeping with the dual approach adopted in Nor-
die countries with regard to the incorporation of interna-
tional agreements into national law, courts have generally 
adopted a negative stance with regard to the direct applica-
tion of international conventions in national disputes unless 
they were specifically incorporated into national law. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND 
METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. Embargo on strikes and lockouts 
Throughout the post-war period the labour market in Finland 
has suffered from a high strike rate. The 1970s were the 
decade which saw most industrial action, mainly in the in-
dustrial sector (metals, paper etc). These were mainly short 
strikes for higher wages during the term of the agreement. In 
the 1980s, and especially during the recession of the 1990s 
with its  high rates of unemployment,  this  type of strike 
action virtually disappeared.  To the extent that strikes do 
occur they are nowadays mainly well planned action by trade 
unions or demonstrations of short duration. 
A  collective agreement performs two  traditional  tasks:  it 
guarantees certain minimum conditions with regard to  the 
employment relationship during the term of the agreement 
and it attempts to guarantee that no strikes or lockouts will 
occur during the term of the agreement. 
The embargo on strikes and  lockouts  is  regulated  in  the 
Collective Agreements Act on the basis of premises which are 
ideologically on an equal footing.  Strikes and lockouts are 
fonnally regulated in a non-partisan way by the fact that the 
law considers action by employees to be no different from 
action by employers. 
The basic premise for the embargo on strikes and lockouts as 
regulated by law is that the embargo is relative. The only 
type of action which  is  prohibited is action which  either 
targets a specific provision of the collective agreement or 
targets the collective agreement in its entirety. In practice the 
embargo has been applied comprehensively and from  the 
point of  view of  Finnish law there is a case for claiming that 
the embargo has been respected absolutely during the current 
agreement period. 
There are two main exceptions to the principal rule accord-
ing to which the embargo is absolute.  During the period 
213 
covered by the current agreement so-called political demon-
strations are permitted.  Such  action can also be taken by 
national-level  trade  unions  to  protest  against  planned 
legislation.  So-called  solidarity  action  is  also  permitted 
under certain circumstances. 
The embargo on strikes and lockouts ends when the collec-
tive agreement expires. 
The embargo is normally split into an active and a passive 
obligation. The passive obligation implies an duty to avoid 
prohibited industrial action and it applies to employers and 
associations which are parties to, or bound by, the agree-
ment. The obligation does not, however, apply to individual 
employees, who can never be prosecuted for breaching the 
embargo. The active obligation comprises an duty to ensure 
that members, in other words organisations and individuals, 
do not initiate prohibited industrial action. 
In  the  event  of the  embargo  being  breached  a  fine  not 
exceeding FIM  130,000 may be imposed. This is imposed 
instead of damages in respect of liability and various other 
circumstances mentioned in the act and applicable to the case 
in question. 
2. The Labour court 
Industrial peace under Finnish law is based on a fundamental 
distinction  between  conflicts of interest and  conflicts  of 
rights.  Conflicts of interest are resolved in free negotiation 
where the parties  may  even  resort to  industrial action  to 
secure their goals. Conflicts of rights, however, relate to the 
application of the current collective agreement. 
For the resolution of disputes affecting the validity of the 
collective agreement, its continuation, its content ot its scope 
a special court has been set up, the Labour Court. This court 
decides the extent to which an incident constitutes an  in-
fringement of the Collective Agreements Act or a breach of 
the provisions of the agreement. Breaches of the embargo on 
strikes and lockouts are also dealt with by the Labour Court, 
which can then also impose sanctions. 
The composition of the labour court is tripartite, composed 
of representatives of employers,  employees and impartial 
members.  The Labour Court is headed by presidents ap-
pointed for three years at a time. As a rule the court works 
on a departmental basis with six judges but it can also be 
convened for a plenary session. 
The plaintiffs and defendants before the Labour Court are 
generally organisations which are parties to the agreement. 
The court handles some 150-200 cases per year. The court's 
judgments are final and there is no leave to appeal against a 
judgment which the labour court has handed down. 
3. Mediation in industrial disputes 
The  system  for  collective  bargaining  is  based  on  free 
negotiation and voluntarily concluded agreements. 
The national authorities do try to prevent conflicts of interest 
and  negotiations leading too hastily to strikes or lockouts 
during periods not covered by agreements. This is achieved 
by having legislation on mediation in labour disputes which 
prescribes that stoppages or strikes and lockouts cannot be 
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two weeks beforehand the conciliator has been noti tied in 
writing of the impending stoppage. The aim is to offer the 
conciliator an opportunity to enter talks with the parties so 
that their differences can be reconciled. Under exceptional 
circumstances  when  the  public  interest  so  dictates,  the 
Ministry of  Labour can also postpone the date on which the 
stoppage was to commence. 
The  law  governing  mediation  in  industrial  disputes  lays 
down that it is compulsory for the parties to cooperate in the 
negotiations headed by the conciliator.  The law also pre-
scribes compulsory mediation. By way of contrast, compul-
sory conciliation is not possible under Finnish law. Neither 
party is required to accept any conciliation which is  pro-
posed. 
The conciliation service is run by a national conciliator and 
six district conciliators. In practice the national conciliator 
frequently  plays  an  important  role when  the  contracting 
parties' negotiations on a new collective agreement break 
down  and  a  mediation  proposal  by  the  conciliator  can 
unblock the situation. 
CHAPTER IV: FINNISH LABOUR LAW SYSTEM 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
1. The background 
Labour  law  in  Finland  has  its  roots  in  the  continental 
mainland (Germany, Austria and elsewhere) and in the other 
Nordic countries (Sweden, and to an extent, Denmark). 
German  influence on the Finnish legal  system during  the 
first decades of this century can be explained among other 
things by the fact that Finland's legal experts had undergone 
training in Germany.  Since the Second World War, how-
ever, Scandinavian influence has become more pronounced. 
2. International private law 
Over the last twenty or thirty years Finnish labour law has 
been largely Finnish in character. The international dimen-
sion has been of most importance for the legislator, who for 
purpose of  comparison has kept abreast of new legislation in 
other countries.  However,  international  private  law  does 
constitute an exception. 
During the 1970s and  1980s Finnish firms began increas-
ingly to devote themselves to what was termed the export of 
designs. This prompted a discussion of the problem of which 
country's rules were applicable to such designs and,  more 
generally, of the extent to which Finnish regulations were 
applicable beyond the country's borders. 
A special chapter was added to the Employment Contracts 
Ad in 1988 in Finland and headed  'Employment contracts of 
an international nature~ In the act it was laid down that in 
any  individual employment contract which had  links  to  a 
number of different countries the applicable law would be 
the law of the country where the employer had his place of 
abode provided that his business was located there. In other 
cases the law to be applied was the law of the country where 
most of the work was carried out or if it was not possible to 
ascertain that the work was mainly carried out in a specific 
country, the law of the country where the employer's place 
of business was located. If, on the other hand, the employ-
ment contract clearly has closer links to a country other than 
the country whose law would be applicable in view of the 
foregoing, the law of this other country shall be applicable 
provided that all the circumstances relevant to the particular 
case have been taken into account.  The Employment Con-
tracts Ad further stipulates expressly that it may be agreed 
to apply the law in the country where the work is primarily 
carried out, where the employer has his place of abode or 
where  the  employer's  business  is  located.  Agreements 
concerning which law is applicable must be completed in 
writing. 
The Employment Contrads Ad  contains a requirement to the 
effect that whenever a law is to be applied to an employment 
contract which is not the law of the country where the work 
is carried out the binding standards to be complied with in 
connection  with  the  employment  relationships  are  those 
which apply where the work is carried out. This implies that 
when a Finnish court applies Finnish law to work which is 
carried out in a third country it is only the binding regula-
tions in that country which have to be observed (work shall 
not  be  carried  out  during  religious  feasts,  regulations 
governing the working environment,  opening and closing 
times,  etc).  Otherwise  under Finnish  law  the applicable 
regulations are those which  in  view of their relevance to 
public  law  or to  some  other associated  important public 
principle should  be applied  irrespective of the provisions 
contained in the contract. 
Among legal experts there are so  many different views on 
whether the universal applicability rule in the Employment 
Contracts Act is to be applied irrespective of what the parties 
to the contract agreed. In other words it was unclear whether 
a foreign employer who posts employees to Finland to carry 
out work on  Finnish territory can choose not to apply the 
conditions contained in the universally applicable collective 
agreements. In the spring of 1996 the law was clarified on 
this  point.  An  addendum  was  included  to  the  universal 
applicability rule in the Finnish Employment Contracts Ad 
in  accordance with which foreign  employees carrying out 
work in Finland were also entitled to the advantages avail-
able under the universal agreement. There are, however, a 
couple of minor exceptions to the rule. Whenever the work 
relates  to  anything  other  than  planning,  supervision  and 
training in connection with the purchase of machinery, plant 
or an expert system including installation, repair or service 
thereof,  and  including  the  transit  of persons  and  goods 
through Finland or transport to Finland and when this work 
is temporary and cannot be carried out by Finnish workers, 
the rule shall not be applicable. In these circumstances the 
parties can therefore agree to apply the other country's law 
with regard to the employment relationship with the foreign 
workers. 
3. Finnish labour law and EEC law 
By and large labour law in Finland can be said to be based 
on  the Nordic model for regulating employment. In many 
respects Finland is, however, closer to continental Europe 
than  Sweden or Denmark,  for example.  Finland has well 
developed legislation and also a system of universal applica-
bility for collective agreements which had been modelled on 
continental practice. FINLAND 
It therefore proved relatively easy to implement the labour 
law directives and transpose them into Finnish law.  The 
directives have necessitated a series of minor adjustments but 
these did not involve radical upheavals or innovations. On 
certain matters questions have been raised whether Finland 
is complying with all the requirements of EC  law but these 
discussions have related only to minor, frequently technical, 
points. The particular features of  Finnish labour law are such 
that in the light of the most widely publicised decisions of 
the European Court of  Justice it would appear to be in no 
way  impossible  to  implement  EC  directives  using  the 
instrument of the collective agreement in Finland. In the 
context of  Finnish traditions it appears natural for a national-
level  implementation  of the directive  to  be  introduced 
nationally at trade or trade-association level. However, it is 
difficult to imagine that a trade association agreement could 
achieve so wide a coverage as to satisfy the EC's require-
ments, the universal applicability provision notwithstanding. 
The question is how the government can guarantee that all 
trade associations, both in the private and public sectors can 
in practical terms conclude agreements which meet the EC 
requirements. 
In Finland there are no legal impediments to the conclusion 
of  collective agreements as defined in the Collective Agree-
ments  Act  (within  the  public  sector known  as  the  Civil 
Service Collective Agreement) at national trade union level. 
The  question  which  arises  is  what  the  advantages  are 
compared with a legislation-based solution when t11e contract 
is concluded at national level. The scope for taking account 
of trade-specific  special  requirements  is  not particularly 
broad at national level. In each case a solution is conceivable 
when the national-level federation guarantees the implemen-
tation of an EC directive but initially assigns responsibility 
for its implementation to individual trade unions. In this way 
it might be possible for the national federation to conclude 
an agreement for those areas where trade-specific agreements 
were not concluded. A similar approach could presumably 
lead to satisfactory implementation in conjunction with the 
universal applicability rule. 
Another problem arises where there is no agreement owing 
to the expiry of the collective agreement's validity.  Upon 
expiry its binding and automatic effects in law cease even 
though in Finland, as in many other countries, it is consid-
ered that the conditions of an agreement should continue to 
apply (the residual effect) in the absence of any agreement to 
any other effect. The obligation at national level to comply 
with the provisions of an EC directive in no way ends when 
a  collective agreement ceases  to apply.  A  residual  effect 
arrangement  open  to  various  optional  interpretations  is 
hardly an adequate  base on which  to  guarantee  that  the 
minimum requirements of a directive are implemented. 
It would therefore seem that as far as Finland is concerned 
the implementation of EU regulations can best be secured by 
a  well  balanced  mix  between  legislation  and  agreements 
tailored to each special case. The most important thing from 
the Finnish point of view is that regulations are issued in a 
form which can ensure comprehensive compliance with the 
requirements while at the same time adequate scope is given 
for national variants in connection with the way in which the 
directives are to be implemented. 
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Finland  takes  the  view  that  involvement  in  the  social 
dialogue and legislative processes in accordance with the 
Maastricht  Treaty's  Social  Chapter  is  something  quite 
natural. Finnish labour market relations are characterised by 
a working social dialogue and a stable tripartite cooperation 
model although some opposing positions are of course also 
maintained. 
In conclusion it can be said that the national level labour 
market organisations issued a joint resolution in June 1994 
prior to the referendum on Finland's accession to the EU, the 
resolution in question relating to European integration and 
national cooperation component. 
Management and labour stated, inter alia, that at the place 
of work the tripartite cooperation model developed by ILO 
was  followed.  Furthermore,  the right of association was 
recognised  as  a  fundamental  right and it was  stated  that 
Finnish labour market policy was based  on a  system of 
negotiation and  agreement which was consensus-oriented. 
The  partners  proclaimed  also  that  the  development  of 
working lives should be based on procedures which respect, 
in a balanced way, the needs of the individual, the collective 
workforce and production. Staff involvement at the work-
place and in development work was to be encouraged. The 
partners declared their willingness to work together on the 
implementation  of  EU  regulations  relating  to  working 
conditions and saw it as an important matter to ensure that 
associated agreements could be applied. 
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Background 
Developments  in  Swedish  labour  law  have  long  been 
influenced to a large extent by the labour-market organisa-
tions and characterised by the existence of collective agree-
ments  regulating  labour-market  conditions.  The Swedish 
trade-union movement, and more particularly that part of it 
representing  blue-collar workers,  has  developed  in  close 
collaboration with the Social Democratic Party, which has 
governed the country for a large part of this century. The 
organisation  of the  labour  market  and  the  principle  of 
collective agreements was established as early as at the tum 
of the century, and for a long time the government merely 
kept an eye on developments without actively intervening. 
Up until the 1970s, only a small amount of employment 
legislation had been passed, the most important examples of 
which include: early legislation in the field of employment 
protection; a State-run conciliation procedure for mediation 
in labour disputes was introduced in 1906; regulations con-
cerning collective agreements were introduced in 1928 - the 
same year as the labour court was created; and freedom of 
association and the right to  negotiate were established in 
1936. 
In the 1930s, however, it looked as though the government 
would intervene more and more on the labour market by, 
among  other  things,  placing  restrictions  on  the  right  to 
strike. At the prospect of  this, the two umbrella organisation 
in  the  private  sector,  namely  the  Swedish  Trade  Union 
C01ifederation (LO) and the Swedish Employers' Confedera-
tion (SAF),  concluded what is  known as  the Saltsjobaden 
Agreement,  or Basic  Agreement  (Saltsjobadenavtalet)  in 
1938 which, among other things, provided for self-imposed 
restrictions with regard to labour disputes. The Saltsjobaden 
Agreement heralded a long period of cooperation and accord 
on various matters between management and labour.  The 
phrase 'the Swedish model"  was coined to refer to successful 
cooperation  between  the  social  partners  for  sharing  the 
benefits of the country's increasing wealth. 
In the ensuing period, the labour-market organisations and 
arrangements concerning negotiations and collective agree-
ments became increasingly centralised. However, the Saltsjo-
baden era, which was characterised by harmonious relations 
and  mutual trust, came to a close towards the end of the 
1960s.  The Swedish labour market then  experienced  far-
reaching technical and economic changes. Tension between 
management and labour increased. Employees took the view 
that there was still a need for reforms in the field of employ-
ment, and for employees to exert more influence. 
The following period saw much legislation introduced. The 
earlier scenario in  which  the regulation of labour-market 
conditions  was  to  an  overwhelming  extent  carried  out 
through collective agreements, with only a minor legislative 
element concerning specific questions,  was replaced  by  a 
situation in which, apart from a few exceptions, legislation 
now generally covered the entire field of labour law. Various 
laws  set  out provisions  on  security  of employment  and 
wages, the powers of employee representatives, representa-
tion of employees on management boards, equality of the 
sexes, racial discrimination, new legislation concerning the 
workplace,  working hours and  holidays,  laws  relating  to 
legal procedures in  labour disputes,  and laws on parental 
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leave, educational leave and the right of immigrants to take 
leave in order attend courses in Swedish.  As far as social 
insurance and  employment policy  are concerned,  a  large 
number of regulations were enacted, and this area is still in 
a constant state of flux. 
Almost all the new laws contain elements of relevance to 
employees, but the most important provisions in this field 
are set out in  the 1976 Codetermination Act (medbestilm-
mandelag - MBL). The Act also includes the most important 
provisions  contained  in  earlier legislation on freedom  of 
association, the right to negotiate and collective agreements. 
The name of the Act gives expression to a specific aim, but 
can  hardly  be said  to contain  any  substantial  provisions 
concerning  codetermination;  instead,  it  merely  refers  to 
observing and influencing developments. 
Employment  legislation  is  not  collected  together  in  any 
specific code or the like, other than as disseminated in the 
Swedish  statute-book  iforfattningssamling).  There  have 
nevertheless  been  discussions  about  whether  these  laws 
should be codified and collected together in a Labour Code 
(  arbetsriittsbalk). 
The almost rocketing increase in legislation in the field of 
labour law has not involved any sudden and total change in 
regulatory  activity.  Most of the  laws  have  followed  the 
approach taken by the social partners; legislation is often set 
out in very broad terms and requires management and labour 
to make appropriate adjustments or additions by means of 
collective agreements; many laws may also be deviated from 
in collective agreements. 
An exception to the general rule that employment legislation 
is drawn up in  consultation with the social partners, or at 
least with their approval, is legislation relating to the equal 
treatment of men and women. The situation is more or less 
the same throughout the Nordic countries. When Swedish 
employment legislation took off, the social partners opposed 
legislation in the field of sex equality and pointed out that 
such  matters could best be solved by means of collective 
agreements. When no collective agreements were concluded 
regarding this question, a right-wing government passed a 
law on sex  equality in  1979 (the currently applicable law 
dates from 1991). Generally speaking, however, the legisla-
tion has been ineffective, one reason probably being that the 
social partners do not give the matter priority. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, new changes became discernible on 
the  Swedish  labour  market.  The  centralised  system  of 
negotiation, which helped to create order and stability but at 
the  same  time  hindered  flexibility  and  problem-specific 
solutions,  has  gradually  been  replaced.  The general eco-
nomic crisis has had an effect on the whole labour market; 
wage negotiations have been made more difficult,  a large 
number of social benefits have been cut back, job security 
diminished and unemployment increased. Sweden has for a 
long time had low unemployment by international standards. 
The official rate of unemployment was kept low by means of 
wide-ranging  employment-policy  measures.  As  of 1992, 
however,  unemployment rose to  a level  unseen since the 
depression of the  1930s,  namely  10%, a rate comparable 
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A  situation now exists in  which there is a  great deal  of 
antagonism  both  between  and  within  employers'  and 
employees' organisations and various political institutions 
regarding  negotiation  arrangements  and  the  system  of 
collective agreements, as well as the question of the future 
shape of employment policy and how to solve the problems 
of unemployment and the overburdening of the system of 
social insurance. In the discussions on these matters, it was 
proposed, for example, that a general reduction in working 
hours be introduced with the primary aim not of improving 
working conditions but rather of creating more employment 
opportunities and expand the private services sector while 
providing various kinds of subsidies for these new workers 
in order to increase the level of  employment. It was argued 
that employment-protection  regulations  made  for  a  rigid 
labour market and prevented the emergence of a flexible jobs 
market accessible to young people beginning their working 
lives. The causes of  these problems and how they can best be 
solved are matters of considerable controversy. 
A  tripartite Labour Law Commission (Arbetsriittskommis-
sion) was set up by the government in 1995. The Commis-
sion's work is aimed at seeking solutions to problems in the 
field  of labour law by finding ways to enable the social 
partners to themselves shape the regulations governing the 
employment market - through collective agreements as far 
as possible - in such a way that these work properly and 
effectively. In the directive concerning the above-mentio~ed 
Commission, it is stated that labour-market conditions will 
normally be regulated through collective agreements. 
Developments at international level also have an effect on 
the Swedish set-up.  Sweden joined the EU  in  1995.  The 
Nordic countries have cooperated in the field of employment 
for a long time. The lines along which they are organised in 
this field are so similar that the Wordic model 
11 for industrial 
relations is sometimes referred to. There are, however, also 
some  significant  differences.  For  example,  the  Danish 
legislature has never intervened on the labour market in the 
same way as in Sweden (or Norway and Finland). Denmark 
and Norway have a much stronger tradition of government 
intervention in wage negotiations and labour disputes. The 
important position enjoyed by these labour-market organisa-
tions and  their high  level  of trade-union  organisation  is 
common  to  all  the  countries,  but  whereas  trade-union 
membership is 75-85% in the other countries, the figure is 
less than 60% in Norway. 
CHAPTER 1:  THE ACTORS 
Traditionally, employers' and employees' organisations have 
been the main actors on the Swedish labour market.  The 
State's role as law-maker has gradually increased in impor-
tance, as has its role as economic policy-maker and public-
sector employer. 
Various forms of  negotiation with opposite sides, such as the 
system enabling workers to influence developments, are an 
important element in the regulation of working conditions. 
1. Freedom of association 
Freedom  of association,  i.e.  the  right  to  belong  to  an 
organisation, is enshrined in the Swedish Constitution. The 
right to belong to an employers' or employees' organisation 
is also set out in employment legislation (the Codetermina-
tion Act), in which it is stipulated as meaning the right to 
belong  to  an  organisation,  to  benefit  from  membership 
thereof and  to  work  for  an  organisation  or help  in  its 
creation. 
Freedom of  association is reciprocal, i.e. both employers and 
employees enjoy the same protection, although for practical 
reasons this protection is of  most significance for employees. 
This only applies in relation to the other side in industrial 
relations; employers therefore do not enjoy any protection in 
relation to other employers, and the same applies to employ-
ees in relation to each other. An employer is not allowed to 
take any measures which are to the detriment of an employee 
because the latter has exercised his right of association, or 
which are aimed at preventing the employee from exercising 
such right. Any employer infringing this right is liable to 
pay damages to the employee and the organisation represent-
ing  him.  Furthermore,  any  measure,  such  as  notice  of 
dismissal,  taken  in  violation  of an  employee's  rights  is 
invalid. 
On the employee side, freedom of  association applies only to 
people actually  in  employment, which means that a job-
seeker cannot use the right of association as an argument 
against an employer who does not wish to  take him on 
because he is a member of  a trade union. So-called uexclusive 
clauses 
11 (or "organisation clauses j  and closed shop agree-
ments are legal in Sweden, since freedom of  association does 
not provide any protection to those seeking a job. Freedom 
of association  does,  however,  offer  protection  to  those 
already in employment who belong to a trade union, and the 
dismissal of an employee on the grounds that they refuse to 
join a specific trade union would also be a violation of the 
employment-protection  laws.  Closed shop agreements are 
not, however, allowed among private-sector employers who 
are  members  of the  Swedish  Employers'  Confederation 
(SAF),  and  are not  met  with  at all  in  the public  sector. 
Examples of such agreements are to be found in the private 
sector outside the sphere of responsibility of the SAF,  but 
these are of little practical relevance given the high level of 
trade-union membership. 
In recent times, Swedish employers have not tried to thwart 
employees wishing to join trade unions.  On  the contrary, 
most employers regard  it  as  useful  to  have a  competent 
opposite number on a continuing basis, and are normally 
happy to ·see their employees becoming members of any of 
the large established trade unions. Nevertheless, employers 
have an interest in those responsible for or representing the 
management (e.g. in negotiations) being free of ties with the 
trade unions with which they are negotiating. This is one of 
the reasons why managers of blue-collar workers have their 
own trade union. As regards white-collar workers, collective 
agreements provide that employers are entitled to demand 
that management employees do not join specific trade-union 
organisations.  All  employees  are,  however,  entitled  to 
belong to a trade union. 
It is only the right to belong to an organisation, known as 
the "positive" right of association, which is protected under 
Swedish law; the right not to join an organisation, known as 
the  ')zegative" right  of association,  does  not  enjoy  any 
protection. This state of affairs has been the source of many SWEDEN 
discussions of underlying principles, and it now looks as if, 
following the incorporation into Swedish law of the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms with effect as of 1995, Sweden may 
be required to offer greater protection for the negative right 
of association. 
These observations apply to the  uexternal "right of associa-
tion, i.e. in relation to organisations' opposite numbers on 
the labour market.  As regards relations between the same 
types of organisation or their members,  i.e. the  'fnternal" 
right of association, no specific statutory provisions exist. 
The  'fnternal" side  is  regulated  by  means  of the  rules 
governing the organisations concerned and by a number of 
general legal principles established by the courts. One such 
principle is  that of equal  treatment for all  members of an 
organisation.  Members  are  entitled  to  demand  that  the 
organisation safeguard their rights in return for their having 
paid their membership dues. The organisations represent the 
members without a specific power of  attorney in negotiations 
and agreements with the employers (e.g. when a collective 
agreement has been concluded). However, a trade union is 
not authorised to control how an individual member exer-
cises his rights in dealings with his employer, e.g. regarding 
entitlement to salary. 
2. Employers' and employees' organisations 
According to the definition in the Codetermination Act, an 
employees'  organisation  is  an  association  of employees 
which, according to the rules governing it, serves to  safe-
guard the interests of  employees in dealings with employers. 
Employers' associations are corresponding organisations on 
the  employers'  side.  "Central  employees'  organisation" 
means an association or similar body, and  '1ocal "employees' 
organisation refers to a club or local branch which is party 
to negotiations at local level. Swedish law does not contain 
any provisions relating to such matters as representativeness 
and  official  recognition  of such  organisations.  However, 
employment legislation is designed in such a way that trade 
unions which have collective agreements with employers 
have many advantages. Smaller unions without any collec-
tive agreement therefore have difficulty  in  making  them-
selves heard. 
Both sides of industry play a crucial  role in  the Swedish 
labour-market set-up. By international standards, member-
ship of both employers'  and  employees'  organisations  is 
particularly high. Generally speaking, all major employers 
are members of an employers' association. However, over 
90% of Swedish employers have fewer than 20 employees, 
and relatively few very small businesses are members of an 
employers' association. On the employee side, trade-union 
membership is around 85%. This figure can be as high as 
100%  in  certain sectors.  In the  1980s,  when demand  for 
labour was high,  union membership showed a downward 
tendency,  but this has now changed.  One of the reasons 
which contributed to the high level of trade-union member-
ship is almost certainly the fact that unemployment insurance 
contributions and benefits are administered through unem-
ployment  funds,  which  are  linked  to  the  trade  unions. 
(Membership of  a union automatically means that one is also 
a  member of the unemployment fund  run  by  it.  It  is  also 
possible to pay into an unemployment fund without being a 
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member of  a union, but the general set-up tends to encourage 
union membership). To a large extent, trade-union structures 
and traditional aims are geared to the needs of male indus-
trial workers (i.e.  breadwinners supporting a family), and 
problems are now being  experienced  in  adapting  to  new 
groups on the labour market, such as young people, women, 
immigrants,  employees  in  the  services sector and white-
collar workers. Nevertheless, it is still the normal thing for 
those entering the labour market to join the appropriate trade 
union.  There  is  never  any  obligation  to join,  but  it is 
certainly  not  unusual  for  colleagues  to  pressurise  non-
unionised  workers  into  joining  a  trade  union.  In some 
sectors, such as computing and high technology, a smaller 
proportion of employees are unionised.  Otherwise, union 
membership levels are broadly similar in the private and 
public sectors and among various groups of employees. Even 
managers and bosses are thus usually members of relevant 
associations. 
There is  no  longer any  clear dividing line to  distinguish 
between blue- and white-collar workers. Seen in a historical 
context,  however,  salaried  employees  have  occupied  a 
position closer to the employer. This distinction was done 
away with a long time ago in the public sector. Nowadays, 
the  main  difference  is  that  blue-collar  and  white-collar 
workers are in different trade unions. The main reason for 
this  is  the  so-called  'industrial  federation  principle" 
(industriforbwulsprincip), according to which all employees 
within a particular company belong to the same blue-collar 
or  white-collar  union.  There  are,  however,  some  trade 
unions which do not follow this principle and are instead 
organised  by  profession  (e.g.  a  number  of university 
lecturers' associations). The fact that blue- and white-collar 
workers belong to  different trade unions generally means 
that they are subject to different collective agreements. In the 
public sector, however, the more general provisions of the 
collective agreements apply to all employees. In the private 
sector, moves in  this direction have begun in the last few 
years.  Generally  speaking,  the  tendency  has always been 
towards  smoothing  out  differences  in  the  conditions  of 
employment  of  the  two  groups  under  their  respective 
collective agreements.  Employment legislation has,  to an 
extent, also been used as a means of eliminating contractual 
differences in terms and conditions of employment. 
On  the  employees'  side,  there  are  three  major umbrella 
organisations, namely the Swedish Trade Union Confedera-
tion (Landsorganisationen i Sverige - LO) representing blue-
collar workers, the Confederation of Professional Employees 
(Tjiinstemiinnens  Centra/organisation - TCO) representing 
white-collar workers, and the Swedish Confederation of Pro-
fessional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorgan-
isation - SACO) for white-collar workers with a university 
education.  These  umbrella organisations are made up  of 
associations from both the public and private sectors. 
In all, the LO has a little over 2.2 million members (out of a 
total  workforce of 4.4 million  in  Sweden).  The  largest 
member organisation is the Swedish Association of Local 
Authority  Workers  (Svenska  Kommunalarbetaiforbund), 
which organises local-authority and county-council employ-
ees, and the next largest is the Swedish Association of Metal 
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which represents workers in the engineering industry. The 
LO has occupied a very strong position as the main employ-
ees' organisation,  but its  position  is  gradually  becoming 
weaker. 
The TCO  has a total of just over 1.3 million members; its 
largest member organisations are the Swedish Association of 
Industrial  Employees  (Sveriges  lndustritjiinstemanna-
forbund) and the Swedish Association of Local  Authority 
Employees (Sveriges Kommunaltjiinstemannaforbund). 
The SACO,  which,  with just under 400,000 members,  is 
much smaller than  the other two umbrella organisations, 
derives most of its membership from the public sector. 
It is the various associations or individual negotiating bodies 
made up of  different associations which conclude agreements 
with the employers. 
Both the LO  and the TCO  were already members of ETUC 
prior to Sweden's joining the EU. 
By international standards, the contrasts between the trade 
unions in Sweden are small. For example, they are not split 
into various unions based on political or religious affiliation. 
However,  some tension does exist between unions in  the 
public  and  private  sectors.  Up  to  now,  there  has  been 
relatively little rivalry between various unions organising the 
same groups of workers. 
The main umbrella organisation for employers in the private 
sector is  the Swedish Employers'  Confederation (Svenska 
arbetsgivareforening - SAF), to which associations in various 
sectors accounting for something over 40,000 businesses are 
affiliated as members. The SAP's previously strong position 
has gradually become weaker. It is the member associations 
which conclude collective agreements.  The SAF  has  for a 
long time been a  member of the  Union of Industrial and 
Employers' Confederations of  Europe (UNICE). 
Employers in the public sector too are organised centrally. 
Local authorities and county councils, which have a long 
tradition of independence,  are organised  centrally  in  the 
Swedish Association of  Local Authorities and the Federation 
of Swedish County Councils (Svenska kommuriforbund och 
Landstingsforbund). The State as employer is represented by 
the National Employers' Administration (Arbetsgivarverk). 
Employers' organisations in the public sector are affiliated 
to  the  Centre  of Enterprises  with  Public  Participation 
(ECPE). 
The primary purpose of  Swedish employers' organisations is 
to conduct negotiations and conclude collective agreements, 
but they also function as policy-shaping interest groups for 
employers. This latter role is of  particular importance for the 
SAF. 
In the last few years, considerable changes have taken place 
in the organisational structure of employers' and employees' 
associations,  and  this  process still  seems  to  be far  from 
complete. General economic and social developments,  the 
call for decentralisation, greater flexibility,  new areas and 
types  of activity,  internationalisation,  etc.  have  made  it 
necessary  for  organisations  on  both  sides  of industry  to 
reorganise themselves accordingly and redefine their strate-
gies. 
a. Trade-union representatives 
New employment legislation introduced in the 1970s led to 
the trade unions being faced with many new tasks, and this 
applied all the more to unions which were party to collective· 
agreements  with  employers.  These  unions  had  largely 
assumed the role of representing all employees, regardless of 
whether they belonged to a union. This responsibility for the 
interests of  employees in general does not, however, stretch 
to a duty of fair representation, as on the labour market in 
the USA. 
One of the many pieces of legislation passed in the 1970s 
was  the  1974 Trade-Union  Representatives  Act  (Lag  om 
fackligafortroendemans stiillning pd arbetsplatsen).Trade-
union representatives in Sweden can be seen as occupying 
the  middle ground  between  a  shop steward and  a  union 
delegate. They are appointed by a union which is party to a 
collective agreement with the employers in order to represent 
union members in the workplace in connection with ques-
tions concerning their employment. If  no collective agree-
ment is in place at a given location, there is no entitlement 
to appoint a trade-union representative. 
Trade-union  representatives  are  entitled  to  the  time  off 
necessary for their tasks, and if they carry out their trade-
union  work at  their own workplace,  they  are entitled to 
retain their rights as an employee. The right to take time off 
is wide-ranging. The only restriction is that the amount of 
time taken off should be reasonable and not interfere with 
the normal course of work. Therefore, the right to time off 
is not necessarily dependent on the time being used for trade-
union activities in  the workplace;  it can also be  taken  to 
enable trade-union representatives to undergo training, for 
example.  Given that representatives retain their right to a 
salary and other benefits, they can, for example, take part in 
negotiations concerning their own place of work, and can 
also carry out preparatory work for such negotiations and 
discuss information concerning their own place of work with 
employees affected by such negotiations and the like. The 
Act also contains a number of  provisions aimed at protecting 
trade-union representatives from harassment as a result of 
their activities, and at guaranteeing that when representatives 
return  to  their normal  work,  they  are not disadvantaged 
because they have been active in the trade union. 
There are some trade unions which, without the employer 
being involved in any way, elect their representatives and 
also decide how responsibility for trade-union activities is to 
be  allocated  between  them.  In  businesses  with  a  large 
workforce, it is usual to have full-time trade-union represen-
tatives, although many prefer to limit their activities to a few 
hours of their working time. The trade unions estimate that 
between a fifth and a sixth of their members carry out tasks 
covered by the Trade-Union Representatives Act. 
Like the employers' organisations, the trade unions also have 
full-time staff working at national (and regional) level in-
cluding ombudsmen to attend to general trade-union matters 
of common interest. 
The 1977 Work Environment Act (Arbetsmiljolag) contains 
provisions on safety representatives, who are chosen from 
the employees in workplaces with at least five workers, and 
on safety committees, which must be established in busi-SWEDEN 
nesses with at least 50  employees.  Safety committees are 
made up of  employer and employee representatives and have 
general tasks concerning changes in the work environment. 
The safety  representative speaks  for  the employees with 
regard to questions concerning the work environment and is 
appointed by the local trade union or, if there is no trade-
union representation,  is  elected  by  the  employees  them-
selves. In most cases, the definition of a trade-union repre-
sentative  in  the  Trade-Union  Representatives  Act  also 
encompasses the safety  representative (and  the employee 
representatives on the safety committee), although these are 
also covered by some provisions of the Work Environment 
Act relating to time off work, protection while engaging in 
trade-union activities, and employment protection. 
3. The role of the state 
As can be seen from the above, the Swedish government has 
traditionally  not  played  a  central  role  in  regulating  the 
Swedish labour market. Despite the legislation introduced in 
the 1970s, this still left fairly wide scope for the two sides of 
industry. By international standards, State intervention in 
negotiations on collective agreements has been negligible. 
Broadly speaking, the only intervention has been in the form, 
of  a number of income-policy measures or talks/discussions 
between the government and  the umbrella organisations. 
There is no legislation on minimum wages or the like, since 
this is regarded as inconsistent with the Swedish system. In 
the last few years, however, the State has become increas-
ingly involved in wage negotiations aimed at tackling the 
considerable economic problems and increased unemploy-
ment. The most prominent example of this up to now is the 
establishment of a special negotiating group consisting of a 
number of former employer and employee representatives 
headed  by  an  experienced  member  which,  acting  in  a 
voluntary capacity, is supposed to get the parties to agree on 
a low wage settlement. This was, broadly speaking, achieved 
in the 1991-1992 round of negotiations. 
The principle underlying Swedish employment law is that 
supervision of  compliance with statutory instruments and the 
protection of individual employees should preferably be dealt 
with by the trade unions,  and not by a  State supervisory 
authority. However, some employment legislation is more in 
the way of regulations issued by a public authority. In the 
field of  the work environment, there is a central government 
authority for the protection of  workers (the National Board 
of  Industrial Safety) together with twelve State-run Labour 
Inspectorates in various parts of the country responsible for 
monitoring  regulations  on  the  work  environment  and 
working hours. The Labour Market Administration (Arbets-
marknadstyrelse) is the central government body responsible 
for employment policy and at local level there is a Regional 
Employment Office.  In the event of collective redundancies 
as referred to in Directives 751129/EEC and 921561 IEEC,  the 
Regional  Employment  Office  is  the  competent  authority 
which must be informed. 
a. Employment in the public sector 
The public sector is very large in Sweden, particularly at 
local level. It  has expanded considerably since the 1950s and 
now employs about 40% of the labour force. Since the end 
of  the 1980s, however, the demand for savings, tax cuts and 
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increased efficiency has checked this increase in the number 
of employees and led to privatisation and reorganisation. It 
is predominantly women who are employed in the sector, in 
areas such as nursing, institutional care and education. 
There has been a  continuing process of the public sector 
moving closer to the private sector as regards conditions of 
employment, negotiations, the law governing disputes, etc. 
Most of  the special regulations applying to the public sector 
have gradually been dispensed with. The new labour legisla-
tion  introduced during the  1970s was, broadly speaking, 
geared equally to the private and State sectors and local-
authority level. There is probably no other country, apart 
from its Nordic neighbours, in which employment legislation 
in the various sectors of the labour market is as far-reaching 
as in Sweden. 
However, certain special provisions, mainly concerning state 
employees,  still  remain  in  place.  These mainly  relate to 
situations  which  arise  as  a  result  of public  authorities 
carrying out activities with a  bearing on the relationship 
between the State and its citizens, e.g. tasks involving the 
exercise  of authority  over  the  general  public.  At  both 
national and local authority level, there is also a need for a 
special approach so that the public authorities which deter-
mine policy do not encroach  too closely on the right of 
employees  to  influence  and  observe  the  running  of the 
undertakings in which they are employed; allowance must be 
made for 
1'political democracy~ 
4. The right of negotiation and the system of negotiations 
According to the basic provision on negotiations contained 
in the Codetemtination Act, employer and employee organi-
sations as well as individual employers have the right to 
negotiate with their opposite number(s) on questions con-
cerning  the  relationship  between  employers  and  their 
employees. The right of negotiation is thus reciprocal, i.e. 
it is balanced out by an obligation on the other side to enter 
into negotiations. 
Generally ~;peaking, there is a right of negotiation as regards 
all  matters which  may  have a  bearing on the employer-
employee relationship. The only matters which are excluded 
are questions such as the employer's purely personal rela-
tionships, aims and approach regarding activities of a reli-
gious,  scientific,  technical,  political or ideological nature 
and,  in  the  public  sector,  supervisory  activities  of the 
authorities in relation to the general public. 
An organisation is only entitled to negotiate on behalf of its 
members, a prerequisite for this being that one of its mem-
bers must be employed at the workplace concerned, or that 
the matter in question concerns a member who previously 
worked for the employer. The basic provisions on the right 
of  negotiation apply to all organisations irrespective of their 
size or whether they are party to a collective agreement. 
The obligation to negotiate means that a party must attend 
negotiations  and  discuss  objectively  the  questions  under 
consideration.  However,  the  obligation  to  take  part  in 
negotiations does not imply any obligation to enter into an 
agreement. 
The negotiation arrangements in place on the Swedish labour 
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•  collective bargaining aimed at concluding new collec-
tive agreements takes as its basis the general provisions 
on  the  right of negotiation  and  concerns  what  are 
known  as  "disputes  of interest~  Here,  the  right of 
negotiation is closely linked to the right to take indus-
trial action. The right of negotiation would be of less 
value if it were not possible to exert pressure on the 
other side in negotiations (see Chapter 11. 2.1); 
•  disputes negotiations (also known as grievance negotia-
tions), which also derive from the general provisions on 
negotiations and relate to so-called "disputes of  rights ~ 
The aim of negotiations is to reach agreement on how 
a law or contractual provision should be interpreted and 
applied so that the dispute does not have to be referred 
to the courts for a ruling (see Chapter 111. 4). 
Both  these  types of negotiations have been  used  on  the 
labour market for as long as employer and employee organi-
sations have existed. Under the Codetermination Act, a third 
type of negotiations was introduced: 
•  codeterminationlcooperative or joint regulation negoti-
ations, which give entitlement to negotiate on questions 
concerning a business and its management, in which the 
employer has the right to take binding decisions but the 
employees are given the opportunity to gain an insight 
into the matter in hand and exert an influence. In most 
cases, the precondition for this type of negotiations is 
the need for a collective agreement with the employer. 
(See also section 6. 2.1). 
5. Employer's management rights 
As long ago as 1906, the LO and SAF entered into an agree-
ment which established the right of employers to  choose 
their employees freely and to manage and allocate work. At 
the same time, the agreement acknowledged the principle of 
freedom of  association. The practice of the courts established 
as a  basic principle the employer's right  to  manage and 
allocate work and to  freely  employ and dismiss workers 
unless the law or collective agreement contained provisions 
preventing this. An important departure from this principle 
came along in 1974 with the introduction of the Employmellf 
Protection Act (the currently applicable version of which 
dates from 1982), which stipulated that employers must have 
an objective reason for dismissing an employee. 
On the basis of their right to determine the running of their 
businesses, employers may therefore choose their employees 
freely.  In the private and to a large extent the local-govern-
ment sector too, an employer can, as a general rule, freely 
choose the people he wishes to employ. The only restriction 
on this choice is that it may not contravene special legisla-
tion banning racial or sex discrimination. In addition, there 
may  also  be  a  few  former  employees  who,  under 
employment-protection legislation, have a priority right to 
a new job within one year of their old job coming to an end. 
An employer can also voluntarily limit his freedom to choose 
employees, e.g. under an agreement with employees' organ-
isations concerning internal recruitment. Employers in the 
public sector,  especially  public authorities,  are more re-
stricted than private-sector employers when taking on em-
ployees. In both the State and local-government sectors, any 
decision to take people on must be objective. Furthermore, 
in the State sector, it must be based on the merit and skills 
of the applicants (i.e. experience and formal qualifications), 
and other specific  regulations also apply with respect to 
some posts (e.g. special requirements regarding training or 
skills, the requirement of Swedish citizenship, etc.). 
The right of management of an employer includes the right 
to determine the work tasks, method of  work, working time 
and location. Under an employment contract, an employee 
makes  his  working  capacity  available  for  carrying  out 
various tasks and is therefore subject to the decisions and 
instructions of his employer. What an obligation to work 
includes is mainly determined by what may have been agreed 
between the parties. As long ago as 1929, the Labour Court 
established a work-obligation principle according to which 
an employee, as a worker under a collective agreement, must 
carry out any work which is connected with the employer's 
activities and which may be regarded as falling within the 
sphere of the employee's general vocational qualifications. 
This principle has since been developed further in a number 
of legal cases. An employer can therefore allocate different 
work tasks to an employee, but limits are set as regards the 
work  an  employer  must  do  under a  given  employment 
contract. If the employer wishes to go beyond these limits, 
a  new agreement must be reached with the employee or a 
new employment contract drawn up. 
The assignment of  an employee to a different work task must 
normally be regarded as a  measure which an employer's 
right of management entitles him to take, provided that the 
employee's contractually stipulated duties include such new 
task.  However,  any  assignment  to  other  duties  which 
encroaches on the freedom of  association or constitutes racial 
or sex  discrimination  can  be challenged  on the basis of 
specific statutory provisions. It is also generally considered 
that management of a business may not be conducted in an 
arbitrary way or in bad faith. In addition, the practice of the 
Labour Court has been to require that objective reasons be 
provided for any assignment to a different task. 
Gradually, through collective agreements, the employees' or-
ganisations  exerted  an  increasing  influence  on  matters 
relating to the management and running of businesses. A 
major aim of the legislation in the 1970s was to deepen and 
widen this influence. 
A number of  other ways in which employees can make their 
influence  felt  are  set  out  below.  The  intention  is  not, 
however, to provide an exhaustive account of these methods. 
For example,  the  long-established  collaboration  between 
employers and employees' representatives regarding ques-
tions concerning the work environment will not be looked at. 
Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  basis  for  this 
collaboration is that it is the employers who have the right to 
run and  manage their businesses.  This gives them wide-
ranging opportunities to take decisions on business policy 
and the scale of production, control the work operation and 
stipulate working hours, etc. 
6. Employee participation 
Employees are able to exert influence on management by 
electing employee representatives to sit on the management 
board. Out on the shop-floor, the various forms of employee 
participation provided for in the Codetermination Act are an SWEDEN 
important  means  of obtaining  information  and  bringing 
pressure to bear. 
a. Representation at management level 
Before new legislation was introduced in the 1970s, provi-
sions on employee representation were contained in collec-
tive agreements on works councils.  Once other channels 
became available for employees to exert an influence, these 
collective agreements ceased to apply. Today, there are no 
works councils in Sweden. However, a completely new law 
for the implementation of  Directive 94/45/EEC on European 
Worh Councils was proposed by a government committee in 
1995. 
On the employees' side, there was from the outset a certain 
degree of doubt about employee representatives sitting on 
management boards. These misgivings subsided when the 
employment legislation introduced in the  1970s provided 
that representation on boards of management should be only 
one of several means of  exerting an influence on the running 
of  businesses. A specific law concerning such representation, 
namely the Board Representation of Private-Sector Employ-
ees Act (lag om styre/serepresentationfor de privatanstiill-
da),  which applies to employees in,  among other things, 
joint-stock companies, banks and insurance companies,  is 
now in place. When at least 25 workers are employed, the 
local trade union which has concluded a collective agreement 
with the employer may pass a resolution on board represen-
tation  and  elect  two  members  to  serve  on  the  board  of 
management,  together with two deputies.  (Swedish joint-
stock  companies  are  organised  according  to  a  one-tier 
system). If the business  operates  in  specific  sectors  and 
employs at least 1,000 people in Sweden, then the unions 
may elect three representatives and three deputies. 
The employee representatives are always in a minority on 
management  boards.  In  principle,  they  are  on  an  equal 
footing with other board members. 
The  idea  behind  board  representation  is  that  employees 
should  be able to observe and exert an  influence on  the 
nmning of  a business. In practice, the legislation introduced 
has mainly served to provide information. The fact that a 
matter is dealt with by the management board in the presence 
of employee representatives does not release the employer 
from his obligation to conduct cooperative negotiations (see 
below). 
In the public sector,  specific regulations apply regarding 
employees sitting  on certain  boards and  committees.  As 
regards public authorities,  however,  these only apply  to 
those appointed by the government, and there is no right of 
representation in local authority bodies or on county coun-
cils.  Political  decisions  taken  by  these  bodies  must  be 
respected, and their employees usually only have a right to 
be present at and/or comment on proceedings, and may not 
take part in the decision-making process. 
b. The Codetennination Act 
The Codetermination Act contains provisions on the various 
ways employees may influence the running of businesses. It 
applies to all business undertakings irrespective of their size. 
However, undertakings of a religious, scientific, political or 
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technical nature or of  any ideological or other persuasion are 
exempted from  these provisions as  far as the aims of the 
undertaking  are  concerned.  In  the  public-sector  labour 
market, in the same way as with the relationship between the 
State and its employees, the employees' influence may not 
interfere with what is known as 
11 political democracy~ i.e. 
the right of public authorities to determine policy. 
i.  Cooperative/Joint Regulation/. 
Codetermination negotiations 
The most important means for employees to influence the 
management of businesses provided for in the Codetermina-
tion Act is the enhanced right of  the trade unions to negotiate 
on questions with respect to which the employer is entitled 
to take the final  decision.  Before an employer decides on 
major changes within his company or as regards the condi-
tions of employment or working conditions of a  worker 
belonging to the union, he must take the initiative in organis-
ing 
11Codetemtination negotiations "with the local trade union 
with which he has concluded a collective agreement; this 
requirement is known as the tprimary duty to negotiate~ The 
employer must  wait until  the negotiations are completed 
before taking any decision. In exceptional cases, however, 
it  is  possible for  the employer to  take a  decision  before 
entering into negotiations, namely when there is a danger to 
life and limb or a risk of serious economic loss if a decision 
is delayed. 
The primary duty to negotiate may apply, for example, in 
connection with scaling-down of a business operation, the 
introduction of new technology, company reorganisations, 
relocation or the assignment of an employee to new duties. 
The idea behind the primary duty to negotiate is to involve 
employees at an early stage and to make this involvement a 
normal part of the decision-making process. The purpose of 
negotiations is for the employer to listen to the points raised 
by the employees' representatives in order to reach agree-
ment on what decision the employer should take. 
As regards business and management matters not covered by 
the primary duty to negotiate, employers are still obliged to 
set out their intentions and negotiate before taking a decision 
if the trade union so requests. There could, for example, be 
matters  which  have  already  been  negotiated  in  routine 
meetings and with respect to which the union wishes changes 
to be made. 
Also in dealings with trade unions with which he has not 
entered into a collective agreement, an employer must take 
the  initiative in  negotiating  and  waiting  before taking  a 
decision specifically relating to the conditions of employ-
ment or working conditions of an employee belonging to 
such a union. 
In order to implement Directives 751129/EEC and 92/56/EEC 
relating to collective redundancies and Directive 771187/EEC 
relating to the safeguarding of  employees' rights in the event 
of transfers of undertakings,  a  new regulation was intro-
duced with effect as of 1 January 1995 which makes provi-
sion for situations in which an employer is not bound by any 
collective agreement at  all.  With any matters concerning 
redundancies because of scarcity of work or the transfer of 
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duty to negotiate with all employee organisations which have 
any members affected by the intended measure. 
The emphasis is on negotiations at local  level,  but if the 
parties at local level are unable to agree on what decision the 
employer should take, the trade union can refer the matter to 
its head organisation for further discussion, although this is 
something which happens only quite rarely. 
When the regulations were introduced, there were misgiv-
ings that the wider obligation to negotiate would unnecessar-
ily create additional work and lead to delays within busi-
nesses. However, research shows that both sides are now for 
the  most  part  in  favour  of the  system and  regard  it  as 
effective. 
ii.  The right to information 
The enhanced right to negotiation involves an obligation on 
the part of the employer to provide his opposite numbers 
with detailed information on the matters for negotiation, but 
there  are  also  specific  legal  provisions  on  the  right  to 
information which are aimed at giving those representing the 
employees a more general insight into the business undertak-
ing's situation. 
Employers must, on their own initiative, keep trade unions 
with which they have concluded a collective agreement in-
formed about the undertaking's progress in terms of produc-
tion and its financial position as well as the guidelines on 
staffing policy.  Employees'  organisations should  also  be 
given  an  opportunity to  examine the accounts and  other 
company documents to the extent necessary for them to be 
able to safeguard the collective interests of their members. 
The employer must provide all reasonable assistance in this 
connection. 
The employer may demand that the information provided by 
him be treated confidentially. If  the trade union does not 
agree to this, the employer is entitled to call for negotiations 
to  discuss  the  duty  to  maintain  confidentiality.  If such 
negotiations do not result in any agreement being reached, 
the employer may, within ten days, refer the matter to the 
Labour Court  for a  ruling.  Notwithstanding  the duty  to 
maintain confidentiality, however, the person receiving the 
information is allowed to pass it on to the union representa-
tive sitting on the management board. 
iii. Agreement on codetem1ination 
In the Codetermination Act, the parties which conclude the 
usual collective agreements on wages and general conditions 
of  employment are called on to enter into what are known as 
11codetermination agreements~ i.e. collective agreements on 
the employees' right of codetermination in matters relating 
to the conclusion and termination of employment contracts, 
management,  work  distribution  and  other aspects  of the 
business operation. 
Codetermination agreements of a different kind have now 
been entered into by central employer and employee organi-
sations  and  cover larger portions of the Swedish  labour 
market. These agreements mainly contain provisions adjust-
ing or adding to the provisions of the Codetermination Act. 
Only in exceptional cases has specific provision been made 
for the right of trade unions to determine matters othetwise 
decided on by the employer, or for restrictions to be placed 
on employers in  matters with regard to which they would 
otherwise  be  free  to  act  at  their own  discretion.  These 
11Central "agreements generally take the form of a framework 
agreement which can be made more specific and amended as 
required at a lower level. 
Developments in this area have been slow, but it is long-
term task which will require the two sides at local level to 
find  new approaches and methods of collaboration which 
work well for them. 
iv.  Priority right of  interpretation 
In the event of  a legal dispute arising between the two sides, 
a  particularly  important  question  is  whose view  should 
prevail whilst the dispute is still going on, and who should 
have the priority right of interpretation while a court ruling 
or some other settlement is being awaited. It is a provisional 
right which, for practical reasons, becomes an established 
decision  in  most  cases.  Given  the  employer's  right  to 
manage his business, the usual approach is that he should 
have  the  priority  right  of interpretation.  However,  the 
legislation introduced in the 1970s granted the priority right 
of interpretation to the trade unions with regard to certain 
matters. 
In the case of  a dispute about an individual worker's obliga-
tion to carry out certain work, the priority right of interpre-
tation  lies  with  the  trade  union  which  has  concluded  a 
collective agreement. If  the union states that, in its view, 
there is no obligation to work, then the worker concerned is 
released  from  his  duty  of loyalty  to  the  employer.  The 
worker can refrain from carrying out the work concerned 
without any risk of sanction; however,  the union may be 
liable for damages in cases where it makes a grave error of 
judgment or invokes the priority right of interpretation in 
bad faith.  The employer may, despite the union's priority 
right of interpretation,  have the work carried out if,  for 
example, the safety of the workplace would otherwise be 
jeopardised. 
The unions' priority right of interpretation also applies in 
disputes about the interpretation of codetermination agree-
ments, penalties for breach of contract by employees (e.g. 
disciplinary measures), the right of trade-union representa-
tives to pay, time off and job-protection. A limited priority 
right of interpretation applies with respect to disputes about 
remuneration (wages etc.) of employees. In addition, there 
are other variants of this right in the fields of employment 
protection and work environment. 
v.  The trade unions' right of  veto 
Employers  have  a  primary  duty  to  negotiate with  trade 
unions party to a collective agreement whenever they intend 
to contract work out to someone who will not become their 
employee, such as an entrepreneur or hired labour. The trade 
union is empowered to use its veto, i.e. prevent the measure, 
if it may be assumed that it disregards the law or collective 
agreement  or  otherwise  goes  against  what  is  generally 
accepted in  the sector concerned.  The veto may  only be 
invoked against a  particular employer (e.g.  who gains a 
reputation for not paying taxes or social insurance contribu-
tions, or who neglects his obligations towards his employ-SWEDEN 
ees) but not against the measure as such. The exercise of a 
veto merely means that a planned measure is stopped; the 
trade unions are not allowed to take any decision of their 
own instead of the employer. 
The rules governing vetoes have been much discussed; they 
were abolished in 1994 (by a right-wing government), and 
when they were reintroduced in 1995 (by a social-democratic 
government) a clause was added to the effect that a veto may 
not be invoked in any dispute concerning the rules on public 
procurement introduced in order to comply with EC law. 
When employees' organisations exercise their right of veto, 
they are subject to liability for their actions but also have a 
wide margin of discretion. 
CHAPTER II: SOURCES OF REGULSATION 
Swedish labour law is derived from provisions contained in 
laws and other regulations, the established practice of the 
courts, collective agreements and  individual  contracts of 
employment. At a lower level, it is based around regulations 
and the like issued by employers by virtue of their right to 
manage their businesses, and also custom ,usage and stan-
dard practice. International sources of law are beginning to 
acquire  greater  importance,  especially  since  Sweden's 
accession to the EU. 
Clearly one of the distinguishing features of Swedish labour 
law is that legislation has only been passed in this field over 
the last few years. For a long time, the main emphasis was 
placed on collective agreements, although many important 
principles were established though the practice of the courts. 
Despite the considerable increase in the amount of legislation 
over the last few decades, collective agreements can still be 
regarded as a particularly important and central source of 
regulation. 
1. Laws and regulations 
Some of  the fimdamental rights in the field of labour law are 
contained  in  the  Swedish  Constitution.  The  freedom  of 
association of employers and employees and their right to 
take industrial action are enshrined in the Constitution. As 
regards the public sector, i.e. government, local authorities 
and county councils, there is a general constitutional require-
ment to remain objective and impartial when decisions are 
Ulken by public authorities; this is known as the "objectivity 
principle". In the State sector, it is also the case that only 
"objective" factors  such  as  work  experience  and  formal 
qualifications may be Ulken into consideration when offering 
employment (see also 1.5 above). The Constitution guaran-
tees  equality  of the  sexes  and  protection  against  racial 
discrimination,  but actual  legal  provisions are set  out in 
specific legislation. Under Swedish law, there is no general 
ban on discrimination on the labour market. (The prevention 
of racial and sex discrimination is, however, provided for in 
specific laws, and legislation banning discrimination against 
the disabled is planned. Public-sector employers are subject 
to  the  requirements  of the  objectivity  principle  in  this 
regard). 
Most employment legislation falls within the field of civil 
law, although some of it does have features of public law. 
For example, public-law aspects are of considerable impor-
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tance in the field of environmental law. The field of social 
insurance and other social-security regulations are related to 
labour law, but usually relate to the general public irrespec-
tive of whether they are in employment or not, and for the 
most part give rise to claims against the State rather than 
employers. Employment policy is broad and flexible and is 
made  up  of a  combination  of civil-law  and  public-law 
provisions. 
Swedish labour law is usually divided up into collective 
labour law, which is concerned with the relationship between 
the  social  partners,  and  individual  labour  law,  which 
concerns the relationship between the individual employee 
and his employer. Given that the main emphasis in Swedish 
labour law is on the social partners' activities and regulation 
of the labour market by means of collective agreements, 
collective labour law is usually given priority over individual 
labour law in any presentation of this field in Sweden. 
The aim that has been pursued has been for employment 
legislation to have as wide a scope of application as possible. 
Special provisions applying to particular groups of employ-
ees are rare.  As  stated earlier,  however,  there are a  few 
special provisions applying to State employees, and specific 
legislation  concerning  work  by  domestic  employees  and 
seamen. It is  unusual  for any categories of worker to  be 
exempted from employment legislation. There are, however, 
some examples, such as home-workers and other 'Unsuper-
vised employees': who are not covered at all by the Working 
Hours Act (arbetstkb·lag) and only partially by the Holidays 
Act  (semesterlag);  senior executives  are not covered  by 
employment-protection legislation. There are no exemptions 
applying specifically to small businesses. 
The Swedish Parliament can  delegate to  the government 
and/or authorities the right to introduce statutory provisions 
in the field of labour law. An example is the work environ-
ment, in which the framework law (namely the 1997 Work 
Environment Act (arbetsmiljolag)) was supplemented by the 
Work  Environment  Ordinance  (arbetsmiljoforordning) 
introduced by  the government, and by a large number of 
regulations on various matters introduced by the National 
Board of Industrial Safety (Arbetarskyddsstyrelse). 
2. Collective agreements 
Collective agreements are sometimes used to regulate ques-
tions which are not a subject for legislation, e.g. wages and 
other remunerations, and sometimes in matters with regard 
to which legislation exists and the social partners are never-
theless allowed to conclude collective agreements deviating 
from it, make appropriate amendments and set out detailed 
provisions for various sectors and areas of activity. 
A collective agreement must by law be set out in writing and 
relate to conditions of employment for employees or other 
aspects of the employer-employee relationship. The contract-
ing parties must be an employers' association or individual 
employer on the one hand and the employees' organisation 
on the other. Both the contracting parties and their members 
are bound by  the agreement.  Non-unionised employees or 
those belonging to an organisation which is not a party to a 
collective agreement with the employer are not bound by 
collective agreements. The established practice of the courts 
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wise stipulated, to have different conditions of employment 
for employees not covered by a collective agreement. If, for 
example, an employer pays a non-unionised worker a lower 
wage than that provided for under a collective agreement, 
the organisation which is party to the agreement may sue 
him for breach of  contract and claim damages. On the other 
hand,  a  worker not covered by  the collective agreement 
cannot invoke any rights deriving from it.  This principle 
means that non-unionised workers enjoy the advantages of 
union membership without having to pay any subscriptions, 
i.e. 'freeloading "is possible. However, the idea behind these 
arrangements is that the employer should not be allowed to 
take on labour at a lower rate of pay than that required for 
union members. 
Employers who are not in any employers' association often 
conclude what are known as 
11derivative agreements • (hiing-
avtal) with the trade union at the place of work, i.e. collec-
tive agreements similar to national agreements applying in 
given sectors of the economy.  Also with employers who 
have not concluded any agreement at all, a widely applied 
collective agreement can be regarded as establishing given 
practice and may thus be applied in the workplace concerned 
(see below). 
The Swedish labour market is covered by national collective 
agreements under which wages and general  conditions of 
employment  are  laid  down  for  various  sectors  and/or 
professions. Such agreements usually apply for between one 
and  two  years,  and  negotiations on new agreements  take 
place, as a rule, each year or every other year. There are also 
some collective agreements which govern the relationship 
between organisations on the labour market.  This type of 
agreement may remain in  force for a very long time.  An 
example  are  the  so-called  'principal/} agreements  in  the 
various sectors of the labour market which regulate basic 
questions concerning negotiations, industrial action and the 
like (one example of this being the Saltsjobaden Agreement 
mentioned above). 
Collective agreements may be concluded at national or local 
level.  It is not permissible for  employers and employees 
bound by a collective agreement to make any arrangements 
infringing  its  provisions;  such  arrangements  are  invalid. 
However, a collective agreement can be designed in such a 
way  that it leaves scope for possible departures  from  its 
provisions where appropriate. An example of this is when, 
within an  individual sector, a national agreement contains 
provisions on a minimum wage which allow the partners to 
agree on a higher wage at local level. It is customary for 
collective agreements to allow deviations from their provi-
sions if these are to the advantage of employees, but if, for 
example, clauses concerning wages provide for  "standard 
wages~ the contractually stipulated wage - no more and no 
less- must be paid. This arrangement is different from many 
other countries, where the provisions of collective agree-
ments are generally restricted to  laying down a minimum 
wage. 
It is not possible under Swedish labour law to extend the 
scope of a  collective agreement or declare it  universally 
valid.  Neither Swedish nor Danish law provides  for  this 
possibility (unlike Finland and Norway). The high degree of 
organisation and the extensive coverage afforded by collec-
tive agreements have meant that such arrangements have not 
been regarded as necessary in Sweden. 
Apart from their regulatory and normative function, collec-
tive agreements are also of considerable importance in that 
they set out what is known as the ']Jeace obligation • of the 
social partners. 
a. Collective bargaining 
Collective bargaining has for a long time been carried out on 
a  highly centralised basis  in  Sweden.  Over recent years, 
however, there has been a move towards more decentralisa-
tion and greater freedom of action at local level, especially 
as regards wages. 
Broadly speaking, this centralised system has meant that, in 
the private sector, framework agreements concerning wages 
and general conditions of employment are concluded at na-
tional level between the Swedish Trade Union Confederation 
{LO) and the Swedish Employers' Cotifederation {SAF), under 
which  the  total  wage  increases are stipulated.  This total 
figure is  then broken down into specific awards firstly at 
national branch level and then at local level by the undertak-
ing concerned and the local trade union. These negotiations 
are conducted subject to the peace obligation on the social 
partners. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, agreements moved towards 
further decentralisation.  This was backed up by intensive 
public-relations work, especially by employers in the private 
sector.  The position of the umbrella organisations became 
weaker.  The main focus of negotiations is now at national 
branch level. The main aim on the employers' side is further 
decentralisation down to local level, or in certain cases to the 
level of individual employees. 
Nevertheless, it is still the case that negotiations are concen-
trated among a small circle of principal protagonists. In the 
private  sector,  the  general  rule  is  that  negotiations  are 
conducted  and  collective  agreements  concluded  between 
national branches and sector-specific organisations. Negotia-
tions at local level then take place in the framework of the 
agreement concluded by the national branch, subject to the 
peace obligation incumbent on the parties. At local-authority 
and county-council level, nationwide agreements are entered 
into  between  the  relevant  employees'  organisation  (or a 
special body acting on behalf of several organisations) and 
the  Swedish  Association  of Local  Authorities  and  the 
Federation of  Swedish County Councils. The agreements are 
not subject to government approval, but each individual local 
authority or county council must approve them. In the State 
sector,  negotiations  are  conducted  between  the  National 
Employers'  Administration  and  the  relevant  employees' 
organisation (or the body negotiating on behalf of the latter). 
The agreement  concluded  applies  directly  to  lower-level 
authorities,  and  negotiations  at  local-authority  level  are 
subject to the peace obligation. 
3. Individual employment contracts 
Under Swedish law, agreements for the performance of work 
can  be  divided  into  two  categories,  namely  employment 
contracts  and  contract  work  agreements.  The  difference 
between the two is very important. As soon as an employ-SWEDEN 
ment contract comes into being, the employee is generally 
covered by employment legislation. 
There is no general legislation on employment contracts, nor 
is  there any  legal  definition of an employment contract. 
When an agreement concerning the performance of work for 
remWleration is entered into, an employer-employee relation-
ship is deemed to exist because an employment contract is 
considered to have come about. The concept of "employee" 
has been developed through the practice of the courts; there 
is no general definition applying in the field of labour law 
generally, nor any precise rule determining when a person is 
to  be  deemed  an  employee.  This  assessment  involves 
weighing up a number of different facts and circumstances 
of  relevance in each individual instance, such as the duration 
of  the work, who is responsible for management, who is to 
supply the materials, the nature of the remuneration and the 
work obligation on the person concerned. 
Like other industrialised countries, Sweden has in the last 
few years seen an increasing degree of variation in the types 
of agreement concerning the performance of work.  Some 
"atypical"  agreements  do  not  generally  fall  within  the 
definition of  an "employment contract~ which means that the 
person performing the work must be regarded as an inde-
pendent contractor. Other arrangements must be classified as 
employment  contracts,  although  the  main  provisions  of 
employment-protection legislation may be departed from if 
the employment concerned is for a limited period, as is the 
case with a  fixed  term job or probationary employment. 
Specific legislation  may  also apply  to  such  employment 
contracts (e.g. contracts on the hiring-out of labour). 
An employment contract may be entered into without having 
to meet any formal requirements. It is often merely specified 
what work is to be carried out by- the employee and the date 
on which he is to start work. The rest of the contract is 
derived from employment legislation - to a  large extent 
collective agreements governing employment relationships -
as well as custom, usage and standard practice. The specific 
provisions contained in contracts between individual employ-
ees and their employers vary greatly, however.  Contracts 
with highly qualified or skilled employees may be very much 
geared to the individual concerned. 
4. Practice of the courts 
The Labour Court (Arbedsdomstol) is a special court which 
rules on labour disputes in Sweden. It plays an especially 
important role in Swedish labour law and sets legal prece-
dents. The Court has in some cases established rules in areas 
in which no regulations existed previous}  y, and sometimes 
has brought about greater legal clarity in areas where the law 
is open to interpretation. It has established many important 
general principles applying on the Swedish labour market, 
e.g. as regards the right of employers to unilaterally manage 
and run a business unless otherwise stipulated. 
Although the Labour Court is the principal court in the field 
of  labour law, some important principles are also established 
by the civil courts, particularly the Supreme Court (hogsta 
domstol), which is the court of final instance in civil law. 
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Sweden's membership of the EU has of course meant that the 
practice of the Labour Court has acquired increasing impor-
tance in Swedish labour law. 
5. Customs, standard practice, etc. 
A collective agreement which is universally applied within 
a given sector may be regarded as a legal custom, even in 
workplaces where the parties concerned are not bound by 
any collective agreement. Unless the parties agree otherwise, 
it is quite likely to be assumed that the established legal 
custom is to apply. The terms of the collective agreement 
may be considered to reflect what should reasonably apply 
in the given context. 
Rules or regulations, etc. introduced unilaterally by employ-
ers on the basis of their right of management,  and also 
established custom, usage and standard practice, may also be 
of relevance. 
6. International law 
As regards international law, Sweden applies what is known 
as  the  ''dualistic  approach~  International  conventions 
ratified by Sweden therefore do not form part of the body of 
laws until they have been incorporated into Swedish law. 
Sweden  is  signatory  to  a  number of ILO  (International 
Labour Organisation) conventions and is thus obliged under 
international law to ensure that its national laws meet the 
requirements  of  the  conventions  concerned.  However, 
ratification  as  such  does  not  imply  that  a  convention's 
provisions can be invoked by parties to a dispute before the 
Swedish courts in the same way as provisions of Swedish 
national law. If  Swedish laws contain no provisions corre-
~;ponding to those of the convention, then the latter must be 
incorporated  into  Swedish  law.  However,  ratification 
without any accompanying legislation for incorporation into 
national law is regarded as an implicit indication that already 
existing provisions of national law correspond to the provi-
sions of the convention concerned. 
Cooperation between the Nordic countries takes place under 
the auspices of the Nordic Council,  and agreements have 
been entered into in the field of  labour law. An agreement on 
the free movement of workers and a common labour market 
within the Nordic countries was introduced as long ago as 
1954 (and was revised in 1982). 
The Convention for the Protection of Human  Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was incorporated into Swedish law 
on 1 January 1995.  Previously, the Convention was only 
regarded as binding on the Swedish State. 
Sweden joined the EU  on 1 January 1995, but was already 
obliged under the EEA Agreement, which entered into force 
one year earlier, to bring its employment legislation into line 
with Community law. Community employment legislation 
thus applies in Sweden. 
7. Interplay of legal provisions in the field of labour law 
The interplay between the various types of legal provisions 
applying to the labour market is complex, and only some of 
the essential features can be outlined here. 228  THE REGULATION OF WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION- VOLUME 2 
Sweden is obliged to comply with its legal obligations under 
international law. Some provisions of Community law may 
be invoked directly in Sweden. 
Employment  legislation  contains  some  absolute  (non-
dispositive)  provisions,  according  to  which  the  social 
partners are not allowed to  make any alternative arrange-
ments or place an employee in a worse position than under 
the  provisions  concerned,  and  non-absolute  (dispositive) 
provisions,  which  may  be  contracted  away.  To  a  large 
extent, employment legislation contains binding provisions 
to  the advantage of employees.  Swedish  labour law also 
makes  use of semi-absolute (semi-dispositive)  provisions. 
Under these provisions, deviations from existing laws are 
only possible subject to  special  qualifications,  which are 
often set out in collective agreements at national  branch 
level, i.e. individual contracts of employment are ruled out 
and collective agreements at local level do not always apply. 
The idea  is  to  ensure  a  strong  negotiating  position  and 
possibly a degree of uniformity in any such deviations from 
statutory provisions. 
The Labour Court has also established a number of general 
principles which are regarded as an  implied component of 
collective agreements or contracts of employment. Individual 
employment contracts between employers and employees are 
of relatively little importance on the Swedish labour market. 
The hierarchical structure of  these various provisions may be 
simplified somewhat: absolute legal provisions (i.e. which 
cannot be contracted away) take top priority, followed by 
collective agreements at national level and then local level, 
non-absolute legal provisions (which may also be placed at 
a higher level of priority than local collective agreements), 
individual  employment  contracts,  with  rules,  established 
customs etc. bringing up the rear. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION, APPROACHES 
TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 
The resolution of  conflicts on the labour market involves not 
merely measures to  resolve disputes but also  measures to 
prevent them.  An  example of the  latter is the system for 
enabling employees to  influence the management of busi-
nesses.  Negotiations between employers and employees are 
an  important  part of both  the  preventive  and  "curative 
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procedures. 
Swedish labour law makes an important distinction between 
disputes of rights and disputes of interests.  The essential 
feature of disputes of interests is that the parties are not in 
dispute about any question on which legal provisions exist, 
but about questions for which there is no underlying princi-
ple for establishing which party is in the right. The decisive 
factor is the relative strength of the parties involved. Puni-
tive measures may be taken to put pressure on the other side 
to meet the given demands.  Disputes of rights concern the 
interpretation and application of laws and collective agree-
ments. Only disputes of rights may be referred to the courts 
for a ruling, and punitive measures in connection with such 
disputes are forbidden. 
1. Strikes and lockouts, etc. 
The right to  take industrial action is a basic constitutional 
right, but may be restricted under specific laws or collective 
agreements, which is often what happens. The basic rule is 
that in cases where a collective agreement does not apply, 
there is a right to take industrial action, although, broadly 
speaking, the peace obligation applies for the duration of the 
agreement  concerned.  Exceptions  to  the  above  are  the 
following: 
•  measures  for  the  purpose  of settling  questions  not 
provided for in the collective agreement (the scope for 
such measures being very limited), 
•  measures merely for giving support to another party on 
the labour market in cases where the latter has taken 
industrial action which is legal, i.e. measures in sympa-
thy with primary action which is legal, 
•  picketing of an employer to force him to meet a clear 
and outstanding wage demand, i.e. to enforce claims, 
•  measures  aimed  at bringing about a codetermination 
agreement. 
In practice, the main exemption from compliance with the 
peace obligation during the term of a collective agreement is 
measures taken in sympathy with other workers. The right 
to take such measures is very wide-ranging under Swedish 
law. The fact that a single, minor dispute can in theory lead 
to lawful action in sympathy by the rest of the labour market 
- even  if the parties concerned have already concluded a 
collective agreement - encourages a centralised approach in 
connection with negotiations and collective agreements. 
A  basic  precondition  for  industrial  action  to  be  deemed 
lawful is that a decision to take such action has been taken in 
the proper manner. The rules governing most organisations 
attach a high degree of importance to the right to take such 
decisions.  Rules  requiring  a  ballot of members  are very 
unusual and, for all practical purposes, such balloting now 
never takes place in connection with industrial action. The 
most  common  type of illegal  strike is  the wildcat strike. 
Actions of this kind are mainly very short-term, and some-
times last only a few hours. Before the introduction of the 
Codetemtination Act, employers used to refuse to negotiate 
if an illegal strike was in progress. The law now states that 
the two sides have a reciprocal obligation to start discussions 
immediately on how the unlawful strikers can be induced to 
return to work. 
Any work which is the subject of an industrial dispute may 
not  be  carried  out by  other workers  not involved  in  the 
conflict.  The  use  of blackleg  labour  is  unknown  on  the 
Swedish labour market. 
Possible forms of industrial action are the strike, lockout, 
picketing and  boycott,  and  "other comparable measures~ 
What these "measures 
11 are is left for the law to decide; they 
usually involve partial  industrial action of various kinds. 
Strikes and lockouts are analogous under the law.  Swedish 
law  imposes  no  restrictions  requiring  that  the  industrial 
action  serve a specific purpose or that it must be socially 
justified. For a long time, strikes and lockouts were the most 
common forms of industrial action, but on today's labour 
market the  pattern of disputes  has  altered.  Disputes now 
often begin with employees taking various forms of limited SWEDEN 
industrial action, such as an overtime ban, a work to  rule 
and selective strikes of key personnel, etc. 
It is always an illegal act for an employer in a dispute to 
withhold outstanding wages. There is a special law banning 
an employer from evicting an employee from tied accommo-
dation during the course of a dispute. 
In the public sector, the general rule is that industrial action 
may only be taken subject to the same requirements as in the 
private sector, although there are some restrictions specified 
by law. State employees with administrative functions may 
only be involved in overtime bans or recruitment freezes. 
They may not, for example, take part in selective strikes and 
are therefore only allowed to take part in strikes in sympathy 
with other workers. 
As far as political action or action in sympathy with workers 
abroad is concerned, existing legislation merely provides that 
public-sector workers are banned  from  taking  action  de-
signed to influence domestic political circumstances.  Case 
law has also provided some clarification. In short, it may be 
said that there is a certain scope for taking industrial action 
with  a  foreign  political  background  even  if a  collective 
agreement has been concluded, provided that these are short-
term protest or demonstration  measures.  With  respect  to 
~ympathy action on behalf of a foreign party, the principle 
ts  that  sympathy  measures  in  Sweden  are  permissible 
provided that the foreign dispute is legal under that country's 
legislation. 
If  a collective agreement has been concluded which provides 
for a peace obligation, outside organisations are also  not 
allowed to  instigate or support illegal industrial action in 
areas covered by such agreement.  Following a number of 
significant  court  rulings,  1991  saw  the  introduction  of 
changes to the law which restricted the above ban so that it 
only  applies  if an  organisation  is  involved  in  industrial 
action in connection with employment relationships to which 
t~e Codetermination Act directly applies.  The new provi-
stons  have  opened  up  the  possibility  for  Swedish  trade 
unions  to  take  industrial  action  aimed  at  setting  aside 
collective agreements which,  for  example,  are concluded 
between a foreign undertaking and workers it has seconded 
abroad to carry out work in Sweden. The trade unions regard 
this as a major opportunity for preventing "social dumping': 
There is some controversy about whether Swedish law makes 
a distinction between Swedish and foreign  employers in  a 
manner contrary to  the provisions of the  Treaty of Rome 
concerning freedom of movement and a ban on discrimina-
tion. 
In addition to these statutory restrictions on the right to take 
industrial action, the social partners have agreed on further 
restrictions.  The  Saltsjobaden  Agreement  in  the  private 
sector does not allow industrial action in which neutral third 
parties are adversely affected or which relate to  essential 
public services. In the public sector, the social partners have 
exempted employees working as employer representatives 
fro.m  any industrial action, and have agreed that any such 
achon  should  show  restraint  in  areas  affecting  national 
security, _taw and order or the care of the sick and elderly. 
Th~ part~es h~ve also  a~reed that  they  would  avoid  any 
action which mtght be detnmental to the democratic system. 
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Before taking any action, the parties are legally required to 
give  the  other  side  seven  days'  advance  notice of their 
intentions. Failure to give such notification does not mean 
t~at.  t?e industrial action planned is illegal, but may lead to 
habthty for compensation. There are no legal provisions in 
place concerning cooling-off periods etc. 
Individual employment agreements may not be terminated 
during a  work stoppage as  part of industrial action,  but 
remain in effect for the duration of the action. However, the 
rights and  obligations of the contracting  parties are sus-
pended for as long as the dispute continues. 
A feature of the Swedish labour market is its great stability. 
Employers' and employees' organisations almost never back 
illegal industrial action. However, there are two sides to the 
cent~ised structure of the market: on the one hand, parties 
exerc1se  responsibility  and  discrimination in  their use  of 
industrial action, but on the other hand such action is often 
very major once it has broken out. In the 1980s, there were 
many serious major disputes,  mainly in the public sector. 
The economic crisis led  to  a  reduction  in  the number of 
disputes,  but recently  public-sector employees have once 
again  been  showing  a  readiness  to  engage  in  industrial 
disputes in  order to  stop their pay slipping behind wage-
levels in the private sector. Despite these moves towards a 
market with less tension and antagonism, there are neverthe-
less still only a few European countries in which the number 
of working days lost through strikes is lower than in Swe-
den. 
If  a party takes illegal industrial action, the other side may 
take  the  matter  to  the Labour Court and  claim damages. 
Ho_wever,  the damages payable by an individual employee 
taking part in illegal industrial action are fairly limited. For 
a long time, SEK  200 was normally payable (which corre-
sponded to one month's wages for a worker when the legal 
provision concerned was introduced in 1928); since 1992, 
SEK 2,000 at current monetary value is payable. If  striking 
workers return to work as a result of discussions between the 
employers and  trade unions,  the Labour Court is usually 
willing to take a lenient view of the need to pay damages. 
The Labour Court can also order striking workers to return 
to  work.  Only  in  particularly  serious  cases  can  illegal 
industrial action lead to dismissal. In principle, no dismissals 
are possible in connection with legal industrial action. 
2. Mediation 
Under Swedish law, no distinction is made between "concili-
ation" and  "mediation". Legal texts even refer to mediation 
being carried out by conciliators. Mediation is the usual pro-
cedure when parties are unable to  settle a dispute among 
themselves. Mediation is intended to be used in disputes be-
tween employers' and employees' organisations, but is not 
restricted to only this type of dispute; in practice, there is a 
separate  procedure  at  local  level  for  dealing  with  legal 
questions concerning, for example, disputes about employ-
ment-protection or wages. 
Mediation is the only institutionalised form of State interven-
tion in wage negotiations in Sweden. A State-run mediation 
body has existed since the beginning of the century, and the 
set of rules and  regulations within which  it operates has 
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National Swedish Mediation Service, which follows develop-
ments on the labour market and sends mediators whenever it 
learns of  a dispute which threatens to lead or has already led 
to industrial action. Mediation in local disputes is first of all 
referred to conciliators permanently based in various regions 
of  the country. The conciliators carry out these activities as 
a secondary occupation. In serious disputes, the Mediation 
Service assigns  one or more conciliators  to  a  particular 
dispute. The parties in dispute have a considerable say in 
who is to be chosen, and they often choose a person of high 
standing in the community, such as a county governor or 
director-general. In recent years, former representatives of 
labour-market organisations have been a popular choice. 
A party must give the Mediation Service and the other side 
to a dispute seven days' advance notification of any indus-
trial action.  The Mediation Service usually keeps up with 
developments in this way, or through one or both parties 
approaching it and asking for a mediator to be appointed. 
The costs involved in providing a mediator are met by the 
State. 
Mediators do not have any actual power over the parties to 
a dispute. The only thing which the latter are obliged to do 
is meet in the mediator's presence. The mediator can neither 
postpone nor stop industrial action, but it was previously 
almost  a  tradition  for  the parties  to  do as  the  mediator 
requests.  In  recent years,  the parties have  taken  a  more 
confrontational attitude, which has made the mediator's job 
more difficult. For example, it is now quite often the case 
that mediation goes on while a dispute is in progress, or that 
industrial action is taken while mediation is going on. 
During the history of the mediation services in Sweden, it 
was proposed on repeated occasions that mediation bodies 
should be given extensive powers, that a conciliator should 
be appointed along the same lines as  in  the other Nordic 
countries, and that the latter should (also in the same way as 
in the other Nordic countries) be empowered to postpone 
industrial action. No proposal of this kind has been imple-
mented up to now. It is still the case that, for all practical 
purposes, all major disputes which the parties involved are 
unable to resolve through negotiations among themselves are 
settled through mediation. 
At  national  and  local-authority  level,  the  parties  fairly 
recently  concluded  a  collective  agreement,  known  as  a 
"principal agreement~ under which they agreed not to take 
any industrial action while efforts are going on to resolve the 
dispute through mediation. 
Private mediation procedures are not supposed to take place 
on the Swedish labour market. 
3. Disputes posing a danger to society 
Sweden does not have any legislation concerning disputes 
posing a danger to society, not even as regards disputes in 
the  public  sector.  Nor  is  there  any  legislation  banning 
industrial action by certain groups of workers. As a general 
rule, the military, police, persons caring for the sick, and 
court employees, to name just a few examples, thus have the 
same  right  to  take  industrial  action  as  other  groups  of 
workers.  Employers'  and  employees'  organisations  have 
been more forceful in asserting their right to self-determina-
tion and independence than has been the case in the other 
Nordic countries. 
In their "principal agreements 
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,  the parties agreed that any 
party which regarded any industrial action as posing a risk 
to society should be able refer the matter to special commit-
tees;  this applies to each sector of the labour market. The 
committees are made up of representatives of the parties, and 
their decisions are merely of an advisory nature. They have 
been criticised for this reason, and a proposal has been put 
forward for a body with wider-reaching powers to be set up. 
In the government and local-authority sectors, the commit-
tees concerned  have recently  been expanded through  the 
appointment of  an equal number of  members representing the 
two sides. 
There is  an  implied  assumption  that  the  government or 
parliament may,  as  a  fmal  resort,  intervene in a  labour 
dispute which  poses  a  risk  to  society  as  a  whole.  Such 
intervention has been planned on three occasions in all, but 
only once did it take place, namely in 1971 when a dispute 
involving teachers and lecturers broke out as a result of a 
particular piece of legislation being introduced. 
4. Negotiations in labour disputes and the Labour Court 
Labour-dispute negotiations are aimed at clarifying the facts 
surrounding an issue, and the interpretation or implementa-
tion of rules in a specific instance. Such negotiations differ 
from  contractual  negotiations  in  that  they  are subject to 
already  existing  rules  restricting  the  parties'  scope  of 
discretion. A precondition for any dispute being referred for 
examination by the Labour Court is that the parties involved 
are  engaged  in  negotiations.  Under  non-absolute  legal 
provisions and most collective agreements, negotiations must 
first  of all  be conducted at  local  level  and  may  then  be 
referred to national level if no agreement can be reached. 
Only after these two stages can a party refer the matter to the 
Labour Court.  The great  majority of legal  disputes  are 
resolved in negotiations; only a small number are referred to 
the Labour Court for a ruling. 
The Labour Court has  since  1928 been the special court 
dealing with labour disputes. The Court is the only one of its 
kind and deals with all disputes throughout the country. It is 
the  court  of both  first  and  final  instance  in  labour-law 
disputes involving employers' and employees' organisations 
or collective agreements concluded by individual employers. 
The dispute must either concern a collective agreement, the 
Codetemtination Act, or alternatively a collective agreement 
must exist between the parties to the lawsuit. The Labour 
Court  therefore  gives  rulings  in  the  field  of labour law 
relating  to  both  collective  arrangements  and  individual 
rights. 
Other labour disputes are dealt with by a lower civil court, 
namely the district court. These disputes concern claims of 
non-unionised workers, or workers whose trade union does 
not wish to represent them.  Appeals against rulings of the 
district court may  be lodged with the Labour Court.  No 
appeal is possible against rulings of the Labour Court. 
The Labour Court is made up of  judges, experts and repre-
sentatives  of employers  and  employees.  The  latter  are 
appointed by the government in  line with proposals from SWEDEN 
employers' and employees' organisations. The members of 
the court each cast a  vote when a  ruling  is  to  be given. 
Following the introduction of  new legislation in the 1970s, 
the number of  judgments increased yearly.  Since then,  the 
Court has dealt with an average of 150-200 cases a year. In 
recent years,  however,  the number of lawsuits  filed  has 
increased  considerably,  especially in  the case of disputes 
concerning employment-protection. This increase is believed 
to have been caused by,  among other things,  the greater 
degree of confrontation between the parties and a harsher 
climate on the labour market. 
As stated earlier, the Labour Court occupies an important 
position as  a  source of labour-law precedents.  However, 
despite the great importance of the Court in Swedish labour 
law and its established position as an integral part of the 
labour market in  Sweden,  it is  still  the subject of some 
controversy; among other things, the question is being asked 
whether the fact that employer and employee representatives 
sit in the Court violates Sweden's obligations under interna-
tional law. 
The main penalty that can be imposed in connection with 
labour disputes is an order to pay damages. Damages may be 
awarded  for losses which are financial  in  nature or non-
financial (i.e. arising from an infringement of the law or 
breach of  contract). An example of other measures available 
to the Court is to order, in cases of unfair dismissal, that the 
employment contract concerned remain in effect (while at the 
same time also awarding damages). 
S. Arbitration proceedings 
Arbitration  proceedings  are  used  very  sparingly  on  the 
Swedish labour market. They are hardly instituted at all in 
connection with disputes of interest. In disputes of rights, 
arbitration  proceedings  are  mainly  used  with  respect  to 
specific issues. Many collective agreements contain arbitra-
tion  clauses  relating  to  specific  questions,  for  example 
disputes about the terms of a contract. The parties have also 
set up a number of permanent arbitration committees, such 
as  the  committee  dealing  with  restraint  of competition 
clauses.  Arbitration  proceedings  may  be  instituted  with 
regard to highly qualified or specialised staff if the agree-
ment between the parties provides for matters to be taken to 
arbitration.  This also  happens  in  some  disputes  between 
different trade unions, or between a trade union and one of 
its members. 
Arbitration  proceedings come under private  law  and  are 
entered into by parties on a voluntary basis. There is no em-
ployment legislation requiring arbitration proceedings to be 
instituted. The parties can agree that the procedure may be 
invoked in connection with both a current dispute and in any 
other  dispute  arising  between  them  in  the  future.  they 
themselves decide how their arbitration committee should be 
made  up.  It  is  customary  for  each  party  to  appoint  an 
arbitrator and  for  these two arbitrators to  appoint a third 
one. A dispute may not be referred to a court if an arbitra-
tion agreement is in force. 
CHAPTER IV: SWEDISH LABOUR LAW 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
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It  is only in  the last few  years that international develop-
ments  have  made  themselves  felt  on the  Swedish  labour 
market. 
1. International private law, 
competent court, applicable law 
With regard to disputes involving a foreign country, Swedish 
employment legislation does not for the most part contain 
any provisions concerning jurisdiction. In order to establish 
whether the  Swedish  courts  have jurisdiction and which 
country's laws are to  apply,  there are a  number of legal 
provisions in force deriving from international conventions 
to which Sweden is a party, and also provisions of Swedish 
law concerning international disputes. Only a very general 
outline will be provided here. 
The question of when a court has jurisdiction to deal with a 
labour dispute is provided for in the 1988 Lugano Conven-
tion, adopted by the EFf  A and EU countries, on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of  judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, which was incorporated into Swedish law in 1993. 
The general  approach  taken  is  that any  lawsuit against a 
person resident in a signatory state should be dealt with by 
the courts in that state.  Alternatively, if a dispute concerns 
a collective agreement,  the matter may be referred to the 
courts with jurisdiction at the location where the employee 
works. The Lugano Convention applies between EFf  A and 
EU  member states,  and  between  EFfA  member  states  in 
relation to each other. (It is worth mentioning here that the 
Lugano Convention applies alongside and is almost identical 
to  the 1968 Brussels Convention between the EU Member 
States. Sweden has not yet signed the latter.) 
If a respondent in a  lawsuit has not been  resident in any 
country which  has  signed up  to  the Lugano Convention, 
Sweden does not have any special legal provisions concern-
ing jurisdiction. The legal position used to be that Sweden 
has jurisdiction if the dispute or the parties to it have such 
strong  links  with  Sweden  that  a  Swedish  interest  in  the 
administration of justice can  be considered to  exist.  The 
principle  underlying  this  approach  is  an  application,  by 
extension, of the rules determining which local court has 
jurisdiction; if no  such court is deemed competent,  then 
Sweden is considered to have jurisdiction unless there are 
any reasons preventing this.  This gives rise to the general 
rule that a case will be dealt with by a Swedish court if the 
respondent is  resident  in  Sweden.  (In  a  ruling  issued  in 
1995,  the  Labour  Court  took  into  consideration  certain 
provisions of the Lugano Convention even though these did 
not relate directly to the dispute concerned.) 
As  regards  the question of which  country's laws  should 
apply in a dispute involving a foreign country, Sweden has 
not yet signed the 1980 Rome Convention applying to all EU 
Member States.  According  to  Swedish  legal  practice and 
jurisprudence, the general rule is that the legal system of the 
COWltry with which the employment relationship (or collec-
tive  agreement)  has  the  closest  and  most  obvious  links 
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2. International context 
Sweden has signed a number of ILO Conventions and has for 
a long time been a driving force behind the work of the ILO. 
However,  the dualistic system in Sweden, which requires 
introductory  legislation,  has  meant  that  questions  are 
occasionally raised about whether all conventions signed by 
Sweden have been incorporated into Swedish law. In the last 
few years, there have been instances of Sweden withdrawing 
from conventions involving changes to Swedish law, and of 
the ILO having to look at the compatibility of Swedish law 
with ILO conventions. There has, among other things, been 
a  public-sector monopoly  on job-placement services  and 
protection against occupational injury. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the introduction of the 
European Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in 1995 will affect the Swedish 
legal  system.  As  mentioned  above,  transposition  into 
Swedish law is considered to have an impact on the protec-
tion  of the 
11negative freedom  of associations" (i.e.  the 
freedom of non-association). 
The main source of international law now having an effect 
on Swedish labour law is EU labour law. 
a. Swedish labour law and EU labour law 
As can be seen from these observations, the structure of and 
legal approaches provided for in Swedish labour law differ 
from the systems applying in the Continental Member States 
and British Isles. The Nordic countries, in contrast, have a 
long tradition of a common employment policy and labour-
market culture (see also the section on Denmark). Two par-
ticular features of the Swedish system are the central role of 
employers' and employees' organisations (especially trade 
unions) and the importance of collective agreements. 
The matter of collective agreements is very  important to 
Sweden. According to some rulings of the European Court 
of Justice  (Cases  91/81,  131/84:  European  Commission 
versus  Italy;  Case  143/83: European  Commission  versus 
Denmark),  collective agreements in Sweden are unable to 
meet the requirements which the implementation of direc-
tives implies. No body exists in Sweden which is responsible 
for the general  validation of collective agreements under 
Swedish labour law (Case 215183: European Commission 
versus Belgium). The legal position of collective agreements 
is also of relevance in Sweden as regards the question of 
whether  EC  directives  may  be implemented  by  means  of 
semi-absolute legal provisions (see Chapter II. 7 above). The 
incorporation of  EC law into Swedish law has made the legal 
provisions concerned  "Ec  dispositive~ which  means  that 
collective agreements may deviate from statutory provisions 
but may not provide for arrangements less advantageous to 
employees  than  are set out in  the current version of the 
relevant directive. 
It is possible that EC law will also have an effect on other 
sources  of labour  legislation  and  bodies  in  Sweden.  In 
Swedish  legal  practice,  the  preparation of pre-enactment 
legislation iforarbeten) is a very important source of inter-
pretation of legal texts.  The European  Court of  Justice's 
refusal  to  consider statements  made in  the forarbeten  as 
fulfilling  the requirements of the  EC  directive concerned 
(Case 143/83: European Commission versus Denmark) can 
be expected to lead to a weaker position for this source of 
law in Sweden. 
When Sweden implemented EU regulations on freedom of 
movement for workers, a number of changes to legislation 
concerning foreigners were necessary,  as well as to legal 
provisions  on the  mutual  recognition  of educational  and 
vocational qualifications. It should be noted that Swedish 
law places cohabiting couples on a par with husbands and 
wives as regards  the family  of the migrant worker con-
cerned. 
In  order  for  Directives  75/129/EEC  and  92/56/EEC  on 
collective redundancies  and Directive  771187/EEC  on  the 
transfer of  undertakings to be implemented, major changes 
had to be made to Swedish regulations relating to the right 
of  employers to dismiss employees if there is a lack of  work, 
and as regards negotiations in connection with dismissals due 
to lack of work or the transfer of a business.  The initial 
attitude of the Swedish  Parliament was that the Swedish 
Employment Protection Act (anstiillningsskydd-lag) and the 
trade unions' right of negotiation and their central role as 
labour-market watchdog meant that Swedish legal provisions 
met  the  requirements  of the  directives.  No  laws  were 
changed until  the EFf  A  Surveillance Authority {ESA) had 
given its comments. Thus, in contrast with earlier Swedish 
legal  provisions,  the  requirement  applying  from  1995 
onwards is that the transfer of a company or business does 
not in  itself constitute an objective reason for dismissing 
staff.  On  the contrary:  the  rights of employees under a 
collective agreement are now transferred into their relation-
ship with their new employer. Employees of the transferred 
company therefore have greater job security. The obligation 
to provide information and notification when negotiations 
are being conducted prior to any dismissals because of lack 
of work are laid  down by law.  As can be  seen from  the 
above, the primary duty to negotiate when dismissals are 
planned because of a shortage of work or the transfer of a 
business has been broadened in scope. 
For a long time, Sweden had legal provisions which broadly 
complied with Directive 80/987/EEC on the protection of 
employees' rights in the event of  an employer's insolvency. 
Reductions in wage-guarantee legislation (which as a result 
of the general economic crisis was proving very expensive) 
which were aimed at preventing abuses and exploitation led 
to a new regulation stipulating that an employee who has on 
one occasion received pay under a wage guarantee upon the 
bankruptcy of his employer is not entitled to any additional 
payment of this  kind  in  the  event of the  insolvency  of 
essentially the same company within two years of the first 
bankruptcy. This change in the law was unsuccessful because 
a ruling of  the EFf  A Labour Court stated that it contravened 
the Directive,  and a  toned-down version of the law was 
introduced on 1 July 1995 under which it is possible in the 
above-mentioned situation to take into account the circum-
stances of individual employees. Following a request, the 
Swedish government submitted the new provisions to  the 
European Commission.  At present, it is regarded as unclear 
whether Swedish law complies with the Directive. 
As regards Directive 91 1533/EEC on an employer's obliga-
tion to inform employees of  the conditions applicable to the SWEDEN 
contract  or employment  relationship,  a  completely  new 
provision to the same effect was introduced into the Swedish 
Employment  Protection  Act  before  the  EEA  Agreement 
entered into force. 
In the field of equal opportunities, Sweden may in many 
respects appear to be well ahead of other countries. Women 
today account for around half the total workforce. However, 
almost half of  them work part-time. Women's income is only 
80-90%  of men's.  Women  in  gainful  employment  are 
restricted to certain activities and sectors of the economy, 
and it is possible to talk of  the  '~en's 
11 and 'Women 's 
11 labour 
markets. 
A  very  important aim,  and also  a  way of attaining  sex 
equality, is considered to be that men and women should 
share responsibility for taking care of their children. The 
primary  means  of achieving  this  is  to  introduce  rules 
concerning  parental  leave  and  insurance  arrangements 
providing  remuneration  during  such  periods  of  leave. 
Despite the cutbacks in the last few years,  these arrange-
ments are very generous by international standards, and in 
principle provide for sickness benefit for 360 days, followed 
by a low level of  benefit for a further 90 days. Remuneration 
during parental leave is also payable if parents have to stay 
off work in order to look after a sick child, for example. 
Parents are entitled to one and a half years' leave following 
the birth (or adoption) of a child, and may also reduce their 
working hours to three quarters of  nonnal working time until 
the child  reaches  the age of 8.  It  is  almost  exclusively 
women who take parental leave to any substantial extent. In 
order  to  increase  the  proportion  of men  doing  this,  an 
arrangement was introduced in 1995 specifically providing 
for increased remuneration if both parents took advantage of 
parental leave. 
A new Sex Equality Act Uiimstiilldhetslag) was introduced 
in 1991, partly in response to the need to bring arrangements 
in  the fields  of equal  pay and  equal  treatment up  to  EU 
standards.  Even after this,  there was a  discussion  about 
whether Swedish law met the requirements of Community 
law and, for this reason among others, the rules on wage 
discrimination were made more stringent with effect as of 1 
July 1994. The principle of equal pay may present problems 
in terms of its compatibility with the traditional freedom in 
wage negotiations prevailing on the Swedish labour market. 
However, Sweden has too little experience and too few court 
precedents in  this  field  to  comment on this.  The ruling 
issued by the European Court of  Justice in October 1995 in 
Case C-450/93 (Kalanke versus the Free Hanseatic City of 
Bremen) concerning the interpretation of Articles 2.1 and 2. 4 
of the equal treatment Directive 761207/EEC led to discus-
sions of the Swedish Sex Equality Act. Swedish law leaves 
scope for what is known as '}Jositive  discrimination'~ which 
gives employers the possibility (as part of a systematic move 
to counterbalance sex discrimination in the workplace) of 
giving precedence to a person of the under-represented sex 
- if they are equally or even less (but nevertheless suffi-
ciently)  qualified  - over persons of the  other  sex.  The 
question has been asked whether such a provision is in line 
with the equal treatment Directive. Two convincing reasons 
suggest that it is:  Swedish legal provisions allow for the 
possibility of choosing someone less qualified but do not 
force employers to do this. The wording of the provisions is 
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also gender-unspecific, and can thus be used for the benefit 
of either sex. 
In the work-environment field, Sweden was well-prepared as 
regards the 
11 product directives":  The Swedish government 
supervisory  authority,  the  National  Board  of Industrial 
Safety (Arbetarskyddsstyrelse), was involved in the European 
standardisation bodies on equal terms with the EU Member 
States long before Swedish membership of the EU came onto 
the agenda.  Some of the product-related  directives  (e.g. 
Directive 89/392/EEC concerning machinery) have led  to 
changes in Swedish law involving both intensification and 
loosening of requirements applying previously. As regards 
the 'Workplace Directive~ there are considerable similarities 
between  the framework  Directive  89/391 IEEC  and  the 
Swedish Work Environment Act (arbetsmiljolag) of 1977. 
Given that the workplace Directive merely sets out minimum 
requirements  and  does  not  require  any  harmonisation 
measures to be carried out, its implementation did not lead 
to  any  substantial  changes  to  Swedish  legal  provisions. 
However,  Council  Directive  92/85/EEC  on  measures  to 
improve  the  safety  and  health  of pregnant  workers  or 
workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding 
gave rise to more rights for these groups of workers in a 
number of respects. 
With regard to the Working Time Directive 93/104/EEC, the 
social partners on the Swedish employment market generally 
take an unfavourable view of detailed regulation in an area 
which has traditionally been dealt with by means of collec-
tive agreements.  The entire Swedish Working Time Act 
(arbetstidslag)  can be contracted away under a  collective 
agreement. In  1995, a government committee submitted a 
proposal for implementing the directive which would involve 
the minimum possible interference with the Working  Time 
Act.  The aim was to  see what legislation the committee 
report might lead to. 
Employee influence in the running of businesses has proved 
difficult to implement at the level of groups of companies, 
since in principle the statutory rights enjoyed by employees 
apply in relation to their own employer, and employees in a 
subsidiary company are therefore not entitled to negotiate 
with the parent company, for example, although in practice 
it is at this level that decisions are taken. A codetermination 
agreement has been concluded which attempts to resolve this 
problem. Directive 94145/EEC on European Works Councils 
provides  for  new  ways  for  employees  to  influence  the 
running of businesses.  In a  report which came out in the 
autumn of 1995, a government committee (the Employment 
Commission  (Arbetsriittskommission)  set  up  in  1995) 
proposed that a special law be introduced to implement the 
Directive. Most of the (just under 100) Swedish companies 
affected have already concluded or are negotiating voluntary 
agreements aimed at resolving the given problems before the 
Directive enters into force. 
Swedish compliance with Community law has thus required 
a number of changes to be made to Swedish law, but it can 
hardly  be claimed  that  these have been wide-ranging or 
drastic. Differences concerning sources of labour law and the 
underlying view of the relationship between trade unions/in-
dividual employees (collectively/individually), employers' 
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law, and collective agreements will almost certainly be of far 
greater importance. 
The relatively poor protection afforded to the basic rights of 
employees in the Swedish system (which is the same as that 
applying in the other Nordic countries) can be expected to be 
strengthened as a result of international legislation such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Community 
law.  The agreement on social policy and its open-minded 
stance as regards social dialogue, negotiations and collective 
agreements, as well as arrangements with "collective-agree-
ment 
11-type solutions set out in some more recent directives 
and  proposals  for  directives,  seem  to  point  to  greater 
flexibility  at European  level.  Sweden  and  the  other two 
Nordic members of the EU may be given an opportunity to 
encourage or devise laws (either jointly or in collaboration 
with the partners on the employment market) to increase the 
scope for  the traditional  Nordic approach.  The opposite 
scenario, in which Sweden and the other Nordic countries 
become increasingly  influenced  by  the  Continental  legal 
system, would probably lead to a greater degree of regula-
tion  and  less  scope  for  the  trade  unions  in  the  Nordic 
countries. 
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CHAPTER 1:  THE ACTORS 
1.1 The Employers 
Several features of the changing industrial organisation of 
corporate employers have a direct impact on the regulation 
of working conditions in the United Kingdom. 
The  first  is  that  major  companies  account  for  a  larger 
proportion of employers than in most other Member States. 
More than half the labour force in manufacturing works in 
companies with over 1,000 employees, and one-quarter in 
companies with over 10,000 employees.  Large companies 
are also dominant in the services sector. The pension funds 
and  investment  trusts,  rather  than  banks,  are  the  major 
shareholders in these companies. It has been argued that this 
has  influenced  companies  to  concentrate  on  short-term 
financial performance
1
• 
Second,  there  has  been  increasing  decentralisation  of 
management.  The  framework  of planning  and  budgetary 
controls  is  laid  down  by  company  headquarters and  then 
tested by performance at divisional or local level. Divisional 
or local managers are responsible for their own costs and 
profits, and therefore set their own levels of pay and terms 
of employment  either  unilaterally  or  after  negotiation. 
Moreover,  the  growth  of licensing,  sub-contracting  and 
franchising  has  resulted  in  a  split between  the  economic 
entity which is the employer and the decision-making centre 
of the undertaking. Many key strategic decisions are taken 
by higher level boards of directors and executives.  This is 
particularly important in the case of multi-national compa-
nies,  bearing in  mind that the United Kingdom is  host to 
many such companies especially those with headquarters in 
the United States or Japan. The more rapid development of 
decentralisation in the United Kingdom than elsewhere was 
one of the reasons for the opposition to  EC-wide measures 
particularly as  envisaged  in  the Maastricht Agreement on 
Social Policy. 
Third, there has been extensive privatisation and contracting-
out.  The effect on industrial relations has been profound. 
The  former  public  corporations  had  a  statutory  duty  to 
recognise trade unions and  to  consult employees  through 
various mechanisms. After privatisation, managements were 
relieved of these legal duties. Although the 1990 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survejl found that there was no evidence 
of widespread  removal of negotiating  rights  in privatised 
workplaces,  other extensive changes in  working practices 
have  occurred.  Contracting-out  of services  has  become 
mandatory for  local  authorities and  other public corpora-
tions,  and  this  too  has  had  a  major  impact  on  working 
practices.  Alongside the strategy of privatisation has been 
that of the de-collectivisation or individualisation of labour 
relations, a movement away from consultation and bargain-
ing with trade unions and towards individual contracts with 
employees. 
Fourth,  the  membership  of employers'  organisations  is 
relatively low in the United Kingdom, compared with other 
I.  A. CosH et al., Takeovers and Short-Termism in the UK,  London, 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1990. 
2.  NElL MILLWARD et al., Workplace Industrial Relations in Transition 
(WIRS 3},  Aldershot, 1992, p.359. 
Member States
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•  In  many sectors this is less than 50%  of 
eligible companies. Multi-national companies such as Ford, 
General Motors and Peugot-Talbot are not members of the 
Engineering Employers' Federation. lei is a member of the 
Chemical Association, but does not follow multi-employer 
agreements. The Confederation of  British Industry {CBI) is a 
pressure group which companies can join, but it does not 
negotiate agreements. Among the reasons for this low level 
of organisation are the fact that collective agreements are 
mainly  concerned with procedural  rather than substantive 
matters;  single employer bargaining is widespread and  is 
usually  independent of multi-employer agreements  rather 
than a supplement to them; pay and other terms of employ-
ment for white-collar workers are usually set by managers 
without reference to collective agreements; and company and 
plant agreements rather than employers'association agree-
ments usually set the 'going' rate There is no concerted co-
ordination of pay bargaining to avoid  'leap-frogging'. 
1.2 Trade unions 
Trade unions have been seriously affected by the economic, 
social, political and legislative changes since 1980. 
According to  returns made by unions to the Certification 
Officer for Trade Unions, trade union membership was at a 
peak of 13.2 million in  1979, but by the end of 1994 had 
fallen  to  8.3  million.,  the  lowest number of trade union 
members since 1945. A more comprehensive analysis of the 
significance of trade unions is available from labour force 
survey  data
4
•  This  indicates  that  the  proportion  of all 
employees who were union members has fallen from 56.1% 
in  1978 to 39%  in  1989 and 32%  in  1995. If  all those in 
employment  (including  the  growing  number  of self-em-
ployed)  are  counted,  union  density  was  28.8%  in  1995 
compared with 30%  in  1994. There is no evidence that this 
long-term decline is beginning to level out. There are great 
sectoral differences, with union density ranging from only 
7%  in  agriculture to  79%  in  rail  transport.  An estimated 
21%  of employees in the private sector are union members 
compared with 61% of employees in the public sector. The 
fall  in  membership  in  the  production  and  construction 
industries has been far greater than the decline in employ-
ment in those sectors, and it is also declining in the services 
sector despite the increase in jobs in that sector. Areas that 
traditionally  were  a  stronghold  of trade  unionism  have 
suffered the greatest decline The gender balance has also 
been changing with union density among men falling from 
44%  in  1989  to  33%  in  1995,  and  that  among  women 
declining only slightly from 35% in  1989 to 32% in 1995. 
There are many  reasons for the decline in union member-
ship.  The most  important factor appears to  have been the 
3.  P. EDWARDS et al., Industrial Relations in the New Europe, Chap. 
1,  (eds.  A. FERNER  and R. HYMAN),  Blackwell, Oxford,  1992, 
p.21. 
4.  Trade wuon membership and recognition: an analysis of  data from 
the 1995 Labour Force Survey, (1996) 104 Labour Market Trends 
215-24. The Labour Force Survey questions only those in employ-
ment, and thus excludes union members who are unemployed or 
economically inactive or whose usual residence is outside the UK. 
For earlier statistics and analysis, see: JEREMY WADDINGTON  and 
COUN WHITSON,  Trade  Unions: Growth, Structure and Policy, in 
P.K. EDWARDS  (ed.), Industrial Relations Theory and Practice in 
Britain, Oxford, 1995, pp.151-202. UNITED KINGDOM 
shift in  the balance of the economy  from  manufacturing 
(where unions were relatively strong) to services (where they 
are relatively weak). Moreover, the changes in the labour 
market encouraged by the government - such as the growth 
of  short-term contracts and part-time work and the spread of 
privatisation (above) -have made it difficult for the unions 
to organise. Another significant factor associated with lower 
levels of aggregate unionisation, has been increasing unem-
ployment,  and  at  the  same  time  an  increase  in  the  real 
earnings of those in jobs, with an accompanying lack of 
interest in unio~. The change in government and employer 
policies since 1980 towards trade unions has also had an 
impact (below). 
Unions have taken a number of steps to respond to these 
pressures. Attempts have been made to improve administra-
tion and financial efficiency. There have been new avenues 
of communication between unions and their members.  In 
part, this was necessitated by legislation which has required 
ballots of members on a  variety of issues,  such  as  trade 
union elections, support for political objects, and industrial 
action.  But polling and other techniques for expression of 
members' views on other topics as well have become more 
common. Unions increasingly use public relations consul-
tants to improve their image among the public. Individual 
unions have launched recruitment drives aimed at weakly 
organised sectors like hotels and catering, retail distribution 
and the financial sector, and at the growing number of part-
time workers. The 'male' image of unions is having to be 
altered  in  face  of the  changing  gender  balance  in  the 
workforce. New services are being offered to members, such 
as improved legal advice and representation and financial 
services. 
It is significant, too, that there have been several important 
mergers of unions in recent years,  in  some cases linking 
widely differing industries and occupations. Although, at the 
end of 1994, there were 243 trade unions on the lists of the 
Certification Officer (the government official responsible for 
maintaining lists of unions and exercising supervision over 
various activities), the 17 largest unions accounted for 79% 
of total union membership.  Seven unions, each with over 
250,000 members, have 59% of all union members
6
•  Eighty 
per cent of all union members are in unions affiliated to the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC). 
1.3 Collective bargaining institutions 
In the UK there is no national framework collective bargain-
ing between the TUC and the principal employers' organisa-
tion, the CBI. These central bodies do not engage in collec-
tive bargaining on their own account. Nor is there any other 
centralised bargaining forum. Generally speaking, employ-
ers' associations in particular industries play a much smaller 
role in bargaining in the UK  than elsewhere. There has been 
a widespread decline in the extent to which basic pay rates 
are set by multi-employer negotiations with trade unions. 
Since 1980 there has been no procedure for the extension of 
collective agreements to weakly organised sectors of a trade 
or industry. The system of tripartite statutory wages coun-
5.  WADDINGTON and WHITSON, op.cit., p. 169. 
6.  Membership  of Trade  Unions  in  1994:  an  Analysis  based  on 
information from  the  Certification  Officer,  (1996)  104  Labour 
Market Trends, pp.49-54. 
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cils,  which  used  to  set  IIDmmum  standards  of pay  and 
holidays in industries where collective bargaining was weak 
or non-existent, was abolished in 1993. In the private sector 
the main focus of bargaining is at company or plant level. In 
the  public  sector,  much  contracted  due  to  privatisation 
(above), bargaining has been largely decentralised. 
Fewer  than  50%  of employees now have their pay  and 
conditions affected by collective institutions. This decline, 
from a peak of 84-86% coverage of  collective bargaining and 
wages councils in 1975, has been steeper than the fall  in 
union density (above). With the abolition of wages councils, 
collective pay-setting now affects fewer employees than at 
any time since 1935. This 'stark, substantial, and incontro-
vertible' decline
7
,  has occurred in a climate of political and 
legal hostility to trade unions and collective bargaining. The 
political power of trade unions is now weaker than at any 
time since the defeat of the 1926 General Strike, and their 
industrial power is hamstrung by unemployment and by the 
economic and structural changes in the labour market. The 
removal of statutory supports for collective bargaining and 
union  membership,  and  the  severe  restrictions  on  the 
immunities in respect of industrial action are an expression 
of government policies, hostile to trade unions.  Although 
union de-recognition by employers still remains relatively 
limited, it has become more widespread since the mid-1980s. 
Some managements have taken advantage of the weakening 
of unions to refuse to recognise them at the workplace, while 
others have adopted a purposive approach of removing union 
influence altogether
8
• 
1.4 Other fonns of workers' participation 
There is no institutionalised system of workers' participa-
tion, either at the level of the establishment or the enterprise 
in the United Kingdom.  An amendment to the Companies 
legislation in 1980 (now the Companies Act 1985, s. 309) 
requires company directors to have regard to the interests of 
employees as well as those of shareholders, but the employ-
ees as  ~;uch cannot enforce this duty because it is owed to the 
company  alone.  A  minor  stimulus  to  greater  'employee 
involvement' was provided by section 1 of the Employment 
Act 1982 (now the Companies Act 1985, Sched.7, Part V), 
which requires companies with more than 250 employees to 
state in their annual reports what they have done over the 
year  to  promote employee  involvement arrangements.  A 
wide variety of voluntary arrangements exist such as infor-
mal and formal management line communications or meet-
ings,  employee  suggestion  schemes,  employee  surveys, 
employee reports or a~counts and the use of consultative 
committees.  However,  according  to  the  1990 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey,  the proportion of workplaces 
with functioning consultative committees has been falling. 
Fewer than  one-fifth  of all  workplaces  had  consultative 
committees in 1990, compared with one-quarter in 1984.
9 At 
one time trade unions played a major part in the appointment 
of consultative committees,  but with the decline in union 
recognition  and  of large  workplaces,  there  has  been  an 
accompanying decline in the proprtion of workplaces with 
7.  N.MILARD et al,  WIRS 3, at p. 352. 
8.  TIM CL.AYDON,  Union De-Recognition: a Re-examination, in: IAN 
J. BFARDWELL (ed.), Contemporary Industrial Relations: a critical 
Analysis, Oxford, 1996, pp. 151-174. 
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consultative committees. Where they exist, it is now com-
mon  for  there to  be a  mixture of trade union  and other 
representatives. In these cases there is a considerable degree 
of overlap between those matters which are the subject of 
consultation and those dealt with by collective negotiations. 
However, in a minority of  workplaces, consultation arrange-
ments have been introduced in the absence of, and as an 
alternative  to  trade  union  representation  and  collective 
bargaining. In a small minority of establishments, non-union 
works committees have been established by employers who 
are resistant to trade unions. There have been other manage-
ment initiatives in recent years to increase employee involve-
ment. In particular, there has been a spread of worker share-
ownership schemes. Between 1980 and 1990 the proportion 
of  workplaces in industry and commerce whose parent com-
pany operated share-ownership schemes  rose  from  13  to 
32%. The proportion of the workforce who participated in 
such schemes where they were available rose from 22% in 
1984 to 34% in 1990
10
• The Government has encouraged this 
development by allowing special tax advantages. 
Overall,  there  is  no indication  that  the  shrinkage  in  the 
extent of trade union representation (above) is being offset 
by an increase in other methods of employee representation. 
A serious weakness of workplace consultation arrangements 
is that they are generally confined to the level of the plant or 
establishment and so are unable to influence decision-making 
at the corporate level. The growth of multidivisional forms 
of  organisation in large enterprises has enhanced the role of 
relatively few senior managers in each enterprise in devel-
oping corporate strategy and controlling subsidiary com-
panies,  particularly  through  budgetary  policy.  Corporate 
decisions by these managers about matters such as invest-
ment  policy,  product development  and  the  opening  and 
closure of  plants lie beyond the scope of establishment-level 
negotiations which  is  the predominant form of collective 
bargaining  in  the  UK.  Where corporate  bargaining  takes 
place the role of  shop stewards is limited and the possibilities 
of  effective  collective  action  are  reduced.  So  whether 
bargaining takes place at establishment or corporate level, 
strategic decisions were unlikely to be much influenced by 
workers' views. So far, there has been no legislative frame-
work in  the UK for board-level representation of workers. 
However, among the Labour government's first action on 
coming to government in 1996 was to agree at the Amster-
dam summit to participation in the Social Chapter and the 
new  Employment  Chapter,  including  a  commitment  to 
implement the European Works Council Directive 94145/EC. 
1.5 The role of the state 
The UK  differs from most other Member States of the EC 
because of  the 'negative' role of  the state. There have always 
been  few  "positive" legal  rights  to support the voluntary 
system of collective bargaining,  and  virtually  all  of the 
'auxiliary' props to  the system have been  removed  since 
1980. There is no state-created system of workers' participa-
tion  (above).  Regulatory  ('protective')  legislation  which 
directly affects working conditions is highly selective and 
much of this has been repealed or modified. From 1919 to 
1979 the state aimed to act as a  'model' employer so as to 
encourage trade unionism,  collective bargaining and  fair 
10.  Ibid., p.265. 
wages, but that tradition has been ended  .. The disbandment 
of the Department of Employment in July  1995,  and  the 
division of its work between four departments, appeared to 
be the culmination of the process of deinstitutionalisation, 
decollectivsation abd deregulation of labour relations in the 
UK.  However, developments in EC law, such as the Working-
Time Directive 93/104/EC and the Young Workers' Directive 
94/33/Ec, are forcing some re-regulation. With the participa-
tion in the European Union's Social Chapter and the imple-
mentation  of the  above  mentioned  directives,  the  main 
source of change is likely to continue to be EC law. How-
ever,  the TUC  has  launched a  campaign  for a  new legal 
framework which combines the traditions of British collec-
tive bargaining with new rights under EC law. 
The developments of state policy may be divided into three 
main periods. 
(a)  Before 1970.  The traditional  system until  the  1960s 
rested  upon  a  social  consensus  that  the  state's  role 
should be minimal.  Trade unions and collective bar-
gaining emerged from illegality in a series of statutes 
from  1824  to  1906.  No positive rights to  organise, 
bargain and take industrial action were established, but 
only a series of 'negative' immunities from the judge-
made common law. The recognition of trade unions was 
achieved without the aid of  legislation or any significant 
demand  for  such  legislation.  However,  there was  a 
certain amount of 'auxiliary' legislation designed to 
promote and support voluntary collective bargaining. 
This  included  the  minimum  wage-fixing  machinery 
established  from  1909  in  selected  'sweated'  trades 
where collective bargaining was weak or non-existent, 
successive  'fair  wages' resolutions of the  House  of 
Commons  from  1891  which  imposed obligations on 
government contractors  to  pay  fair  wages of which 
collectively agreed terms were the primary guide, and 
the machinery established in 1896 and 1919 to encour-
age the use of voluntary conciliation and arbitration. 
The primacy of  collective bargaining meant that regula-
tory  legislation,  directly  laying  down  rules  of em-
ployment on matters such as hours, health and safety, 
tended to take second place. The policy of the state was 
not to regulate by statute the terms and conditions of 
those  who  could  protect  themselves  by  collective 
action. Legislation applied primarily to children, young 
persons and women but not to adult men. As a result of 
this approach, there has been an absence of the kind of 
comprehensive regulation that is to be found in other 
industrial  countries  of such  matters  as  hours  and 
holidays for all employees. With a few exceptions, the 
hours of work of adult men (and most women) have 
been  regulated  by  collective  bargaining  (or  wages 
councils) but not by legislation. In the field of health 
and safety, as late as 1972, five million workers worked 
in  premises not covered by any kind of occupational 
health and safety legislation
11
• 
(b)  1970-79. There were already signs in the late 1950s and 
early  1960s that the social consensus which had sus-
tained the traditional voluntarist framework was under 
11.  Report of  the Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1970-72, 
Cmnd. 5034. UNITED KINGDOM 
strain. The pressure of full employment had contributed 
to a shift in power to the workplace; there was  'wages 
drift', increases in earnings not accounted for by central 
industry-wide  negotiations,  and  trade  unions  were 
blamed for their failure to control the relatively large 
number  of unofficial  (wildcat)  strikes  in  breach  of 
agreed procedures, and for the inefficient use of labour 
through  the  imposition  of restrictive  practices  and 
overmanning. 
Two broad strategies were adopted  in  order both  to 
maintain full employment and to control inflation. One 
was a succession of  incomes policies. The other was the 
use of law in order to influence the conduct of indus-
trial relations.  These strategies were not consistently 
applied  and  were  not  infrequently  discordant.  The 
negative restraints on the results of collective bargain-
ing were accompanied by a series of positive measures 
to  encourage  or  promote  trade  union  growth  and 
recognition: in the period 1948 to  1979 union density 
among manual (blue collar) workers grew from 53  to 
63%,  and among non-manual  (white collar) workers 
from  33  to 44%.  The most significant result of the 
incomes  policies  was  the  politicisation of collective 
bargaining,  the  blurring  of the  distinction  between 
economics and politics on which the traditional system 
was based. There was 'corporatist bargaining' in which 
the trade union interest in a wide range of policy issues 
was recognised.  In particular, the TUC  entered into a 
'social contract' with the Labour Government (1974-
76) under which the trade unions agreed to temporary 
pay restraint in  return for a wide range of new  legal 
rights for workers and trade unions. This included new 
rights for individuals (e.g. against unfair dismissal and 
discrimination) enforced through industrial tribunals. 
The policy of reform was also evident in the legislation 
on collective bargaining.  The Royal Commission  on 
Trade  Unions  &  Employers '  Associations  (Donovan 
Commission) which reported in  1968, had wanted to 
introduce  'order' into the largely informal system of 
plant bargaining  'if  possible,  without destroying  the 
British tradition of  keeping industrial relations out of 
the courts"
12
•  However, the Conservative Government, 
elected in 1970, saw legislation as the main instrument 
for bringing about reform. The Industrial Relations Act 
1971  contained  a  series  of provisions  designed  to 
reform bargaining structures, to secure recognition of 
unions by employers, to encourage legally enforceable 
agreements and to reform union rules. The immediate 
cause of the failure of the Act was the defeat of the 
Heath Government in the February 1974 election which 
arose from a confrontation with the miners' union over 
incomes policy.  However,  the TUC's  policy of non-
cooperation had rendered the Act largely inoperable: 
the Act had tried to bring about too drastic a change in 
existing institutions and behaviour by means of law. It 
was based on the mistaken assumption that employers 
would use the law and the transplantation of institutions 
from the United States (e.g. bargaining units, cooling-
off periods) took insufficient account of the different 
economic and political circumstances. 
12.  Cmnd. 3623 (1968), para. 190. 
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The Labour Government's social  contract legislation 
(1974-76) returned to the path of reform by restoring 
the presumption  that collective agreements were not 
intended  to  be  legally  enforceable contracts  and  by 
recreating extended  immunities  from  legal  action  in 
respect of strikes and lockouts. An Advisory Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Service (ACAS) and Central Arbi-
tration Committee (  CAC) were created and novel rights 
to trade union recognition and disclosure of information 
for collective bargaining as well as improved provisions 
for  the  extension  of collective  agreements  to  non-
organised workers were created.  The wages councils 
system was  strengthened.  The primacy of collective 
bargaining was emphasised by reforms such as these. 
(c)  Since 1980.  By  1979, unemployment was mounting, 
inflation remained at high levels,  public expenditure 
was being cut and there was acute discontent with the 
government's income policies. In May 1979, the Con-
servatives, led by Mrs Thatcher were elected to power. 
The policies  of her Administration,  and  that  of Mr 
Major  since  1990,  have  fundamentally  altered  the 
parameters of state intervention in labour relations. The 
solution to the major problems of the 1970s- inflation 
and the politicisation of the unions - has been sought in 
the restoration of 'free' markets. The argument was that 
trade union  'coercion' had caused inflation, unemploy-
ment and fluctuating living standards. Trade unions and 
collective bargaining are seen as a distortion of market 
relations  between  the  employer  and  individual  em-
ployee. In order to make markets 'work' it is necessary 
to  deregulate,  to  privatise,  to  reduce public expendi-
ture, and to weaken trade union power. The idea of any 
kind of 'social dialogue' involving unions, employers 
and government is anathema. 
This  ideology  has  been  reflected  in  the  extensive 
legislation enacted since 1980. First, workers' rights of 
self-help through collective organisation and industrial 
action have  been  effectively  restricted  to  their own 
employment units.  For example,  sympathy and  soli-
darity action between enterprises has virtually been pro-
hibited. Secondly, the ability of trade unions to govern 
their own  affairs  and  maintain  solidarity  have been 
severely  restricted.  For example,  trade  union  funds 
have been placed at risk (since 1982 it has been possible 
to  make  unions  responsible  for  unlawful  action  by 
members and some unions have suffered heavy fines 
and sequestration of all  or a substantial part of their 
assets  for  failing  to  observe court orders restraining 
industrial action); there are stringent requirements for 
secret ballots to elect voting and non-voting members of 
the principal  executive  committee;  requirements  for 
periodic ballots to maintain funds for political expendi-
ture;  rights of trade union members to require secret 
ballots before industrial action and not to be disciplined 
for ignoring majority decisions; rights for members to 
challenge union decisions in court without waiting for 
the outcome of internal union procedures; the removal 
of all legal protection for the closed shop, and severe 
limits on check-off arrangements for payment of union 
dues.  A Commissioner for the Rights of  Trade  Union 
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action  against  their  unions,  and  Commissioner  for 
Protection Against Unlawful Industrial Action to allow 
members of the public to bring proceedings against a 
union which is taking or threatening unlawful action. 
Although little used  in practice,  the institutions  are 
indicative of  government policy. 
Thirdly, contrary to the public policy of the previous 
hundred years, in the new structure of labour law there 
is now a clear commitment to restrict collective bar-
gaining. The Government itself gave a lead by banning 
membership  of  trade  unions  at  the  Government 
Communications  Headquarters  (GCHQ)  in  January 
1984. Statutory provisions for the recognition of trade 
unions were repealed  in  1980;  collective bargaining 
over teachers' pay and conditions was effectively ended 
in 1987. The law now makes pressures on an employer 
to engage trade unionists and to negotiate and consult 
with trade unions unlawful, while at the same time it is 
lawful to induce an employer not to negotiate with a 
union.  The removal of legal supports from collective 
representation rendered largely ineffective the duties to 
inform and consult workers' representatives in the event 
of  collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings 
introduced in response to EC  Directives in  1975 and 
1981 It is only since 1995, as a result of infringement 
proceedings brought by the European Commission, that 
the regulations have been amended so as to allow for 
some form of employee representation in these cases, 
but even then this may be done by undermining recog-
nised independent trade unions. 
Fourthly, central to the whole strategy has  been  the 
control  of labour  through  the  market.  Traditional 
supports for the low-paid have been removed: in 1983 
the Government secured the repeal of the Fair Wages 
Resolution (above); the machinery for fixing minimum 
wages  in  the road  haulage  industry  was  repealed  in 
1980; the provisions for extending recognised  terms 
and  conditions to  unorganised  sectors of a  trade or 
industry were repealed  in  1980;  in  1986  the wages 
councils (above) were slimmed down so as to exclude 
young people under 21  from statutory protection and to 
restrict councils to setting only a minimum hourly rate 
and a single overtime for adults within their scope, and 
in 1993 they were abolished altogether. Job security has 
been diminished by increasing the qualifying period for 
unfair dismissal rights from 6 months to 2 years. The 
right of women to return to work after pregnancy and 
confinement was restricted in various ways, although 
the  Pregnant  Workers  Directive  92/85/Ec  has  now 
established certain minimum standards. Many changes 
have been made in the social  security system, which 
have the effect of imposing a powerful discipline on 
workers  to  hold  down  their jobs or seek  low-paid 
employment if unemployed. This has included extend-
ing the period of disqualification for 'voluntary' unem-
ployment from 13 to 26 weeks, compelling unemployed 
persons  to  seek  employment  outside  their  normal 
occupation  after  13  weeks,  and  requiring  benefit 
recipients to be actively seeking work. The Jobseekers' 
Allowance, which replaced unemployment benefit in 
1996, may be lost if the jobseeker fails to carry out any 
direction by a local government officer, for example to 
work at a wage which the jobseeker considers to be too 
low. 
The process of 'lifting the burden' on business has in-
cluded the removal of restrictions on women's working 
hours and on men's hours in bakeries, and the repeal of 
restrictions  on  the  hours  and  conditions  of young 
people,  the  removal  of licensing  requirements  on 
employment agencies and employment businesses, the 
deregulation of labour supply in the docks, and a range 
of other  measures  aimed  to  'individualise'  labour 
relations. 
CHAPTER II: INSTRUMENTS -OUTLINE 
OF SOURCES OF REGULATION 
2.1 Constitutional Law and Social Rights 
The Parliament of the UK can enact any law on any subject; 
even the rules and conventions of constitutional law can be 
changed by ordinary legislation. This means that there are 
not the formal restraints against encroachment on individual 
liberties which exist in most other democracies. There are no 
entrenched rights, far less  'social' rights to associate in trade 
unions and to strike. The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter (ESC) and 
various  international  instruments which  recognise certain 
minimum civil and social rights are not directly enforceable 
in the UK.  Concern over issues such as the denial by the 
Conservative Government of the right to belong to independ-
ent trade unions at General Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) in 1984, and earlier legislation by a Labour Govern-
ment permitting compulsory trade union membership, has 
led  in  recent  times  to  pressures  for  some  limitation  on 
executive  and  parliamentary  power  and  for  the  formal 
entrenchment of  basic rights. The abour Party has promised 
that, if  elected to power in 1997, it will introduce legislation 
incorporating the  ECHR  into  domestic  law.  More radical 
proposals, for a written constitution and entrenched Bill of 
Rights, are unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable 
future. 
13  On the both sides of industry, there remains deep 
hostility against transferring the resolution of disputes from 
the industrial and political spheres to the judicial sphere, 
which would be a consequence of constitutionalising funda-
mental rights. 
2.2 Statute law 
Acts of  Parliament are the main source of legal regulation of 
working conditions. Over 50 general Acts on employment 
have been passed since 1970. Labour law is not codified, but 
there has been some consolidation of statute law. The two 
principal consolidation Acts currently in force are the Trade 
Union  and Labour Relations  (Consolidation)  Act  1992, 
which deals with collective labour relations, and the Employ-
ment Rights Act 1996,  which is concerned with individual 
rights. In addition, there is a large number of general rules, 
orders and statutory instruments made by Ministers under 
parliamentary authority, most of these being post-1970. In 
addition, there are hundreds of Acts and instruments apply-
ing to specific employments. The complexity of legislation 
13.  See e.g. proposals by the Institute for Public Policy Research, The 
Constitution ofthe United Kingdom, London, 1991. UNITED KINGDOM 
has frequently ben criticised, not only by the judiciary, but 
also,  in connection with legislation on strikes, by the ILO 
Committee of  Experts on the Application of  Conventions and 
Recommendations
14
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Most legislation applies throughout Great Britain (England 
and Wales, and Scotland), and similar legislation has in most 
cases been applied (under separate statutory instruments) in 
Northern Ireland.  There is  no  form of devolved regional 
government, and local authorities have very limited compe-
tence  in  employment  matters  (e.g.  certain  regulations 
regarding the employment of children). 
Legislation is of three main types. 
Regulatory, directly affecting the payment of wages, 
health and safety at work, the terms of the contract of 
employment  and  termination  of employment.  The 
policy  of deregulation  since  1979  has  involved  the 
repeal or modification of some of this legislation (e.g. 
hours of  work of  women and young persons). It is now 
mainly to be found in the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
and the Health and Safety at Work etc.  Act 1974. 
Auxiliary, supporting the collective bargaining process 
(much of this has been repealed since 1979, e.g. on fair 
wages, wages councils, and trade union recognition), 
and assisting in the resolution of disputes (especially the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
and Central Arbitration Committee (CAC)).  The main 
legislation is  the Trade  Union  and Labour Relations 
(Consiolidation) Act 1992.  Another important source 
has been EC law on consultation with workers' repre-
sentatives,  usually  implemented  by  statutory  instru-
ments made by Ministers under the European Commu-
nities Act 1972. 
Restrictive,  defining  what  is  allowed  and  what  is 
forbidden in the context of strikes and lock-outs (e.g. 
statutory immunities from liability in tort, and control 
of trade unions).  This is  mainly  to  be found  in  the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992. 
Two broad approaches to the interpretation of legislation can 
be found in the case law. The first is the purposive approach 
by which the court gives effect to the policy of the statute 
and the intentions of Parliament. The second approach is to 
ascertain the true meaning of the words used in the statute as 
the best guide to the intention of the lawgiver. If  the words 
of the statute are unambiguous,  then those words must be 
expounded in their natural and ordinary sense and the policy 
of the Act is  irrelevant. These two approaches often con-
verge and lead to the same conclusions. However, reliance 
on textual and linguistic analysis has traditionally been an 
important feature of British statutory interpretation. British 
legislation usually specifies in detail the application of the 
law  in  particular circumstances.  This  contrasts  with  the 
approach in  Continental and  EC  legislation which express 
only  broad  objectives.  British  judges  have,  until  fairly 
recently,  found  it ·difficult  to  adjust  to  the  Continental 
tradition when dealing with the interpretation of Community 
obligations in the sphere of employment and discrimination 
law However, the House of Lords (as highest court) has been 
14.  Report III, Pt 4A, p.241. 
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developing  a  more  purposive approach  especially  in  the 
context of sex discrimination legislation. 
2.3 Codes of Practice 
These are issued to provide guidance on the application of 
various statutory provisions, and sometimes go beyond the 
statute. There are two main types: 
Codes made by the Secretary of  State, after approval by 
resolution of each House of  Parliament. This includes 
the  Code of Practice  on  Picketing  (revised)  and  on 
Trade Union Ballots on Industrial Action (revised). 
Codes made by regulatory agencies. This includes the 
A CAS Codes of  Practice on Disciplinary Practices and 
Procedures in Employment, Disclosure of  Information 
to  Trade  Unions for Collective Bargaining Purposes, 
Time  Off  for Trade  Union  Duties and Activities (re-
vised), the Equal Opportunities Commission Codes of 
Practice for  the  Elimination  of Discrimination  on 
Grounds of  Sex or Marriage, and on Equal Pay, and 
the Commission for Racial Equality's Code of  Practice 
for the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination. 
A failure on the part of  any person to observe the provisions 
of a Code does not of itself render him or her liable to any 
proceedings, but the Code is admissible in evidence, and any 
relevant provision must be taken into account by the court or 
tribunal.  There are also  important self-regulatory Codes, 
such as the TUC Dbputes Principles and Procedures (known 
as the 'Bridlington' principles) which are not intended to be 
legally enforceable, and whose effect has been restricted by 
legislation. 
2.4 Common law 
Those matters which are not covered by legislation are the 
domain of the common law,  which is  to  be  found  in  the 
decisions of the courts. As  'ihe law behind the law which is 
enacted by Parliament 'AS,  the common law has a powerful 
impact on the interpretation of employment legislation. Its 
importance  has  grown,  rather  than  diminished,  with  the 
growth  of legislation.  For  example  the  law  relating  to 
industrial action  is  based  on judge-made economic torts, 
whose  application  in  the  sphere  of  'trade  disputes'  is 
restricted by statutory immunities. This gives much scope 
for judicial creativity both in developing the torts, and in 
limiting  the  application  of the  immunities,  so  having  a 
crucial impact on the freedom to strike. 
The focus of the common law is on the relationshp between 
the  individual  employer  and  employee,  characterised  in 
terms  of the  contract  of employment.  The  contract  of 
employment remains the "cornerstone of  labour law 
11 in the 
UK
16
•  The common  law  contract of service differs  in  its 
origins and development from the contract of employment in 
civil law systems. It originated in the status of 'master and 
servant', and this has had a lasting impact on the modem 
law.  In  particular,  the patchy and inadequate coverage of 
legislation which applies to  the contract of employment in 
the sense of a 'contract of  service', arises from the limited 
scope of the concept of 'service'.  Moreover, the courts make 
15.  LORD WEDDERBURN,  The  Worker and the Law,  (3
111  ed),  p.648, 
citing HAROLD LASKI. 
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use of  the technique of 'implying' terms into contracts. Since 
everyday obligations, such as the speed of work, are implied 
from  what  the  employer has  laid  down  and  applied  in 
practice either formally or informally, these implied terms 
tend to favour the employer. The civil law idea of positive 
regulation of  the contract by imperative norms is alien to the 
common law, with the result that parties may contract out of 
collective agreements. In general, however, it is forbidden 
to contract out of  employment protection legislation. 
In regard to the development of the law. It is important to 
note that a  specialised  system of industrial  tribunals has 
existed since 1965 to deal with disputes under a variety of 
legislation including unfair dismissal and redundancy and 
anti -discrimination statutes. They also have jurisdiction to 
deal with some contractual disputes. There is an appeal on 
questions of law to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) 
which  covers  the  whole  of Great  Britain.  (In  Northern 
Ireland, appeals go direct to the Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal). From the EAT there may be a further appeal to the 
Court of  Appeal (England and Wales) or Court of  Session 
(Scotland). From these courts there may be a final appeal, 
with leave, to the House of  Lords. The industrial tribunals 
consist of a  legally-qualified chairman and two  industrial 
members from panels nominated respectively by employers 
and trade union organisations. The industrial members are 
expected to reach their decisions as impartial judges, but to 
do  so  on  the  basis  of their  specialised  knowledge  and 
experience  of labour  relations.  The  EAT  has  a  similar 
composition, with a High Court or Court of  Session judge 
presiding  and  sitting  with  industrial  members.  So  the 
expectation is that Acts of  Parliament will be construed  "so 
as to give effect to good industrial relations rather than the 
contrary tJ. 
7
• 
Questions of employment law  may  also  come before the 
ordinary courts in respect of: 
(1)  actions for damages and other remedies for breach of 
contract; 
(2)  actions in tort (delict) the most important of which are 
injunctions  (interdicts)  and  damages  in  respect  of 
unlawful industrial action; 
(3)  actions  for  personal  injuries and  death  arising  from 
industrial accidents and diseases. 
The High  Court and  the Court of Session  have a general 
supervisory power over inferior tribunals and over adminis-
trative action. Although there is no separate system of public 
law in the UK, and no administrative court as such, a special 
procedure by  way  of judicial  review has  to  be followed 
where the actions of the executive are called into question. 
It will be observed that there is no specialist labour court 
dealing  with  collective  labour disputes.  Claims  by  trade 
union members or non-members about the conduct of trade 
union  affairs  usually  go  to  the  High  Court  or Court of 
Session. 
2.5 Collective agreements 
A unique feature of  collective agreements in the UK,  in com-
parison with other Member States, is the very weak system 
of  enforcement. There is no labour inspectorate charged with 
17.  TGMJ v Ledbury Preserves (I928) Ltd [1986], Industrial Relations 
Law Reports, 492, p. 495. 
administration  of labour  standards.  The agreement  itself 
usually does not have contractual effect. This is because of 
a  statutory presumption (codifying the common law)  that 
collective agreements are not intended to have contractual 
effect unless the parties agree otherwise in writing (s.  179 
Trade  Union  and Labour Relations  (Consolidation)  Act 
1992).  Very  few  agreements have  been  made which are 
expressed to be legally binding. This absence of contractual 
effect has created problems in the application of  EC employ-
ment and equality Directives. In infringement proceedings in 
1984
18
,  the  UK  Government argued  that  the non-binding 
character of collective agreements removed them from the 
field of application of article 4(b) of Directive 76/207/Ec. 
Mrs Advocate-General Rozes, favoured the Commission's 
position that the Directive was intended to create a legal 
safeguard  against  discrimination  in  agreements,  'fn par-
ticular by reason of  the requirements of  clarity and legal 
certainty":  The European Court of  Justice rejected the UK 
Government's argument, and held that the Directive "covers 
all collective agreements without distinction as to the nature 
of  their legal effects which they do or do not  produce~ The 
Court recognised  the  important de facto consequences of 
collective  agreements,  despite  their  non-enforceability. 
Following this reasoning it may be argued that Article 3(2) 
of  Directive 771187/EC (Transfers of  Undertakings) places a 
legal  obligation  on  the  transferee  of an  undertaking  to 
observe the terms of a collective agreement, irrespective of 
the non-enforceability of the agreement under UK domestic 
law. However, the implementing UK  Transfer of  Undertak-
ings (Protection of  Employment) Regulations 1981, appear 
to preserve the non-enforceability of collective agreements 
as against the transferee of an undertaking. 
Although  the collective agreement does  not usually have 
contractual effect in the UK,  appropriate terms of the agree-
ment may have normative effect by virtue of being expressly 
or impliedly incorporated into the  individual  contracts of 
employment of relevant employees, whether or not members 
of  the  union/s  which  negotiated  the  agreement.  These 
employees can individually enforce their contracts by legal 
action. Case law has established that if the employer unilat-
erally withdraws from the collective agreement, the collec-
tive agreement may remain part of the individual contract 
because these terms can be varied only with the employee's 
express or implied consent. The consent may be implied if 
the employee continues to work without objection to the 
altered terms. Moreover, it remains open to the employer to 
change the terms incorporated from the collective agreement 
by  terminating  the  individual  contracts (with notice) and 
offering to re-employ the relevant employees on new terms. 
If  the employee has been continuously employed for two or 
more years he or she may be able to complain that this is an 
unfair dismissal, but in most cases, provided the employer 
has consulted the employees or their representatives and the 
new terms are such as could be required by a 'reasonable' 
employer,  the industrial tribunal is likely to find  that the 
'dismissal' was not unfair. 
It can be seen that individual enforcement of the collective 
agreement is likely to prove difficult. It may be difficult to 
'bridge' the  gap between  the  individual  contract and  the 
18.  Case  165/82,  Commission  v  United Kingdom  [1984],  Industrial 
Cases Reports,  192. UNITED KINGDOM 
collective agreement because of the need to show that there 
is  an  express  or implied  term  or custom  which  allows 
incorporation. It may,  then,  be problematical as to which 
terms  in  the  collective  agreement  are  'appropriate'  for 
translation into the individual contract, particularly in the 
case of  procedural clauses which are collective in character. 
Perhaps most important of all, the common law, in contrast 
to the civil law systems, does not recognise the distinction 
between  'imperative' and  'optional' norms of the  law of 
contract. This means that a collective agreement will not be 
construed as containing compulsory minimum terms of the 
individual contract.  The seriousness of this  defect in  the 
common law has become obvious at a time when there is no 
longer any statutory mechanism for applying  'recognised' 
(i.e. collectively agreed) terms to those employers who are 
not  observing  collective  agreements.  Employers  have 
succeeded in not a few cases in cutting wages or otherwise 
breaking collective agreements by the simple expedient of 
terminating individual contracts and offering re-engagement 
on unilaterally imposed terms. 
2.6 Custom and practice 
Custom and practice have tended to become less important 
sources of regulation as working practices have been forma-
lised. However, they may  still be relevant.  For example, 
when  ascertaining  the  terms  of individual  contracts  of 
employment courts and tribunals are willing to incorporate 
customs which are reasonable, certain and well-known.  A 
somewhat different type of  custom and practice developed in 
manufacturing industry in the 1950s in the form of informal 
workplace bargaining, displacing national agreements. This 
was increasingly recognised as an important source of terms 
of  employment. In the past few decades workplace bargain-
ing has itself become increasingly formalised. 
2. 7 International law 
It is a general principle of the legal systems of the UK  that 
treaties are not self-executing.  Accordingly,  international 
law  has  no  direct  effect  on  the  regulation  of working 
conditions until incorporated by Act of Parliament. 
The UK  is a founder member of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). The general policy of the UK has been 
not  to  ratify  ILO  Conventions  unless  domestic  law  and 
practice are in conformity with the international standards in 
question. Before 1979, the UK had ratified over 80 Conven-
tions. Since then few Conventions have been ratified, and 
several have been denounced so that changes could be made 
in  UK  law  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  denounced 
Conventions. Those denounced include the Labour Clauses 
(Public Contracts) 1949 (No. 94) preparatory to the repeal 
of  the  Fair  Wages  Resolution;  Minimum  Wage-Fixing 
Machinery 1929 (No 26) preparatory to the Wages Act 1986; 
Protection of  Wages 1949 (No 95) also preparatory to the 
Wag~  Act 1986; Night Work (Women) (Revised) 1937 (No. 
41) preparatory to the Sex Discrimination Act 1986; and the 
Underground  Work  (Women)  Convention  1935 (No  45). 
preparatory to the Employment Act 1989. It is to be noted 
that the UK has not yet ratified the Discrimination (Employ-
ment and Occupation) Convention 1958 (No 111). In recent 
years, several complaints have been made by national  ~d 
international workers' organisations to the ILO  Governmg 
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Body's Cornmittee on FreediJm of  Association (e.g. regarding 
the unilateral  ~w;pension of the Civil Service Pay Agreement 
(1981),  the ban on trade union membership at GCHQ (1984), 
and the ending of collective bargaining for teachers (1987). 
The Committee of  Experts on the Application of  Conventions 
and Recommendations has also invited the UK Government 
to amend certain legislation to comply with Conventions on 
freedom of association and the right to organise. 
The UK  has  ratified  the European  Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and recognised 
the  competence of the European  Commission  on Human 
Rights to receive petitions. Two cases of particular impor-
tance to the UK,  were those of Young, James and Webster
19
, 
in which the European Court on Human Rights held, by a 
majority of 18-3, that the dismissal of 3 British Rail  empl~y­
ees for refusal to join a particular union in accordance wtth 
a closed shop agreement, was a breach of Article 11 of the 
Convention,  and  the  GCHQ  case  (1986),  in  which  the 
Commission ruled that the petition was inadmissible on the 
grounds that the workers at GCHQ were part of the 'adminis-
tration of  the state' and that the prohibition of membership 
was a  'lawful restriction' under Article 11 (2)  second sen-
tence.  The  first  decision  was  used  by  the  Conservative 
Government to justify its policy of reversing the previous 
Labour Government's legislation on the closed shop, under 
which the case arose. 
The UK has also ratified the European Social Charter {ESC), 
and  accepted  all  numbered  paragraphs  except  art.  2(1) 
(working hours), 4(3) (equal pay for work of equal value), 
7(1) (age of  admission to employment), 7(4) (working hours 
of persons under 16), 7(7) (3  weeks' holiday for persons 
under 18), art 8(2) (dismissal during maternity leave), 8(3) 
(time off to nurse infants), 8( 4)(a) (regulation of night work 
by women), 12(2) (social security standards),  12(3) (progres-
sive raising  of social  security),  12(4)  (foreign nationals' 
social security rights). 
2.8 Conflict of laws 
Judge-made case law is the most important source of law in 
this field.  Three issues may be distinguished. 
1.  Jurisdiction.  This depends solely on procedure and not 
upon  nationality,  residence  or domicile.  So  far  as 
proceedings in the High  Court are concerned so long as 
a writ of summons has been served upon a person who 
is present within the jurisdiction, in accordance with the 
rules of procedure, he or she is subject to the power of 
the  court even  though  he or she  is  a  foreigner and 
despite the fact that the cause of action has no factual 
connection with England. This basic common law rule 
has been modified by Acts of Parliament and rules of 
court which give a discretionary power to a judge to 
authorise service of a writ of summons upon a defen-
dant abroad in certain cases (e.g. where a contract was 
made within the jurisdiction). 
2.  Choice of  law.  This depends on rules developed by the 
judges to  determine which  system of law governs a 
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contract or tort (delict) or other issue. The details can 
be found in specialist commentaries
20
• 
3.  Application of  statutes. An important feature of  judicial 
interpretation of statutes in  the  UK  is  that  the courts 
have refused to apply to statutes the ordinary criteria of 
private international  law.  In other words,  instead of 
regarding the territorial scope of statutes as being co-
terminous with the proper law of the contract, labour 
legislation has generally been confined in its operation 
to work done within the territorial boundaries of the 
UK. Most employment legislation is expressed to apply 
only to those employees who under their contracts of 
employment 'ordinarily work' in Great Britain. 
2.9 Hierarchy and interplay of sources 
There is no formal  hierarchy of sources in the UK,  except 
that  legislation may  override the common  law.  There is, 
however, a general principle of statutory interpretation that 
Parliament does not intend to interfere with common  law 
rights. This includes the presumptions that, in the absence of 
express words or necessary intendment, statutes are not to be 
interpreted so as to: 
(a)  restrict access to the ordinary courts; 
(b)  abrogate existing contractual rights; or 
(c)  deprive a person of property rights without compensat-
ion. 
The second and  third of these presumptions have led  UK 
courts  and  tribunals  to  give  narrow  interpretations  to 
Community  obligations  and  to  UK  statutes  on  working 
conditions. 
Because  legislation  has  developed  in  parallel  and  often 
independently of the common law contract of employment, 
the relationship between statutes and the contractual employ-
ment relationship is complex. Some statutory rights operate 
wholly outside the contract of employment (e.g. breach of 
the Health and Safety at Work etc.  Act 1974) may be subject 
to criminal prosecution or, in some cases, civil actions for 
breach of statutory duty in tort, but are the statutory duties 
are not  themselves  part of the  contract).  In  some  cases, 
statutory  and  contractual  rights  exist  side  by  side  (e.g. 
guarantee  payments  for  workless  days)  and  overlap  is 
avoided by provisions in the statutes for set-off of sums of 
money awarded under the statute against sums of money due 
under the contract, or by the creation of composite rights 
allowing the employee to  claim whichever right  is  more 
favourable.  Some recent legislation expressly provides that 
the rights created take effect as a compulsory clause of the 
contract (e.g. the equality clause in respect of equal pay for 
men and women). Yet other statutes are silent on this point, 
leaving it to courts and tribunals to decide whether or not 
rights arise under the contract. This has on occasion led to 
the employee being deprived of statutory protection (e.g. 
protection  from  unfair dismissal  is  lost  is  the contract  is 
tainted with illegality because of an agreement to defraud the 
Revenue). 
20.  For a brief account, see: B.A. HEPPLE  and S. FREDMAN,  Lahour 
Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain, Deventer, Kluwer, 
1986, pp. 68-72. 
CHAPTER Ill: INDUSTRIAL ACTION AND 
METHODS FOR  CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
3.1 The decline in strike activity since 1980 
In the 1980s and 1990s there has been a sharp decline in the 
incidence of strikes.  In  1994, only 278,000 working days 
(13 per 1,000 employees) were lost due to strikes, the lowest 
number since records began in  1891.  In  1995, there were 
slightly more days lost, 415,000 (19 per 1,000 employees), 
but this was still well below the peak of 29,474,000 in 1979 
(1,272 per  1,000 employees).  In 1994,  107,000 workers 
were  involved  and  in  1995,  174,000,  compared  with 
4,608,000 in  1979.  The very high number of days lost in 
1979  was  mainly  due  to  a  major  strike  by  engineering 
workers. In 1984 and 1985 a high number of days was lost 
due  the  miners'  strike.  Since  1990,  large  strikes  have 
become very infrequent. Strikes which last for longer than 3 
days are rare. Since the mid-1980s strikes about immediate 
workplace issues such  as  allocation of work, disciplinary 
measures  and  working  conditions  and  supervision,  have 
outnumbered strikes about pay issues.  As pointed out earlier, 
the United Kingdom did not have a formalised system of 
works councils for dealing with such issues, and the extent 
of shop  steward  organisation  at  the  workplace  has  been 
declining. 
The  lower  incidence  of strikes  is  due  to  many  causes, 
including: technological and structural changes, the changing 
composition of the  workforce,  leading  to  greater fragm-
entation; recession and declining employment in strike-prone 
industries notably mining, docks,  and car production; the 
reduction of inflation haswhich reduced pressures for higher 
wages; the decline of the power and status of trade unions; 
and new laws which have severely discouraged strikers and 
their unions. The effect of the requirements, introduced in 
the early  1980s,  for  pre-strike ballots is ambivalent.  The 
proportion of ballots in favour of strikes rose from 78% in 
1985-86 to  95%  in  1992
21
•  Yet most strike ballots do not 
result in action, because management, faced with the clear 
signal of solidarity, settles the dispute
22
•  The law has had a 
significant impact on secondary boycotts, secondary picket-
ing and sympathy strikes which have almost disappeared
23
• 
Despite the stringent imposition of responsibility on trade 
unions for authorised (i.e. official) industrial action, two-
thirds of  cases of  strike action by manual workers in 1989-90 
and well over nine out of ten cases of strikes by non-manual 
workers were made official by unions
24
• 
Since 1990, it has been possible to make selective dismissals 
of unofficial strikers, and  trade unions risk legal action if 
they organise solidarity strikes in support of such dismissed 
strikers. 
3.2 Other forms of industrial action 
In  addition to  all-out stoppages of work,  there are many 
other forms of  concerted pressure. These are not recorded in 
official statistics, but workplace surveys indicate that non-
21.  S.DUNN and D.METCALFE,  Trade  Union lAw since 1979, in: Con-
temporarty Industrial relations (ed. IAN J. BEARDWELL), p. 84. 
22.  J.ELGAR  and  B.SIMPSON,  in:  New  Perspectives  on  Industrial 
Disputes, (D. METCALF and S. MILNER eds) London, 1993. 
23.  N.MJLLWARD et al, WIRS 3, pp. 289-292. 
24.  Ibid.' p. 296. UNITED KINGDOM 
strike action is about twice as common as strikes, and has 
been  declining  more  slowly  than  strikes25•  Such  action 
includes bans on overtime working, go-slows, and 'working 
to contract'. 
3.3 Machinery for conflict resolution 
Most disputes in the UK are not processed through machinery 
provided by the state. They are settled informally through 
workplace procedures and joint industrial bodies. Parliament 
has encouraged the growth of voluntary procedures.  For 
example, employers of 20 or more employees are obliged to 
give  every  employee  a  note  specifying  disciplinary  and 
grievance procedures applicable to each employee
26
•  Another 
example, is that officers of ACAS (below) must have regard 
to  the desirability  of using  voluntary  procedures  before 
intervening in individual or collective disputes. There is a 
wide variety of  voluntary procedures. Most involve a series 
of stages, each with time limits, and if these fail to resolve 
a dispute the matter is then referred to an outside body or 
individual for conciliation,  mediation or arbitration.  The 
arrangements for arbitration usually envisage a joint rather 
than  unilateral  reference.  In  recent  years  there has  been 
increasing use in voluntary agreements of pendulum (last-
offer) arbitration. 
It is to be noted that in the UK the distinction, often found in 
other systems,  between disputes of right and  disputes of 
interest, has little practical relevance. The reason for this is 
to be found in the dynamic system of collective bargaining 
which has  traditionally been  characteristic of the  UK,  as 
distinct from the static or contractual method. Both forms of 
dispute  may  be  referred  to  conciliation  or  arbitration. 
Despite the shift in bargaining from national to company or 
workplace level in the private sector, decentralisation and 
contracting-out in the public sector, and the growth of single 
union agreements with arbitration clauses,  there does not 
appear to have been any greater use of a distinction between 
disputes of right and disputes of interest.  Disputes over 
statutory  rights  are  mainly  dealt  with  by  the  industrial 
tribunals. 
The Advisory,  Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), 
is the most important machinery provided by the state for 
dispute resolution. Since 1974, it has had the general duty to 
improve industrial relations, in particular by the settlement 
of 'trade disputes'. Originally it also had the specific duty to 
encourage the extension of collective bargaining  and  the 
development and reform of  collective bargaining machinery, 
but this objective was out of line with government policy 
after 1979, and was removed in 1993. ACAS took over from 
the (former) Department of Employment  the functions  of 
conciliation, arbitration and mediation. It is a tripartite body, 
which is independent from government and not subject to 
direction by Ministers; it is expected to act impartially. It 
does  not  have  powers  of compulsion.  ACAS  provides 
facilities for settling collective disputes by conciliation, at 
the request of  one or more of the parties or otherwise. ACAS 
involvement in such disputes was greater in the period of 
government  incomes  policies  than  at  present.  Each  year 
between 80% to 90% of cases completed by ACAS result in 
25.  See:  P.EDWARDS in:  Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in 
Britain, p. 443. 
26.  Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 3. 
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a  settlement or progress towards a settlement.  ACAS  may 
also, at the request of one or more of the parties to a dispute 
and with  the consent of all  of them,  refer the dispute to 
arbitration or mediation by one or more outside persons or 
to  the  Central  Arbitration  Committee  (CAC).  Mediation 
differs from conciliation because the mediator may  make 
positive recommendations, although the parties themselves 
must reach an agreement. Arbitration awards are not legally 
binding, unless the parties expressly agree in advance to this, 
but ACAS reminds parties that there is a longstanding practice 
of accepting awards. There has been a decline in recent years 
in ACAS  referrals to arbitration. ACAS  provides employers 
unions and workers with free advice on industrial relations; 
this occupies four times as many staff hours as collective 
conciliation. ACAS also has power to inquire into any ques-
tion relating to industrial relations, even where no dispute is 
in existence or pending. 
Another function  of ACAS  is  to  endeavour to  promote a 
settlement  of any  complaint  presented  to  an  industrial 
tribunal in respect of unfair dismissal, unlawful discrimina-
tion and certain other statutory rights.  This results in the 
settlement or withdrawal of a high percentage of complaints 
to tribunals. 
The Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) was established in 
1975 as a permanent tripartite arbitration panel maintained 
at state expense. It is the successor to the Industrial Court, 
established  in  1919 and  the  Industrial Arbitration Board 
(1975).  The CAC  is  not subject to  any directions from a 
Minister. With the consent of all the parties ACAS may refer 
a dispute to the CAC for arbitration. Only a small handful of 
cases is received each year under this voluntary jurisdiction. 
The CAC had a number of powers of compulsory arbitration 
when first created but these have been whittled away, so that 
it is now left only with the power to arbitrate in disputes 
over disclosure of information for bargaining which is little 
used in practice (and may be removed if overnment propos-
als made in  1996 are implemented). 
CHAPTER IV: THE NATIONAL SITUATION 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
4.1 Essential characteristics 
From the preceding account it can be seen that the regulation 
of working conditions in  the UK  has a number of unique 
characteristics  in  comparison  with  other Member States. 
Some of these may be summarised here. 
There is no institutionalised system of workers' representa-
tion and workers' participation in decision-making. 
Collective bargaining now determines the pay and terms of 
employment of less than 50%  of the workforce, and in any 
event rests upon voluntary recognition of trade unions by 
employers and  voluntary collective agreements which are 
usually presumed not to have contractual effect between the 
collective parties. 
There  is  a  relative  absence  of 'positive'  legal  rights  to 
support the voluntary system of collective bargaining and 
most  of the  'auxiliary'  props  to  the  system  have  been 
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Regulatory  legislation  which  directly  affects  working 
conditions is highly selective. 
There is an absence of entrenched constitutional civil 
and social rights. 
There is a weak system of  legal enforcement of individ-
ual  rights under collective agreements which are not 
treated as laying down compulsory minimum terms, nor 
is there any statutory mechanism for applying collective 
agreements to other employers in the industry. There is 
no right to  be  covered by a  collective agreement or 
similar arrangement. 
Statutes tend to specify in detail the circumstances in 
which they apply, and the courts tend to rely on a gen-
eral  presumption  that Parliament does  not  intend  to 
interfere with common law rights. 
4.2 The Community context 
The main thrust of the deregulatory policies of the former 
UK  Government was built around the weakening of trade 
unions and collective bargaining, through measures such as 
extensive privatisation of strongly-unionised public corpora-
tions and  local  authority services,  the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining  to  corporate and  plant  level  where 
unions are relatively weak in times of recession, and legisla-
tion which has severely restricted the freedom to organise, 
to bargain and  to strike.  In order to  fulfil  these policies 
various n.o Conventions and articles of the European Social 
Charter were denounced, regulation of working conditions 
at EC level opposed, the Community Charter of  Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers  was not signed,  and an opt-out 
from  the  Maastricht  Agreement  on  Social  Policy  was 
secured. The changes which will have to be made within the 
UK in order to make these proposals feasible will include: 
(1)  the revision of existing legislation to give full effect to 
existing Community obligations; 
(2)  the creation of more effective remedies for breach of 
Community obligations; 
(3)  the acceptance by the UK  of the spirit as well as the 
letter of such obligations; 
(4)  the establishment by law and practice of more effective 
machinery for workers' representation; 
(5)  the establishment of  a right of workers to be covered by 
collective agreements; 
(6)  a  general  right of workers' representatives to be  in-
formed and consulted about major changes in working 
conditions. 
The new UK government agreed at the Amsterdam Summit 
to participate in the Social Chapter and the new Employment 
Chapter,  recognizing  the importance of employment and 
social policies at European level, and meaning commitment 
to implement the measures so far adopted under the Agree-
ment, such as the European Works Council Directive, and 
the Parental Leave Directive. 
The Government has furthermore committed itself to: 
•  introduce legislation to institute a National Minimum 
Wage; 
•  introduce a statutory duty on employers to bargain with 
a trade union where 51 percent of the relevant workfor-
ce vote for this in a ballot; 
•  an Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Bill, with 
the aim to facilitate the resolution of complaints under 
employment rights law; 
•  support a Public Interest Disclosure Bill to give more 
effective protection against dismissal or other sanctions 
to  employees  who publicize  malpractices  which are 
against the public interest. European Commission 
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